---
type: source
source_type: telegram
title: "Telegram: @m3taversal — hey-futairdbot-here-s-some-interesting-info-for-y"
author: "@m3taversal"
url: "https://x.com/01resolved/status/2037550464188006477?s=46"
date: 2026-03-27
domain: internet-finance
format: conversation
status: null-result
priority: high
intake_tier: directed
rationale: "Hey  here’s some interesting info for you  and"
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

## Conversation

**@m3taversal:**
Hey @FutAIrdBot here’s some interesting info for you https://x.com/01resolved/status/2037550464188006477?s=46 and https://x.com/01resolved/status/2037550467316847015?s=46

**Rio (response):**
01Resolved is making two good points here that line up with what we've already been discussing.

First piece confirms the Superclaw liquidation proposal details. SUPER trading below NAV, 11% monthly burn, limited traction. They frame it as "early stage governance risk," which is the right lens. A community-initiated liquidation proposal 23 days after ICO is a stress test for the whole futarchy launchpad model. If the mechanism handles it cleanly (market prices it correctly, execution follows through), it's actually a positive signal for the system even though it's a negative outcome for SUPER holders.

Second piece is more interesting. 01Resolved is arguing that sensitive treasury proposals need project-specific guardrails and post-ICO timing windows. They point out that P2P.me's ICO already builds this in with community governance proposals only enabled 7-9 months after funding. That's a direct design response to exactly the Superclaw scenario.

This is a real tension in futarchy design. The whole point is permissionless proposals, but a liquidation vote in the first month can kill a project before it has any chance to execute. The P2P.me approach of a cooling-off window is pragmatic but it's also a concession that pure permissionless governance has failure modes. You're essentially saying "the market is wise, except right after launch when it might be panicking."

01Resolved apparently has a longer piece on permissionless proposal design for MetaDAO decision markets. That would be worth reading if you can find it.

LEARNING: factual Superclaw ($SUPER) liquidation proposal appeared just 23 days after ICO. P2P.me ICO includes a 7-9 month post-funding window before community governance proposals are enabled, as a guardrail against early-stage treasury proposals. 01Resolved has written about permissionless proposal guardrails for MetaDAO decision markets.

SOURCE: 01Resolved (@01resolved) analysis on Superclaw liquidation proposal and post-ICO governance guardrails. First tweet: "A new proposal to liquidate the @superclaworg treasury is now trading in a live decision market just 23 days after ICO. The authors state $SUPER is trading below NAV, traction has remained limited, and another month of operating spend is estimated to reduce NAV by roughly 11%. Under those conditions, the argument is that continued spending destroys recoverable value that could otherwise be returned to holders. If passed, the proposal would: Remove liquidity from the Futarchy AMM, Consolidate treasury assets..." Second tweet: "This is exactly the type of early stage governance risk we wrote about recently. Our view is that sensitive treasury proposals should be subject to project specific guardrails and post-ICO timing windows, rather than becoming immediately eligible. The @P2Pdotme ICO currently live on @MetaDAOProject appears to already reflect some of this thinking. In the ICO details, community governance proposals are only enabled 7-9 months after funding. Our 'Permissionless Proposals for MetaDAO Decision Markets' piece covers this in more detail." Attribution: shared by @m3taversal

## Article Content (fetched)

A new proposal to liquidate the @superclaworg treasury is now trading in a live decision market just 23 days after ICO.

The authors state $SUPER is trading below NAV, traction has remained limited, and another month of operating spend is estimated to reduce NAV by roughly 11%. Under those conditions, the argument is that continued spending destroys recoverable value that could otherwise be returned to holders.

If passed, the proposal would:

▪️ Remove liquidity from the Futarchy AMM
▪️ Consolidate all treasury USDC
▪️ Open a prorata redemption for eligible holders
▪️ Return non-treasury assets (IP, infrastructure, etc.) to the appropriate entity and contributors

The market is currently in the Pre-TWAP window, with traders and volume by economic direction favoring Fail at 58.82% and 61.76%, respectively.

## Agent Notes
**Why archived:** Tagged exchange in ownership community.
**Rationale from contributor:** Hey  here’s some interesting info for you  and
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.