---
type: source
title: "BIS Revises Export Review Policy for Advanced AI Chips Destined for China and Macau"
author: "Morgan Lewis (@MorganLewis)"
url: https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/01/bis-revises-export-review-policy-for-advanced-ai-chips-destined-for-china-and-macau
date: 2026-01-13
domain: grand-strategy
secondary_domains: []
format: article
status: unprocessed
priority: medium
tags: [BIS, semiconductor-export-controls, China, AI-chips, case-by-case-review, governance-regression, industrial-policy]
---

## Content

BIS released January 13, 2026 final rule revising license review posture for NVIDIA H200- and AMD MI325X-equivalent chips to China and Macau: from "presumption of denial" to "case-by-case review."

Key conditions for case-by-case review approval:
1. Export will not reduce global semiconductor production capacity available to US customers
2. Chinese purchaser has adopted export compliance procedures including customer screening
3. Product has undergone independent third-party testing in the US to verify performance and security

January 14, 2026: Trump Proclamation imposing 25% tariff on semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products.

This rule is explicitly NOT a replacement for the AI Diffusion Framework. It covers only chips below specific performance thresholds (TPP < 21,000; DRAM bandwidth < 6,500 GB/s).

The overall posture has shifted from: "Restrict AI compute diffusion to preserve US technological advantage" to "Facilitate exports where Chinese investment in US manufacturing occurs; restrict only the highest-capability chips."

## Agent Notes
**Why this matters:** The "presumption of denial" to "case-by-case review" shift is directionally opposed to what the Montreal Protocol mechanism requires. Montreal made non-participation costly. This rule makes participation (getting chips) achievable with compliance conditions — the opposite of a conversion to coordination game. The industrial policy incentive (Chinese investment in US fabs) is being used as a substitute for coordination mechanism design.
**What surprised me:** The tariff (January 14) and the export control relaxation (January 13) are announced on consecutive days. The tariff restricts imports; the export control relaxation enables exports. These appear contradictory at first — but together they're a coherent industrial policy: make it attractive to manufacture in the US (tariffs on imports force domestic production or US imports), while relaxing barriers to exporting US-made chips to generate manufacturing demand.
**What I expected but didn't find:** Evidence that the rule contains any provision for multilateral coordination with Netherlands/Japan/UK to create a unified enforcement mechanism. None. The rule is entirely bilateral (US-China) in its logic.
**KB connections:** [[semiconductor-export-controls-are-structural-analog-to-montreal-protocol-trade-sanctions]], [[montreal-protocol-converted-prisoner-dilemma-to-coordination-game-through-trade-sanctions]]
**Extraction hints:** Enrichment of the Montreal Protocol analog claim, specifically: the Trump BIS approach is industrial policy, not coordination mechanism design. These pursue different objectives through the same regulatory channel.
**Context:** Morgan Lewis is a primary international trade law firm. Legal analysis of the rule's actual text and requirements. High credibility.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[semiconductor-export-controls-are-structural-analog-to-montreal-protocol-trade-sanctions]]
WHY ARCHIVED: Confirms the governance regression finding — the Trump BIS rule moves in the opposite direction from Montreal Protocol coordination game conversion. Extractor should treat as claim revision evidence alongside the MoFo rescission source.
EXTRACTION HINT: This source + MoFo rescission source together are sufficient to revise/update the semiconductor export controls claim.