--- type: entity entity_type: decision_market name: "MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?" domain: internet-finance status: passed parent_entity: "[[metadao]]" platform: "futardio" proposer: "joebuild" proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG" proposal_date: 2024-01-24 resolution_date: 2024-01-29 category: "mechanism" summary: "Proposal to replace CLOB-based conditional markets with AMM architecture to improve liquidity and reduce state rent costs" key_metrics: budget: "400 META on passing + 800 META on completion" timeline: "3 weeks development + 1 week review" team: "joebuild (program), 0xNalloK (frontend), TBD (review)" tracked_by: rio created: 2026-03-11 --- # MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy? ## Summary Proposal to migrate MetaDAO's futarchy implementation from Central Limit Order Books (CLOBs) to Automated Market Makers (AMMs) to address three structural problems: liquidity fragmentation from wide bid-ask spreads, manipulation vulnerability through midpoint pushing and wash trading, and state rent costs of 3.75 SOL per market pair. ## Market Data - **Outcome:** Passed - **Proposer:** joebuild - **Created:** 2024-01-24 - **Completed:** 2024-01-29 - **Budget:** 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion (1,200 META total) - **Timeline:** 3 weeks development + 1 week review ## Proposal Details **Problem Statement:** 1. Lack of liquidity: Wide valuation uncertainty discourages limit orders near midpoint 2. Manipulation susceptibility: 1 META can push midpoint; VWAP vulnerable to wash trading 3. State rent costs: 3.75 SOL per market pair = 135-225 SOL annually ($11,475-$19,125) **Solution:** - AMM with liquidity-weighted price metric (more liquidity = more weight to current price) - High fees (3-5%) to incentivize LPs and deter wash trading - Proposers lock initial liquidity and set starting pass/fail prices - Near-zero state rent costs **Implementation Scope:** - Write basic AMM tracking liquidity-weighted average price - Integrate AMM into autocrat + conditional vault - Feature to pause swaps and return positions after verdict - Feature to close AMMs and return state rent SOL - Loosen time restrictions on proposal creation (currently 50 slots) - Auto-revert to fail if proposal instructions don't execute after X days **Team:** - joebuild: program development - 0xNalloK: frontend integration - TBD: expert review ## Significance First major architectural change to MetaDAO's futarchy implementation since launch. The migration from CLOBs to AMMs represents a fundamental shift in how conditional markets operate - from discrete order books to continuous pricing curves. The proposal explicitly prioritizes liquidity and manipulation resistance over features like one-sided liquidity provision. The state rent economics are notable: at 3-5 proposals/month, CLOB costs compound to $11K-$19K annually, making AMMs economically necessary at scale. ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] - core mechanism upgrade - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - implementation being modified - [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - addresses liquidity friction