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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7KkoRGyvzhvzKjxuPHjyxg77a52MeP6axy
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proposal_date: 2024-06-08
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resolution_date: 2024-06-11
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category: "grants"
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summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club targeting 5% FDV increase through student engagement"
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summary: "Allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens to University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to foster collaboration and attract talent"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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@ -19,22 +19,21 @@ created: 2026-03-11
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# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
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## Summary
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Proposal to allocate 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to $1,300 USDC at proposal time) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club's 200 members. The proposal set a success condition requiring a 5% increase in The Dean's List DAO's fully diluted valuation (from $115,655 to $121,438) measured over a 5-day trading period. The proposal passed, indicating market belief that student engagement would drive sufficient value creation.
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This proposal allocated 1 million $DEAN tokens (equivalent to 1,300 USDC at the time) to the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club to strengthen partnership, attract skilled talent from their 200-member base, and increase participation in Dean's List DAO governance. The proposal passed with a condition that the partnership should result in a 5% increase in the DAO's fully diluted valuation.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days
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- **Token Allocation:** 1,000,000 $DEAN (~$1,300 USDC)
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- **Target FDV Increase:** 5% ($5,783)
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- **Estimated ROI:** $4.45 per dollar spent
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- **Trading Period:** 5 days (2024-06-08 to 2024-06-11)
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- **Token Allocation:** 1 million $DEAN (~1,300 USDC)
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- **DAO FDV at Proposal:** $115,655
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- **Required FDV Increase:** $5,783 (5%)
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- **Projected ROI:** $4.45 per dollar spent
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation where the market prices the expected value of community partnerships. The proposal's economic model explicitly calculated per-student value contribution ($28.915 per student across 200 members) and required the partnership to generate measurable FDV growth. The passing outcome suggests market participants believed university blockchain club engagement could drive token value through increased participation, governance contribution, and ecosystem development.
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The proposal also illustrates how futarchy handles subjective value propositions (community building, talent pipeline) by requiring them to manifest as measurable token price impact.
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This proposal demonstrates futarchy-governed grant allocation with explicit performance conditions tied to measurable outcomes (FDV increase). The proposal framed university partnership as a talent acquisition strategy with quantified expected returns, treating educational outreach as an investment rather than charitable spending. The 200-student club represented potential governance participation and ecosystem contribution that the market deemed worth the token allocation.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[deans-list]] - parent organization governance decision
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- [[deans-list]] - governance decision for talent acquisition
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- [[futardio]] - platform used for decision market
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used (5-day window variant)
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used
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