Compare commits

..

No commits in common. "extract/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01" and "main" have entirely different histories.

7 changed files with 1 additions and 167 deletions

View file

@ -59,12 +59,6 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
Sanctum's Wonder proposal (2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota, created 2025-03-28, completed 2025-03-31) represents the first major test of Autocrat futarchy for strategic product direction rather than treasury operations. The team explicitly stated: 'Even though this is not a proposal that involves community CLOUD funds, this is going to be the largest product decision ever made by the Sanctum team, so we want to put it up to governance vote.' The proposal to build a consumer mobile app (Wonder) with automatic yield optimization, gasless transfers, and curated project participation failed despite team conviction backed by market comparables (Phantom $3B valuation, Jupiter $1.7B market cap, MetaMask $320M swap fees). This demonstrates Autocrat's capacity to govern strategic pivots beyond operational decisions, though the failure raises questions about whether futarchy markets discount consumer product risk or disagreed with the user segmentation thesis.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
The v0.1 upgrade made proposal duration configurable, changing the default from an unspecified longer period to 3 days explicitly to enable 'quicker feedback loops.' This confirms that the three-day window is a tunable parameter optimized for iteration speed rather than a fixed theoretical requirement.
---
Relevant Notes:

View file

@ -35,12 +35,6 @@ This pattern is general. Since [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token pri
- MetaDAO's current scale ($219M total futarchy marketcap) may be too small to attract sophisticated attacks that the removed mechanisms were designed to prevent
- Hanson might argue that MetaDAO's version isn't really futarchy at all — just conditional prediction markets used for governance, which is a narrower claim
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
The v0.1 migration introduced configurable proposal durations as a practical improvement over fixed parameters. The proposer noted they 'was unable to build this new program with solana-verifiable-build' due to unspecified reasons, accepting counterparty trust risk in exchange for shipping the upgrade faster. This demonstrates the production tradeoff between theoretical purity (verifiable builds) and operational velocity.
---
Relevant Notes:

View file

@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
- **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
- **2026-03-05** — [[insert-coin-labs-futardio-fundraise]] launched for Web3 gaming studio (failed, $2,508 / $50K = 5% of target)
- **2026-03-05** — [[git3-futardio-fundraise]] failed: Git3 raised $28,266 of $100K target (28.3%) before entering refunding status, demonstrating market filtering even with live MVP
- **2023-12-03** — First MetaDAO proposal using Autocrat v0.1 features (configurable proposal durations) submitted
## Competitive Position
- **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
- **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

View file

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
---
type: entity
entity_type: decision_market
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1"
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
proposal_date: 2023-12-03
resolution_date: 2023-12-13
category: "mechanism"
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
## Summary
This proposal upgraded MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation to v0.1, introducing configurable proposal slot durations with a new 3-day default (down from an unspecified longer period) to enable faster governance iteration. The migration transferred 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the v0.0 treasury to the v0.1 program's treasury.
## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
- **Proposal Account:** AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
- **DAO Account:** 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
- **Completed:** 2023-12-13
## Significance
This was MetaDAO's first major governance mechanism upgrade, establishing the pattern of iterative futarchy refinement. The shift to configurable and shorter proposal durations reflected a production learning: faster feedback loops matter more than theoretical purity in early-stage futarchy adoption.
The proposal also highlighted a key production tradeoff: the upgrade was deployed without verifiable builds due to unspecified constraints, accepting counterparty trust risk to ship the improvement faster. The proposer acknowledged this as temporary, noting future versions would use verifiable builds.
## Key Risks Acknowledged
- **Smart contract risk:** Potential bugs in v0.1 not present in v0.0 (assessed as low given limited code changes)
- **Counterparty risk:** Non-verifiable build required trust in proposer not introducing backdoors
## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] - first major mechanism upgrade
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - configurable duration feature
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] - verifiable build tradeoff

View file

@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
- **2024-03-02** — [[metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction]] passed: completed Dutch auction and liquidity provision, moving all protocol-owned liquidity to Meteora 1% fee pool
- **2025-01-27** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] proposed: Theia offers $500K for 370.370 META at 14% premium with 12-month vesting
- **2025-01-30** — [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] passed: Theia acquires 370.370 META tokens for $500,000 USDC
- **2023-12-03** — [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] proposed: upgrade to Autocrat v0.1 with configurable 3-day proposal windows and treasury migration (990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL)
- **2023-12-13** — [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] passed: Autocrat v0.1 deployed with faster governance iteration cycles
## Key Decisions
| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

View file

@ -6,14 +6,9 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9z
date: 2023-12-03
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: processed
status: unprocessed
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-11
enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "Governance proposal for mechanism upgrade. Primary output is decision_market entity. Two enrichments: one extending the Autocrat mechanism claim with configurable duration detail, one confirming the production tradeoffs claim with verifiable build example. No new claims—the insights strengthen existing mechanism design claims rather than introducing novel propositions."
---
## Proposal Details
@ -68,10 +63,3 @@ For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
- Autocrat version: 0
- Completed: 2023-12-13
- Ended: 2023-12-13
## Key Facts
- MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 made proposal slot duration configurable with 3-day default (2023-12-03)
- Treasury migration: 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, 5.5 SOL from v0.0 to v0.1 program
- Proposal passed and completed 2023-12-13
- v0.1 deployment used non-verifiable build due to unspecified constraints