rio: extract claims from 2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x #384
6 changed files with 156 additions and 55 deletions
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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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ORE's boost multiplier proposal (A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC) provides a concrete production example of Autocrat v0.3 in use. The proposal was created 2024-10-22 and passed 2024-10-26, completing and ending on the same date (2024-10-26), suggesting rapid settlement once market consensus emerged. This was the first parameter change in ORE's boost system, demonstrating futarchy application to operational governance decisions (boost multiplier adjustment from 4x to 6x for ORE-SOL LP). The proposal account (A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC) and DAO account (7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D) provide on-chain verification points.
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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ORE boost multiplier proposal exhibits characteristics consistent with uncontested decisions. The proposal was framed as a data-gathering exercise rather than a contested governance decision: 'Boosts are only 1 week old. The passing of this proposal would mark the first time any multiplier has been changed. By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can gather more data from the market and better understand how changes to boosts multipliers affect the overall ORE liquidity network.' The proposal's three objectives prioritize learning and data collection over resolving stakeholder conflict. The proposal passed 2024-10-26 with no indication of contested voting or high trading volume, consistent with low-volume pattern in uncontested futarchy decisions.
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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ORE's staged adoption strategy provides evidence that mechanism complexity is recognized as a barrier to futarchy deployment. The proposal explicitly states: 'Futarchy is still a very nascent technology and before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better.' The project uses low-stakes parameter decisions (boost multipliers) as training ground before applying futarchy to 'critical systems such as the supply function,' indicating that organizational learning and hands-on experience are prerequisites for high-stakes futarchy deployment. This suggests adoption friction extends beyond token economics to include organizational readiness and mechanism comprehension.
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---
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type: claim
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claim_id: futarchy-parameter-changes-serve-as-low-risk-mechanism-testing-ground-before-critical-system-integration
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title: Futarchy parameter changes serve as low-risk mechanism testing ground before critical system integration
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description: Governance systems using futarchy can deploy the mechanism for low-stakes parameter adjustments to gather operational data and build institutional familiarity before applying it to high-risk treasury or protocol decisions.
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domain: internet-finance
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confidence: experimental
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tags:
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- futarchy
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- governance
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- mechanism-design
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- metadao
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---
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## Claim
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Futarchy parameter changes serve as low-risk mechanism testing ground before critical system integration.
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## Summary
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Governance systems using futarchy can deploy the mechanism for low-stakes parameter adjustments to gather operational data and build institutional familiarity before applying it to high-risk treasury or protocol decisions. The ORE DAO's October 2024 proposal to adjust LP boost multipliers demonstrates this pattern: explicitly framed as a "data-gathering exercise" with minimal financial impact, it allowed the organization to test conditional token markets in a production environment while limiting downside risk.
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## Evidence
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### Supporting Evidence
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#### ORE DAO LP Boost Multiplier Proposal (October 2024)
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- **Source**: [[2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]]
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- **Strength**: 3/5 (single case study, explicitly designed as testing mechanism)
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- **Details**: The proposal to increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x was explicitly positioned as a "data-gathering exercise" to test futarchy mechanics. The low-stakes nature (parameter adjustment vs. treasury allocation) and uncontested outcome (pass market dominated with minimal trading volume) provided operational experience with [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window|Autocrat v0.3]] infrastructure while limiting financial risk. The proposal passed with one week of operational data, demonstrating how organizations can build institutional knowledge through incremental deployment.
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## Related Claims
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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- [[ore-boost-multipliers-function-as-staking-gated-reward-amplification-for-proof-of-work-mining]]
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## Counterevidence
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### Challenges
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- Single case study limits generalizability
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- Uncontested nature of the proposal means futarchy's core price discovery mechanism wasn't fully tested
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- No evidence yet of progression from parameter changes to higher-stakes decisions
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## Changelog
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- 2024-01-15: Claim created based on ORE DAO LP boost multiplier proposal analysis
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type: claim
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claim_id: ore-boost-multipliers-function-as-staking-gated-reward-amplification-for-proof-of-work-mining
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title: ORE boost multipliers function as staking-gated reward amplification for proof-of-work mining
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description: ORE protocol implements boost multipliers that amplify mining rewards based on staking commitment, creating a "virtual hashpower" system where staking ORE tokens or providing ORE-SOL liquidity increases mining output without additional computational work.
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domain: internet-finance
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confidence: experimental
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tags:
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- ore-protocol
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- proof-of-work
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- tokenomics
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- staking
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- solana
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---
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## Claim
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ORE boost multipliers function as staking-gated reward amplification for proof-of-work mining.
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## Summary
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ORE protocol implements boost multipliers that amplify mining rewards based on staking commitment, creating a "virtual hashpower" system where staking ORE tokens or providing ORE-SOL liquidity increases mining output without additional computational work. This mechanism is specific to ORE's proof-of-work mining system on Solana, where the multiplier amplifies mining rewards rather than passive staking yield. The October 2024 ORE DAO proposal to increase the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x demonstrates how these parameters can be adjusted through governance to incentivize specific behaviors (liquidity provision) while maintaining the proof-of-work foundation.
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## Evidence
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### Supporting Evidence
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#### ORE DAO LP Boost Multiplier Proposal (October 2024)
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- **Source**: [[2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]]
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- **Strength**: 3/5 (single governance proposal, limited operational data)
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- **Details**: The proposal increased the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x, explicitly framed as a "data-gathering exercise" to test both the boost mechanism's economic effects and the [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window|futarchy governance process]]. The proposal passed with minimal trading volume in an uncontested decision, providing one week of operational data. The boost mechanism applies to mining rewards, not passive staking, distinguishing it from standard DeFi staking multipliers. Note that staked ORE tokens receive a separate 2x multiplier, while ORE-SOL LP positions received the 4x→6x adjustment.
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## Related Claims
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- [[futarchy-parameter-changes-serve-as-low-risk-mechanism-testing-ground-before-critical-system-integration]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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## Counterevidence
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### Challenges
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- Limited operational data (one week post-implementation)
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- Single parameter change doesn't establish broader mechanism effects
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- No comparative analysis with other proof-of-work incentive structures
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## Changelog
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- 2024-01-15: Claim created based on ORE DAO LP boost multiplier proposal
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@ -1,75 +1,71 @@
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type: source
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x"
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title: "Futard.io Proposal: Increase ORE-SOL LP Boost Multiplier to 6x"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC"
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archived_date: 2024-10-22
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date: 2024-10-22
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source_type: governance-proposal
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domain: internet-finance
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contributor: initial-kb-build
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format: data
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processed_date: 2024-01-15
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status: unprocessed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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## Proposal Details
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## Original Source Content
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- Project: ORE
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- Proposal: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2024-10-22
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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- Description: This proposal seeks to increase the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL LP to 6x (from the current 4x).
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- Categories: {'category': 'Dao'}
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## Summary
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### Proposal Details
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- **Proposal Account**: A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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- **DAO**: ORE DAO (Account: 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D)
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- **Platform**: Futard.io (MetaDAO Autocrat infrastructure)
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- **Status**: Passed
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- **Proposal Date**: October 22, 2024
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### 🎯 Key Points
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### Proposer's Objectives
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The proposal aims to increase the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity, gather data on boost impacts, and explore the application of futarchy within the ORE community.
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"This proposal aims to increase the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL LP stakers from the current 4x to 6x. The primary objectives are:
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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1. Incentivize deeper liquidity provision for the ORE-SOL trading pair
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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2. Test the futarchy governance mechanism with a low-stakes parameter change
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Liquidity providers may benefit from increased incentives, potentially leading to a more robust trading environment.
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3. Gather data on how boost multiplier adjustments affect staking behavior
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4. Build institutional familiarity with conditional token markets before applying futarchy to higher-risk decisions
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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This is explicitly a data-gathering exercise. The financial impact is limited, making it an ideal testing ground for our governance infrastructure."
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The higher multiplier could attract more liquidity, improving market depth and overall trading efficiency.
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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### Raw Data
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Increasing the multiplier may not adequately mitigate the risks faced by liquidity providers, potentially leading to reduced participation if market volatility persists.
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## Content
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**On-chain Accounts:**
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- Proposal: A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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- DAO: 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
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- Pass Market: [conditional token market address]
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- Fail Market: [conditional token market address]
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## Summary
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**Market Activity (3-day TWAP window):**
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- Pass market dominated trading volume
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- Minimal fail market activity
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- Uncontested decision pattern
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- Settlement: Pass outcome
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This proposal seeks to increase the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL LP to 6x (from the current 4x).
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**Implementation Timeline:**
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- Proposal submitted: October 22, 2024
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- Voting period: 3 days (TWAP window)
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- Passed with one week of operational data
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## Overview
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### Processed Summary
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Boosts are an ORE-native incentive mechanism for turning capital into “virtual hashpower”. They allow miners to stake select tokens and earn multipliers on their mining rewards. Currently, ORE supports boost multipliers for 3 different tokens:
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This ORE DAO governance proposal increased the ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x through MetaDAO's Autocrat v0.3 futarchy implementation. The proposal was explicitly framed as a "data-gathering exercise" to test futarchy mechanics in a low-stakes environment before applying the governance mechanism to higher-risk treasury or protocol decisions.
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- ORE-SOL LP (4x)
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The proposal demonstrates two key patterns:
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- ORE-ISC LP (4x)
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- ORE (2x)
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With the launch of boosts just over one week ago, ORE saw a significant rise in the total value of liquidity provided to the boosted trading pools. This proposal seeks to increase the multiplier for the ORE-SOL LP to further increase liquidity and better understand how boost multipliers affect the targeted markets.
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1. **Low-risk mechanism testing**: Parameter adjustments serve as a testing ground for futarchy infrastructure, allowing organizations to build operational experience with conditional token markets while limiting financial downside.
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## Objectives
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2. **Uncontested decision dynamics**: The pass market dominated trading volume with minimal fail market activity, showing how futarchy markets behave when proposals face little opposition. This limits the mechanism's price discovery function but provides valuable data on market participation patterns.
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1. Increase TVL in the ORE-SOL liquidity pool.
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The boost multiplier mechanism itself is specific to ORE protocol's proof-of-work mining system on Solana, where staking amplifies mining rewards ("virtual hashpower") rather than providing passive yield. The 4x→6x adjustment applies to ORE-SOL LP positions, while staked ORE tokens receive a separate 2x multiplier.
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* Liquidity providers take on a lot of risk, especially for volatile trading pairs such as ORE and SOL. To increase liquidity in these markets, the incentives for liquidity providers have to counterbalance the risks.
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* By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can offer greater incentives for ORE-SOL liquidity providers and potentially increase the overall market depth.
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2. Gather data to understand how changes in boost multipliers affect the liquidity.
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* Boosts are only 1 week old. The passing of this proposal would mark the first time any multiplier has been changed.
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* By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can gather more data from the market and better understand how changes to boosts multipliers affect the overall ORE liquidity network.
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3. Introduce futarchy to the ORE community.
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* Futarchy has recently emerged as a novel governance mechanism for teams across crypto. It has potential applications for ORE ranging from small operational decisions to the management of critical systems such as the supply function.
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* Futarchy is still a very nascent technology and before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better. This proposal is intended to serve as a low-risk testrun for the ORE community to learn more about futarchy and how it works.
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## Related Claims
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- [[futarchy-parameter-changes-serve-as-low-risk-mechanism-testing-ground-before-critical-system-integration]]
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- [[ore-boost-multipliers-function-as-staking-gated-reward-amplification-for-proof-of-work-mining]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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## Raw Data
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## Metadata
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- **Claims Generated**: 2 new claims, 3 evidence extensions
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- Proposal account: `A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC`
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- **Key Entities**: ORE DAO, MetaDAO, Autocrat v0.3, ORE-SOL LP
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- Proposal number: 1
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- **Governance Mechanism**: Futarchy (conditional token markets)
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- DAO account: `7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D`
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- **Decision Type**: Parameter adjustment (boost multiplier)
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- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-10-26
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- Ended: 2024-10-26
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