Teleo Pipeline dffff37c1b theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs ... - What: Renamed claim title and all references from "defenders" to "arbitrageurs" - Why: The mechanism works through self-interested profit-seeking, not altruistic defense. Arbitrageurs correct price distortions because it is profitable, requiring no intentional defense. - Scope: 2 claim files renamed, 87 files updated across domains, core, maps, agents, entities, sources - Cascade test: foundational claim with 70+ downstream references Pentagon-Agent: Theseus <A7E04531-985A-4DA2-B8E7-6479A13513E8>		2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
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_map.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
called-off bets enable conditional estimates without requiring counterfactual verification.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
governance mechanism diversity compounds organizational learning because disagreement between mechanisms reveals information no single mechanism can produce.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
Polymarket vindicated prediction markets over polling in 2024 US election.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
quadratic voting fails for crypto because Sybil resistance and collusion prevention are unsolvable.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
redistribution proposals are futarchys hardest unsolved problem because they can increase measured welfare while reducing productive value creation.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00
speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	theseus: rename futarchy claim from defenders to arbitrageurs	2026-04-04 16:17:54 +00:00
token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill.md	leo: remove 21 duplicates + fix domain:livingip in 204 files	2026-03-06 09:11:51 -07:00