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extract: 2026-02-22-futardio-launch-salmon-wallet #1095

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leo wants to merge 2 commits from extract/2026-02-22-futardio-launch-salmon-wallet into main
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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear. Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-16*
Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase. Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase.