From fc288698f9754d3c63d4928999c954cc09fd933e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 16:46:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] rio: extract from 2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md - Source: inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...osal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md b/inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md index 715eabddf..1d45785e3 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content.md @@ -6,9 +6,14 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJ date: 2024-08-28 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-11 +enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md", "MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "This source is a failed governance proposal, not a product launch or company formation. Primary output is the decision_market entity. No novel claims extracted—the proposal's failure provides counter-evidence to existing claims about futarchy-governed memecoin adoption and confirms existing claims about futarchy adoption friction. The proposal's explicit tradeoff analysis (advantages vs pitfalls) and market rejection demonstrate sophisticated collective judgment about reputational positioning." --- ## Proposal Details @@ -352,3 +357,11 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2024-09-01 - Ended: 2024-09-01 + + +## Key Facts +- Futardio proposal (EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJo) was proposal #8 on MetaDAO +- Proposal used Autocrat v0.3 +- Proposed $100k grant over 6 months with Q3 launch target +- Nallok and Proph3t were named as supporters/funders, not core team +- Proposal included 6 potential advantages and 4 potential pitfalls in explicit tradeoff analysis -- 2.45.2 From 0250f2c8a19ddc97caf0ce75075164e10bae7786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 15:30:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] auto-fix: strip 1 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- entities/internet-finance/metadao.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md index 825b69115..6dc365891 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ MetaDAO is the platform bet on futarchy as a governance mechanism. If decision m - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism description - [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — known limitation - [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — active design challenge -- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — the problem MetaDAO solves +- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — the problem MetaDAO solves --- -- 2.45.2