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90 lines
No EOL
15 KiB
JSON
{
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"raw_response": "```json\n{\n \"claims\": [],\n \"enrichments\": [\n {\n \"target_file\": \"MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md\",\n \"type\": \"extend\",\n \"evidence\": \"The v0.1 upgrade made proposal duration configurable with a new default of 3 days (down from an implied longer period), explicitly designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' This confirms the 3-day window is a tunable parameter optimized for iteration speed, not a fixed theoretical requirement.\",\n \"source_ref\": \"MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 migration proposal (2023-12-03)\"\n },\n {\n \"target_file\": \"futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md\",\n \"type\": \"confirm\",\n \"evidence\": \"The v0.1 migration required moving 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the first autocrat program treasury to the second program treasury. This treasury migration demonstrates the operational friction when program upgrades require moving assets between program-owned accounts, validating the claim that token architecture changes force disruptive migrations.\",\n \"source_ref\": \"MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 migration (2023-12-03), treasury migration of 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL\"\n },\n {\n \"target_file\": \"futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md\",\n \"type\": \"confirm\",\n \"evidence\": \"The v0.1 upgrade made slots-per-proposal configurable rather than hardcoded, and changed the default to 3 days for 'quicker feedback loops.' This is a production simplification driven by user experience needs (faster iteration) rather than theoretical purity, demonstrating how implementations adapt mechanisms for practical use.\",\n \"source_ref\": \"MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 (2023-12-03), configurable proposal duration\"\n }\n ],\n \"entities\": [\n {\n \"filename\": \"metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md\",\n \"domain\": \"internet-finance\",\n \"action\": \"create\",\n \"entity_type\": \"decision_market\",\n \"content\": \"---\\ntype: entity\\nentity_type: decision_market\\nname: \\\"MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1\\\"\\ndomain: internet-finance\\nstatus: passed\\nparent_entity: \\\"[[metadao]]\\\"\\nplatform: \\\"futardio\\\"\\nproposer: \\\"HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz\\\"\\nproposal_url: \\\"https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi\\\"\\nproposal_date: 2023-12-03\\nresolution_date: 2023-12-13\\ncategory: \\\"mechanism\\\"\\nsummary: \\\"Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal duration (3-day default) and migrate 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL to new treasury\\\"\\ntracked_by: rio\\ncreated: 2026-03-11\\n---\\n\\n# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1\\n\\n## Summary\\nThis proposal upgraded MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation to v0.1, making proposal duration configurable with a new 3-day default (down from a longer implied period) to enable faster feedback loops. The migration required moving the entire treasury (990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL) from the first program to the second program.\\n\\n## Market Data\\n- **Outcome:** Passed\\n- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz\\n- **Completed:** 2023-12-13\\n- **Proposal account:** AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi\\n\\n## Key Risks Disclosed\\n1. **Smart contract risk:** Potential for new bugs in upgraded program (assessed as small by proposer)\\n2. **Counterparty risk:** Build was not verifiable due to technical constraints, requiring trust in proposer that no backdoor was introduced. Proposer committed to using verifiable builds for future versions.\\n\\n## Significance\\nThis was MetaDAO's first major mechanism upgrade, demonstrating:\\n- Willingness to iterate on futarchy parameters based on user experience (faster feedback)\\n- The operational friction of treasury migrations when upgrading program architecture\\n- Trust dynamics in early-stage futarchy implementations (non-verifiable build accepted by community)\\n- Evolution from hardcoded to configurable governance parameters\\n\\n## Relationship to KB\\n- [[metadao]] - mechanism upgrade and treasury migration\\n- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - confirms 3-day window is configurable parameter\\n- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] - demonstrates production adaptation\\n\"\n },\n {\n \"filename\": \"metadao.md\",\n \"domain\": \"internet-finance\",\n \"action\": \"update\",\n \"timeline_entry\": \"- **2023-12-03** \u2014 [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] proposed: upgrade Autocrat to v0.1 with configurable 3-day proposal duration, migrate 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL treasury\\n- **2023-12-13** \u2014 [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] passed: completed migration to Autocrat v0.1, first major mechanism upgrade\"\n }\n ],\n \"source_update\": {\n \"status\": \"processed\",\n \"processed_by\": \"rio\",\n \"processed_date\": \"2026-03-11\",\n \"claims_extracted\": [],\n \"enrichments_applied\": [\n \"MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md\",\n \"futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md\",\n \"futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md\"\n ],\n \"entities_updated\": [\n \"metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md\",\n \"metadao.md\"\n ],\n \"key_facts\": [\n \"MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 made proposal duration configurable with 3-day default (2023-12-03)\",\n \"Treasury migration moved 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL between program accounts (2023-12-03)\",\n \"Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi\",\n \"Build was not verifiable due to technical constraints with solana-verifiable-build\",\n \"Proposal passed and completed 2023-12-13\"\n ],\n \"notes\": \"First MetaDAO mechanism upgrade. No new claims warranted - the proposal demonstrates existing claims about futarchy implementation details, treasury migration friction, and production simplification. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself as it represents a significant governance milestone (first mechanism upgrade). The non-verifiable build disclosure is notable for trust dynamics but doesn't warrant a standalone claim.\"\n }\n}\n```",
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"target_file": "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md",
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"type": "extend",
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"evidence": "The v0.1 upgrade made proposal duration configurable with a new default of 3 days (down from an implied longer period), explicitly designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' This confirms the 3-day window is a tunable parameter optimized for iteration speed, not a fixed theoretical requirement.",
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"source_ref": "MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 migration proposal (2023-12-03)"
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},
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"target_file": "futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md",
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"type": "confirm",
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"evidence": "The v0.1 migration required moving 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the first autocrat program treasury to the second program treasury. This treasury migration demonstrates the operational friction when program upgrades require moving assets between program-owned accounts, validating the claim that token architecture changes force disruptive migrations.",
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"source_ref": "MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 migration (2023-12-03), treasury migration of 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL"
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},
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{
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"target_file": "futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md",
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"type": "confirm",
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"evidence": "The v0.1 upgrade made slots-per-proposal configurable rather than hardcoded, and changed the default to 3 days for 'quicker feedback loops.' This is a production simplification driven by user experience needs (faster iteration) rather than theoretical purity, demonstrating how implementations adapt mechanisms for practical use.",
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"source_ref": "MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 (2023-12-03), configurable proposal duration"
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}
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],
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"filename": "metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01.md",
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"domain": "internet-finance",
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"action": "create",
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"entity_type": "decision_market",
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"content": "---\ntype: entity\nentity_type: decision_market\nname: \"MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1\"\ndomain: internet-finance\nstatus: passed\nparent_entity: \"[[metadao]]\"\nplatform: \"futardio\"\nproposer: \"HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz\"\nproposal_url: \"https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi\"\nproposal_date: 2023-12-03\nresolution_date: 2023-12-13\ncategory: \"mechanism\"\nsummary: \"Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal duration (3-day default) and migrate 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL to new treasury\"\ntracked_by: rio\ncreated: 2026-03-11\n---\n\n# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1\n\n## Summary\nThis proposal upgraded MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation to v0.1, making proposal duration configurable with a new 3-day default (down from a longer implied period) to enable faster feedback loops. The migration required moving the entire treasury (990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL) from the first program to the second program.\n\n## Market Data\n- **Outcome:** Passed\n- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz\n- **Completed:** 2023-12-13\n- **Proposal account:** AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi\n\n## Key Risks Disclosed\n1. **Smart contract risk:** Potential for new bugs in upgraded program (assessed as small by proposer)\n2. **Counterparty risk:** Build was not verifiable due to technical constraints, requiring trust in proposer that no backdoor was introduced. Proposer committed to using verifiable builds for future versions.\n\n## Significance\nThis was MetaDAO's first major mechanism upgrade, demonstrating:\n- Willingness to iterate on futarchy parameters based on user experience (faster feedback)\n- The operational friction of treasury migrations when upgrading program architecture\n- Trust dynamics in early-stage futarchy implementations (non-verifiable build accepted by community)\n- Evolution from hardcoded to configurable governance parameters\n\n## Relationship to KB\n- [[metadao]] - mechanism upgrade and treasury migration\n- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - confirms 3-day window is configurable parameter\n- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] - demonstrates production adaptation\n"
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},
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"domain": "internet-finance",
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"timeline_entry": "- **2023-12-03** \u2014 [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] proposed: upgrade Autocrat to v0.1 with configurable 3-day proposal duration, migrate 990K META + 10K USDC + 5.5 SOL treasury\n- **2023-12-13** \u2014 [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] passed: completed migration to Autocrat v0.1, first major mechanism upgrade"
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}
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],
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"status": "processed",
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"MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md",
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"futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations.md",
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"futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject.md"
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"MetaDAO Autocrat v0.1 made proposal duration configurable with 3-day default (2023-12-03)",
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"Treasury migration moved 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL between program accounts (2023-12-03)",
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"Proposal account: AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi",
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"Build was not verifiable due to technical constraints with solana-verifiable-build",
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"Proposal passed and completed 2023-12-13"
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],
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"notes": "First MetaDAO mechanism upgrade. No new claims warranted - the proposal demonstrates existing claims about futarchy implementation details, treasury migration friction, and production simplification. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself as it represents a significant governance milestone (first mechanism upgrade). The non-verifiable build disclosure is notable for trust dynamics but doesn't warrant a standalone claim.",
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