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teleo-codex
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core
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mechanisms
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Teleo Agents
d28adc9906
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reweave: merge 30 files via frontmatter union [auto]
2026-04-25 01:15:29 +00:00
..
_map.md
agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md
blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement.md
called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification.md
coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md
decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md
futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets.md
futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs.md
futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making.md
governance mechanism diversity compounds organizational learning because disagreement between mechanisms reveals information no single mechanism can produce.md
MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md
permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid.md
Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election.md
quadratic voting fails for crypto because Sybil resistance and collusion prevention are unsolvable.md
redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation.md
speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md
token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md