domains/internet-finance/cftc-licensed-dcm-preemption-protects-centralized-prediction-markets-but-not-decentralized-governance-markets.md

@@ -1,10 +1,5 @@
 ```markdown
 ## The Claim (current version)
-
-
-## Challenging Evidence
-
-**Source:** MultiState, March 23, 2026
-
+**Source:** MultiState, March 23, 2026 (Scenario-based content)
 Curtis-Schiff bill would override CFTC DCM preemption through Congressional redefinition of sports contracts as gambling, demonstrating that DCM registration may not provide durable protection against legislative reclassification. Bipartisan sponsorship (Curtis R-Utah, Schiff D-California) suggests political durability beyond partisan gaming revenue disputes.
 ```

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse.md

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 ```markdown
 ## The Claim (current version)
-
-
-## Supporting Evidence
-
 **Source:** MultiState legislative tracking, March 23, **2026 (Scenario-based content)**
-
 Curtis-Schiff Prediction Markets Are Gambling Act (March 2026) explicitly defines sports event contracts as gambling products requiring state gaming licenses, with bipartisan Senate sponsorship from ideologically divergent states (R-Utah, D-California). Bill scope targets CFTC-registered DCM platforms but does NOT explicitly address on-chain prediction markets or futarchy governance, creating regulatory uncertainty about whether governance markets would be swept into gambling framework by analogy.
 ```

domains/internet-finance/prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets.md

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
 ```markdown
-## Extending Evidence
-
-**Source:** MultiState, March 2026 (Proposed Legislation)
-
+**Source:** MultiState, March 23, 2026 (Proposed Legislation Scenario)
 Legislative threat vector (Curtis-Schiff bill) operates independently of court outcomes and cannot be addressed through mechanism design. Bipartisan Senate support from ideologically divergent states (R-Utah, D-California) indicates opposition broader than state gaming revenue protection, with Utah sponsorship particularly notable given lack of major gaming industry.
 ```