entities/internet-finance/metadao-burn-993-percent-meta.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "doctor.sol & rar3"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1NcU"
+proposal_date: 2024-03-03
+resolution_date: 2024-03-08
+category: treasury
+summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
+tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to burn approximately 99.3% of treasury-held META tokens (~979,000 of 982,464) to significantly reduce the Fully Diluted Valuation. Passed on Autocrat v0.1. The high FDV was perceived as discouraging investors and limiting participation in the futarchy experiment. Post-burn treasury: ~4,500 META valued at ~$4M plus ~$2M in META-USDC LP at the time ($880/META). Total META supply after burn: ~20,885.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-08)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
+- **Key participants:** doctor.sol & rar3 (authors), Proph3t (executor)
+
+## Significance
+One of the most consequential early MetaDAO governance decisions. The burn fundamentally changed MetaDAO's token economics — eliminating the treasury's ability to pay in META and forcing future operations to use USDC or market-purchase META. This created a natural scarcity signal but also meant the DAO would eventually need mintable tokens (which the proposal explicitly noted as a future possibility). The burn set the stage for the later token split and elastic supply debates.
+
+The proposal also reveals early futarchy dynamics: community members (not founders) proposed a radical tokenomics change, and the market approved it. This is a concrete example of futarchy enabling non-founder governance proposals with material treasury impact.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — governance decision, treasury management
+- [[futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets]] — demonstrates market-governed treasury decisions
+- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — burn as extreme active management
+- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this burn directly created the conditions that made mintable tokens necessary
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — executor
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Proph3t & Nallok"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJbG"
+proposal_date: 2024-05-27
+resolution_date: 2024-05-31
+category: hiring
+summary: "Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028"
+tags: ["futarchy", "compensation", "founder-incentives", "mechanism-design"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
+
+## Summary
+The founders proposed a convex performance-based compensation package: 2% of token supply per $1 billion market cap increase, capped at 10% (1,975 META each) at $5B. Fixed salary of $90K/year each. Four-year cliff — no tokens unlock before April 2028 regardless of milestones. DAO can claw back all tokens until December 2024. The $1B market cap benchmark was defined as $42,198 per META (allowing for 20% dilution post-proposal).
+
+The proposal included explicit utility calculations using expected value theory: Nallok requires $361M success payout to rationally stay (20% success probability estimate), Proph3t requires $562M (10% success probability). This drove the 10% allocation at $5B market cap (~$500M payout each).
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-05-31)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Proph3t (architect/mechanism designer), Nallok (operations manager)
+
+## Significance
+This is the first real-world example of futarchy-governed founder compensation. The mechanism design is sophisticated: convex payouts align incentives with exponential growth, the 4-year cliff signals long-term commitment, and the clawback provision creates accountability.
+
+The explicit utility calculation in the proposal is remarkable — founders openly modeled their reservation wages, success probabilities, and effort costs, then derived the compensation that makes maximum effort rational. Proph3t estimated only 10% success probability, making his required payout higher than Nallok's despite both receiving equal allocation. This transparency is the opposite of typical startup compensation negotiations.
+
+The proposal also honestly acknowledges centralization: "If Nallok and I walk away, probability of success drops by at least 50%." Futarchy governed the compensation decision, but the organization remained founder-dependent — the market approved this rather than pretending otherwise.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — founder compensation structure
+- [[performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution]] — direct implementation of this mechanism
+- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — performance-based rather than fixed allocation
+- [[time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked]] — this proposal uses milestone vesting instead of time-based, partially addressing the hedging problem
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — compensated founder
+- [[nallok]] — compensated founder
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "unknown"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb"
+proposal_date: 2024-11-21
+resolution_date: 2024-11-25
+category: strategy
+summary: "Minimal proposal to create Futardio — failed, likely due to lack of specification and justification"
+tags: ["futarchy", "futardio", "governance-filtering"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?
+
+## Summary
+A minimal one-sentence proposal: "Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen." Filed under the "Program" category. Failed within 4 days. No budget, no specification, no implementation plan. The proposer identity is not associated with core team members.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Failed (2024-11-25)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Unknown proposer
+
+## Significance
+This failed proposal is more informative than many that passed. It demonstrates futarchy's quality filtering function — the market rejected an unsubstantiated proposal despite the concept (Futardio/permissionless launchpad) eventually being approved three months later with proper specification (see [[metadao-release-launchpad]]). The market distinguished between "good idea" and "well-specified proposal," rejecting the former and approving the latter.
+
+This is concrete evidence against the criticism that futarchy markets are easily manipulated or that token holders vote based on vibes rather than substance. The failure also shows that non-founder community members can propose, even if their proposals face higher scrutiny.
+
+Note: The later "Release a Launchpad" proposal (2025-02-26) by Proph3t and Kollan succeeded — same concept, dramatically better specification.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — governance decision, quality filtering
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — this proposal was too simple to pass
+- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — the market correctly filtered a low-quality proposal
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[futardio]] — the entity that was eventually created
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-faas.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "0xNallok"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9Cc"
+proposal_date: 2024-03-13
+resolution_date: 2024-03-19
+category: strategy
+summary: "Fund $96K to build futarchy-as-a-service platform enabling other Solana DAOs to adopt futarchic governance"
+tags: ["futarchy", "faas", "product-development", "solana-daos"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
+
+## Summary
+Nallok proposed building a Realms-like UI enabling any Solana DAO to create and participate in futarchic governance. Budget: $96K for 2 months ($40K USDC from treasury + 342 META to convert). Team: 1 smart contract engineer, 1 auditor, 2 UI/UX, 1 data/services developer, 1 project manager. This was MetaDAO's first product expansion beyond self-governance — the pivot from "futarchy for MetaDAO" to "futarchy for everyone."
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-19)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.1
+- **Key participants:** 0xNallok (entrepreneur/PM), Proph3t (multisig), Nico (multisig)
+
+## Significance
+This proposal marks MetaDAO's strategic pivot from a governance experiment to a platform business. The financial projections (5-100 DAO customers, $50-$500/proposal in taker fees, $50-$1,000/month licensing) reveal early business model thinking. The explicit goal of "vertical integration" and "owning the whole stack" shows Proph3t and Nallok's approach to defensibility.
+
+Particularly notable: the monetization model (taker fees + licensing + consulting) anticipated the Futarchic AMM revenue model that would later become MetaDAO's primary income source. The FaaS concept directly led to Drift, Dean's List, and Future adopting futarchy.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — strategic pivot to platform
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — FaaS was the first step toward this
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — multisig custody of funds alongside futarchy approval
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — FaaS aimed to reduce adoption friction
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[nallok]] — project entrepreneur
+- [[proph3t]] — multisig member
+- [[deans-list]] — early FaaS adopter
+- [[drift]] — early FaaS adopter
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-fundraise-2.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Proph3t"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3AzX"
+proposal_date: 2024-06-26
+resolution_date: 2024-06-30
+category: fundraise
+summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
+tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels. Terms: no discount, no lockup, minimum price $375/META (implying $7.81M minimum FDV based on 20,823.5 META in public hands). Funds custodied by Proph3t and Nallok in a multisig, released at $100K/month to minimize DAO attack risk. Burn rate: $1.38M/year covering two founders ($90K each), three engineers ($190K each), audits ($300K), office ($80K), growth person ($150K), and admin ($100K).
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-06-30)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Proph3t (proposer), Nallok (multisig co-custodian)
+
+## Significance
+This was MetaDAO's first VC fundraise approved through futarchy — the market decided whether to dilute existing holders for growth capital. The "no discount, no lockup" terms are unusual for crypto fundraises and reflect futarchy's transparency ethos: investors get the same terms as the market.
+
+The multisig custodianship ($100K/month release) reveals a practical tension: futarchy governs the fundraise decision, but operational security requires trusted custodians. The DAO cannot safely hold and disburse large sums through governance alone — an early signal of the pattern where futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate scaffolding for treasury operations.
+
+The detailed budget breakdown provides one of the few public windows into early MetaDAO operational costs, valuable for benchmarking futarchy-governed organizations.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — capital formation event
+- [[internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines]] — futarchy-governed fundraise completed in 4 days
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — multisig custody alongside futarchy approval
+- [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — but this raise has identifiable custodians, complicating the "no beneficial owners" argument
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — proposer and custodian
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-hire-robin-hanson.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Proph3t"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF"
+proposal_date: 2025-02-10
+resolution_date: 2025-02-13
+category: hiring
+summary: "Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy) as advisor — 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years for mechanism design and strategy"
+tags: ["futarchy", "robin-hanson", "advisory", "mechanism-design"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to hire Robin Hanson — the economist who originally proposed futarchy in 2000 — as an advisor. Scope: mechanism design and strategy advice, co-authoring blog posts and whitepapers on new futarchic mechanisms (specifically mentioning a "shared liquidity AMM" design). Compensation: 0.1% of supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years. Early termination allowed by Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan unanimously.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-02-13)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Proph3t (proposer), Robin Hanson (advisor)
+
+## Significance
+The futarchy mechanism's inventor becoming an advisor to its most advanced implementation creates a theory-practice feedback loop. Hanson's insights have already influenced concrete product design — the proposal mentions a "shared liquidity AMM" where META/USDC liquidity can be used in both pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC conditional markets, addressing a key capital inefficiency problem.
+
+The compensation terms (0.1% of supply) are modest relative to founder allocations (10% each for Proph3t and Nallok), appropriate for an advisory role. The 2-year vest with early termination clause is standard advisory structure — another example of futarchy-governed DAOs adopting traditional corporate governance patterns for operational decisions.
+
+This is also the first time a major academic figure (GMU economics professor, >10,000 citations) has been hired through futarchic governance, lending institutional credibility to the mechanism.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — advisory hire
+- [[shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets]] — Hanson-Proph3t collaboration product
+- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — Hanson bridges theory and implementation
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — standard advisory terms within futarchy governance
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — proposer
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "HenryE & Proph3t"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963"
+proposal_date: 2024-03-28
+resolution_date: 2024-04-03
+category: mechanism
+summary: "Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%)"
+tags: ["futarchy", "autocrat", "mechanism-upgrade", "solana"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
+
+## Summary
+Technical upgrade from Autocrat v0.1 to v0.2. Three new features: (1) reclaimable rent — recover ~4 SOL used to create proposal markets, lowering proposal creation friction; (2) conditional token merging — combine 1 pTOKEN + 1 fTOKEN back into 1 TOKEN, improving liquidity during multiple active proposals; (3) conditional token metadata — tokens show names and logos in wallets instead of raw mint addresses. Config changes: pass threshold lowered from 5% to 3%, default TWAP value set to $100, TWAP updates in $5 increments (enhancing manipulation resistance), minimum META lot size reduced from 1 to 0.1 META.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-04-03)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.1 (last proposal on v0.1)
+- **Key participants:** HenryE (author), Proph3t (author), OtterSec (program verification)
+
+## Significance
+First major Autocrat upgrade approved through futarchy itself — MetaDAO used its own governance mechanism to upgrade its governance mechanism. The changes directly addressed friction points: high proposal creation costs (~4 SOL), liquidity fragmentation across proposals, and poor UX for conditional tokens.
+
+The pass threshold reduction from 5% to 3% is particularly noteworthy — it lowered the bar for proposals to pass, reflecting the team's belief that the original threshold was too conservative. The TWAP manipulation resistance improvements ($5 increments instead of 1%) show iterative mechanism refinement based on live experience.
+
+Programs deployed: autocrat_v0 (metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp), openbook_twap (twAP5sArq2vDS1mZCT7f4qRLwzTfHvf5Ay5R5Q5df1m), conditional_vault (vAuLTQjV5AZx5f3UgE75wcnkxnQowWxThn1hGjfCVwP).
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — mechanism upgrade
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — Autocrat evolution
+- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — iterative UX improvements
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — directly addressed proposal creation friction
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — co-author
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Migrate META Token"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Proph3t & Kollan"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4grb3pea8ZSqE3ghx76Fn43Q97mAh64XjgwL9AXaB3Pe"
+proposal_date: 2025-08-07
+resolution_date: 2025-08-10
+category: mechanism
+summary: "1:1000 token split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5 (Squads), LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5%"
+tags: ["futarchy", "token-migration", "elastic-supply", "squads", "meta-token"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Migrate META Token
+
+## Summary
+Migration from METAC (unmintable, ~20K supply) to new META token (mintable, ~20.86M supply via 1:1000 split). Mint and update authority transferred to new DAO governed via Squads vault (v0.5). Protocol-owned liquidity fee reduced from 4% to 0.5%. New DAO passing threshold reduced to 1.5%, monthly spending limit set at $120K. Migration contract deployed as permanent one-way conversion. New META token: METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta. New DAO: Bc3pKPnSbSX8W2hTXbsFsybh1GeRtu3Qqpfu9ZLxg6Km.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-08-10)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Proph3t (co-author), Kollan (co-author)
+
+## Significance
+This is the resolution of the mintable-token saga that began with the 99.3% burn ([[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]]), continued through the failed community proposal ([[metadao-token-split-elastic-supply]]), and culminated here. The DAO's treasury was exhausted (as the burn had predicted), forcing the migration to mintable tokens.
+
+Key architectural decisions: (1) mint authority to DAO governance, not any multisig — "market-driven issuance" as extension of market-driven decision-making; (2) Squads integration for operational security; (3) LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5% anticipating the custom Futarchic AMM; (4) permanent migration contract with unlimited conversion window, avoiding forced timelines.
+
+The proposal explicitly frames mintable supply as philosophically consistent with futarchy: "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance." This is the strongest empirical evidence for the claim that futarchy DAOs require mintable governance tokens — the fixed-supply model broke in practice.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — token architecture migration
+- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — the burn that created the need for this migration
+- [[metadao-token-split-elastic-supply]] — the earlier failed community version
+- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — primary evidence for this claim
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — 1:1000 split addresses unit bias
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[proph3t]] — co-author
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md

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+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Proph3t & Kollan"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef"
+proposal_date: 2025-02-26
+resolution_date: 2025-03-01
+category: strategy
+summary: "Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool"
+tags: ["futarchy", "launchpad", "unruggable-ico", "capital-formation", "futardio"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad
+
+## Summary
+Proposal to release a launchpad enabling new projects to raise capital through futarchy-governed DAOs. Mechanics: (1) project creators specify minimum USDC needed; (2) funders commit USDC over 5 days, receiving 1,000 tokens per USDC; (3) if minimum met, 10% of USDC paired with tokens in a constant-product AMM, remaining USDC + mint authority transferred to a futarchy DAO; (4) if minimum not met, funders burn tokens to reclaim USDC. Initially permissioned (Proph3t and Kollan select projects), with discretion to transition to permissionless.
+
+This is the genesis proposal for what became Futardio — MetaDAO's ownership coin launchpad.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-03-01)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** Proph3t (co-author), Kollan (co-author)
+
+## Significance
+This is arguably MetaDAO's most consequential proposal — it created the Futardio launchpad that would generate most of MetaDAO's revenue and ecosystem value. The "unruggable ICO" framing solves the central trust problem of crypto fundraising: if the team walks away, anyone can propose treasury liquidation and return funds to investors. This is the concrete mechanism behind the claim that "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible."
+
+The progression from [[metadao-create-futardio]] (failed, one sentence, November 2024) to this proposal (passed, detailed mechanics, February 2025) demonstrates futarchy's quality filtering: same concept, dramatically different specification, opposite outcomes.
+
+Key design choices: fixed price (1,000 tokens/USDC) rather than auction, 10% to AMM LP, initially permissioned with path to permissionless. The founders explicitly reserved discretion to change mechanics (e.g., adopt IDO pool approach), showing pragmatic flexibility within the futarchy governance framework.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — launchpad creation, major strategic pivot
+- [[futardio]] — the entity created by this proposal
+- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — the earlier failed version of this concept
+- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the core value proposition
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] — launchpad designed around investor protection
+- [[internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines]] — 5-day raise window
+- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — initially permissioned to manage this risk
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[futardio]] — the launchpad created by this proposal
+- [[proph3t]] — co-author
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao-token-split-elastic-supply.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+last_updated: 2026-03-11
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "@aradtski"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CBhieBvzo5miQBrdaM7vALpgNLt4Q5XYCDfNLaE2wXJA"
+proposal_date: 2025-01-28
+resolution_date: 2025-01-31
+category: mechanism
+summary: "1:1000 token split with mint authority to DAO governance — failed, but nearly identical proposal passed 6 months later"
+tags: ["futarchy", "token-split", "elastic-supply", "meta-token", "governance"]
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META
+
+## Summary
+Proposed by community member @aradtski: deploy a new META token with 1:1000 split (20,886,000 baseline supply), transfer mint and update authority to the DAO governance module, and enable opt-in migration with unlimited time window. The proposal explicitly addressed unit bias ("If it is not below the likes of Amazon and Nvidia to do stock splits... it is not below MetaDAO"), argued that mintable supply is safe because futarchy prevents inflationary minting that damages token price, and positioned MetaDAO as the first to "entrust token minting to Futarchic governance."
+
+Failed on 2025-01-31 after 3 days.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Failed (2025-01-31)
+- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
+- **Key participants:** @aradtski (author), community
+
+## Significance
+This is a fascinating case study in futarchy dynamics. The proposal was well-specified, well-argued, and addressed a real problem (unit bias, treasury exhaustion, lack of mint authority). Yet it failed — and a nearly identical proposal by the founding team (Proph3t and Kollan) passed 6 months later as [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]].
+
+Possible explanations: (1) market participants trusted founder execution more than community member execution for a critical migration; (2) timing — the treasury wasn't yet fully exhausted in January 2025; (3) the later proposal included additional operational details (Squads integration, specific LP fee changes, migration frontend already underway).
+
+This pair of outcomes (community proposal fails, founder proposal passes on same concept) raises questions about whether futarchy markets evaluate proposals purely on merit or whether proposer identity acts as a quality signal. Both interpretations are defensible — founders may have better execution capability, making the "same" proposal genuinely higher-EV when they propose it.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — governance decision, token architecture
+- [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] — the later proposal that passed with nearly identical specification
+- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this proposal was the first attempt to solve the problem this claim describes
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — unit bias argument explicitly cited
+- [[domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge]] — possible proposer-identity effect on market evaluation
+
+---
+
+Relevant Entities:
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] — the later successful version
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet finance and decision markets]]

entities/internet-finance/metadao.md

@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2026-03** — Ranger liquidation proposal; treasury subcommittee formation
 - **2026-03** — Pine Analytics Q4 2025 quarterly report published
 
+## Key Decisions
+| Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
+|------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
+| 2024-03-03 | [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] | doctor.sol & rar3 | Treasury | Passed |
+| 2024-03-13 | [[metadao-develop-faas]] | 0xNallok | Strategy | Passed |
+| 2024-03-28 | [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02]] | HenryE & Proph3t | Mechanism | Passed |
+| 2024-05-27 | [[metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok]] | Proph3t & Nallok | Hiring | Passed |
+| 2024-06-26 | [[metadao-fundraise-2]] | Proph3t | Fundraise | Passed |
+| 2024-11-21 | [[metadao-create-futardio]] | unknown | Strategy | Failed |
+| 2025-01-28 | [[metadao-token-split-elastic-supply]] | @aradtski | Mechanism | Failed |
+| 2025-02-10 | [[metadao-hire-robin-hanson]] | Proph3t | Hiring | Passed |
+| 2025-02-26 | [[metadao-release-launchpad]] | Proph3t & Kollan | Strategy | Passed |
+| 2025-08-07 | [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] | Proph3t & Kollan | Mechanism | Passed |
+
 ## Competitive Position
 - **First mover** in futarchy-governed organizations at scale
 - **No direct competitor** for conditional-market governance on Solana

inbox/archive/2024-03-03-futardio-proposal-burn-993-of-meta-in-treasury.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/ELwCkHt1U9VBpUFJ7qGoVMatEwLSr1HYj9q9t8JQ1Nc
 date: 2024-03-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-burn-993-percent-meta — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2024-03-13-futardio-proposal-develop-futarchy-as-a-service-faas.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/D9pGGmG2rCJ5BXzbDoct7EcQL6F6A57azqYHdpWJL9C
 date: 2024-03-13
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-develop-faas — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2024-03-28-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v02.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj96
 date: 2024-03-28
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-migrate-autocrat-v02 — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-approve-performance-based-compensation-package-for-proph3t-a.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/BgHv9GutbnsXZLZQHqPL8BbGWwtcaRDWx82aeRMNmJb
 date: 2024-05-27
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2024-06-26-futardio-proposal-approve-metadao-fundraise-2.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9BMRY1HBe61MJoKEd9AAW5iNQyws2vGK6vuL49oR3Az
 date: 2024-06-26
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-fundraise-2 — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-create-futardio.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb
 date: 2024-11-21
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio

inbox/archive/2025-01-28-futardio-proposal-perform-token-split-and-adopt-elastic-supply-for-meta.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CBhieBvzo5miQBrdaM7vALpgNLt4Q5XYCDfNLaE2wXJ
 date: 2025-01-28
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-token-split-elastic-supply — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-hire-robin-hanson-as-an-advisor.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2025-02-10
-enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "futarchy-implementations-must-simplify-theoretical-mechanisms-for-production-adoption-because-original-designs-include-impractical-elements-that-academics-tolerate-but-users-reject.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-DAOs-converge-on-traditional-corporate-governance-scaffolding-for-treasury-operations-because-market-mechanisms-alone-cannot-provide-operational-security-and-legal-compliance.md", "futarchy-implementations-must-simplify-theoretical-mechanisms-for-production-adoption-because-original-designs-include-impractical-elements-that-academics-tolerate-but-users-reject.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md", "metadao-hire-robin-hanson — decision_market entity created"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 claims_extracted:
   - "shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets.md"

inbox/archive/2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad.md

@@ -6,7 +6,12 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFke
 date: 2025-02-26
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: []
+enrichments:
+  - "metadao-release-launchpad — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

inbox/archive/2025-08-07-futardio-proposal-migrate-meta-token.md

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ claims_extracted:
 enrichments:
   - "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements — META 1:1000 split confirms token split as solution for unit bias"
   - "MetaDAOs Autocrat program — v0.5 program address auToUr3CQza3D4qreT6Std2MTomfzvrEeCC5qh7ivW5 adds to on-chain program details"
+  - "metadao-migrate-meta-token — decision_market entity created"
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 ---

schemas/attribution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+# Attribution Schema
+
+Attribution tracks who contributed what to the knowledge base. Every claim traces back to the people and agents who produced it. Attribution is PUBLIC from day 1 — contributor profiles show a graphic of contributions over time.
+
+## Design Principles
+
+1. **Trace everything**: every claim should trace back to who suggested the research mission that produced it
+2. **Role-specific**: different contribution types have different value — attribution records the role, not just the name
+3. **Pseudonymous-first**: contributors use handles, not legal names. Handles persist across contributions.
+4. **Git-native**: the Pentagon-Agent trailer in git commits is the foundation. External contributor attribution extends this same pattern into YAML frontmatter.
+5. **Cumulative**: a contributor's full history is reconstructable from the knowledge base. No contribution is invisible.
+
+## The Five Contributor Roles
+
+| Role | What They Do | Example |
+|------|-------------|---------|
+| **sourcer** | Identifies the source material or research direction that led to this claim | "Look into Kalshi's revenue model" or shares an article |
+| **extractor** | Extracts the specific claim from source material — separates signal from noise, writes the prose-as-title | Agent or human who reads the source and produces the claim file |
+| **challenger** | Tests the claim through counter-evidence, boundary conditions, or adversarial review | "This doesn't hold when markets are thin" |
+| **synthesizer** | Connects this claim to other claims, producing cross-domain insight | "This mechanism is isomorphic to X in health domain" |
+| **reviewer** | Evaluates claim quality against the KB quality gates and approves/rejects | Leo's eval role, or peer reviewers |
+
+A single person/agent can hold multiple roles on the same claim. A claim can have multiple people in the same role.
+
+## Claim Frontmatter Extension
+
+Add an `attribution` block to claim YAML frontmatter:
+
+```yaml
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "..."
+confidence: likely
+source: "Theia Research 2025 annual letter, analysis by Rio"
+created: 2026-03-11
+
+# Attribution (new)
+attribution:
+  sourcer:
+    - handle: "m3taversal"
+      context: "directed research into Theia's investment thesis"
+    - handle: "@theiaresearch"
+      context: "published the annual letter"
+  extractor:
+    - handle: "rio"
+      agent_id: "760F7FE7-5D50-4C2E-8B7C-9F1A8FEE8A46"
+  challenger: []
+  synthesizer: []
+  reviewer:
+    - handle: "leo"
+      agent_id: "294C3CA1-0205-4668-82FA-B984D54F48AD"
+---
+```
+
+## Attribution Fields
+
+### Per-role entry
+
+| Field | Type | Required | Description |
+|-------|------|----------|-------------|
+| handle | string | yes | Contributor's persistent pseudonymous identity |
+| agent_id | UUID | if agent | Pentagon agent UUID (agents only) |
+| context | string | no | What specifically this contributor did in this role |
+| date | date | no | When the contribution was made (defaults to claim created date) |
+
+### Role-specific notes
+
+- **sourcer**: can be external (X handle, author name) or internal (agent, m3taversal). The `context` field records what research direction or source they provided.
+- **extractor**: usually an agent. The `agent_id` field links to the Pentagon agent. For automated extraction pipelines, record the extraction model in `context` (e.g., "MiniMax M2.5 extract → Haiku 4.5 review").
+- **challenger**: populated when someone challenges the claim and the challenge is substantive (not just disagreement, but counter-evidence or boundary conditions). Empty array until challenged.
+- **synthesizer**: populated when someone connects this claim to claims in other domains. Cross-domain synthesis is the highest-value contribution type.
+- **reviewer**: populated during PR review. Records who evaluated and approved.
+
+## Backwards Compatibility
+
+The existing `source` field continues to serve as a human-readable one-liner for quick reference. The `attribution` block provides the structured, queryable version. Both coexist:
+
+- `source`: "Theia Research 2025 annual letter, analysis by Rio" (human-readable)
+- `attribution`: structured role-by-role breakdown (machine-readable)
+
+For claims created before attribution was introduced, `source` remains the only attribution data. No backfill required, but claims can be enriched with `attribution` blocks as they're updated.
+
+## Git Trailer Integration
+
+Agent contributions are also recorded in git commit trailers:
+
+```
+Pentagon-Agent: Rio <760F7FE7-5D50-4C2E-8B7C-9F1A8FEE8A46>
+```
+
+The git trailer records WHO committed the change. The YAML attribution records WHO contributed WHAT in WHICH ROLE. These are complementary:
+- Git trailer = "who made this change to the repository"
+- YAML attribution = "who produced this knowledge and in what capacity"
+
+A single commit may create 10 claims. The trailer says Rio committed them. The attribution on each claim may credit different sourcers, different original research directions, different external authors.
+
+## Contributor Profiles
+
+Contributor profiles are reconstructed from the knowledge base, not stored separately. To build a profile:
+
+1. **Query**: search all claim `attribution` blocks for a given `handle`
+2. **Aggregate**: count contributions by role, domain, confidence level, date
+3. **Visualize**: contribution-over-time graphic showing when and how they contributed
+
+This means:
+- No separate "contributor database" to maintain
+- Profiles are always consistent with the actual KB state
+- New contributions automatically appear in profiles
+- Attribution disputes are resolved by editing claim frontmatter
+
+### Person Entity Bridge
+
+When a contributor has enough contributions to warrant tracking, their person entity (`entities/{domain}/{handle}.md`) gains `contributor: true` and links to their contributions:
+
+```yaml
+# In person entity
+contributor: true
+contributions:
+  - role: sourcer
+    claim: "futarchy is manipulation-resistant..."
+    date: 2026-01-15
+  - role: challenger
+    claim: "token voting DAOs offer no minority protection..."
+    date: 2026-02-20
+first_contribution: 2026-01-15
+attribution_handle: "@theiaresearch"
+```
+
+## Governance
+
+- Attribution is added at extraction time (extractor + sourcer) and updated during review (reviewer) and challenge (challenger)
+- Synthesizer attribution is added when cross-domain connections are made, which may happen well after initial creation
+- Disputes about attribution are resolved through the normal PR process
+- Removing attribution requires justification (e.g., the sourcer was misidentified)
+
+## Contribution Weights
+
+Role weights determine how much each contribution type counts toward a contributor's weighted score. Weights are **global policy**, not per-claim data — they live in `schemas/contribution-weights.yaml`, not in claim frontmatter.
+
+Why weights are global, not per-claim:
+1. Weights are policy (how much we value each role), not data (who did what)
+2. Weights evolve as bottlenecks shift — updating one config file beats migrating 400+ claims
+3. Per-claim weights create gaming incentive to inflate role on high-value claims
+
+The build pipeline reads `contribution-weights.yaml` and multiplies role counts × weights to produce weighted scores. The frontend displays both raw counts (by role) and the weighted score.
+
+See `schemas/contribution-weights.yaml` for current weights and rationale.
+
+## Build Artifacts
+
+The website build pipeline (extract-graph-data.py) produces a `contributors.json` artifact alongside graph-data.json and claims-context.json:
+
+```json
+{
+  "contributors": [
+    {
+      "handle": "naval",
+      "roles": {"sourcer": 12, "extractor": 0, "challenger": 3, "synthesizer": 1, "reviewer": 0},
+      "weighted_score": 5.4,
+      "domains": {"internet-finance": 8, "grand-strategy": 5, "ai-alignment": 3},
+      "first_contribution": "2026-02-15",
+      "latest_contribution": "2026-03-11",
+      "claim_count": 16,
+      "timeline": [
+        {"date": "2026-02", "count": 3, "domains": ["internet-finance"]},
+        {"date": "2026-03", "count": 13, "domains": ["internet-finance", "grand-strategy"]}
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+This is a static file rebuilt on every merge to main (~15 minute staleness). The frontend reads it at page load — no API or runtime queries needed.
+
+**Timeline**: Monthly granularity. Used by the frontend for contribution heatmap or sparkline graphic (Cory requirement).
+
+## Implementation Priority
+
+1. **Now**: Add `attribution` block to new claims going forward. No backfill required.
+2. **Soon**: Rhea adds attribution aggregation pass to extract-graph-data.py, producing contributors.json.
+3. **Soon**: Frontend contributor profile pages — handle + sparkline + domain pie + top claims by role.
+4. **Later**: Automated attribution from the extraction pipeline (MiniMax → Haiku → agent).

schemas/claim.md

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ challenged_by: []  # list of counter-evidence or counter-claims
 | depends_on | list | Evidence and claims this builds on (the reasoning chain) |
 | challenged_by | list | Counter-evidence or counter-claims (disagreement tracking) |
 | secondary_domains | list | Other domains this claim is relevant to |
+| attribution | object | Role-specific contributor tracking — see `schemas/attribution.md` |
 
 ## Governance
 

schemas/contribution-weights.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Contribution Weights
+#
+# Global policy for how much each contributor role counts toward weighted scores.
+# Used by the build pipeline (extract-graph-data.py) to compute weighted_score
+# in contributors.json. Updated via PR — changes here affect all contributor profiles.
+#
+# Weights sum to 1.0. The build pipeline multiplies each contributor's role count
+# by the corresponding weight, then sums across roles.
+#
+# Current rationale (2026-03-11):
+# - Extraction is the current bottleneck and requires the most skill (reading sources,
+#   separating signal from noise, writing prose-as-title). Highest weight.
+# - Challenge is the quality mechanism — adversarial review catches errors that
+#   self-review cannot. Second highest. This also signals that the system values
+#   intellectual honesty over agreement: challenging bad claims is rewarded more
+#   than rubber-stamping good ones.
+# - Sourcing discovers new information but is lower effort per instance.
+# - Synthesis connects claims across domains — high value but rare.
+# - Review is essential but is partially automated via the eval pipeline.
+#
+# These weights WILL change as the collective matures. When challenges become
+# the bottleneck (more claims than reviewers), challenger weight should increase.
+# When synthesis becomes the primary value-add, synthesizer weight increases.
+
+role_weights:
+  sourcer: 0.15
+  extractor: 0.40
+  challenger: 0.20
+  synthesizer: 0.15
+  reviewer: 0.10