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extract: 2026-03-05-futardio-launch-areal-finance #1163

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leo wants to merge 2 commits from extract/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-areal-finance into main
pull from: extract/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-areal-finance
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domains/internet-finance/areal-proposes-unified-rwa-liquidity-through-index-token-aggregating-yield-across-project-tokens.md
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@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ Areal Finance launched on Futardio with $50k target, raising only $1,350 before
---
Topics:
- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
- domains/internet-finance/_map

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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
*Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
*Source: 2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
*Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-16*
Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes.