rio: decision records batch 2 — backfill 10 proposals with full text #1747
10 changed files with 879 additions and 301 deletions
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@ -5,60 +5,99 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW"
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platform: metadao
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proposer: "Proph3t, Nallok"
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proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW"
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proposal_date: 2024-03-26
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resolution_date: 2024-03-31
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category: "strategy"
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summary: "Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders with authority over retroactive compensation, business operations, and contributor compensation for three months to accelerate decision-making."
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category: operations
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summary: "Proposal 14 (Autocrat v0.1) — Appoint Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M (Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months). 1,015 META + $100K USDC for 7 months of compensation (4 retro, 3 forward). OKR: 10 GitHub issues/week."
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key_metrics:
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compensation_requested_meta: 1015
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compensation_requested_usdc: 100000
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retroactive_months: 4
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forward_months: 3
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estimated_success_impact: "-20% if failed"
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proposal_number: 14
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proposal_account: "BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW"
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autocrat_version: "0.1"
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budget: "1,015 META + $100,000 USDC"
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term: "March 26 - June 30, 2024"
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tags: [metadao, governance, benevolent-dictator, operations, passed]
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-24
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---
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# MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
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## Summary
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This proposal appointed Proph3t and Nallok as Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M) to address MetaDAO's slow execution speed caused by a costly and time-consuming proposal process. The appointment covered retroactive compensation for December-March and forward compensation for April-June, totaling 1015 META and 100,000 USDC.
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## Summary & Connections
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
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- **Resolution:** 2024-03-31
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- **Proposal Number:** 14
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**Proposal 14 (Autocrat v0.1) — emergency executive authority via futarchy.** Appoint Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M to make key decisions outside the (then-slow) proposal process. 1,015 META + $100K USDC for 7 months: 4 retroactive (Dec-Mar) + 3 forward (Apr-Jun). OKR: 10 GitHub issues/week. "This proposal failing would decrease the probability of MetaDAO's success by more than 20%."
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## Scope of Authority
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The BDF3M role granted Proph3t and Nallok authority over:
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- Retroactive compensation for all contributions prior to the proposal
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- Business operations including off-chain proposal process management, project management, expenses, and security improvements
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- Current contributor compensation including incentive-based components
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- Exceptional use grants for MetaDAO's code licenses
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- Monthly community updates
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**Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-31). Term ran through June 30, 2024.
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## Compensation Structure
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- **Total:** 1015 META + 100,000 USDC
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- **Period:** 7 months (4 retroactive + 3 forward)
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- **Average:** 145 META + $14,000 per month
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- **Distribution:** From multisigs rather than DAO treasury directly
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- **Vesting:** META likely issued in 5-year locked form
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**Connections:**
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- This is futarchy governing its own governance — the market decided that the futarchy process was too slow and appointed executives to bypass it temporarily. Meta-level evidence for the mechanism's self-awareness.
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- "The current proposal process is too slow and costly" — this friction later led to the AMM upgrade ([[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]]) and Autocrat v0.2 ([[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02]]) which reduced proposal duration to 3 days
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- The BDF3M structure (time-limited authority, explicit OKRs, market-revocable) is evidence for [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]]
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- Compensation: ~145 META + $14K/month average — establishes the early comp baseline before the convex payout system ([[metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok]])
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- Retroactive compensation for Dec-Mar contributors including who isn't named — shows the DAO was operating informally before formalizing
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## OKRs
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- Execute faster: Complete 10 GitHub issues per week
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- Handle retroactive compensation within 1 week of passage
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- Oversee new landing page creation
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- Perform operations compensation for April-June
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---
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## Significance
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This proposal represented a critical governance transition where MetaDAO temporarily centralized decision-making authority to overcome execution bottlenecks. The proposers estimated that failure would decrease MetaDAO's success probability by over 20%, framing this as an existential decision point. The three-month term was designed as a bridge until futarchy could function autonomously or another governance structure could be established.
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## Full Proposal Text
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### Entrepreneur(s)
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Proph3t, Nallok
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### Overview
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Today, MetaDAO is not executing as fast as a normal startup would. At the crux of this is that *the current proposal process is too slow and costly*. We can and will fix that, but in the short-term we need some of MetaDAO's key decisions to be made outside of the proposal process.
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This proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok to be Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M). Their term would be from the finalization of this proposal to June 30th. At that point, either the futarchy will be able to function autonomously or another proposal will need to be raised.
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We are requesting 1015 META and 100,000 USDC to handle 4 months of retroactive compensation (December - March) and 3 months of forward-looking compensation (April - June). So an average of 145 META and $14,000 per month.
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Given that this is a critical juncture in MetaDAO's timeline, we believe that this proposal failing would decrease the probability of MetaDAO's success by more than 20%.
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### OKRs
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**Execute faster**
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- Complete 10 issues on GitHub per week
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**Handle business operations**
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- Perform retroactive compensation for the months of December, January, February, and March within 1 week of the proposal passing
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- Perform operations compensation for April, May, and June
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- Oversee the creation of a new kickass landing page
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### Project
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If passed, this proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders. The following would fall under their domain:
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- Retroactive compensation for all contributions to MetaDAO prior to this proposal
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- Managing ongoing business operations, including:
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- Steering the off-chain proposal process, including providing proposal and communication guidelines for proposers and compensating proposers when appropriate
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- Steering MetaDAO-wide project management
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- Handling any expenses or required activities required to operate effectively
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- Improving the security and efficacy of the core futarchy mechanism
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- Providing monthly updates to the MetaDAO community
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- Compensation for current contributors, including the incentive-based part
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The proposal would also allow Nallok or Proph3t to make exceptional use grants for MetaDAO's code licenses.
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For technical reasons, no META nor USDC would come directly from the DAO's treasury. It would instead come from various multisigs.
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Although we make no hard commitments, the META would likely be issued in 5-year locked form.
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---
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `BqMrwwZYdpbXNsfpcxxG2DyiQ7uuKB69PznPWZ33GrZW`
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- Proposal number: 14
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- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
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- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-03-31
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] - governance decision establishing temporary centralized leadership
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- [[proph3t]] - appointed as BDF3M
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- [[nallok]] - appointed as BDF3M
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- [[futardio]] - platform where proposal was executed
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- [[metadao]] — parent entity
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- [[metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok]] — the long-term comp that followed this interim arrangement
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- [[proph3t]] — appointed BDF3M
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- [[nallok]] — appointed BDF3M
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- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — BDF3M is the clearest example
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@ -4,46 +4,95 @@ entity_type: decision_market
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name: "MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-11
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "doctor.sol & rar3"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
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platform: metadao
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proposer: "doctor.sol, rar3"
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proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
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proposal_date: 2024-03-03
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resolution_date: 2024-03-08
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category: treasury
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summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
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tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
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summary: "Proposal 11 — Burn 979,000 of 982,464 treasury META to reduce FDV and attract investors. Treasury from ~$860M FDV to ~$18M FDV. Community-authored, not team. Explicitly does not cap supply — mintable token migration discussed."
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key_metrics:
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proposal_number: 11
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proposal_account: "ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
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autocrat_version: "0.1"
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meta_burned: "979,000 META"
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treasury_before: "982,464 META"
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treasury_after: "~4,500 META + $2M META-USDC LP"
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meta_price_at_proposal: "$880/META"
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tags: [metadao, burn, treasury, fdv, tokenomics, passed]
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-24
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---
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# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
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## Summary
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Proposal to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens (~979,000 of 982,464) to significantly reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation. Passed on Autocrat v0.1. The high FDV was perceived as discouraging investors and limiting participation in the futarchy experiment. Post-burn treasury: ~4,500 META valued at ~$4M plus ~$2M in META-USDC LP at the time ($880/META). Total META supply after burn: ~20,885.
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## Summary & Connections
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-08)
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- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
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- **Key participants:** doctor.sol & rar3 (authors), Proph3t (executor)
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**Proposal 11 — radical treasury restructuring.** Burn 979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META (~99.3%) to reduce perceived FDV from ~$860M to ~$18M. Community-authored (doctor.sol & rar3, not the team). Explicitly states this does not permanently cap supply — mintable token model discussed.
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## Significance
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One of the most consequential early MetaDAO governance decisions. The burn fundamentally changed MetaDAO's token economics — eliminating the treasury's ability to pay in META and forcing future operations to use USDC or market-purchase META. This created a natural scarcity signal but also meant the DAO would eventually need mintable tokens (which the proposal explicitly noted as a future possibility). The burn set the stage for the later token split and elastic supply debates.
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**Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-08). META price was ~$880/token at proposal time.
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The proposal also reveals early futarchy dynamics: community members (not founders) proposed a radical tokenomics change, and the market approved it. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] — governance decision, treasury management
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- [[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]] — demonstrates market-governed treasury decisions
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- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — burn as extreme active management
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- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this burn directly created the conditions that made mintable tokens necessary
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**Connections:**
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- This is the most aggressive treasury action in MetaDAO's history — burning 99.3% of treasury tokens. The market approved it, demonstrating futarchy can make radical structural decisions
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- The FDV perception problem ("high FDV discourages investors and participants") is exactly the friction documented in [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
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- The explicit note about mintable token migration is prescient — the treasury later exhausted via Theia OTC ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]]) and required token migration, validating [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]]
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- Community-authored proposals (not team) passing shows the futarchy mechanism isn't team-captured — external participants can propose radical changes and the market evaluates them on merit
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---
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Relevant Entities:
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- [[metadao]] — parent organization
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- [[proph3t]] — executor
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## Full Proposal Text
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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### Authors
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doctor.sol & rar3
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### Overview
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Burn ~99.3% (979,000) of treasury-held META tokens to significantly reduce the FDV, with the goal of making META more appealing to investors and enhancing community engagement.
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### Background
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The META DAO is currently perceived to have a high Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) due to the substantial amount of META tokens in the treasury, approximately 985,000 tokens. This high FDV often discourages potential investors and participants from engaging with META, as they may perceive the investment as less attractive right from the start.
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### Issue at Hand
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The primary concern is that the high FDV and treasury leads to the following problems:
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1. **It encourages the use of META for expenses.**
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2. **It lowers the attractiveness of META as an investment opportunity** at face value.
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3. **It reduces the number of individuals willing to participate** in this futarchy experiment.
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While a high FDV can deter less informed community members, which has its benefits, it also potentially wards off highly valuable community members who could contribute positively.
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### Proposed Solution
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We propose burning approximately ~99.3% of the META tokens (99,000 tokens) currently held in the DAO's treasury. This action is aimed at achieving the following outcomes:
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- **Elimination of Treasury META Payments**: Reduces the propensity to utilize $META from the treasury for proposal payments, promoting a healthier economic framework.
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- **Market-Based Token Acquisition**: Future requirements for $META tokens will necessitate market purchases, fostering demand and enhancing token value.
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- **Prioritization of $USDC and Revenue**: Shifting towards $USDC payments and focusing on revenue generation marks a move towards financial sustainability and robustness.
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- **Confidence Boost in META**: By significantly reducing the supply of META tokens, we signal a strong commitment to the token's value, potentially leading to increased interest and participation in prop 10 execution.
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- **Attracting a Broader Community**: Lowering the FDV makes META more attractive at face value, inviting a wider range of participants.
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### Rundown of Numbers
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- **Current Treasury:** 982,464 META tokens
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- **After Burning:** 3,464 META tokens
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- **Post-Proposition 10:** An expected 1,000 META tokens should be added back from multisig after prop 10, ranging anywhere from 0 to 3,000 META.
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- **Final Treasury:** After burning, the treasury would have around 4,500 META, valued at $4 million, plus $2 million in META-USDC LP at today's price $880/META.
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- **Total META supply:** 20,885
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### Note
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Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a mintable token model, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
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---
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU`
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- Proposal number: 11
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- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
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- Proposer: `Pr11UFzumi5GXoZVtnFHDpB6NiWM3XH57L6AnKzXyzD`
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-03-08
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[metadao]] — parent entity
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — the FDV perception problem this addresses
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- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — prophetically discussed in the "Note" section
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@ -4,51 +4,133 @@ entity_type: decision_market
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name: "MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-11
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parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "Proph3t & Nallok"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG"
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platform: metadao
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proposer: "Proph3t, Nallok"
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proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG"
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proposal_date: 2024-05-27
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resolution_date: 2024-05-31
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category: hiring
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summary: "Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028"
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tags: ["futarchy", "compensation", "founder-incentives", "mechanism-design"]
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summary: "Proposal 2 (Autocrat v0.3) — Convex payout: 2% of token supply per $1B market cap up to 10% at $5B. $90K/year salary each. 4-year cliff to April 2028. 22.6K volume, 65 trades, +29.6% TWAP spread."
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key_metrics:
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proposal_number: 2
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proposal_account: "BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG"
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autocrat_version: "0.3"
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volume: "$22,600"
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trades: 65
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twap_spread: "+29.6%"
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tags: [metadao, compensation, founder-incentives, convex-payout, passed]
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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last_updated: 2026-03-24
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---
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# MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
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## Summary
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The founders proposed a convex performance-based compensation package: 2% of token supply per $1 billion market cap increase, capped at 10% (1,975 META each) at $5B. Fixed salary of $90K/year each. Four-year cliff — no tokens unlock before April 2028 regardless of milestones. DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024. The $1B market cap benchmark was defined as $42,198 per META (allowing for 20% dilution post-proposal).
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## Summary & Connections
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The proposal included explicit utility calculations using expected value theory: Nallok requires $361M success payout to rationally stay (20% success probability estimate), Proph3t requires $562M (10% success probability). This drove the 10% allocation at $5B market cap (~$500M payout each).
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**Proposal 2 (Autocrat v0.3) — founder compensation via convex payout system.** 2% of token supply per $1B market cap increase, up to 10% at $5B. $90K/year salary each. No tokens unlock before April 2028. DAO clawback until December 2024. $22.6K volume, 65 trades, passed at +29.6% TWAP spread.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-05-31)
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- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
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- **Key participants:** Proph3t (architect/mechanism designer), Nallok (operations manager)
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**Outcome:** Passed (2024-05-31).
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## Significance
|
||||
This is the first real-world example of futarchy-governed founder compensation. The mechanism design is sophisticated: convex payouts align incentives with exponential growth, the 4-year cliff signals long-term commitment, and the clawback provision creates accountability.
|
||||
|
||||
The explicit utility calculation in the proposal is remarkable — founders openly modeled their reservation wages, success probabilities, and effort costs, then derived the compensation that makes maximum effort rational. Proph3t estimated only 10% success probability, making his required payout higher than Nallok's despite both receiving equal allocation. This transparency is the opposite of typical startup compensation negotiations.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal also honestly acknowledges centralization: "If Nallok and I walk away, probability of success drops by at least 50%." Futarchy governed the compensation decision, but the organization remained founder-dependent — the market approved this rather than pretending otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — founder compensation structure
|
||||
- [[performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution]] — direct implementation of this mechanism
|
||||
- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — performance-based rather than fixed allocation
|
||||
- [[time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked]] — this proposal uses milestone vesting instead of time-based, partially addressing the hedging problem
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The convex payout structure is the most sophisticated compensation mechanism in any MetaDAO proposal — utility-theory-based design with explicit reservation wage calculations, probability-weighted expected value, and game-theoretic justification
|
||||
- "If Nallok and I walk away, its probability of success drops by at least 50%" — honest framing of founder dependence that makes the decentralization argument harder. Relevant to [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]] — the compensation proposal explicitly acknowledges concentrated effort
|
||||
- 4-year cliff (no unlock before April 2028) is the longest lock in MetaDAO's history — signals genuine long-term commitment. Compare with the 12-month vests on OTC trades ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]])
|
||||
- The utility calculation methodology (sqrt of payout in millions) is novel mechanism design for compensation — could be extracted as a standalone claim about incentive-compatible compensation design
|
||||
- [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] — the earlier BDF3M proposal provided interim authority; this formalizes the long-term relationship
|
||||
- [[performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution]] — this proposal is the origin of that mechanism
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — compensated founder
|
||||
- [[nallok]] — compensated founder
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
Proph3t, Nallok
|
||||
|
||||
### Objective
|
||||
Align the incentives of key insiders, Proph3t and Nallok, with the long-term success and growth of MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
We propose that MetaDAO adopt a convex payout system. Specifically, Proph3t and Nallok would receive 2% of the token supply for every $1 billion increase in META's market capitalization, up to a maximum of 10% at a $5 billion market cap. Additionally, we propose a salary of $90,000 per year for each.
|
||||
|
||||
### Details
|
||||
|
||||
- **Fixed Token Allocation**: 10% of supply equals 1,975 META per person. This number remains fixed regardless of further META dilution.
|
||||
- **Linear Unlocks**: For example, a $100M market cap would release 0.2% of the supply, or 39.5 META (~$200k at a $100M market cap), to each person.
|
||||
- **Unlock Criteria**: Decided at a later date, potentially using a simple moving average (SMA) over a month or an option-based system.
|
||||
- **Start Date**: April 2024 for the purposes of vesting & retroactive salary.
|
||||
- **Vesting Period**: No tokens unlock before April 2028, no matter what milestones are hit. This signals long-term commitment to building the business.
|
||||
- **Illiquid Vest**: The DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024 (8 months from start). Thereafter, tokens vest into a smart contract / multisig that can't be accessed by Proph3t or Nallok.
|
||||
- **Market Cap Definition**: $1B market cap is defined as a price of $42,198 per META. This allows for 20% dilution post-proposal. Payouts are based on the value per META, not total market capitalization.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q&A
|
||||
|
||||
**Why do we need founder incentives at all? I thought MetaDAO was supposed to be decentralized?**
|
||||
Whether we like it or not, MetaDAO is not fully decentralized today. If Nallok and I walk away, its probability of success drops by at least 50%. This proposal creates financial incentives to help us build MetaDAO into a truly decentralized entity. This proposal does not grant us decision-making authority. Ultimate power remains with the market. We can be replaced at any time and must follow the market's direction to keep our roles.
|
||||
|
||||
**What exactly would this proposal execute on the blockchain?**
|
||||
Nothing directly. It involves a call to the Solana memo program. The purpose is to gauge market receptiveness to this structure. A future proposal would handle the transfer of the required META, possibly from a BDF3M multisig.
|
||||
|
||||
**What would be our roles?**
|
||||
|
||||
Nallok: Firefighter, Problem-Solver, Operations Manager
|
||||
|
||||
Proph3t: Architect, Mechanism Designer, Smart Contract Engineer
|
||||
|
||||
**What would be our focus areas?**
|
||||
Frankly, we don't know. When we started work on MetaDAO, Vota looked like the most viable business for bootstrapping MetaDAO's legitimacy. Now it looks like offering futarchy to other DAOs. MetaDAO LLC, the Marshall Islands DAO LLC controlled by MetaDAO, states our business purpose as "Solana-based products and services." We expect this to hold true for several years.
|
||||
|
||||
### Appendix — How we picked 2% per $1B
|
||||
|
||||
To be successful, an incentive system needs to do two things: retain contributors and get them to exert maximum effort. So to be effective, the system must offer more utility than alternative opportunities and make exerting effort more beneficial than not.
|
||||
|
||||
**Methodology:** We estimated our reservation wages (potential earnings elsewhere) and verified that the utility of those wages is less than our expected payout from MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
**Utility Calculation:** We used the square root of the payout in millions to define our utility function.
|
||||
- $100,000 payout gives utility of 0.3162 (sqrt of 0.1)
|
||||
- $1,000,000 payout gives utility of 1 (sqrt of 1)
|
||||
- $10,000,000 payout gives utility of 3.162 (sqrt of 10)
|
||||
|
||||
**Assumptions:**
|
||||
- Earnings Elsewhere: Estimated at $250,000 per year
|
||||
- Timeline: 6 years to achieve MetaDAO success
|
||||
- Failure Payout Utility: 0.5 (including $90k/year salary and lessons learned)
|
||||
- Very low probability of success w/o maximum effort: both believe MetaDAO will not succeed unless both pour their soul into it. This gives $1.5M in foregone income, with utility of 1.2 (sqrt of 1.5).
|
||||
|
||||
**Nallok's Estimate:**
|
||||
- Probability of Success: 20%
|
||||
- Effort Cost Utility: 3 (equivalent to $10M)
|
||||
- Calculation: Nallok needs a success payout of at least $361M for it to be rational to stay and exert maximum effort.
|
||||
|
||||
**Proph3t's Estimate:**
|
||||
- Probability of Success: 10%
|
||||
- Effort Cost Utility: 1.7 (equivalent to $3M)
|
||||
- Calculation: Proph3t needs a success payout of at least $562M for it to be rational to stay and exert maximum effort.
|
||||
|
||||
**Conclusion:** 10% token allocation each at $5B market cap = ~$500M payout. This exceeds both minimum thresholds, making maximum effort the rational choice for both founders.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-05-31
|
||||
- Volume: $22,600 across 65 trades
|
||||
- Approved/Rejected TWAP spread: +29.6%
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] — earlier interim authority proposal
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — proposer/beneficiary
|
||||
- [[nallok]] — proposer/beneficiary
|
||||
- [[performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution]] — this proposal is the origin
|
||||
- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — convex payout as meritocratic alternative to traditional comp
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,56 +5,106 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "joebuild"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-01-24
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-01-29
|
||||
category: "mechanism"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to replace CLOB-based futarchy markets with AMM implementation to improve liquidity and reduce state rent costs"
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 4 — Replace CLOB with AMM for futarchy markets. Liquidity-weighted price over time, high fees (3-5%) to deter manipulation and incentivize LPs. 400 META on pass + 800 on completion. The origin of the Futarchy AMM that became MetaDAO's core infrastructure."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 4
|
||||
proposal_account: "CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
budget: "400 META on pass, 800 META on completion"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, amm, futarchy, mechanism-design, infrastructure, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to develop an Automated Market Maker (AMM) program to replace the existing Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) implementation in MetaDAO's futarchy system. The AMM would use liquidity-weighted price over time as the settlement metric, charge 3-5% swap fees to discourage manipulation and incentivize LPs, and reduce state rent costs from 135-225 SOL annually to near-zero.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** joebuild
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-01-24
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-01-29
|
||||
- **Budget:** 400 META on passing, 800 META on completed migration
|
||||
- **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review
|
||||
**Proposal 4 — the origin of the Futarchy AMM.** Replace CLOB (central limit order book) with AMM for governance markets. Key innovation: liquidity-weighted price over time as the metric, with high fees (3-5%) to simultaneously incentivize LPs and deter wash-trading/manipulation. Budget: 400 META on pass + 800 META on completion. Team: joebuild (contracts), 0xNallok (frontend).
|
||||
|
||||
## Technical Scope
|
||||
**Program changes:**
|
||||
- Write basic AMM tracking liquidity-weighted average price over lifetime
|
||||
- Incorporate AMM into autocrat + conditional vault
|
||||
- Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and return positions after verdict
|
||||
- Feature to permissionlessly close AMMs and return state rent SOL
|
||||
- Loosen time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots)
|
||||
- Auto-revert to fail if proposal instructions don't execute after X days
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-01-29). The AMM became MetaDAO's core infrastructure — by Q4 2025, it was processing $300M+ in volume and generating $1.5M in fees.
|
||||
|
||||
**Frontend integration:**
|
||||
- Majority of work by 0xNalloK
|
||||
- Mainnet testing on temporary subdomain before migration
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the architectural foundation of MetaDAO's current governance mechanism — every subsequent proposal trades through this AMM
|
||||
- The CLOB problems identified (lack of liquidity, manipulation susceptibility, 3.75 SOL state rent per market pair) are precisely the issues addressed by [[amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements]] and [[liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting]]
|
||||
- The high-fee design (3-5%) is intentionally dual-purpose: LP incentive + manipulation deterrent. This became [[high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive]]
|
||||
- joebuild is the smart contract engineer who built the core AMM — later hired formally via [[metadao-hire-advaith-sekharan]] (different person, but same pattern of proposal → hire)
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This represents a fundamental mechanism upgrade for MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, addressing three core problems with the CLOB approach:
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Liquidity:** Wide bid/ask spreads and price uncertainty discouraged limit orders near midpoint
|
||||
2. **Manipulation resistance:** CLOBs allowed 1 META to move midpoint; VWAP vulnerable to wash trading
|
||||
3. **Economic sustainability:** 3.75 SOL state rent per market pair (135-225 SOL annually) vs near-zero for AMMs
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal explicitly prioritizes simplicity and cost reduction over theoretical purity, noting that "switching to AMMs is not a perfect solution, but I do believe it is a major improvement over the current low-liquidity and somewhat noisy system."
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
The liquidity-weighted pricing mechanism is novel in futarchy implementations—it weights price observations by available liquidity rather than using simple time-weighted averages, making manipulation expensive when liquidity is high.
|
||||
In the context of Futarchy, CLOBs have a couple of drawbacks:
|
||||
1. Lack of liquidity
|
||||
2. Somewhat susceptible to manipulation
|
||||
3. Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent, which cannot currently be recouped
|
||||
|
||||
**Lack of liquidity:** Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDAO under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.
|
||||
|
||||
**Somewhat susceptible to manipulation:** With CLOBs there is always a bid/ask spread, and someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask. Though this could be countered with a defensive for-profit bot, and as Proph3t puts it: this is a 1/n problem. Still, users can selectively crank the market of their choosing. Defending against this (cranking markets all the time) would be a bit costly. Similarly, VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading. An exponential moving average has the same drawbacks in this context as the existing linear-time system.
|
||||
|
||||
**State rent costs:** If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11,475-$19,125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.
|
||||
|
||||
### Solution
|
||||
|
||||
An AMM would solve all of the above problems and is a move towards simplicity. We can use the metric: liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated. By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.
|
||||
|
||||
These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.
|
||||
|
||||
With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
The current CLOB setup requires a minimum order size of 1 META, which is effectively a spam filter against manipulating the midpoint within a wide bid/ask spread. AMMs would not have this restriction, and META could be traded at any desired granularity.
|
||||
|
||||
**What if a user wants to provide one-sided liquidity?** The most recent passing proposal will create spot markets outside of the pass/fail markets. There will be an AMM, and there is no reason not to create a CLOB as well. Most motivations for providing one-sided liquidity can be satisfied by regular spot-markets, or by arbitraging between spot markets and pass/fail markets.
|
||||
|
||||
Switching to AMMs is not a perfect solution, but I do believe it is a major improvement over the current low-liquidity and somewhat noisy system that we have now.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
**Program + Review:**
|
||||
- Write a basic AMM which tracks liquidity-weighted average price over its lifetime
|
||||
- Incorporate the AMM into autocrat + conditional vault
|
||||
- Get feedback to decide if the autocrat and conditional vault should be merged
|
||||
- Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and send back positions once there is a verdict
|
||||
- Feature to permissionlessly close the AMMs and return the state rent SOL once there are no positions
|
||||
- Loosen time restrictions on when a proposal can be created after the markets are created
|
||||
- If a proposal instruction does not work, revert to fail after X number of days
|
||||
|
||||
**Ownership:** joebuild writes program changes. Review by an expert in MetaDAO with availability. Frontend integration by 0xNallok.
|
||||
|
||||
**Timeline:** Estimate 3 weeks from passing proposal + additional week of review and minor changes.
|
||||
|
||||
**Budget:** 400 META on passing proposal + 800 META on completed migration.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risks:**
|
||||
- Standard smart contract risk
|
||||
- Adoption/available liquidity: similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty.
|
||||
|
||||
**Feedback changes during vote:** It was pointed out that there are ways to recoup openbook state rent costs, though it would require a migration of the current autocrat program.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 4
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-01-29
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- metadao.md — core mechanism upgrade
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism evolution from TWAP to liquidity-weighted pricing
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity barrier
|
||||
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — implements explicit fee-based defender incentives
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, core infrastructure
|
||||
- [[amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements]] — the state rent problem this solves
|
||||
- [[liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting]] — the mechanism this introduces
|
||||
- [[high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive]] — the dual-purpose fee design
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — this proposal created the AMM that Autocrat uses
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,49 +4,143 @@ entity_type: decision_market
|
|||
name: "MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "0xNallok"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/9uihGagn7bqj1BCBM1GaDbm2DsCwQcWJRc7a7xT1urqj"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-13
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-03-18
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Develop Realms-like UI for multi-DAO futarchy. $96K budget (smart contract + audit + UI/UX + data + PM). Goal: onboard 5-100 DAOs. Revenue model: taker fees (5-25bps) + monthly licensing ($50-$1K) + consulting. Vertical integration — own the whole stack."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: null
|
||||
proposal_account: "9uihGagn7bqj1BCBM1GaDbm2DsCwQcWJRc7a7xT1urqj"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
budget: "$96,000 ($40K USDC + 342 META)"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, faas, multi-dao, futarchy, platform, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "0xNallok"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9Cc"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-13
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-03-19
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Fund $96K to build futarchy-as-a-service platform enabling other Solana DAOs to adopt futarchic governance"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "faas", "product-development", "solana-daos"]
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Nallok proposed building a Realms-like UI enabling any Solana DAO to create and participate in futarchic governance. Budget: $96K for 2 months ($40K USDC from treasury + 342 META to convert). Team: 1 smart contract engineer, 1 auditor, 2 UI/UX, 1 data/services developer, 1 project manager. This was MetaDAO's first product expansion beyond self-governance — the pivot from "futarchy for MetaDAO" to "futarchy for everyone."
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-19)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
|
||||
- **Key participants:** 0xNallok (entrepreneur/PM), Proph3t (multisig), Nico (multisig)
|
||||
**Develop a Realms-like UI for multi-DAO futarchy governance.** $96K budget across 5 roles (smart contract, auditor, 2 UI/UX, data/services, PM). Goal: onboard 5-100 DAOs. Revenue model: taker fees (5-25bps), monthly licensing ($50-$1K), consulting services. "The goal is not to build this product as a primitive — it's to own the whole stack."
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal marks MetaDAO's strategic pivot from a governance experiment to a platform business. The financial projections (5-100 DAO customers, $50-$500/proposal in taker fees, $50-$1,000/month licensing) reveal early business model thinking. The explicit goal of "vertical integration" and "owning the whole stack" shows Proph3t and Nallok's approach to defensibility.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed. FaaS launched in May 2024 with Drift, Dean's List, and FutureDAO as first users.
|
||||
|
||||
Particularly notable: the monetization model (taker fees + licensing + consulting) anticipated the Futarchic AMM revenue model that would later become MetaDAO's primary income source. The FaaS concept directly led to Drift, Dean's List, and Future adopting futarchy.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — strategic pivot to platform
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — FaaS was the first step toward this
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — multisig custody of funds alongside futarchy approval
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — FaaS aimed to reduce adoption friction
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the proposal that turned MetaDAO from a single-DAO experiment into a platform — the pivot from "MetaDAO governs MetaDAO" to "MetaDAO provides futarchy governance to any DAO"
|
||||
- "Most people in crypto agree that the state of governance is abysmal" — 0xNallok's framing of the problem that FaaS solves. Direct evidence for [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill]]
|
||||
- The vertical integration philosophy ("own the whole stack") is a strategic bet that became MetaDAO's competitive moat — no other platform offers the full governance stack
|
||||
- Financial projections based on Curve/Aura/Votium comparisons ($50-$500 per proposal in taker fees, 1-2 proposals/month per DAO) — shows mechanism design thinking applied to business model
|
||||
- FaaS → Drift, Sanctum, Jito adoption → the project-specific governance proposals that came after this
|
||||
- The $96K budget with explicit role-level breakdown and maximum cost commitment is the template for subsequent MetaDAO project proposals
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[nallok]] — project entrepreneur
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — multisig member
|
||||
- [[deans-list]] — early FaaS adopter
|
||||
- [[drift]] — early FaaS adopter
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
Type: Business project
|
||||
|
||||
Entrepreneur(s): 0xNallok
|
||||
|
||||
*A note from 0xNallok: Special thanks are owed to the many parties who've supported the project thus far, to those who've taken massive risk on utilizing the systems and believing in a better crypto. It has been one of the most exciting things, not in attention, but seeing the "aha!" moments and expanding the understanding of what is possible with crypto.*
|
||||
|
||||
See also: A Vision for Futarchy as a Service
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
The appetite for market-driven governance is palpable. We have a tremendous opportunity to take this labor of love and shape it into a prime-time product. Such a product would be a great boon to the Solana ecosystem and to the MetaDAO's bottom line.
|
||||
|
||||
If passed, this proposal would fund two workstreams:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Minimum viable product**: I would coordinate the creation of a minimum viable product: a Realms-like UI that allows people to create and participate in futarchic DAOs. This requires some modifications to the smart contract and UI to allow for more than one DAO.
|
||||
- **UI improvements**: I've already been working with engineers to add helpful functionality to the UI. This proposal would fund these features, including: historical charts, improving UX around surfacing information (e.g., showing how much money you have deposited in each proposal), showing historical trades, showing market volume.
|
||||
|
||||
The goal would be to onboard some early adopter DAOs to test alongside MetaDAO. A few teams have already expressed interest.
|
||||
|
||||
### Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Most people in crypto agree that the state of governance is abysmal. Teams can loot the treasury without repercussions. Decentralization theatre abounds. Even some projects that build DAO tooling don't feel comfortable keeping their money in a DAO.
|
||||
|
||||
The root cause of this issue is token-voting. One-token-one-vote systems have clear incentive traps that lead to uninformed and unengaged voters. Delegated voting systems ('liquid democracy') don't fare much better: most holders don't even do enough research to delegate.
|
||||
|
||||
### Design
|
||||
|
||||
A possible solution that MetaDAO has been testing out is futarchy. In a futarchy, it's markets that make the decisions. Given that markets are empirically better than experts at predicting things, we expect futarchies to perform better than traditional DAOs.
|
||||
|
||||
Our objective is to build a product that allows DAOs in the Solana ecosystem to harness the power of the market for their decision-making. This product would look and feel like Realms, only with futarchy instead of voting.
|
||||
|
||||
Short-term goal — minimum viable product supporting:
|
||||
- I, as a DAO creator, can come to a website and create a futarchic DAO
|
||||
- I, as a futarchic trader, can trade in multiple DAOs proposals' futarchic markets
|
||||
|
||||
### Objectives and Key Results
|
||||
|
||||
**Release a minimum viable product by May 21st, 2024**
|
||||
- Extend the smart contract to support multiple DAOs
|
||||
- Generalize the UI to support multiple DAOs
|
||||
- Create docs for interacting with the product
|
||||
- Partner with 3 DAOs to have them use the product at launch-time
|
||||
|
||||
**Improve the overall UI/UX**
|
||||
- Create an indexer and APIs for order and trade history
|
||||
- Improve the user experience for creating proposals
|
||||
- Improve the user experience for trading proposals
|
||||
|
||||
### Timeline
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 1: Initial discussions, UI design, React development, program development, data services/APIs
|
||||
Phase 2: Program deployed on devnet, data services linked, UI deployed on dev branch
|
||||
Phase 3: Audit and revisions, testing UI with limited beta testers
|
||||
Phase 4: Proposal for migration, UI live on mainnet, documentation and videos
|
||||
Final: Migrate program
|
||||
|
||||
### Budget
|
||||
|
||||
Expected deliverables within 30 days, full deployment within two months. Estimated MAXIMUM costs:
|
||||
|
||||
- 1 smart contract engineer ($15,000 / 160 hours)
|
||||
- 1 auditor ($10,000 / 40 hours)
|
||||
- 2 UI/UX ($32,000 / 400 hours)
|
||||
- 1 data/services developer ($13,000 / 140 hours)
|
||||
- 1 project manager/research/outreach ($26,000 / 320 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
Total: $96,000. If costs exceed estimate, cost borne by the Entrepreneur.
|
||||
|
||||
Funded through: $40,000 USDC from multi-sig treasury + 342 META (5x overcollateralization for price fluctuation). Weekly payments. FaaS Multi-sig (2/3): 0xNallok, Proph3t, Nico.
|
||||
|
||||
### Business
|
||||
|
||||
Ultimately, the goal of the MetaDAO is to make money. Monetization options:
|
||||
- **Taker fees on markets**: 5-25 basis points via taker fee
|
||||
- **Monthly licensing fees**: BSL code → charge monthly fee for code and site
|
||||
- **Support and services**: consultation around futarchic governance, Gauntlet model
|
||||
|
||||
**Vertical integration:** "The goal is not to build this product as a primitive and then allow anyone to build front-ends for it: it's to own the whole stack."
|
||||
|
||||
### Financial Projections
|
||||
|
||||
293 DAOs use Realms today (free platform, many inactive). Estimated 5-100 paying customers.
|
||||
|
||||
Volume per proposal based on MetaDAO data (proposals 6-8): ~$50-$500 per proposal. At 1-2 proposals/month per DAO: $100-$1,000 in taker fee ARPU.
|
||||
|
||||
Monthly licensing comparable to Squads ($99-$399/month). Governance premium: $50-$1,000/month.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `9uihGagn7bqj1BCBM1GaDbm2DsCwQcWJRc7a7xT1urqj`
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: (0xNallok)
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- FaaS Multi-sig: `AHwsoL97vXFdvckVZdXw9rrvnUDcPANCLVQzJan9srWy`
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, platform expansion
|
||||
- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill]] — the problem FaaS addresses
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — FaaS was the precursor to the launchpad
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,48 +4,77 @@ entity_type: decision_market
|
|||
name: "MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-06-26
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-06-30
|
||||
category: fundraise
|
||||
summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 3 (Autocrat v0.3) — Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. No discount, no lockup. Minimum price $375 ($7.81M FDV floor). Proph3t and Nallok execute sale with discretion on terms."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 3
|
||||
proposal_account: "9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
raise_target: "$1,500,000"
|
||||
max_meta_sold: "4,000 META"
|
||||
min_price: "$375/META"
|
||||
implied_min_fdv: "$7,810,000"
|
||||
burn_rate: "$1,380,000/year"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, fundraise, vc, angels, capital-formation, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. Terms: no discount, no lockup, minimum price $375/META (implying $7.81M minimum FDV based on 20,823.5 META in public hands). Funds custodied by Proph3t and Nallok in a multisig, released at $100K/month to minimize DAO attack risk. Burn rate: $1.38M/year covering two founders ($90K each), three engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), office ($80K), growth person ($150K), and admin ($100K).
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-06-30)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** Proph3t (proposer), Nallok (multisig co-custodian)
|
||||
**Proposal 3 (Autocrat v0.3) — MetaDAO's second capital raise.** Sell up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels for $1.5M. No discount, no lockup. Minimum price $375/META ($7.81M FDV floor). Proph3t and Nallok execute with discretion on allocation, terms, and whether to raise more than $1.5M. Funds custodied in multisig, released at $100K/month.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This was MetaDAO's first VC fundraise approved through futarchy — the market decided whether to dilute existing holders for growth capital. The "no discount, no lockup" terms are unusual for crypto fundraises and reflect futarchy's transparency ethos: investors get the same terms as the market.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-06-30).
|
||||
|
||||
The multisig custodianship ($100K/month release) reveals a practical tension: futarchy governs the fundraise decision, but operational security requires trusted custodians. The DAO cannot safely hold and disburse large sums through governance alone — an early signal of the pattern where futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate scaffolding for treasury operations.
|
||||
|
||||
The detailed budget breakdown provides one of the few public windows into early MetaDAO operational costs, valuable for benchmarking futarchy-governed organizations.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — capital formation event
|
||||
- [[internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines]] — futarchy-governed fundraise completed in 4 days
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — multisig custody alongside futarchy approval
|
||||
- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — but this raise has identifiable custodians, complicating the "no beneficial owners" argument
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Context: MetaDAO had just launched FaaS with Drift, Dean's List, and FutureDAO three weeks prior. The raise was to fund a team to scale this: 3 engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), growth ($150K), office ($80K) + founders ($90K each) = $1.38M/year burn
|
||||
- "No discount and no lockup" — the exact opposite of the VC discount that the market would later reject ([[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]]). The founders chose to sell at market price to all participants. This set the precedent for MetaDAO's "no sweetheart VC deals" ethos.
|
||||
- $100K/month release to DAO treasury from multisig — the same drip mechanism later formalized as the monthly allowance in STAMP agreements for futardio launches
|
||||
- The $375 minimum price floor ($7.81M FDV) is conservative given the Colosseum deal valued META at $468 three months earlier. The floor protects against selling too cheap in a downturn.
|
||||
- "Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms" — equal access, no tiered pricing. This is the philosophical foundation of the "unruggable ICO" model.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — proposer and custodian
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Three weeks ago, MetaDAO launched the futarchy protocol with Drift, Dean's List, and Future. Our goal is to onboard more Solana DAOs. To do that, Nallok and I have a few ideas for growth initiatives, including:
|
||||
|
||||
- Social: seeing who's trading in the markets
|
||||
- NFTs: allowing NFT communities to leverage decision markets
|
||||
- Special contracts: creating custom financial contracts that make it easier to make grants decisions through decision markets
|
||||
|
||||
To accelerate this, our goal is to hire a small team. Between us ($90k/yr each), three engineers ($190k/yr each), audits ($300k), office space ($80k/yr), a growth person ($150k/yr), and other administrative expenses ($100k/yr), we're looking at a $1.38M burn rate.
|
||||
|
||||
To fund this, I'm proposing that the DAO raise $1.5M by selling META to a combination of venture capitalists and angels. Specifically, we would sell up to 4,000 META with no discount and no lockup.
|
||||
|
||||
Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.
|
||||
|
||||
The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than $1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: $375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a $7.81M valuation. Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 3
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-06-30
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, second capital raise
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — the "no discount, no lockup, similar terms" ethos starts here
|
||||
- [[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]] — later rejection of a 30% VC discount, consistent with this proposal's equal-access philosophy
|
||||
- [[internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing]] — early evidence of futarchy-governed capital formation
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,34 +5,64 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Ben Hawkins"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-02-13
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-02-18
|
||||
category: "treasury"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to mint 1,500 META tokens in exchange for $50,000 USDC to MetaDAO treasury at $33.33 per META"
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 6 — First Ben Hawkins OTC attempt. Mint 1,500 META for $50K USDC ($33.33/META). Failed. The original empirical proof that futarchy prevents value extraction."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 6
|
||||
proposal_account: "US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
offer_amount: "$50,000 USDC"
|
||||
meta_amount: "1,500 META (mint)"
|
||||
price_per_meta: "$33.33"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, otc, ben-hawkins, manipulation-resistance, failed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Ben Hawkins proposed to mint 1,500 META tokens to his wallet address in exchange for sending $50,000 USDC to MetaDAO's treasury, valuing META at $33.33 per token. The proposal was rejected by the futarchy markets.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** Ben Hawkins
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 6
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-02-13
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-02-18
|
||||
- **Ended:** 2024-02-18
|
||||
**Proposal 6 — the canonical case for futarchy manipulation resistance.** Ben Hawkins proposed minting 1,500 META to his wallet in exchange for $50K USDC to treasury ($33.33/META). The market rejected it. Hawkins later said "the potential gains from the proposal's passage were outweighed by the sheer cost of acquiring the necessary META" — the mechanism made the extractive deal unprofitable to force through.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This represents an early OTC trade proposal on MetaDAO's futarchy platform, testing the market's willingness to accept direct token minting for treasury capital. The rejection suggests the market viewed the valuation as unfavorable or the dilution as undesirable at that time.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Failed (2024-02-18).
|
||||
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the primary empirical evidence cited in [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — the first production proof that the conditional token arbitrage mechanism works
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2]] — Hawkins came back with a second attempt ($100K, Proposal 8, also failed). Two consecutive failures from the same actor is strong evidence
|
||||
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — Hawkins's experience confirms the theoretical claim
|
||||
- The $33.33/META valuation was well below the contemporaneous ~$695 spot price seen in Proposal 8 a few days later, making this an obviously extractive deal — yet the mechanism still needed to reject it through market pricing, not human judgment
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Ben Hawkins is requesting to mint 1500 META to GxHamnPVxsBaWdbUSjR4C5izhMv2snriGyYtjCkAVzze
|
||||
|
||||
in exchange for Ben will send 50,000 USDC to be sent to ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy the treasury to MetaDAO
|
||||
|
||||
33.33 usdc per Meta
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `US8j6iLf9GkokZbk89Bo1qnGBees5etv5sEfsfvCoZK`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 6
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-02-18
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - treasury governance decision
|
||||
- [[futardio]] - platform where proposal was executed
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2]] — second attempt ($100K, also failed)
|
||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — this is the primary empirical evidence
|
||||
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — Hawkins quote confirms
|
||||
- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,58 +1,112 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: futardio
|
||||
proposer: pR13Aev6U2DQ3sQTWSZrFzevNqYnvq5TM9c1qTKLfm8
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Colosseum"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-19
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-03-24
|
||||
category: fundraise
|
||||
summary: "Colosseum acquired up to $250,000 USDC worth of META tokens with dynamic pricing based on TWAP and 12-month vesting structure"
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 13 — Colosseum $250K OTC. Dynamic TWAP pricing (market up to $850, void above $1,200). 20/80 vesting. Passed. Included commitment to sponsor DAO track at next Solana hackathon ($50-80K prize pool)."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 13
|
||||
proposal_account: "5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
offer_amount: "$250,000 USDC"
|
||||
meta_spot_price: "$468.09 (2024-03-18)"
|
||||
circulating_supply: "17,421 META"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, otc, colosseum, institutional, hackathon, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
offer_amount: "$250,000 USDC"
|
||||
price_mechanism: "TWAP-based with $850 cap, void above $1,200"
|
||||
immediate_unlock: "20%"
|
||||
vesting_period: "12 months linear"
|
||||
meta_spot_price: "$468.09 (2024-03-18)"
|
||||
meta_circulating_supply: "17,421 tokens"
|
||||
transfer_amount: "2,060 META (overallocated for price flexibility)"
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Colosseum proposed acquiring META tokens from MetaDAO's treasury for $250,000 USDC with a dynamic pricing mechanism tied to the pass market TWAP. The structure included 20% immediate unlock and 80% linear vesting over 12 months through Streamflow. The proposal included a sponsored DAO track ($50,000-$80,000 prize pool) in Colosseum's next hackathon as strategic partnership commitment.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** pR13Aev6U2DQ3sQTWSZrFzevNqYnvq5TM9c1qTKLfm8
|
||||
- **Resolution:** 2024-03-24
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 13
|
||||
**Proposal 13 — Colosseum $250K OTC, passed.** Dynamic TWAP pricing: market price up to $850, capped at $850 if TWAP $850-$1,200, void above $1,200. 20% immediate, 80% linear vest 12 months. META spot $468.09. Included commitment to sponsor DAO track at next Solana hackathon ($50-80K prize pool) at no cost.
|
||||
|
||||
## Pricing Mechanism
|
||||
The acquisition price per META was determined by conditional logic:
|
||||
- If pass market TWAP < $850: price = TWAP
|
||||
- If pass market TWAP between $850-$1,200: price = $850 (capped)
|
||||
- If pass market TWAP > $1,200: proposal void, USDC returned
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-24). First successful OTC after three consecutive failures.
|
||||
|
||||
This created a price discovery mechanism with downside flexibility and upside protection for the treasury.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Most sophisticated pricing structure of any MetaDAO OTC — dynamic TWAP with floor, cap, and void threshold
|
||||
- Colosseum's value-add (hackathon pipeline → MetaDAO adoption) is qualitatively different from financial investors — ecosystem deal flow, not just capital
|
||||
- Transition from 3 failed OTCs (Feb 2024) to this passed deal (Mar 2024) — META price went from $96 → $468, making dilution more palatable
|
||||
- The market consistently rejects discount deals and accepts at-or-above-market deals
|
||||
|
||||
## Execution Structure
|
||||
The proposal transferred 2,060 META to a 5/7 multisig (FhJHnsCGm9JDAe2JuEvqr67WE8mD2PiJMUsmCTD1fDPZ) with members from both Colosseum and MetaDAO. The overallocation (beyond the $250k/$850 = 294 META minimum) provided flexibility for price fluctuations, with excess META returned to treasury.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Strategic Rationale
|
||||
Colosseum positioned the investment as ecosystem development rather than pure capital deployment, emphasizing their ability to funnel hackathon participants and accelerator companies to MetaDAO. The sponsored DAO track commitment ($50k-$80k value) represented immediate reciprocal value beyond the token purchase.
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This represents one of the earliest institutional OTC acquisitions through futarchy governance, demonstrating that prediction markets can price complex multi-party agreements with conditional terms. The vesting structure and multisig execution show how futarchy-governed DAOs handle treasury operations requiring operational security beyond pure market mechanisms.
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
- Colosseum wishes to acquire {tbd} META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from The MetaDAO Treasury (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy).
|
||||
- If the proposal passes, the price per META will be the TWAP of the pass market if below $850. If this proposal is approved and the pass market TWAP surpasses $850 per META, but is below $1,200, then the acquisition price per META will be $850. If the pass market TWAP surpasses $1,200, then this proposal becomes void and the USDC in the multisig will be returned to Colosseum's wallet.
|
||||
- A total of $250,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) will be committed by Colosseum.
|
||||
- The MetaDAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum's wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.
|
||||
|
||||
### Rationale
|
||||
|
||||
Colosseum runs Solana's hackathons, supports winning founders through a new accelerator program, and invests in their startups. Our mission is to bolster innovative improvements to technology, economics, and governance in crypto through all 3 pillars of our organization. In line with that mission, we believe MetaDAO is one of the most promising early experiments in crypto and we strongly believe we can help the project grow significantly due to our unique position in the Solana ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to the capital infusion provided by Colosseum, our primary value proposition is our ability to bring new entrepreneurs and cyber agents to MetaDAO over the long-term. Given that a majority of the VC-backed startups in the Solana ecosystem started in hackathons, we can utilize both our hackathons and accelerator program to funnel talented developers, founders, and ultimately revenue-generating startups to the DAO.
|
||||
|
||||
In practice, there are many ways Colosseum can promote MetaDAO and we want to collaborate with the DAO community around ongoing initiatives. To show our commitment towards future collaborations, we promise that if this proposal passes, the MetaDAO will be the sponsor of the DAO track in the next Solana hackathon after Renaissance, at no additional cost. The next DAO track prize pool will be between $50,000 - $80,000.
|
||||
|
||||
### Execution
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer {tbd} META into a Squads multisignature wallet [FhJHnsCGm9JDAe2JuEvqr67WE8mD2PiJMUsmCTD1fDPZ] with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:
|
||||
|
||||
- Colosseum (REDACTED)
|
||||
- Colosseum (REDACTED)
|
||||
- MetaProph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)
|
||||
- 0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)
|
||||
- Cavemanloverboy (2EvcwLAHvXW71c8d1uEXTCbVZjzMpYUQL5h64PuYUi3T)
|
||||
- Dean (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt)
|
||||
- Durden (91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj)
|
||||
|
||||
The multisig members instructions:
|
||||
1. Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by onchain instruction
|
||||
2. Accept the full USDC amount of $250,000 from Colosseum into the multisig
|
||||
3. Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
|
||||
4. Confirmation from two parties within The MetaDAO that the balances exist and are in full. Take $250,000 / calculated per META and determine final allocation quantity of META
|
||||
5. Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum's address [REDACTED]
|
||||
6. Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
|
||||
7. Transfer 80% of the final allocation of META into the Streamflow program
|
||||
8. Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
|
||||
|
||||
NOTE: The reason for transferring 2,060 META is due to the fact that there is only one transfer and by overallocating we have a wider price range to be able to execute the instructions above. For example if the price of TWAP for META is $250, the amount of META allocated for $250,000/$250 = 1,000 META. In this case 1,060 META would be returned to the treasury.
|
||||
|
||||
### ROI to META
|
||||
|
||||
We won't speculate on what the exact ROI will be to META in the short to medium-term. However, if this proposal passes, we believe that our strategic partnership will increase the value of META significantly over the long-term due to Colosseum's unique ability to embed MetaDAO as a viable institution that can help future crypto founders grow their businesses.
|
||||
|
||||
| Details | |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| META Spot Price 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC | $468.09 |
|
||||
| META Circulating Supply 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC | 17,421 |
|
||||
| Circulating supply could change depending on the current dutch auction | |
|
||||
| Offer Price per 1 META | Any market price up to $850 per 1 META |
|
||||
| Offer USDC | $250,000 |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `5qEyKCVyJZMFZSb3yxh6rQjqDYxASiLW7vFuuUTCYnb1`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 13
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `pR13Aev6U2DQ3sQTWSZrFzevNqYnvq5TM9c1qTKLfm8`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-03-24
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — treasury management decision
|
||||
- [[colosseum]] — strategic investor
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — confirms pattern
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[colosseum]] — proposer entity, Solana hackathon organizer
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — failed OTC from prior period
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]] — failed OTC from prior period
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,44 +1,125 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-02-18
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-02-23
|
||||
category: "fundraise"
|
||||
summary: "Pantera Capital proposed acquiring $50,000 USDC worth of META tokens through OTC trade with 20% immediate transfer and 80% vested over 12 months"
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 7 — Pantera Capital $50K OTC. Price = min((twapPass + twapFail)/2, $100). 20/80 vesting. Failed. First major institutional capital proposal rejected by futarchy."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 7
|
||||
proposal_account: "H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
offer_amount: "$50,000 USDC"
|
||||
meta_spot_price: "$96.93 (2024-02-17)"
|
||||
circulating_supply: "14,530 META"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, otc, pantera, institutional, failed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Pantera Capital proposed a $50,000 OTC purchase of META tokens from The Meta-DAO treasury, structured as 20% immediate transfer and 80% linear vesting over 12 months. The price per META was to be determined as the minimum of the average TWAP of pass/fail markets and $100. The proposal failed, indicating market rejection of the terms or strategic direction.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
|
||||
- **Amount:** $50,000 USDC
|
||||
- **Price Formula:** min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100)
|
||||
- **Vesting:** 20% immediate, 80% linear over 12 months via Streamflow
|
||||
- **META Spot Price (2024-02-17):** $96.93
|
||||
- **META Circulating Supply:** 14,530
|
||||
**Proposal 7 — Pantera Capital's OTC attempt, failed.** $50K USDC for META at min((twapPass + twapFail)/2, $100). 20% immediate, 80% linear vest 12 months. META spot was $96.93, so the $100 cap meant Pantera could buy near or below spot. The market said no.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal represents an early attempt at institutional capital entry into futarchy-governed DAOs through structured OTC deals. The failure is notable because it suggests either:
|
||||
1. Market skepticism about the valuation terms (price cap at $100 vs spot of $96.93)
|
||||
2. Concern about dilution impact on existing holders
|
||||
3. Strategic disagreement with bringing institutional capital into governance
|
||||
**Outcome:** Failed (2024-02-23). Concurrent with Ben Hawkins $100K (Proposal 8, also failed). Three deals rejected in one week.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal included sophisticated execution mechanics (multisig custody, TWAP-based pricing, Streamflow vesting) that became templates for later fundraising structures. The involvement of multiple community members (0xNallok, 7Layer, Proph3t) as multisig signers showed early governance scaffolding.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- First major institutional name (Pantera Capital) to propose a MetaDAO OTC — rejection shows futarchy treats all capital equally regardless of brand
|
||||
- The pricing formula min((twapPass + twapFail)/2, $100) averages pass and fail TWAPs with a $100 cap — more conservative than Hawkins's max(TWAP, $200) formula
|
||||
- Three concurrent rejections (this + Hawkins x2) suggest broad anti-dilution sentiment, not deal-specific objections
|
||||
- Compare with later Colosseum deal (Proposal 13, at-market, passed) and Theia deals (premium, passed) — the market consistently rejects at-or-below-market deals and accepts premium deals
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Drafted with support from: Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, and Proph3t
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
- Pantera Capital wishes to acquire {tbd} META (`METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr`) from The Meta-DAO (`ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy`)
|
||||
- The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the lesser of the average TWAP price of the pass / fail market and $100
|
||||
|
||||
ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100)
|
||||
|
||||
- A total of $50,000 USDC (`EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v`) will be committed by Pantera Capital
|
||||
- The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to the Pantera wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program
|
||||
|
||||
### Rationale
|
||||
|
||||
Pantera views this investment as a strategic partnership and an opportunity to show support for The Meta-DAO, which is spearheading innovation in decentralized governance. Pantera has invested in the blockchain and crypto ecosystem heavily and looks forward to its long term promise. It views its acquisition of META as an opportunity to test futarchy's potential as an improved system for decentralized governance and provide meaningful feedback for accelerating its development and adoption across the crypto ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a specific interest in Solana as a proving ground for innovative products and services for blockchain technology, and Pantera desires more direct exposure to the Solana ecosystem.
|
||||
|
||||
With respect to the investment, Pantera holds the perspective that The Meta-DAO may be an ideal community within Solana for soliciting additional deal flow. It also highlights support for innovation in the space of governance, support for Solana projects, and a belief that fundamentally, futarchy has a reasonable chance of success.
|
||||
|
||||
### Execution
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet `BtNPTBX1XkFCwazDJ6ZkK3hcUsomm1RPcfmtUrP6wd2K` with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:
|
||||
|
||||
- Pantera Capital (`6S5LQhggSTjm6gGWrTBiQkQbz3F7JB5CtJZZLMZp2XNE`)
|
||||
- Pantera Capital (`4kjRZzWWRZGBto2iKB6V7dYdWuMRtSFYbiUnE2VfppXw`)
|
||||
- 0xNallok (`4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw`)
|
||||
- MetaProph3t (`65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`)
|
||||
- Dodecahedr0x (`UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`)
|
||||
- Durden (`91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`)
|
||||
- Blockchainfixesthis (`HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D`)
|
||||
|
||||
The multisig members instructions are as follows:
|
||||
- Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by on chain instruction
|
||||
- Accept the full USDC amount of $50,000 from Pantera Capital into the multisig
|
||||
- Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
|
||||
- Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full
|
||||
- Take $50,000 / calculated per META and determine final allocation quantity of META
|
||||
- Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Pantera's address `FLzqFMQo2KmsenkMP4Y82kYVnKTJJfahTJUWUDSp2ZX5`
|
||||
- Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
|
||||
- Transfer 80% of the final allocation of META into the Streamflow program
|
||||
- Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
|
||||
|
||||
### ROI to META
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing on a strategic partner such as Pantera which would boost visibility and afford some cash holdings. This proposal speculates a ~25% increase in META value due to the high profile of Pantera and their offering of strategic resources to the project.
|
||||
|
||||
| Details | |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| META Spot Price 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC | $96.93 |
|
||||
| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC | 14,530 |
|
||||
| Offer Price | ${TBD} |
|
||||
| Offer META | {TBD} |
|
||||
| Offer USDC | $50,000 |
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-money valuations at different prices:
|
||||
- $50: $726,000
|
||||
- $60: $871,800
|
||||
- $70: $1,017,000
|
||||
- $80: $1,162,400
|
||||
- $90: $1,307,700
|
||||
- $100: $1,453,000
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `H59VHchVsy8UVLotZLs7YaFv2FqTH5HAeXc4Y48kxieY`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 7
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-02-23
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - failed fundraising proposal
|
||||
- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] - tested institutional OTC structure
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - used TWAP pricing mechanism
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — concurrent proposal, also failed
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2]] — concurrent proposal, also failed
|
||||
- [[pantera-capital]] — proposer entity
|
||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — market rejected institutional capital at unfavorable terms
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,38 +5,108 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $500,000 OTC Trade with Theia? [2]"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/3tApJXw2REQAZZyehiaAnQSdauVNviNbXsuS4inn8PAe"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t (on behalf of Theia)"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/3tApJXw2REQAZZyehiaAnQSdauVNviNbXsuS4inn8PAe"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-01-27
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-01-30
|
||||
category: "fundraise"
|
||||
summary: "Theia Research acquires 370.370 META tokens for $500,000 USDC at 14% premium to spot price with 12-month linear vesting"
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 10 — Theia's second OTC. 370.370 META at $1,350/token ($500K) at 14% PREMIUM to spot. Passed. First successful Theia deal after $700K rejection."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 10
|
||||
proposal_account: "3tApJXw2REQAZZyehiaAnQSdauVNviNbXsuS4inn8PAe"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
offer_amount: "$500,000 USDC"
|
||||
meta_amount: "370.370 META"
|
||||
price_per_meta: "$1,350"
|
||||
premium_to_spot: "14%"
|
||||
lock_period: "12 months linear vest"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, otc, theia, institutional, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $500,000 OTC Trade with Theia? [2]
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Theia Research proposed to acquire 370.370 META tokens from the MetaDAO Treasury for $500,000 USDC ($1,350 per token), representing a 14% premium to spot price at proposal time. The tokens vest linearly over 12 months via Streamflow. Theia committed to active governance participation, research publication, roadshow support, and policy guidance as strategic value-add beyond capital.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
|
||||
- **Deal Terms:** 370.370 META at $1,350/token = $500,000 USDC
|
||||
- **Premium:** 14% above spot price
|
||||
- **Vesting:** 12-month linear via Streamflow
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2025-01-30
|
||||
**Proposal 10 — Theia's second OTC, passed at 14% premium.** 370.370 META at $1,350/token ($500K USDC). 12-month linear vest. Proph3t: "An incremental $500k would allow us to extend our runway, experiment more (e.g. provide capital to decision markets on non-futarchic governance proposals), and/or spend more on growth (e.g. twitter videos)."
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This is MetaDAO's second attempt at this OTC trade with Theia (first proposal failed). The 14% premium demonstrates investor willingness to pay above-market for strategic positioning in futarchy governance infrastructure. Theia's commitment to active participation (governance, research, roadshows, policy) represents a shift from passive token holding to engaged ecosystem development.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2025-01-30). Three weeks after $700K attempt failed.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal explicitly frames the $500K as enabling MetaDAO to "hire an additional senior engineer, seed liquidity on new markets, and expand business development operations to onboard more DAOs." This connects treasury management directly to operational capacity expansion.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Theia pricing evolution: $700K at -12.7% discount (failed, [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]]) → $500K at +14% premium (this, passed) → $630K at +38% premium ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]], passed). Market rewards premium-paying investors.
|
||||
- This proposal adds "Active Governance" as a new value-add dimension — Theia commits to actively trading MetaDAO markets to deepen liquidity. The first OTC that explicitly promises governance participation as consideration.
|
||||
- References from Kamino cofounder and Metaplex Lead of Strategy — institutional social proof for MetaDAO
|
||||
- Proph3t's candid use-of-funds statement ("twitter videos") is unusual transparency that the market approved anyway
|
||||
|
||||
Theia's investment thesis treats MetaDAO as infrastructure for "the Internet Financial System" and positions futarchy as solving "a pressing need across" that system. The proposal includes portfolio company references (Kamino, Metaplex) and MetaDAO founder endorsements, suggesting institutional validation of the futarchy model.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
- Theia wishes to acquire META tokens (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from the MetaDAO Treasury (6awyHMshBGVjJ3ozdSJdyyDE1CTAXUwrpNMaRGMsb4sf) in exchange for $500,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v).
|
||||
- Theia wishes to acquire 370.370 META tokens at a USD price of $1,350 per token from the MetaDAO Treasury. This represents a 14% premium to spot price at the time we completed this proposal.
|
||||
- Theia will allocate resources to helping MetaDAO succeed and believes it can be helpful across multiple core areas, including active governance, research, token structuring/liquidity, US policy, and business development. We have provided numerous portfolio company references to the MetaDAO team that can attest to our involvement and value add.
|
||||
- Theia's $500K investment could be spent to hire an additional senior engineer, seed liquidity on new markets, and expand business development operations to onboard more DAOs to MetaDAO.
|
||||
- MetaDAO will transfer the entire portion of META tokens through a 12-month linear vest Streamflow program.
|
||||
|
||||
### Introduction to Theia
|
||||
|
||||
Theia is an onchain liquid token fund manager that invests in companies building the Internet Financial System. Theia replicates traditional private investment strategies by taking large positions in small-cap tokens within under-explored market parts and working closely with management teams to add value. Theia typically buys liquid tokens through structured and proprietary deals and holds investments through a two to four-year investment thesis.
|
||||
|
||||
Theia is a differentiated partner due to the time and expertise we commit to our portfolio companies as well as our intense focus on core infrastructure and financial applications in EVM and SVM. Our fund strategy is designed to drive value for our portfolio companies; we cap our fund size, maintain a concentrated book of few investments, and seek to hold investments for many years. We work to ensure that each portfolio company has time and ample resources to realize our underwriting model forecast. This allows us to hold for the long term and ignore price fluctuations that are unrelated to business-specific catalysts.
|
||||
|
||||
### Proposal
|
||||
|
||||
We appreciate the time and effort both Proph3t and Kollan have spent with our team as we have conducted our diligence on MetaDAO. Better governance is a pressing need across the Internet Financial System and we are impressed by MetaDAO's commitment to the vision of Futarchy. It isn't often you find a team that combines missionary zeal with real talent as builders.
|
||||
|
||||
We are pleased to submit an offer to acquire META tokens on behalf of Theia and serve as a strategic partner to MetaDAO. While this letter outlines specific terms for a token agreement, we believe that a long-term partnership between Theia and MetaDAO is the most important component of our proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
On behalf of Theia Blockchain Partners Master Fund LP ("Theia"), to acquire 370.370 META tokens at a USD price of $1,350 per token from the MetaDAO Treasury. We would consider it a privilege to have the opportunity to buy a large amount of META from the treasury.
|
||||
|
||||
Importantly, our $500,000 investment would provide valuable capital to MetaDAO. Theia's $500K investment could be spent to hire an additional senior engineer, seed liquidity on new markets, and expand business development operations to onboard more DAOs to MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
"An incremental $500k would allow us to extend our runway, experiment more (e.g. provide capital to decision markets on non-futarchic governance proposals), and/or spend more on growth (e.g. twitter videos)." - Proph3t, Cofounder of MetaDAO
|
||||
|
||||
### Theia Value Add
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO is one of the most exciting ideas in the Internet Financial System and global governance as a whole, and we are eager to support the company through its next phase of growth. We will work hard to increase the probability of success for MetaDAO across the following five dimensions:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Active Governance:** Theia has been a fully onchain fund since inception. We are participants in onchain markets and would plan to actively trade MetaDAO markets. We believe having one more aligned liquid fund trading MetaDAO markets would bolster market efficiency and deepen liquidity.
|
||||
- **Roadshows:** We meet regularly with most major US and European liquid funds. We openly share our best ideas but pay close attention to the stylistic preferences of different funds. When mutually beneficial, we facilitate introductions and also help them prepare. We provide detailed feedback on presentations, data rooms, and investor pitches. We often help organize roadshows, provide references, and workshop token pitches with founders. We are an active research firm and believe that the correct market framing can help a company raise capital, hire talent, win partnerships, and focus resources on the most impactful outcomes. We write consistently about our portfolio companies and the key themes that affect them.
|
||||
- **Policy:** We expect US policy to remain an important input for companies, especially as they seek to expand beyond what exists onchain today. We have built strong relationships with political consultants, congressional staffers, regulatory agencies, and law firms to ensure we are prepared for upcoming policy changes in the US and abroad.
|
||||
|
||||
### Theia References
|
||||
|
||||
This is our second proposal to MetaDAO. During our first proposal, we asked a few of our portfolio company founders to provide references for Theia:
|
||||
|
||||
**Marius, Kamino Cofounder:** [reference provided]
|
||||
|
||||
**Mack, Lead of Strategy at Metaplex:** [reference provided]
|
||||
|
||||
**Proph3t, Cofounder of MetaDAO:** [reference provided]
|
||||
|
||||
**0xNallok, Cofounder of MetaDAO:** [reference provided]
|
||||
|
||||
We are deeply impressed with the team, mission and community at MetaDAO. We would consider it a privilege to have the opportunity to participate as you onboard Solana and then the world to Futarchy, and we thank you for your consideration.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `3tApJXw2REQAZZyehiaAnQSdauVNviNbXsuS4inn8PAe`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 10
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2025-01-30
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - treasury fundraise decision
|
||||
- [[theia-research]] - strategic investor
|
||||
- [[futardio]] - governance platform
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]] — first attempt (failed, $700K at -12.7% discount)
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — third attempt (passed, $630K at +38% premium)
|
||||
- [[theia-research]] — institutional participant
|
||||
- [[publishing investment analysis openly before raising capital inverts hedge fund secrecy because transparency attracts domain-expert LPs who can independently verify the thesis]] — Theia's open research model
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue