---
type: entity
entity_type: decision_market
name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?"
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "joebuild"
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
proposal_account: "CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG"
proposal_number: 4
proposal_date: 2024-01-24
resolution_date: 2024-01-29
category: "mechanism"
summary: "Migrate MetaDAO futarchy markets from CLOB to AMM architecture to improve liquidity, reduce manipulation risk, and eliminate state rent costs"
budget: "400 META on passing, 800 META on completion"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---

# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?

## Summary
Proposal to replace Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) implementation of futarchy markets with Automated Market Maker (AMM) architecture using liquidity-weighted price over time as settlement metric. Addresses three CLOB limitations: lack of liquidity due to pricing uncertainty, manipulation vulnerability through midpoint pushing and wash trading, and 3.75 SOL per market pair in non-recoverable state rent costs.

## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposer:** joebuild
- **Budget:** 400 META on passing proposal, 800 META on completed migration
- **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review
- **Resolution:** 2024-01-29

## Technical Specification
**AMM Design:**
- Liquidity-weighted average price over lifetime as settlement metric
- 3-5% swap fees to incentivize LPs and discourage wash trading
- Integration with autocrat + conditional vault programs
- Permissionless pause/close functions for post-verdict settlement

**Additional Features:**
- Loosen 50-slot restriction on proposal creation timing
- Auto-revert to fail after X days if proposal instructions fail
- Remove 1 META minimum order size (CLOB spam filter no longer needed)

**Team:**
- Program: joebuild
- Review: TBD expert
- Frontend: 0xNalloK

## Significance
First major architectural change to MetaDAO's futarchy implementation since launch. Represents shift from orderbook to AMM primitives for conditional token markets, with implications for all futarchy implementations. Economic motivation (135-225 SOL annual state rent savings) combined with mechanism design improvements (manipulation resistance, liquidity bootstrapping).

## Risks Identified
- Standard smart contract risk
- Uncertain LP adoption: "similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty"
- Migration complexity for existing markets

## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] - core mechanism upgrade
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] - addresses known CLOB manipulation vectors
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - architectural change to this implementation