rio: extract 10 MetaDAO governance proposals as decision_market entities #574
1 changed files with 49 additions and 0 deletions
49
entities/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md
Normal file
49
entities/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: entity
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "doctor.sol & rar3"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-03
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-03-08
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens (~979,000 of 982,464) to significantly reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation. Passed on Autocrat v0.1. The high FDV was perceived as discouraging investors and limiting participation in the futarchy experiment. Post-burn treasury: ~4,500 META valued at ~$4M plus ~$2M in META-USDC LP at the time ($880/META). Total META supply after burn: ~20,885.
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-08)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
|
||||
- **Key participants:** doctor.sol & rar3 (authors), Proph3t (executor)
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
One of the most consequential early MetaDAO governance decisions. The burn fundamentally changed MetaDAO's token economics — eliminating the treasury's ability to pay in META and forcing future operations to use USDC or market-purchase META. This created a natural scarcity signal but also meant the DAO would eventually need mintable tokens (which the proposal explicitly noted as a future possibility). The burn set the stage for the later token split and elastic supply debates.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal also reveals early futarchy dynamics: community members (not founders) proposed a radical tokenomics change, and the market approved it. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — governance decision, treasury management
|
||||
- [[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]] — demonstrates market-governed treasury decisions
|
||||
- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — burn as extreme active management
|
||||
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this burn directly created the conditions that made mintable tokens necessary
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — executor
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue