inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ This claim is independent of the DC Circuit outcome and can be extracted prior t
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Government's substantive public response to the "pretextual" argument. The government's legal brief should be due May 6 but full text not yet public. Absence of public national security justification for the designation (as opposed to policy disagreement) is notable.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- Mode 2 in governance failure taxonomy: [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — Mode 2's judicial dimension complicates but does not replace the strategic indispensability mechanism
+- Mode 2 in governance failure taxonomy: voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — Mode 2's judicial dimension complicates but does not replace the strategic indispensability mechanism
 - [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them]] — the DC Circuit challenge is directly testing whether this claim's enforcement mechanism is legally durable
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ The DC Circuit challenge is the strongest external pressure on the three-level p
 **KB connections:**
 - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — Level 2 evidence: corporate nominal compliance produces the same outcome as voluntary pledge collapse, via a different mechanism
 - [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them]] — Level 1 evidence: the Hegseth enforcement demonstration
-- [[regulation by contract is structurally insufficient for military AI governance]] — Level 2 evidence: contract-level governance (advisory language, nominal amendments) cannot substitute for statutory requirements
+- regulation by contract is structurally insufficient for military AI governance — Level 2 evidence: contract-level governance (advisory language, nominal amendments) cannot substitute for statutory requirements
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - PRIMARY: This is a Leo synthesis claim. Individual components (Google deal, OpenAI amendment, Warner letter) are captured elsewhere. The synthesis — three levels simultaneously operational, each reinforcing the other's form-without-substance — is the extractable claim.