diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md
index 83b9db42f..536c42931 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md
@@ -69,3 +69,8 @@ Key mechanisms:
 
 P2P.me ICO demonstrates futarchy-governed launches can attract institutional capital, not just retail speculation. Three venture investors publicly announced investment theses and competed for allocation in the same mechanism as retail participants, suggesting the governance model has credibility beyond meme-coin speculation.
 
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
+
+Futardio Cult raised $11.4M (63.7% of platform total) as a futarchy-governed meme coin, demonstrating 22,806% oversubscription and validating that governance tokens structured as meme coins can attract massive speculative capital
+
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
index 7cea4d792..861845baf 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
@@ -10,3 +10,8 @@ Seyf's near-zero traction ($200 raised) suggests that while participation fricti
 
 Proposals 7, 8, and 9 all failed despite being OTC purchases at below-market prices. Proposal 7 (Ben Hawkins, $50k at $33.33/META) failed when spot was ~$97. Proposal 8 (Pantera, $50k at min(TWAP, $100)) failed when spot was $695. Proposal 9 (Ben Hawkins v2, $100k at max(TWAP, $200)) failed when spot was $695. These weren't rejected for bad economics—they were rejected despite offering sellers massive premiums. This suggests participation friction (market creation costs, liquidity requirements, complexity) dominated economic evaluation.
 
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
+
+Nvision raised $99 of $50K (0.2% of goal) despite being a futarchy-adjacent prediction market product, demonstrating that even conceptually aligned projects fail when participation friction exceeds community attention threshold
+
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md
index a02f618ed..9ff849763 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-ico-platform-demonstrates-15x-oversubscription-validating-futarchy-governed-capital-formation.md
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ Kuleen Nimkar frames P2P ICO as testing whether the team can grow EM userbase an
 
 P2P.me ICO on MetaDAO described as 'one of the most compelling public sale opportunities we've seen in quite some time' by institutional participant Moonrock Capital, with FDV 15-25M and structure praised for fairness (100% unlock for participants vs locked investors and KPI-based team unlock).
 
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
+
+Futardio's parallel permissionless platform shows even more extreme oversubscription patterns: Superclaw achieved 11,902% oversubscription ($6M raised) and Futardio Cult 22,806% ($11.4M), suggesting permissionless mode may amplify rather than dampen oversubscription dynamics
+
+
 
 
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
index 107be93a6..e3c9a306e 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md
@@ -79,10 +79,16 @@ Ninth Circuit denied Kalshi's motion for administrative stay on March 19, 2026,
 ---
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-03-21-federalregister-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets]] | Added: 2026-03-21*
+*Source: 2026-03-21-federalregister-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets | Added: 2026-03-21*
 
 CFTC ANPRM RIN 3038-AF65 (March 2026) reopens the regulatory framework question for prediction markets despite Polymarket's QCX acquisition. The ANPRM asks whether to amend or issue new regulations on event contracts, suggesting the CFTC views the current framework as potentially inadequate. This creates uncertainty about whether the QCX acquisition path remains viable for other prediction market operators or whether new restrictions may emerge.
 
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis]] | Added: 2026-03-25*
+
+Polymarket CFTC approval occurred in 2025 via QCX acquisition with $112M valuation. This established prediction markets as CFTC-regulated derivatives, but the March 2026 ANPRM shows the regulatory framework still treats all prediction markets uniformly without distinguishing governance applications.
+
+
 
 Relevant Notes:
 - [[Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election]]
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
index f745ca165..329def867 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 - **2024-08-28** — MetaDAO proposal to create futardio memecoin launchpad failed. Proposal would have allocated portion of each launched memecoin to futarchy DAO, with $100k grant over 6 months for development team. Identified potential advantages (drive futarchy adoption, create forcing function for platform security) and pitfalls (reputational risk, resource diversion from core platform).
 - **2024-08-28** — MetaDAO proposal to develop futardio (memecoin launchpad with futarchy governance) failed. Proposal would have allocated $100k grant over 6 months to development team. Platform design: percentage of each launched memecoin allocated to futarchy DAO, points-to-token conversion within 180 days, revenue distributed to $FUTA holders, immutable deployment on IPFS/Arweave.
 - **2026-03-05** — Areal Finance launch: $50k target, $1,350 raised (2.7%), refunded after 1 day
+- **2026-03-25** — Platform totals: $17.9M committed across 52 launches from 1,030 funders; 97.2% of capital concentrated in top 2 projects (Futardio Cult $11.4M, Superclaw $6M)
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/kalshi.md b/entities/internet-finance/kalshi.md
index 883e54c30..663ba32bc 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/kalshi.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/kalshi.md
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ CFTC-designated contract market for event-based trading. USD-denominated, KYC-re
 - **2026-01-09** — Tennessee court ruled in favor of Kalshi in KalshiEx v. Orgel, finding impossibility of dual compliance and obstacle to federal objectives, creating circuit split with Maryland
 - **2026-03-19** — Ninth Circuit denied administrative stay motion, allowing Nevada to proceed with temporary restraining order that would exclude Kalshi from Nevada for at least two weeks pending preliminary injunction hearing
 - **2026-03-16** — Federal Reserve Board paper validates Kalshi prediction market accuracy, showing statistically significant improvement over Bloomberg consensus for CPI forecasting and perfect FOMC rate matching
+- **2026-03-23** — CEO Tarek Mansour co-founded [[5cc-capital]] with Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan, creating dedicated VC fund for prediction market infrastructure
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Regulation-first**: Only CFTC-designated prediction market exchange. Institutional credibility.
 - **vs Polymarket**: Different market — Kalshi targets mainstream/institutional users who won't touch crypto. Polymarket targets crypto-native users who want permissionless market creation. Both grew massively post-2024 election.
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
index 54622ad66..d5a6ca008 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2024-03-31** — [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] Passed: Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M with 1015 META + 100k USDC compensation for 7 months to overcome execution bottlenecks
 - **2024** — [[metadao-proposal-1-lst-vote-market]] Passed: LST vote market development approved as first revenue-generating product
 - **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-migration-proposal-2026]] Active at 84% likelihood: Migration to new onchain DAO program with $408K traded
+- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-gmu-futarchy-research-funding]] Active: Proposal to fund futarchy research at GMU with Robin Hanson under community discussion
+- **2024-03-31** — [[metadao-appoint-nallok-proph3t-benevolent-dictators]] Passed: Appointed Proph3t and Nallok as BDF3M with 1015 META + 100k USDC compensation to address execution bottlenecks
+- **2026-03-23** — [[metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal-march-2026]] Active at 84% pass probability: Autocrat program migration with Squads v4.0 multisig integration and legal document updates ($408K volume)
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md b/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md
index 49ccc1df5..337a97cd4 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/polymarket.md
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ Crypto-native prediction market platform on Polygon. Users trade binary outcome
 - **2026-01-XX** — Nevada Gaming Control Board sued Polymarket to halt sports-related contracts, arguing they constitute unlicensed gambling under state jurisdiction
 - **2026-01-XX** — Partnered with Palantir and TWG AI to build surveillance system detecting suspicious trading and manipulation in sports prediction markets
 - **2026-01-XX** — Targeting $20B valuation alongside Kalshi as prediction market duopoly emerges
+- **2026-03-23** — CEO Shayne Coplan co-founded [[5cc-capital]] with Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour, creating dedicated VC fund for prediction market infrastructure
 ## Competitive Position
 - **#1 by volume** — leads Kalshi on 30-day volume ($8.7B vs $6.8B)
 - **Crypto-native**: USDC on Polygon, non-custodial, permissionless market creation
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2026-03-25-futardio-launch-generated-test.md b/inbox/archive/2026-03-25-futardio-launch-generated-test.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c011e0487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/archive/2026-03-25-futardio-launch-generated-test.md
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+---
+type: source
+title: "Futardio: Generated Test fundraise goes live"
+author: "futard.io"
+url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE"
+date: 2026-03-25
+domain: internet-finance
+format: data
+status: unprocessed
+tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
+event_type: launch
+---
+
+## Launch Details
+- Project: Generated Test
+- Description: Creating the future of finance holds everything in our hands.
+- Funding target: $10.00
+- Total committed: $1.00
+- Status: Live
+- Launch date: 2026-03-25
+- URL: https://www.futard.io/launch/EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE
+
+## Team / Description
+
+# mockToken — Initial Coin Offering Document
+
+*This document is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Please read the Legal Disclaimer before proceeding.*
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+mockToken is a next-generation digital asset designed to [brief description of purpose or use case]. Built on a foundation of transparency, security, and decentralisation, mockToken aims to address [key problem or market gap] by providing [core value proposition].
+
+The mockToken ICO represents an opportunity for early participants to support the development of a robust ecosystem and gain access to a token with [utility description — e.g. governance rights, access to platform services, staking rewards]. A total supply of [X] mockTokens will be issued, with [Y]% made available during the public sale.
+
+Our team comprises experienced professionals in blockchain development, cryptography, and enterprise technology, united by a shared commitment to delivering a scalable and compliant platform.
+
+---
+
+## Technology
+
+### Architecture Overview
+
+mockToken is built on [blockchain platform — e.g. Ethereum, Solana, Polygon], leveraging its established infrastructure for security, interoperability, and developer tooling. The protocol is governed by a set of audited smart contracts that manage token issuance, distribution, and utility functions.
+
+### Smart Contracts
+
+All smart contracts underpinning the mockToken ecosystem have been developed in accordance with industry best practices and are subject to third-party security audits prior to deployment. Contract addresses will be published publicly upon mainnet launch.
+
+### Security & Auditing
+
+Security is a core priority. mockToken's codebase undergoes rigorous internal review and independent auditing by [Audit Firm Name]. All audit reports will be made available to the public via our official repository.
+
+### Scalability
+
+The platform is designed with scalability in mind, utilising [Layer 2 solutions / sharding / other mechanism] to ensure that transaction throughput and fees remain viable as the user base grows.
+
+---
+
+## Roadmap
+
+### Q1 [Year] — Foundation
+- Concept development and whitepaper publication
+- Core team formation and initial advisory board appointments
+- Seed funding round
+
+### Q2 [Year] — Development
+- Smart contract development and internal testing
+- Launch of developer testnet
+- Community building and early adopter programme
+
+### Q3 [Year] — ICO & Launch
+- Public ICO commences
+- Independent smart contract audit completed and published
+- Token Generation Event (TGE)
+- Listing on [Exchange Name(s)]
+
+### Q4 [Year] — Ecosystem Expansion
+- Platform beta launch
+- Strategic partnerships announced
+- Governance framework activated
+- Staking and rewards mechanism goes live
+
+### [Year+1] — Maturity & Growth
+- Full platform launch
+- Cross-chain integration
+- Expansion into [new markets or regions]
+- Ongoing protocol upgrades governed by token holders
+
+---
+
+## FAQ
+
+**What is mockToken?**
+mockToken is a digital asset issued on [blockchain platform] that provides holders with [utility — e.g. access to platform services, governance rights, staking rewards]. It is designed to [brief purpose statement].
+
+**How do I participate in the ICO?**
+To participate, you will need a compatible digital wallet (e.g. MetaMask) and [accepted currency — e.g. ETH or USDC]. Full participation instructions will be published on our official website prior to the sale opening.
+
+**What is the total supply of mockToken?**
+The total supply is capped at [X] mockTokens. Of this, [Y]% will be allocated to the public sale, with the remainder distributed across the team, advisors, ecosystem reserve, and treasury according to the tokenomics schedule.
+
+**Is mockToken available to investors in all countries?**
+mockToken is not available to residents of certain jurisdictions, including [restricted regions — e.g. the United States, sanctioned countries]. Participants are responsible for ensuring compliance with the laws of their local jurisdiction.
+
+**When will mockToken be listed on exchanges?**
+We are targeting listings on [Exchange Name(s)] in [Q/Year]. Announcements will be made through our official communication channels.
+
+**Has the smart contract been audited?**
+Yes. mockToken's smart contracts have been audited by [Audit Firm Name]. The full audit report is available [here/on our website].
+
+**How can I stay informed about the project?**
+You can follow our progress via our official website, Telegram community, Twitter/X account, and newsletter. Links to all official channels can be found at [website URL].
+
+---
+
+*© [Year] mockToken. All rights reserved. This document is subject to change without notice.*
+
+## Links
+
+- Website: https://reids.space
+
+## Raw Data
+
+- Launch address: `EbKRmpdKp2KhmBkGwKuFkjCgTqL4EsDbaqDcQ4xQs4SE`
+- Token: ENv (ENv)
+- Token mint: `ENvHYc8TbfCAW2ozrxFsyRECzD9UiP1G9pMR6PQaxoQU`
+- Version: v0.7
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md b/inbox/archive/general/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md
similarity index 90%
rename from inbox/queue/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md
rename to inbox/archive/general/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md
index f4fd42b78..908f35fe0 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/general/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-25
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: tweet
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: medium
 tags: [p2p-me, polymarket, prediction-markets, manipulation, self-dealing, futarchy, metadao-ico]
 ---
@@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ The highest-information actor (P2P team, who controls business decisions) can pu
 **What I expected but didn't find:** A formal Polymarket ruling or investigation. The allegation appears in the comment thread, not in any official announcement. This may mean: (a) Polymarket investigated and found nothing, (b) Polymarket hasn't investigated, or (c) the allegation was low-quality. Cannot determine which from available data.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
-- [[Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B)]] — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — this is a DIFFERENT manipulation type (prediction market social proof, not governance market)
+- Speculative markets aggregate information only when participants have incentives to acquire and reveal information (Mechanism B) — team participation corrupts Mechanism B by making the highest-information actor self-interested in the prediction
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM CANDIDATE: Prediction market participation by project issuers in their own commitment markets creates circular social proof with no arbitrage correction — novel mechanism risk not in KB
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md
similarity index 99%
rename from inbox/queue/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md
rename to inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md
index 7d91c9bf9..1f9e28740 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ date: 2026-03-25
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: tweet
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: medium
 tags: [futardio, permissionless-capital, capital-concentration, meta-bets, futarchy, launchpad]
 ---
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md
similarity index 90%
rename from inbox/queue/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md
rename to inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md
index fc4fa5e22..3ac0a1b84 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-25-pine-analytics-p2p-me-ico-analysis.md
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ Pine Analytics published a comprehensive pre-ICO analysis of P2P.me ahead of the
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Founder backgrounds. The team section is completely blank in every indexed source. This is a meaningful transparency gap for an "ownership" thesis — you're aligned with people you can't identify.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators]] — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
-- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
+- MetaDAO ICO participant composition includes 30-40% passive allocators — the 50% float will immediately surface this structural pressure post-TGE
+- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — the performance-gated vesting is the mechanism design instantiation of this belief
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — contrast with the Polymarket controversy (see separate archive)
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: Performance-gated team vesting (no benefit below 2x ICO price) eliminates early insider selling as an ownership alignment mechanism — extract as a mechanism design innovation claim
diff --git a/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.json b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.json
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c35f380cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.json
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "futarchy-governance-markets-face-gaming-classification-risk-without-advocacy-distinguishing-them-from-event-prediction-contracts.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "filename": "governance-decision-markets-are-structurally-distinguishable-from-event-prediction-contracts-through-endogenous-resolution-and-hedging-utility.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 2,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 4,
+    "rejected": 2,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "futarchy-governance-markets-face-gaming-classification-risk-without-advocacy-distinguishing-them-from-event-prediction-contracts.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
+      "futarchy-governance-markets-face-gaming-classification-risk-without-advocacy-distinguishing-them-from-event-prediction-contracts.md:stripped_wiki_link:the-gaming-classification-of-prediction-markets-is-the-prima",
+      "governance-decision-markets-are-structurally-distinguishable-from-event-prediction-contracts-through-endogenous-resolution-and-hedging-utility.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
+      "governance-decision-markets-are-structurally-distinguishable-from-event-prediction-contracts-through-endogenous-resolution-and-hedging-utility.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-governed-entities-are-structurally-not-securities-b"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "futarchy-governance-markets-face-gaming-classification-risk-without-advocacy-distinguishing-them-from-event-prediction-contracts.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
+      "governance-decision-markets-are-structurally-distinguishable-from-event-prediction-contracts-through-endogenous-resolution-and-hedging-utility.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-25"
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.json b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.json
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..032555553
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-futardio-capital-concentration-live-data.json
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 1,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 1,
+    "rejected": 1,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md:set_created:2026-03-25"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "permissionless-futarchy-capital-formation-produces-extreme-power-law-concentration-in-platform-meta-bets.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-25"
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.json b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.json
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91d0378f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/inbox/queue/.extraction-debug/2026-03-25-polymarket-p2p-commitment-market-controversy.json
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "rejected_claims": [
+    {
+      "filename": "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md",
+      "issues": [
+        "missing_attribution_extractor"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "validation_stats": {
+    "total": 1,
+    "kept": 0,
+    "fixed": 3,
+    "rejected": 1,
+    "fixes_applied": [
+      "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:set_created:2026-03-25",
+      "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:stripped_wiki_link:futarchy-is-manipulation-resistant-because-attack-attempts-c",
+      "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:stripped_wiki_link:speculative-markets-aggregate-information-through-incentive-"
+    ],
+    "rejections": [
+      "prediction-market-issuer-participation-creates-circular-social-proof-without-arbitrage-correction.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
+    ]
+  },
+  "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
+  "date": "2026-03-25"
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.md
index 549a9eb98..5b2c4858b 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-cftc-anprm-prediction-markets-law-firm-analysis.md
@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ date: 2026-03-16
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: []
 format: thread
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 priority: high
 tags: [cftc, prediction-markets, futarchy, regulation, anprm, governance-markets, advocacy-gap]
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-25
+enrichments_applied: ["polymarket-achieved-us-regulatory-legitimacy-through-qcx-acquisition-establishing-prediction-markets-as-cftc-regulated-derivatives.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -60,9 +64,9 @@ Truth Predict (Trump Media, March 2026): Trump's media company entering predicti
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any indication that MetaDAO, Robin Hanson, or Proph3t has submitted or is planning to submit a CFTC comment. META-036 (if it passed) would fund academic research that could inform such a comment, but the practical regulatory window closes before the research would complete.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk]] — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
-- [[CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis]] (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
-- [[Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility]] (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
+- The gaming classification of prediction markets is the primary regulatory threat to futarchy governance — worse than the securities classification risk — this is the direct evidence that the gaming classification risk is unaddressed
+- CFTC ANPRM regulatory analysis (Session 9 archive, if filed) — enrichment target
+- Decentralized mechanism design creates regulatory defensibility (Belief #6) — the Howey analysis doesn't help here; the gaming classification requires a completely separate argument
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: CFTC ANPRM contains no futarchy-specific questions, creating default gaming classification risk for governance decision markets — high confidence, directly documented
@@ -75,3 +79,12 @@ Truth Predict (Trump Media, March 2026): Trump's media company entering predicti
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: Gaming classification risk claim (identified in Sessions 2-3 as existential regulatory threat to futarchy)
 WHY ARCHIVED: Documents the advocacy gap and closes the loop on the multi-session CFTC regulatory thread; actionable with 36 days remaining
 EXTRACTION HINT: Extract as TWO claims: (1) the advocacy gap as an empirical fact, (2) the structural argument for distinguishing governance markets from event prediction — these are different claims with different confidence levels
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- CFTC ANPRM published March 16, 2026 in Federal Register (docket RIN 3038-AF65)
+- Comment period closes April 30, 2026 (45 days)
+- Prediction markets grew to >$13B industry size by March 2026
+- 19+ federal lawsuits in state-federal jurisdiction battle over prediction markets
+- No futarchy-specific comments filed in regulations.gov docket as of March 25, 2026
+- ANPRM contains 40+ questions on manipulation, settlement, insider trading, position limits, blockchain risk, and DCM Core Principles
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal.md
index 29d24f091..ab2a9d69d 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-metadao-omnibus-migration-proposal.md
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ The Squads multisig integration is particularly interesting for the trustless jo
 **What I expected but didn't find:** The proposal text. The 429 rate-limiting on MetaDAO's platform has been a recurring obstacle. This is the third session where a significant governance event is confirmed to exist but content is inaccessible.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation]] (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities]] — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
-- [[Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles]] — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
+- Futarchy-governed DAOs can use conditional markets to authorize temporary executive delegation (BDF3M meta-governance claim from Session 11) — the Squads integration may be the structural replacement for the temporary centralization
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities — program migrations directly affect the manipulation surface area
+- Ooki DAO proved entity structure is prerequisite for futarchy vehicles — legal document update component may relate to entity structuring
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. Once proposal text is accessible: extract as evidence for mechanism improvement claim (autocrat migration history pattern)
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-prediction-market-institutional-legitimization.md b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-prediction-market-institutional-legitimization.md
index c764d2965..1af450e11 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-prediction-market-institutional-legitimization.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-03-25-prediction-market-institutional-legitimization.md
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ Two March 2026 developments signal accelerating institutional adoption of predic
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any 5c(c) Capital statement on the types of prediction market companies they'll invest in. If they invest in governance decision market platforms (futarchy), they become natural allies for regulatory advocacy. If they invest only in event prediction platforms, they're separate interests.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Markets beat votes for information aggregation]] (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
-- [[CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap]] (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
+- Markets beat votes for information aggregation (Belief #1) — institutional legitimization is indirect evidence for societal acceptance of the "markets as better mechanism" thesis
+- CFTC ANPRM futarchy advocacy gap (see separate archive) — the institutional players mobilizing around prediction markets may or may not include futarchy advocates
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. CLAIM: Prediction market founders creating dedicated VC funds signals industry maturation beyond platform-building into capital formation infrastructure — institutional legitimization milestone