rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond simple fundraising into complex economic mechanism design. COAL's treasury protocol implements a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing (c(y) license function), decay mechanics (4% daily tool degradation), and deterministic treasury accumulation (μ ORE per INGOT smelted). The proposal passed through futarchy governance with community discussion on Discord, showing the platform can coordinate sophisticated protocol upgrades, not just binary funding decisions. This represents MetaDAO projects using the platform for ongoing governance of live economic systems, not just initial capital formation.
+(extend) The COAL/Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's futarchy platform being used for operational protocol governance, not just fundraising. The proposal restructures COAL's entire economic model—moving mining power into tools, introducing INGOT smelting with ORE fees, implementing evergreen tool mechanics with decay and repair—all decided through futarchy markets. This shows the platform handling complex multi-parameter protocol changes with real economic stakes (ORE treasury accumulation, COAL emission distribution, tool crafting economics). The proposal passed 2025-11-10 and includes governance-adjustable parameters, suggesting MetaDAO supports ongoing protocol management through futarchy, not just one-time launch decisions.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-mining-systems.md

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's c(y) license function automatically scales mining tool creation costs with COAL/ORE price ratio, creating self-regulating supply without governance intervention"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Dynamic license fees create price-responsive supply throttle in token mining systems
-
-The Meta-PoW license mechanism implements a cubic price function c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^3 where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating automatic supply adjustment without requiring governance votes or manual intervention. When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license cost falls, making pickaxe crafting economically viable for more participants. This increases mining activity, INGOT demand, and ORE treasury inflow. When COAL weakens (y increases), license costs rise, throttling new tool creation and reducing system load.
-
-The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates strong sensitivity to price changes while the clamp bounds (c_min = 1, c_max = 300) prevent extreme values. With baseline c0 = 200 COAL and y_ref = 50, the function spans a 300x range across realistic price scenarios. The license is paid in COAL and burned, not sent to the treasury, making it a pure control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism.
-
-This differs from fixed emission schedules or governance-adjusted difficulty because the throttle responds continuously to market signals rather than predetermined curves or discretionary decisions. The EMA-smoothed TWAP for y prevents manipulation through short-term price spikes.
-
-## Evidence
-- License function: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, clamped between c_min and c_max
-- Suggested defaults: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300
-- Behavior: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
-- Control vs revenue: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
-- Price source: "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-tied-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-systems.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "License costs that scale exponentially with token price ratios automatically regulate new participant entry without requiring governance intervention"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dynamic license fees tied to price ratios create automatic supply throttling in token systems
+
+Meta-PoW implements a dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y) that adjusts based on the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating an automatic throttle on new mining capacity without requiring governance votes. The license formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p uses exponential scaling (suggested p = 3) to make the cost highly sensitive to relative token prices.
+
+With suggested defaults (c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL), the license cost responds dramatically to price movements. When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases below the reference ratio of 50), the license cost falls exponentially, making pickaxe crafting economically attractive and increasing mining capacity. When COAL weakens (y increases above 50), the license cost rises exponentially toward the 300 COAL cap, pricing out new entrants and stabilizing the system.
+
+The exponential exponent (p = 3) creates non-linear sensitivity. If y doubles from 50 to 100, the license cost increases by 8x (2^3). If y halves from 50 to 25, the license cost falls to 1/8th. This aggressive scaling prevents gradual drift—small price movements trigger meaningful economic responses.
+
+Critically, the license is paid in COAL and burned, not sent to the treasury. This makes it a pure control parameter rather than a revenue mechanism. The proposal states: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+
+The price ratio y = P_ORE / P_COAL is calculated using an EMA-smoothed TWAP (time-weighted average price) to prevent manipulation through short-term price spikes. This makes the throttle responsive to genuine market conditions while resistant to flash attacks.
+
+The system is self-stabilizing: when COAL is strong, low license costs attract miners, increasing INGOT demand and ORE inflow to the treasury, which strengthens ORE and raises y, which increases license costs and slows new entry. When COAL is weak, high license costs deter new miners, reducing sell pressure on COAL and allowing price recovery. The proposal explicitly describes this: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable... If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
+
+## Evidence
+- License formula: "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, Clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max"
+- Suggested parameters: "c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300"
+- Price calculation: "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
+- Control vs revenue: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+- Self-stabilizing behavior: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes liquid markets for both COAL and ORE with reliable price feeds. If either market is illiquid or manipulable, the TWAP can be gamed to artificially lower license costs. The exponential scaling (p = 3) is aggressive—if miscalibrated, it could create cliff effects where small price movements cause mass entry or exit. The clamping bounds (1-300 COAL) are governance parameters but untested at the extremes. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-sustained-demand-for-consumables.md

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Meta-PoW's 4-percent daily decay with cumulative repair costs makes tool maintenance economically rational over abandonment, ensuring continuous INGOT consumption"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Evergreen tool design with repair cheaper than replacement creates sustained demand for consumables
-
-Meta-PoW implements a decay-and-repair system where pickaxes lose 4% of their power daily if not maintained, but can always be restored by paying accumulated repair costs (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day). The daily repair cost (~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD) is calibrated to be cheaper than crafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license), making maintenance the economically rational choice for any tool that has been used.
-
-This creates fundamentally different demand dynamics than consumable tools or durability systems with permanent breakage. Instead of boom-bust cycles where users craft tools, use them until they break, then decide whether to re-enter, evergreen tools create continuous baseline demand. Once a pickaxe enters circulation, it generates ~0.083 INGOT of demand per day indefinitely, as long as mining remains profitable.
-
-The 4% decay rate is slow enough that missing a few days doesn't destroy value, but fast enough that extended abandonment significantly reduces tool power. This allows players to pause participation without losing their capital investment, while still creating economic pressure to maintain active tools. The cumulative repair cost for restoration means that tools left idle for extended periods require larger one-time payments to reactivate, creating a soft penalty for abandonment without permanent destruction.
-
-## Evidence
-- Decay mechanics: "If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
-- Repair vs recraft: "Repairing is cheaper than constantly recrafting. A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury."
-- Restoration: "If you decide to repair later, you pay the accumulated repair cost (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day) to restore full power"
-- Design intent: "Makes tools evergreen (no permanent break), Keeps a consistent economic choice (repair vs abandon and recraft), Avoids churn and keeps the system state stable"
-- Daily costs: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD for full repair
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-economics-with-decay-and-repair-prevents-churn-cycles-in-token-mining-systems.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Tools that decay gradually but remain repairable indefinitely create stable demand patterns versus disposable tools that cause boom-bust crafting cycles"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Evergreen tool economics with decay and repair prevents churn cycles in token mining systems
+
+Meta-PoW introduces an "evergreen" tool design where pickaxes (mining tools) never permanently break but decay by 4% per day if not maintained. Players can repair tools at any time by paying accumulated repair costs (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day), restoring full power. This creates a continuous maintenance economy rather than a replacement economy.
+
+The economic incentive structure makes repair cheaper than recrafting. Daily repair costs ~0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD to maintain full power (p = 1). Crafting a new pickaxe costs 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, and a dynamic COAL license fee c(y) that ranges from 1 to 300 COAL depending on price ratios. Since repair costs are roughly 1/12th the INGOT cost of crafting (0.082643 vs 1.0) and avoid the license fee entirely, rational players maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting.
+
+This design prevents the churn cycles that plague many mining token systems, where players craft tools during profitable periods and abandon them when margins compress, creating volatile demand for crafting materials and unstable treasury inflows. With evergreen tools, the decision to stop mining is separate from the decision to destroy capital—players can idle tools without losing their investment, then resume mining by paying catch-up repair costs.
+
+The 4% daily decay rate creates urgency without catastrophic loss. After 7 days of no maintenance, a tool retains ~73% power (0.96^7). After 30 days, ~29% power (0.96^30). This gradual degradation means short breaks don't destroy value, but extended abandonment makes the tool economically unviable to resurrect (accumulated repair costs exceed crafting a fresh tool). The system naturally retires tools that are genuinely abandoned while preserving those temporarily idled.
+
+The proposal explicitly states this goal: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it" and "This: Makes tools evergreen (no permanent break), Keeps a consistent economic choice (repair vs abandon and recraft), Avoids churn and keeps the system state stable."
+
+## Evidence
+- Decay mechanism: "If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
+- Repair vs recraft economics: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" for repair vs "1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL" for crafting
+- Catch-up repair: "If you decide to repair later, you pay the accumulated repair cost (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day) to restore full power"
+- Design intent: "Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable."
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes players can accurately forecast mining profitability and make rational repair-vs-abandon decisions. If COAL emissions become worthless relative to repair costs, players may abandon tools en masse despite the sunk cost, causing treasury inflow collapse. The 4% decay rate is governance-adjustable but untested—too slow and tools never retire, too fast and the system reverts to churn dynamics. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -34,12 +34,6 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-The Meta-PoW proposal illustrates the complexity challenge: the full specification includes multi-token interactions (COAL/ORE/INGOT/WOOD), dynamic pricing functions (c(y) with cubic exponent and EMA-smoothed TWAP), decay mechanics (4% daily with cumulative repair), and calibration targets (μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT, r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643). The proposal explicitly notes 'this proposal allows parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community,' suggesting that even after futarchy approval, the technical complexity requires expert implementation discretion. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve directional decisions on complex mechanisms, but the cognitive load of evaluating multi-parameter economic systems may limit pure market-based governance.
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accrual-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW model channels ORE into treasury through mandatory smelting fees paid when crafting INGOT, creating predictable revenue flow tied to mining activity"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW creates deterministic ORE treasury accrual through INGOT smelting fees
+
+The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a mechanical loop where all ORE paid into the system flows directly to the COAL treasury through a single choke point: INGOT smelting. To smelt 1 INGOT, users must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE per INGOT) to the treasury. Since INGOT is required for both crafting and repairing pickaxes (the mining tools that access COAL emissions), and pickaxes are designed to be maintained rather than constantly replaced, the system creates sustained demand for INGOT and therefore sustained ORE inflow.
+
+The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day flowing to the treasury per fully maintained pickaxe. With daily repair costs set at ~0.082643 INGOT per pickaxe, and repair being cheaper than recrafting (which costs 1 INGOT plus 8 WOOD plus a dynamic COAL license fee), rational players maintain their tools rather than churn them. This creates a stable relationship between active mining participants and treasury ORE accumulation.
+
+The model is self-regulating through the dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y), which adjusts based on the COAL/ORE price ratio. When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y = P_ORE / P_COAL decreases), the license cost falls, making pickaxe crafting more economically viable, which increases INGOT demand and accelerates ORE inflow. When COAL weakens, the license cost rises, throttling new pickaxe creation without breaking existing tools. The license formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p (with suggested defaults c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL) creates exponential sensitivity to price dynamics.
+
+This architecture differs from typical token economics by making the treasury accumulation mechanism deterministic rather than discretionary. Every unit of mining power added to the system has a calculable ORE cost, and the evergreen tool design (4% daily decay if not repaired, but repairable at any time by paying accumulated repair costs) prevents the boom-bust cycles that plague fixed-supply mining tokens.
+
+## Evidence
+- Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury" with "Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT"
+- Calibration target: "r_ing_total is set so that... A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury" with "Current calibration: r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day"
+- Self-regulation mechanism: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, More picks are economically viable, More smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury"
+- Evergreen tool design: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
+- Proposal passed 2025-11-10 on futardio
+
+## Challenges
+The model assumes rational player behavior (maintaining tools rather than abandoning them) and stable participation. If COAL/ORE price volatility exceeds the license curve's ability to throttle, the system could see either treasury depletion (if ORE becomes too expensive relative to mining rewards) or excessive dilution (if COAL strengthens too much). The calibration parameters are governance-adjustable but untested at scale. This is a single-source proposal with no live deployment data yet.
+
+---
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's Meta-PoW model channels ORE into treasury through mandatory smelting fees paid when creating INGOT, the crafting material for mining tools"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting fees
-
-The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a mechanical loop where all ORE inflow to the COAL treasury occurs at a single point: INGOT smelting. To smelt 1 INGOT, users must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE) directly to the treasury. Since INGOT is required for both crafting and repairing pickaxes (the mining tools that access COAL emissions), and pickaxes are designed to be cheaper to repair than recraft, the system creates sustained INGOT demand that translates to continuous ORE accumulation.
-
-The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day of treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe, with daily repair costs set at ~0.082643 INGOT. This creates a deterministic relationship between active mining participation and treasury growth, unlike discretionary fee models where revenue depends on voluntary transactions.
-
-The evergreen tool design reinforces this: pickaxes decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but can always be restored by paying accumulated repair costs. This makes abandonment economically irrational compared to maintenance, ensuring that once pickaxes enter circulation, they generate sustained INGOT demand rather than one-time crafting spikes.
-
-## Evidence
-- Smelting is the only point where ORE enters the system: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair."
-- Current calibration: μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT, with r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day for full repair
-- Design target: "A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury"
-- Evergreen mechanics: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "coal core team"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Restructures COAL mining economics to accumulate ORE in treasury through deterministic INGOT smelting fees and evergreen tool mechanics"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+Meta-PoW fundamentally restructures COAL's token economics by moving mining power from direct token emissions into craftable pickaxes, introducing INGOT as a crafting material that requires burning COAL plus paying ORE fees, and implementing evergreen tool mechanics with decay and repair. The model creates a deterministic loop where mining activity drives ORE accumulation in the COAL treasury through mandatory smelting fees, with dynamic license costs that automatically throttle new capacity based on COAL/ORE price ratios.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** COAL core team
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
+- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+
+## Key Mechanisms
+1. **INGOT Smelting:** To craft 1 INGOT, users burn 100 COAL and pay ~12.10 ORE to treasury. All ORE enters system only through smelting.
+2. **Evergreen Tools:** Pickaxes decay 4% daily if not repaired but can be restored by paying accumulated repair costs (~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per day). Repair is cheaper than recrafting (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + dynamic license fee).
+3. **Dynamic License:** Pickaxe crafting requires burning c(y) COAL where c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300, with y = P_ORE/P_COAL. License cost rises exponentially when COAL weakens, throttling new capacity.
+4. **Treasury Calibration:** System targets ~1 ORE/day flowing to treasury per fully maintained pickaxe.
+
+## Significance
+This proposal demonstrates futarchy governance applied to complex operational protocol economics, not just binary launch decisions. The multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with interdependent mechanics and governance-adjustable parameters shows futarchy handling ongoing protocol management. The deterministic treasury accrual mechanism through mandatory smelting fees creates a novel "ownership coin" model where mining activity directly funds the treasury through unavoidable ORE payments.
+
+The evergreen tool design with decay and repair prevents boom-bust crafting cycles common in mining tokens, while the exponential license fee scaling creates automatic supply throttling without governance intervention. The proposal explicitly allows core team parameter adjustments before launch based on community feedback, suggesting a hybrid governance model where futarchy approves architecture but implementation details remain flexible.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[coal]] - protocol governance decision
+- [[futardio]] - governance platform
+- [[ore]] - treasury asset
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - demonstrates operational governance use case
+- [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale]] - extends to protocol economics management

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "COAL: Meta-PoW Treasury Protocol"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "coal project"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_date: 2025-11-07
-resolution_date: 2025-11-10
-category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Implements Meta-PoW economic model with deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting fees and dynamic license-based supply throttle"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# COAL: Meta-PoW Treasury Protocol
-
-## Summary
-The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a multi-token economic system for COAL that accumulates ORE in the treasury through mandatory smelting fees. Players burn COAL and pay ORE to create INGOT, which is required for crafting and repairing pickaxes (mining tools). The system includes a dynamic license fee c(y) that scales with COAL/ORE price ratio, creating automatic supply throttling without governance intervention. Tools are evergreen with 4% daily decay and cumulative repair costs, making maintenance cheaper than replacement and ensuring sustained INGOT demand.
-
-## Market Data
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** coal project
-- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
-
-## Mechanism Design
-- **Treasury Accumulation:** μ ORE per INGOT (calibrated at ~12.10 ORE), paid only at smelting
-- **Dynamic License:** c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^3, where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (defaults: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3)
-- **Tool Economics:** Daily repair ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD, 4% decay if skipped
-- **Target:** ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe
-
-## Significance
-This proposal demonstrates futarchy governance of complex economic mechanisms beyond simple funding decisions. The multi-token system with dynamic pricing, decay mechanics, and deterministic treasury flows represents sophisticated protocol design coordinated through conditional markets. The proposal explicitly allows core team parameter adjustment based on community feedback, showing the boundary between futarchy approval and technical implementation.
-
-## Relationship to KB
-- [[futardio]] - governance decision
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]

entities/internet-finance/futardio.md

@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
-- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-treasury-protocol]] passed: Implemented Meta-PoW economic model with deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting fees and dynamic c(y) license throttle
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md", "dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-mining-systems.md", "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-creates-sustained-demand-for-consumables.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accrual-through-ingot-smelting-fees.md", "evergreen-tool-economics-with-decay-and-repair-prevents-churn-cycles-in-token-mining-systems.md", "dynamic-license-fees-tied-to-price-ratios-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-systems.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md", "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about deterministic treasury accumulation, dynamic supply throttling, and evergreen tool economics. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal. Enriched existing MetaDAO and futarchy friction claims with evidence of complex mechanism governance. Source contains detailed technical specification with governance-tunable parameters."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 novel mechanism claims about deterministic treasury accrual, evergreen tool economics, and dynamic license throttling. Enriched 2 existing claims about futarchy governance scope. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated COAL entity timeline. Source contains detailed token economics with governance-adjustable parameters—all key numerical facts preserved in key_facts for reference."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -274,11 +274,14 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens with halving bands every 5% of supply (1,250,000 COAL)
-- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
-- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL burned + μ ORE to treasury (μ ≈ 12.10 ORE)
-- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
-- Axe crafting: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD, produces w0 WOOD/day (3-5 range)
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 with halving bands every 5% of supply (1,250,000 COAL)
+- Initial daily emissions: 11,250 COAL/day, halving by band index k_t
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL burned + ~12.10 ORE to treasury
+- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license (1-300 range)
+- Daily repair cost: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per pickaxe
+- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired (p_next = 0.96 * p)
+- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD, repair: ~0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
+- License formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300 COAL, y = P_ORE/P_COAL via EMA-smoothed TWAP
 - Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
 - DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- GUI planned: minechain.gg for mining, smelting, chopping, crafting