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53
decisions/internet-finance/mtncapital-wind-down.md
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decisions/internet-finance/mtncapital-wind-down.md
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---
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type: decision
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "mtnCapital: Wind Down Operations"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[mtncapital]]"
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platform: metadao
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proposal_date: 2025-09
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resolution_date: 2025-09
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category: liquidation
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summary: "First MetaDAO futarchy-governed liquidation — community voted to wind down operations and return capital at ~$0.604/MTN redemption rate"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-20
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---
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# mtnCapital: Wind Down Operations
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## Summary
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The mtnCapital community voted via futarchy to wind down the fund's operations and return treasury capital to token holders. This was the **first futarchy-governed liquidation** on MetaDAO, preceding the Ranger Finance liquidation by approximately 6 months.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed (wind-down approved)
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- **Redemption rate:** ~$0.604 per $MTN
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- **Duration:** ~September 2025
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## Evidence: NAV Arbitrage in Practice
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Theia Research executed the textbook NAV arbitrage strategy:
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- Bought 297K $MTN at average price of ~$0.485 (below redemption value)
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- Voted for wind-down via futarchy
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- Redeemed at ~$0.604 per token
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- Profit: ~$35K
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This demonstrates the mechanism described in [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] working in reverse — the same arbitrage dynamics that prevent value extraction ALSO create a price floor at NAV. When token price < redemption value, rational actors buy and vote to liquidate, guaranteeing profit and enforcing the floor.
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@arihantbansal confirmed the mechanism works at small scale too: traded $100 in the pass market of the wind-down proposal, redeemed for $101 — "only possible with futarchy."
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## Manipulation Concerns
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@_Dean_Machine (Nov 2025) flagged potential exploitation: "someone has been taking advantage, going as far back as the mtnCapital raise, trading, and redemption." Whether this constitutes manipulation or informed arbitrage correcting a mispricing depends on whether participants had material non-public information about the wind-down timing.
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## Significance
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1. **Orderly liquidation is possible.** Capital returned through futarchy mechanism without legal proceedings or team absconding.
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2. **NAV floor is real.** The arbitrage opportunity (buy below NAV → vote to liquidate → redeem at NAV) was executed profitably.
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3. **Liquidation sequence.** mtnCapital (orderly wind-down, ~Sep 2025) → Hurupay (failed minimum, Feb 2026) → Ranger Finance (contested liquidation, Mar 2026) — three different failure modes, all handled through the futarchy mechanism.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[mtncapital]] — parent entity
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — NAV arbitrage is empirical confirmation
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- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — first live test
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — manipulation concerns test this claim
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@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ This mechanism proof connects to [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms
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The VC discount rejection case shows the mechanism working in practice: the market literally priced in 'we rejected the extractive deal' as positive (16% price surge), proving that conditional markets make minority exploitation unprofitable. The community rejected a deal that would have diluted their position, and the token price rewarded that decision.
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The VC discount rejection case shows the mechanism working in practice: the market literally priced in 'we rejected the extractive deal' as positive (16% price surge), proving that conditional markets make minority exploitation unprofitable. The community rejected a deal that would have diluted their position, and the token price rewarded that decision.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: X research — @jimistgeil, @arihantbansal, @donovanchoy, @nonstopTheo | Added: 2026-03-20*
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**NAV floor arbitrage (mtnCapital, ~Sep 2025).** The mtnCapital wind-down is the FIRST futarchy-governed liquidation, predating Ranger by ~6 months. When the fund failed to deploy capital successfully, futarchy governance enabled orderly wind-down with capital returned at ~$0.604/MTN. Theia Research executed the textbook NAV arbitrage: bought 297K $MTN at avg $0.485 (below redemption value), voted for wind-down, redeemed at $0.604 — profiting ~$35K. This confirms the conditional token arbitrage mechanism creates a price floor at NAV: when token price < redemption value, rational actors buy and vote to liquidate, guaranteeing profit and enforcing the floor. The mechanism works in both directions — preventing extraction (Ben Hawkins, VC discount rejection) AND creating orderly liquidation when projects fail (mtnCapital, Ranger). See [[mtncapital-wind-down]] for full decision record.
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---
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
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MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
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MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: X research — @jimistgeil, @arihantbansal, @donovanchoy, @TheiaResearch | Added: 2026-03-20*
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**mtnCapital: the FIRST liquidation, predating Ranger by ~6 months.** mtnCapital raised ~$5.76M via MetaDAO ICO (~Aug 2025) and was wound down via futarchy governance vote (~Sep 2025). Different failure mode than Ranger — no misrepresentation allegations, just failure to deploy capital successfully. The enforcement mechanism handled both cleanly: orderly wind-down, capital returned at ~$0.604/MTN. Theia Research profited ~$35K via NAV arbitrage (bought at $0.485, redeemed at $0.604). This changes the claim's framing: the description focuses on Ranger as "the first production test" but mtnCapital was actually first. The claim remains valid but the evidence base is now stronger with two independent liquidation cases plus one refund case: mtnCapital (orderly wind-down) → Hurupay (failed minimum, refund) → Ranger (contested misrepresentation). Confidence upgrade from `experimental` may be warranted. See [[mtncapital-wind-down]] for full decision record.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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Relevant Notes:
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75
entities/internet-finance/mtncapital.md
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entities/internet-finance/mtncapital.md
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: fund
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name: "mtnCapital"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: liquidated
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-20
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last_updated: 2026-03-20
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tags: [metadao, futarchy, ico, liquidation, fund]
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token_symbol: "$MTN"
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parent: "[[metadao]]"
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launch_date: 2025-08
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amount_raised: "$5,760,000"
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built_on: ["Solana"]
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---
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# mtnCapital
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## Overview
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mtnCapital was a futarchy-governed investment fund launched through MetaDAO's permissioned launchpad. It raised approximately $5.76M USDC, all locked in the DAO treasury. The fund was subsequently wound down via futarchy governance vote (~Sep 2025), making it the **first MetaDAO project to be liquidated** — predating the Ranger Finance liquidation by approximately 6 months.
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## Current State
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- **Status:** Liquidated (wind-down completed via futarchy vote, ~September 2025)
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- **Token:** $MTN (token_mint unknown)
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- **Raise:** ~$5.76M USDC (all locked in DAO treasury)
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- **Launch FDV:** Unknown — one source (@cryptof4ck) cites $3.3M but this is unverified and would imply a substantial discount to NAV at launch
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- **Redemption price:** ~$0.604 per $MTN
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- **Post-liquidation:** Token still traded with minimal volume (~$79/day as of Nov 2025)
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## ICO Details
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Launched via MetaDAO's permissioned launchpad (~August 2025). All $5.76M raised was locked in the DAO treasury under futarchy governance. Token allocation details unknown. This was one of the earlier MetaDAO permissioned launches alongside Avici, Omnipair, Umbra, and Solomon Labs.
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## Timeline
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- **~2025-08** — Launched via MetaDAO permissioned ICO, raised ~$5.76M USDC
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- **2025-08 to 2025-09** — Trading period. At times traded above NAV.
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- **~2025-09** — Futarchy governance proposal to wind down operations passed. Capital returned to token holders at ~$0.604/MTN redemption rate. See [[mtncapital-wind-down]] for decision record.
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- **2025-09** — Theia Research profited ~$35K via NAV arbitrage (bought at avg $0.485, redeemed at $0.604)
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- **2025-11** — @_Dean_Machine flagged potential manipulation concerns "going as far back as the mtnCapital raise, trading, and redemption"
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- **2026-01** — @AK47ven listed mtnCapital among 5/8 MetaDAO launches still green since launch
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- **2026-03** — @donovanchoy cited mtnCapital as first in liquidation sequence: "mtnCapital was liquidated and returned capital, then Hurupay, now (possibly) Ranger"
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## Significance
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mtnCapital is the **first empirical test of the unruggable ICO enforcement mechanism**. The futarchy governance system approved a wind-down, capital was returned to investors, and the process was orderly. This establishes that:
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1. **Futarchy-governed liquidation works in practice** — mechanism moved from theoretical to empirically validated
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2. **NAV arbitrage creates a price floor** — Theia bought below redemption value and profited, confirming the arbitrage mechanism
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3. **The liquidation sequence matters** — mtnCapital (orderly wind-down) → Hurupay (refund, didn't reach minimum) → Ranger (contested liquidation with misrepresentation) shows enforcement operating across different failure modes
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## Open Questions
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- What specifically triggered the wind-down? The fund raised $5.76M but apparently failed to deploy capital successfully. Details sparse.
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- @_Dean_Machine's manipulation concerns — was there exploitative trading around the raise/redemption cycle?
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- Token allocation structure unknown — what % was ICO vs team vs LP? This affects the FDV/NAV relationship.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] — parent entity, permissioned launchpad
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — mtnCapital liquidation is empirical confirmation of the NAV arbitrage mechanism
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- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — first live test of this enforcement mechanism
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — one of the earlier permissioned launches
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---
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Relevant Entities:
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- [[metadao]] — platform
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- [[theia-research]] — NAV arbitrage participant
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- [[ranger-finance]] — second liquidation case (different failure mode)
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-metadao-ico]] Active: ICO scheduled, targeting $6M raise at $15.5M FDV with Pine Analytics identifying 182x gross profit multiple concerns
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- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-metadao-ico]] Active: ICO scheduled, targeting $6M raise at $15.5M FDV with Pine Analytics identifying 182x gross profit multiple concerns
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- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-ico-march-2026]] Active: $6M ICO at $15.5M FDV scheduled on MetaDAO
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- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-ico-march-2026]] Active: $6M ICO at $15.5M FDV scheduled on MetaDAO
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- **2026-03-26** — [[metadao-p2p-me-ico]] Active: ICO launch targeting $15.5M FDV at 182x gross profit multiple
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- **2026-03-26** — [[metadao-p2p-me-ico]] Active: ICO launch targeting $15.5M FDV at 182x gross profit multiple
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- **2026-03-26** — [[p2p-me-metadao-ico-march-2026]] Active: ICO scheduled, targeting $6M at $15.5M FDV
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