From 1aab9227f77517c99d303d10d8ba90bacc416bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 19:16:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede --- ...pation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md | 6 +++ ...ys-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md | 6 +++ ...ing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.json | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ncing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md | 14 ++++++- 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.json diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md index f8916167..19828359 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md @@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Single-case evidence limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to: However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when the economics appear favorable. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +The Dean's List DAO proposal passed with a 5.33% projected FDV increase against a 3% TWAP requirement, demonstrating that proposals with clear economic benefits and quantified projections can overcome participation friction. The proposal included detailed mathematical modeling showing 400 USDC daily buy pressure against 500 USDC baseline volume (80% increase), with explicit calculations of upward price pressure (24%) versus downward pressure (15%) from contributor selling. This level of analytical rigor may reduce friction by making the economic case transparent. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md index 9650f2a3..dc98d753 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ created: 2026-03-15 The Autocrat v0.1 upgrade introduces configurable slots per proposal with a default of 3 days, explicitly designed to "allow for quicker feedback loops." This represents a significant reduction from previous implementations and addresses a key friction point in futarchy adoption: the time cost of decision-making. The proposal passed and migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL to the new program, demonstrating community acceptance of faster iteration cycles. The architectural change makes proposal duration a parameter rather than a constant, allowing MetaDAO to tune the speed-quality tradeoff based on empirical results. This matters because governance mechanism adoption depends on matching decision velocity to organizational needs—too slow and participants route around the system, too fast and markets cannot aggregate information effectively. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +The Dean's List DAO proposal was created on 2024-07-18, ended on 2024-07-22, and completed on 2024-07-22, confirming a 4-day total duration from creation to completion. The proposal used Autocrat version 0.3 and was settled by TWAP over the proposal window. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.json b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8d98f812 --- /dev/null +++ b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.json @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +{ + "rejected_claims": [ + { + "filename": "treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "dao-contributor-payment-in-governance-tokens-creates-structural-sell-pressure-proportional-to-token-liquidity.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "stablecoin-treasury-tax-hedges-governance-token-volatility-for-dao-operational-stability.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + } + ], + "validation_stats": { + "total": 3, + "kept": 0, + "fixed": 4, + "rejected": 3, + "fixes_applied": [ + "treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md:stripped_wiki_link:ownership-coin-treasuries-should-be-actively-managed-through", + "dao-contributor-payment-in-governance-tokens-creates-structural-sell-pressure-proportional-to-token-liquidity.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "stablecoin-treasury-tax-hedges-governance-token-volatility-for-dao-operational-stability.md:set_created:2026-03-15" + ], + "rejections": [ + "treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md:no_frontmatter", + "dao-contributor-payment-in-governance-tokens-creates-structural-sell-pressure-proportional-to-token-liquidity.md:no_frontmatter", + "stablecoin-treasury-tax-hedges-governance-token-volatility-for-dao-operational-stability.md:no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5", + "date": "2026-03-15" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md b/inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md index 9f416606..7c99f236 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md @@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU date: 2024-07-18 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-15 +enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md", "metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" --- ## Proposal Details @@ -146,3 +150,11 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2024-07-22 - Ended: 2024-07-22 + + +## Key Facts +- The Dean's List DAO proposal 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp passed on 2024-07-22 +- The Dean's List DAO charges 2500 USDC per dApp review +- The Dean's List DAO had $337,074 FDV and $500 daily trading volume as of July 2024 +- The Dean's List DAO proposal used Autocrat version 0.3 +- The Dean's List DAO proposal was created by account 8Cwx4yR2sFAC5Pdx2NgGHxCk1gJrtSTxJoyqVonqndhq -- 2.45.2