From 34490974e36f1b22957314764861dc63cd4b3ae7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:45:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rio: extract claims from 2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md - Source: inbox/archive/2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...first platform for ownership coins at scale.md | 6 ++++++ ...ghted average price over a three-day window.md | 6 ++++++ ...ted trading volume in uncontested decisions.md | 6 ++++++ ...-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md | 15 ++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md index b2124043e..5cc6f2a0a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md @@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M **Three-tier dispute resolution:** Protocol decisions via futarchy (on-chain), technical disputes via review panel, legal disputes via JAMS arbitration (Cayman Islands). The layered approach means on-chain governance handles day-to-day decisions while legal mechanisms provide fallback. Since [[MetaDAOs three-layer legal hierarchy separates formation agreements from contractual relationships from regulatory armor with each layer using different enforcement mechanisms]], the governance and legal structures are designed to work together. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +MetaDAO's futarchy implementation is being used for internal DAO governance decisions beyond capital formation. The 'mtn Meets META Hackathon' proposal (proposal #17) was created on 2025-02-24 and failed by 2025-02-27, demonstrating active use of the Autocrat v0.3 program for Test DAO governance. The proposal aimed to organize a hackathon to 'foster innovation and collaboration within the DAO community, while enhancing visibility and engagement.' This shows MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure is being deployed for operational governance decisions including community engagement initiatives, not just capital formation mechanisms. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md index 4d7b92bb2..b4ae1cacf 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md @@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +The mtn Meets META Hackathon proposal demonstrates the three-day settlement window in practice: created 2025-02-24, completed and ended 2025-02-27, exactly matching the documented three-day TWAP settlement period. The proposal used Autocrat version 0.3, confirming the program is actively deployed and processing real governance decisions with the specified settlement mechanics. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md index 321296cf4..8e62c2362 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md @@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ In uncontested decisions -- where the community broadly agrees on the right outc This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- futarchy excels precisely where disagreement and manipulation risk are high, but it wastes its protective power on consensual decisions. The MetaDAO experience validates the mixed-mechanism thesis: use simpler mechanisms for uncontested decisions and reserve futarchy's complexity for decisions where its manipulation resistance actually matters. The participation challenge also highlights a design tension: the mechanism that is most resistant to manipulation is also the one that demands the most sophistication from participants. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +The mtn Meets META Hackathon proposal failed with no trading volume data reported in the proposal interface, suggesting minimal market participation. The proposal description ('You know you asked for it so you get what you ask for') and the characterization of the DAO as 'hidden' indicate this was likely an uncontested or low-stakes decision that attracted little trading interest, consistent with the pattern of limited volume in uncontested decisions. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md b/inbox/archive/2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md index 83383246b..56be6582a 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2025-02-24-futardio-proposal-mtn-meets-meta-hackathon.md @@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ZYMaLKWn9PSLTX1entmqJUYBiCkZbRxeRz1tVvYwqy date: 2025-02-24 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2025-02-24 +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "This source is a single failed futarchy proposal from a test/hidden DAO. No novel claims extractable - the proposal itself contains no substantive evidence about futarchy mechanisms beyond confirming existing claims about MetaDAO's implementation. The three-day settlement window, Autocrat v0.3 usage, and limited trading volume pattern all confirm existing knowledge base claims. The proposal's failure and minimal description suggest it was a test case or low-stakes decision rather than a substantive governance event." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -50,3 +55,11 @@ But you have access to the data via API so here you are! - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2025-02-27 - Ended: 2025-02-27 + + +## Key Facts +- Test DAO proposal #17 'mtn Meets META Hackathon' created 2025-02-24, failed 2025-02-27 +- Proposal account: 9ZYMaLKWn9PSLTX1entmqJUYBiCkZbRxeRz1tVvYwqy6 +- DAO account: GWywkp2mY2vzAaLydR2MBXRCqk2vBTyvtVRioujxi5Ce +- Used Autocrat version 0.3 +- Test DAO is described as 'hidden' requiring API access to view proposals -- 2.45.2