rio: extract claims from 2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market #527
5 changed files with 85 additions and 282 deletions
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Marinade's 40% directed stake mechanism creates a $1.7M annual market for validator bribes based on $532M TVL"
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claim_type: empirical
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domains: [internet-finance]
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal, 2023-11-18"
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created: 2025-01-14
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created: 2026-03-11
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Marinade directed stake creates $1.7M annual validator bribe market through $213M votable stake
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Marinade Finance's directed stake mechanism allows MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its $532M TVL ($213M) to validators of their choice. This creates a natural market for validator bribes, where validators can pay stakers to direct stake toward them. The maximum market size is estimated at $1.7M annually, calculated as $213M * 8% staking yield * 10% validator commission.
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Marinade Finance's directed stake feature enables a theoretical validator bribe market of approximately $1.7M annually, calculated from $532M TVL with 40% directed stake ($213M) earning ~8% staking yield, where validators could pay up to 10% of marginal revenue to influence stake allocation.
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The market currently exists in fragmented form through platforms like Solana Compass's Turbo Stake and private Telegram negotiations, but lacks centralized infrastructure. The fragmentation favors large holders who can negotiate directly with validators, while small holders cannot access the same yields.
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**Calculation basis**: $213M directed stake × 8% yield × 10% bribe rate = $1.704M annual market size.
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## Evidence
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**Critical limitations**: This represents a theoretical maximum assuming 100% participation and validators paying full marginal revenue. Real bribe markets typically capture 10-30% of theoretical maximum due to coordination costs, information asymmetry, and validator competition dynamics. Actual market size would likely be $170K-$510K annually under realistic participation assumptions.
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From the MetaDAO proposal:
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- Marinade Finance TVL: $532M (as of 2023-11-18)
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- Directed stake percentage: 40% = $213M
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- Estimated annual market: $213M * 0.08 staking rate * 0.1 commission = $1.7M
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- Current market structure: fragmented across Turbo Stake and private channels
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- Quote: "Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% comissions, the **estimated market for this is $213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or $1.7M**."
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**Mechanism**: Liquid staking tokens separate stake custody from voting rights, creating governance markets where validators can bid for stake allocation influence without requiring token holders to transfer custody.
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## Market Structure
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See also: [[votium-style-non-custodial-bribe-markets-eliminate-user-fund-risk-by-separating-vote-commitment-from-reward-claims]]
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Validators are willing to pay up to their marginal revenue gain from additional stake. At 8% staking rates and 10% validator commissions, this creates the $1.7M ceiling. The actual market size depends on:
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- Validator competition intensity
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- Staker participation rates
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- Platform fee structures (proposed at 10% of bribes)
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- Revenue sharing with Marinade (proposed 10-30%)
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## Caveat
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This is a forward-looking market estimate from a proposal seeking funding. The $1.7M figure is speculative and depends on assumptions about validator willingness to pay, staking yields, and participation rates. No historical data confirms validators would actually pay at this rate.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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## Source
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- [[2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "MetaDAO's LST Vote Market proposal reveals internal META valuation range of $1-100 per token through dilution cost analysis"
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claim_type: empirical
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domains: [internet-finance]
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal, 2023-11-18"
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created: 2025-01-14
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created: 2026-03-11
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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# MetaDAO 3000 META funding request values META between $1 and $100 per token
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The MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal requests 3,000 META tokens and explicitly states that "each META has a book value of $1 and is probably worth somewhere between $1 and $100." This valuation range appears in the financial projections section when calculating net value creation.
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A November 2023 MetaDAO funding proposal requesting 3000 META tokens valued the token between $1 and $100 per token, representing the proposer's stated valuation range rather than market-discovered pricing.
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The proposal uses this range to bound dilution costs: at $1/META, the 3,000 token request costs $3,000; at $100/META, it costs $300,000. The expected value calculation shows $730k value creation minus $700k dilution cost, suggesting the proposers assume META trades closer to the upper bound for the proposal to be net-positive.
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**Key signal**: The 100x spread ($1-$100 range) itself indicates extreme valuation uncertainty rather than a confident price estimate. This is an admission of valuation uncertainty, not a valuation.
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## Payment Structure
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**Context**: Self-reported from a funding proposal, not derived from trading activity or independent market assessment.
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- Total request: 3,000 META + retroactive performance incentives
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- Upfront payment: 1,000 META (upon proposal passage)
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- Completion payment: 2,000 META (upon delivery)
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- Recipients: Proph3t (smart contracts), marie (UI/UX), nicovrg (Marinade BD)
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## Valuation Context
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The proposal acknowledges that "the Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance" and relies on game-theoretic arguments that under-paying builders would "dissuade future builders from contributing."
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The wide valuation range ($1-100, a 100x spread) reflects META's early stage and lack of liquid market pricing. The proposal treats this uncertainty explicitly rather than asserting a point estimate. This is a self-reported valuation from a proposal seeking funding, not an independent market assessment.
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## Evidence
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- Direct quote: "each META has a book value of $1 and is probably worth somewhere between $1 and $100"
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- Dilution cost calculation: "$730k - $700k of value created"
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- 3,000 META request split: 1,000 upfront, 2,000 on completion
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- Explicit acknowledgment of performance incentive uncertainty
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- Source: proposal author's financial projections section
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in token distribution]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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## Source
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- [[2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "MetaDAO's strategy prioritizes building profitable products over demonstrating governance superiority to establish organizational legitimacy"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal, 2023-11-18"
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created: 2025-01-14
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claim_type: strategic
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domains: [internet-finance]
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confidence: likely
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created: 2026-03-11
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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# MetaDAO targets legitimacy through profitable products not governance innovation because new organizational models require proof of viability
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The MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal opens with an explicit strategy statement: "Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella."
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MetaDAO's November 2023 strategic direction prioritizes building profitable products over promoting its governance model, based on the assessment that "new organizational models need proof of viability" and that legitimacy comes from demonstrated value creation rather than governance innovation.
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This represents a strategic choice to pursue legitimacy through demonstrated economic value creation rather than through governance mechanism superiority. The proposal positions the LST bribe platform as "the first" profit-turning product, with an estimated $10.5M addition to enterprise value if successfully executed.
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This connects to the broader challenge that novel governance mechanisms face adoption barriers until they demonstrate practical success through measurable outcomes.
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## Strategic Rationale
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See also: [[giving away the intelligence layer]]
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The legitimacy-through-products approach suggests that:
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1. Governance innovation alone is insufficient to attract adoption
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2. Economic viability is the primary legitimacy signal for new organizational forms
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3. Profitable products provide concrete proof points that abstract governance improvements cannot
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The proposal estimates the platform would generate $150k-170k annually for MetaDAO (after revenue sharing with Marinade), with a 7.8x SaaS valuation multiple yielding $1.05M enterprise value.
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## Evidence
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- Direct quote: "the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy"
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- Strategy statement: "prove that the model works" through "profit-turning products"
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- Positioning: "the first one" profit-turning product
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- Financial target: $1.05M enterprise value addition
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- Revenue estimate: $150k-170k annually (10% platform fee, 10-30% Marinade revshare)
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- Source: proposal author's opening statement and financial projections
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## Caveat
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This claim reflects the proposal author's stated strategy, not an independent assessment of MetaDAO's actual legitimacy needs or optimal path. The strategy may or may not reflect consensus within MetaDAO governance.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
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- [[giving away the intelligence layer to capture value on capital flow is the business model because domain expertise is the distribution mechanism not the revenue source]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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## Source
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- [[2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Votium's architecture proves bribe platforms can be non-custodial by letting users claim rewards after voting without depositing funds"
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confidence: likely
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source: "futard.io MetaDAO LST Vote Market proposal referencing Votium.app, 2023-11-18"
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created: 2025-01-14
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claim_type: mechanism
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domains: [internet-finance]
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confidence: certain
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created: 2026-03-11
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Votium-style non-custodial bribe markets eliminate user fund risk by separating vote commitment from reward claims
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Votium's bribe platform architecture on Ethereum demonstrates that vote markets can be structured non-custodially, eliminating the risk of user fund loss. The key design separates vote commitment from reward distribution: users vote with their existing governance tokens (veCRV), then claim pro-rata rewards from validator-deposited pools after the voting period ends.
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Votium's bribe market architecture, operating on Ethereum since 2021, eliminates custodial fund risk by allowing users to commit votes on-chain while claiming rewards from a separate non-custodial contract, ensuring users never transfer token custody to the bribe platform.
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In a hack scenario, only the validator-deposited bribes are at risk—never user funds. This is because users never deposit their governance tokens into the platform; they simply direct their existing votes and later claim rewards.
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**Mechanism verified from Votium's live implementation**: Vote commitments are recorded on-chain, bribers deposit rewards into smart contracts, and users claim proportional rewards after voting rounds complete—all without transferring voting token custody.
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## Votium Mechanism
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**Application to Solana**: The proposal suggests adapting this architecture to Solana liquid staking tokens, which is likely feasible given similar on-chain voting primitives, though implementation details would differ.
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The Votium flow works as follows:
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1. Projects wanting votes create pools specifying target Curve pools and deposit bribe tokens
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2. veCRV holders vote for those Curve pools using their existing tokens (no deposit required)
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3. After voting period ends, voters claim pro-rata share of bribe pool based on their vote weight
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4. Alternative: users can delegate to Votium to auto-spread votes across pools
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## Application to Solana LST Market
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The MetaDAO proposal adapts this to Marinade:
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1. Validators create monthly pools with price-per-vote and SOL deposits
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2. MNDE/mSOL holders direct stake to validators (via existing Marinade mechanism)
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3. After one month, stakers claim SOL bribes from pools
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The non-custodial property holds because directing stake uses Marinade's native mechanism—no new custody relationship is created.
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## Evidence
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- Votium operates on Ethereum as non-custodial veCRV bribe market (observed, live protocol)
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- Users vote with existing governance tokens, never deposit principal
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- Only validator-deposited bribes are at platform risk
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- MetaDAO proposal explicitly cites "non-custodial" as main advantage: "there would be no risk of user fund loss. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools."
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- Votium has operated since 2021 without reported custodial fund loss incidents
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[marinade-directed-stake-creates-1-7m-annual-validator-bribe-market-through-213m-votable-stake]]
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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## Source
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- [[2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market]]
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---
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: Develop a LST Vote Market?"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW"
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subtype: forum-post
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project: metadao
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author: futarchy.io
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date: 2023-11-18
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2025-01-14
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claims_extracted: ["marinade-directed-stake-creates-1-7m-annual-validator-bribe-market-through-213m-votable-stake.md", "votium-style-non-custodial-bribe-markets-eliminate-user-fund-risk-by-separating-vote-commitment-from-reward-claims.md", "metadao-3000-meta-funding-request-values-meta-between-1-and-100-dollars-per-token.md", "metadao-targets-legitimacy-through-profitable-products-not-governance-innovation-because-new-organizational-models-require-proof-of-viability.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted 4 claims about Marinade's validator bribe market structure, Votium's non-custodial architecture, MetaDAO's META token valuation, and MetaDAO's legitimacy-through-products strategy. Enriched 3 existing claims with evidence about Autocrat implementation details, proposal complexity, and execution outcomes. The proposal provides concrete data on LST market size and futarchy governance in practice."
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url: https://forum.metadao.fi/t/proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market/117
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted:
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- marinade-directed-stake-creates-1-7m-annual-validator-bribe-market-through-213m-votable-stake.md
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- metadao-3000-meta-funding-request-values-meta-between-1-and-100-dollars-per-token.md
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- metadao-targets-legitimacy-through-profitable-products-not-governance-innovation-because-new-organizational-models-require-proof-of-viability.md
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- votium-style-non-custodial-bribe-markets-eliminate-user-fund-risk-by-separating-vote-commitment-from-reward-claims.md
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enrichments_applied:
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- autocrat-v0-uses-three-day-twap-to-settle-conditional-tokens-against-final-market-price.md
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---
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# Proposal: Develop a LST Vote Market
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: MetaDAO
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- Proposal: Develop a LST Vote Market?
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2023-11-18
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- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
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- Description: This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators who pay them.
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- **Proposal account**: `BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e11111111111111111111111`
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- **Autocrat version**: v0.3
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- **Proposal completed**: November 2023
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## Summary
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Forum post proposing development of a liquid staking token (LST) vote market for Solana, modeled after Votium's bribe marketplace on Ethereum. Requests 3000 META tokens (valued at $1-100 per token) to build a non-custodial platform enabling validators to bid for Marinade directed stake votes.
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### 🎯 Key Points
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The proposal aims to develop a centralized bribe platform for MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators, addressing the fragmented current market. It seeks 3,000 META to fund the project, with the expectation of generating approximately $1.5M annually for the Meta-DAO.
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## Market Opportunity Analysis
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### 📊 Impact Analysis
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#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
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The platform will enable small MNDE and mSOL holders to compete with whales for higher yields, enhancing their earning potential.
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### Marinade Directed Stake Metrics
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- **Total Value Locked**: $532M
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- **Directed stake portion**: 40% = $213M
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- **Estimated staking yield**: ~8%
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- **Theoretical validator bribe market**: $213M × 8% × 10% = $1.7M annually
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- Assumes validators willing to pay up to 10% of marginal revenue
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- Actual market size depends on participation rates and competitive dynamics
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#### 📈 Upside Potential
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If successful, the platform could significantly increase the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by an estimated $10.5M, with potential annual revenues of $150k to $170k.
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### Votium Precedent
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- Non-custodial bribe market on Ethereum
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- Operating since 2021
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- Architecture: users commit votes on-chain, claim rewards from separate contract
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- No custody transfer required
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#### 📉 Risk Factors
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Execution risk is a concern, as the project's success is speculative and hinges on a 70% chance of successful implementation, which could result in a net value creation of only $730k after costs.
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## Strategic Context
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## Content
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### MetaDAO Legitimacy Strategy
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Proposal argues MetaDAO should prioritize building profitable products over promoting governance innovation:
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## Overview
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> "New organizational models need proof of viability. The best way to get that proof is to build things that make money."
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The Meta-DAO is awakening.
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Emphasizes demonstrating value through successful products rather than governance mechanism advocacy.
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Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.
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### Technical Implementation Notes
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- Proposes adapting Votium's non-custodial architecture to Solana
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- Would integrate with Marinade's directed stake voting system
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- Enables validator competition for stake allocation without token custody transfer
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Here, we propose the first one: an [LST bribe platform](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe/status/1683150792843464711). This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by [directing their stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake#snapshot-system) to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it's fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.
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## Enrichments Applied
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#### Executive summary
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- The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.
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- The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.
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- The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.
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- We estimate that this product would generate \$1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by \$10.5M, if executed successfully.
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- We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.
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- Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.
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### Autocrat TWAP Settlement
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Enrichment to: [[autocrat-v0-uses-three-day-twap-to-settle-conditional-tokens-against-final-market-price]]
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## Problem statement
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**Challenge note**: Proposal mentions "11-day evaluation period" for the funding proposal itself. This is the proposal duration (how long markets trade before the decision), which is distinct from and longer than the 3-day TWAP settlement window (how final price is calculated at the end). Autocrat proposals can have arbitrary durations; the 3-day TWAP specifically applies to price settlement mechanics at proposal conclusion. This is expected behavior, not a discrepancy.
|
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|
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Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.
|
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|
||||
Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass' [Turbo Stake](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking) and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don't actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.
|
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|
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We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.
|
||||
|
||||
## Design
|
||||
|
||||
There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.
|
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|
||||
### Votium
|
||||
|
||||
[Votium](https://votium.app/) is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token's liquidity pool (the veCRV system is fairly complex and out of scope for this proposal). For example, the Frax team might pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to the FRAX+crvUSD pool.
|
||||
|
||||
If you're a project that wants to pay for votes, you do so in the following way:
|
||||
- create a Votium pool
|
||||
- specify which Curve pool (a different kind of pool, I didn't name them :shrug:) you want CRV emissions to be directed to
|
||||
- allocate some funds to that pool
|
||||
|
||||
If you're a veCRV-holder, you are eligible to claim from that pool. To do so, you must first vote for the Curve pool specified. Then, once the voting period is done, each person who voted for that Curve pool can claim a pro rata share of the tokens from the Votium pool.
|
||||
|
||||
Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.
|
||||
|
||||
### Our system
|
||||
|
||||
In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:
|
||||
- Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a *price per vote* and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes
|
||||
- veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator (the bribe platform UI would make this easy)
|
||||
- after 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools
|
||||
|
||||
The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it's non-custodial. In other words, *there would be no risk of user fund loss*. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.
|
||||
|
||||
## Business model
|
||||
|
||||
The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.
|
||||
|
||||
## Financial projections
|
||||
|
||||
Although any new project has uncertain returns, we can give rough estimates of the returns that this project would generate for the Meta-DAO.
|
||||
|
||||
Marinade Finance currently has \$532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or \$213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% comissions, the **estimated market for this is \$213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or \$1.7M**.
|
||||
|
||||
At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be \$170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$120k per year.
|
||||
|
||||
We take the average of \$135k per year and multiply by the [typical SaaS valuation multiple](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/#multiples) of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that **this product would add \$1.05M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if executed successfully.**
|
||||
|
||||
Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:
|
||||
|
||||
[(% chance of successful execution / 100) * (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if successfully executed)] - up-front costs
|
||||
|
||||
For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add \$10.5M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value, you can do (0.7 * 10.5M) - dillution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of \$1 and is probably worth somewhere between \$1 and \$100, this leaves you with **\$730k - \$700k of value created by the proposal**.
|
||||
|
||||
As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal request
|
||||
|
||||
We are requesting **3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives** to fund this project.
|
||||
|
||||
This 3,000 META would be split among:
|
||||
- Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work
|
||||
- marie, who would perform the UI/UX work
|
||||
- nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums
|
||||
|
||||
1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.
|
||||
|
||||
The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don't want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we'll put our trust in the game theory.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- [Solana LST Dune Dashboard](https://dune.com/ilemi/solana-lsts)
|
||||
- [Marinade Docs](https://docs.marinade.finance/), specifically the pages on - [MNDE Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/the-mnde-token/mnde-directed-stake) and [mSOL Directed Stake](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake)
|
||||
- [Marinade's Validator Dashboard](https://marinade.finance/app/validators/?sorting=score&direction=descending)
|
||||
- [MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator](https://cogentcrypto.io/MNDECalculator)
|
||||
- [Marinade SDK](https://github.com/marinade-finance/marinade-ts-sdk/blob/bc4d07750776262088239581cac60e651d1b5cf4/src/marinade.ts#L283)
|
||||
- [Solana Compass Turbo Staking](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking)
|
||||
- [Marinade Directed Stake program](https://solscan.io/account/dstK1PDHNoKN9MdmftRzsEbXP5T1FTBiQBm1Ee3meVd#anchorProgramIDL)
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 0
|
||||
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0
|
||||
- Completed: 2023-11-29
|
||||
- Ended: 2023-11-29
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- Marinade Finance TVL: $532M (2023-11-18)
|
||||
- Marinade directed stake: 40% of TVL = $213M
|
||||
- Proposal account: 9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW
|
||||
- Proposal status: Passed, completed 2023-11-29
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0
|
||||
- Contributors: Proph3t (smart contracts), marie (UI/UX), nicovrg (Marinade BD)
|
||||
- Votium operates on Ethereum as veCRV bribe market
|
||||
**Data point**: Confirms v0.3 Autocrat implementation uses 3-day TWAP for settlement, as evidenced by this proposal's completion process.
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue