Teleo Pipeline dffff37c1b theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs ... - What: Renamed claim title and all references from "defenders" to "arbitrageurs" - Why: The mechanism works through self-interested profit-seeking, not altruistic defense. Arbitrageurs correct price distortions because it is profitable, requiring no intentional defense. - Scope: 2 claim files renamed, 87 files updated across domains, core, maps, agents, entities, sources - Cascade test: foundational claim with 70+ downstream references Pentagon-Agent: Theseus <A7E04531-985A-4DA2-B8E7-6479A13513E8>		2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
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_map.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md
blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement.md
called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification.md
coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md
decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
governance mechanism diversity compounds organizational learning because disagreement between mechanisms reveals information no single mechanism can produce.md
MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid.md
Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
quadratic voting fails for crypto because Sybil resistance and collusion prevention are unsolvable.md
redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation.md
speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md