extract: metadao-proposals-16-30 #1706

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@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cos
--- ---
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[metadao-proposals-16-30]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
Proposal 16 notes 'Reclaimable rent: you will now be able to get back the ~4 SOL used to create OpenBook proposal markets. This should lower the friction involved in creating proposals.' The v0.2 upgrade added rent reclamation for CLOB markets, confirming that orderbook storage creates significant cost friction (~4 SOL = ~$600 at 2024 prices) that AMM-based futarchy would eliminate.
Relevant Notes: Relevant Notes:
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
- metadao.md - metadao.md

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@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ Coal DAO executed a one-time supply increase from 21M to 25M tokens (19% increas
--- ---
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[metadao-proposals-16-30]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
Proposal 27 proposed migrating to a new token with 'supply sovereignty by giving MetaDAO governance ownership over the token program, which it currently does not have' and 'allow MetaDAO to expand the META supply through its futarchy-driven governance.' The proposal argued this enables 'becoming future-proof means embracing the unknown unknowns, which may create a need to mint tokens into the future for reasons that have yet to reveal themselves.' Market rejected it at 2.4%, but the proposal's existence confirms the constraint that fixed-supply tokens create operational limitations for futarchy DAOs.
Relevant Notes: Relevant Notes:
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — unit bias was a compounding problem that mintability and token splits address - [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — unit bias was a compounding problem that mintability and token splits address
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — Squads vault adoption in META migration is another data point for this convergence - [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — Squads vault adoption in META migration is another data point for this convergence

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@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ Phonon Studio AI raised $88,888 target but ended in 'Refunding' status within on
--- ---
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[metadao-proposals-16-30]] | Added: 2026-03-23*
Proposal 21 (Futardio memecoin launchpad) failed at 2.1% TWAP despite potential for 'driving attention and usage to futarchy.' The proposal explicitly acknowledged 'potential pitfalls' including 'makes futarchy look less serious' and 'may make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations.' Market rejected it, then Proposal 29 (general launchpad for futarchy DAOs) passed at 25.9%, suggesting the market distinguished between memecoin-specific and general-purpose launchpad reputational risk.
Relevant Notes: Relevant Notes:
- futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility - futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility
- MetaDAO - MetaDAO

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
{
"rejected_claims": [
{
"filename": "futarchy-conditional-token-merging-solves-liquidity-fragmentation-across-concurrent-proposals.md",
"issues": [
"missing_attribution_extractor"
]
},
{
"filename": "futarchy-pass-threshold-reduction-increases-proposal-success-rate-by-lowering-market-confidence-requirement.md",
"issues": [
"missing_attribution_extractor"
]
},
{
"filename": "convex-founder-compensation-with-market-cap-milestones-creates-superlinear-alignment-by-rewarding-exponential-value-creation.md",
"issues": [
"missing_attribution_extractor"
]
}
],
"validation_stats": {
"total": 3,
"kept": 0,
"fixed": 9,
"rejected": 3,
"fixes_applied": [
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"convex-founder-compensation-with-market-cap-milestones-creates-superlinear-alignment-by-rewarding-exponential-value-creation.md:stripped_wiki_link:time-based-token-vesting-is-hedgeable-making-standard-lockup"
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]
},
"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
"date": "2026-03-23"
}

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@ -5,10 +5,14 @@ title: "MetaDAO Proposals 16-30 — Full Proposal Text"
date: 2026-03-23 date: 2026-03-23
domain: internet-finance domain: internet-finance
format: governance-document format: governance-document
status: unprocessed status: enrichment
proposed_by: "@m3taversal" proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
contribution_type: research-direction contribution_type: research-direction
tags: [metadao, governance, proposals, decision-markets] tags: [metadao, governance, proposals, decision-markets]
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-23
enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md", "futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md", "amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
--- ---
# MetaDAO Proposals 16-30 # MetaDAO Proposals 16-30
@ -969,3 +973,30 @@ At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right t
We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO
## Key Facts
- MetaDAO Proposal 16 passed with unspecified volume and trade count
- MetaDAO Proposal 17 appears to be a mistake/null proposal that failed
- MetaDAO Proposal 18 had 22.6k volume and 65 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 19 had 14.2k volume and 49 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 20 had 30.2k volume and 79 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 21 had 511.1k volume and 1.3k trades (highest volume in this set)
- MetaDAO Proposal 22 had 74.2k volume and 233 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 23 had 285.7k volume and 763 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 24 had unspecified volume
- MetaDAO Proposal 25 had 86k volume and 264 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 26 had 21.9k volume and 97 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 27 had 40.2k volume and 134 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 28 had 52k volume and 208 trades
- MetaDAO Proposal 29 had 89.1k volume and 212 trades
- MetaDAO's expected annualized burn rate as of August 2024 was $1.378M
- MetaDAO's Q3 2024 roadmap included hiring 3 engineers at $190k/year each, $300k for audits, $80k/year for office space, $150k/year for growth person, and $100k/year for administrative expenses
- MetaDAO treasury held approximately $2.2M USDC as of October 2024
- MetaDAO v0.2 upgrade reduced minimum META lot sizes from 1 META to 0.1 META
- MetaDAO v0.2 upgrade changed TWAP increments from 1% to $5 fixed increments
- MetaDAO v0.2 upgrade set default TWAP value to $100 instead of $1
- MetaDAO v0.2 upgrade requires proposals to have markets open minimum 10 days to allow rent retrieval
- Proph3t and Nallok estimated their reservation wages at $250,000/year
- Proph3t estimated his probability of MetaDAO success at 10% and effort cost utility at 1.7 (equivalent to $3M)
- Nallok estimated his probability of MetaDAO success at 20% and effort cost utility at 3 (equivalent to $10M)