Add fail-closed leoclean staging installer

docs/gcp-leoclean-nosend-service-package.md

@@ -246,6 +246,65 @@ extra descriptor fields, wrong-architecture images, missing repository-digest
 bindings, mismatched image labels, duplicate JSON keys, and non-finite JSON
 values are rejected.
 
+## Install, restart, verify, and roll back
+
+The installer consumes one finalized release-v3 bundle. Its default invocation
+is a dry run: it validates the exact two-file bundle, re-renders the unit from
+the descriptor, binds the installer/package/control-helper source closure to
+the clean Git revision and this checkout's fixed contract root, captures those
+stable bytes once, and prints the proposed target without changing the host:
+
+```bash
+python3 ops/install_gcp_leoclean_nosend_release.py \
+  --bundle /tmp/leoclean-nosend-release
+```
+
+After separate host-restart authorization, the same reviewed revision can be
+executed as root:
+
+```bash
+sudo python3 ops/install_gcp_leoclean_nosend_release.py \
+  --bundle /tmp/leoclean-nosend-release \
+  --execute-restart
+```
+
+The executable path never pulls an image. Before touching the service it
+requires the exact digest reference and normalized config digest already to be
+present on the local `unix:///var/run/docker.sock` daemon through an empty,
+service-private Docker config directory. The complete executable transaction,
+including rollback, holds a nonblocking root-owned mode-`0600` lock at
+`/run/leoclean-gcp-nosend-installer.lock`. It installs only the deterministic
+unit, a standalone release-bound container-control helper, the exact release
+descriptor, and a mode-`0600` install receipt. Atomic publications retain the
+published inode identity across durability/readback failure; rollback refuses
+to overwrite a pathname that no longer names that inode. The helper controls a
+container only through a mode-`0600` CID file in the service's mode-`0700`
+runtime directory, then rechecks the full ID, name, immutable image reference,
+config digest, release hash, role label, and running state. After the trusted ID
+disappears it rechecks that the canonical name is still unbound before removing
+the CID file. It never removes a container, uses a mutable name as stop
+authority, or invokes `--force`.
+
+An already installed release is verified without a restart. During an upgrade,
+the installer accepts only a stable two-readback active/running or inactive/dead
+prior posture. Before trusting the old `ExecStop`, it exact-binds effective
+`ExecStartPre`, `ExecStart`, `ExecStop`, runtime-directory and systemd security
+properties to the release and verifies the supervising PID's executable,
+command line and cgroup through `/proc`. It then stops the prior service through
+that currently loaded release-bound unit and only afterward replaces and
+reloads the unit. Candidate verification also rejects filesystem or effective
+systemd drop-ins, environment files, forbidden inherited process environment,
+an unexpected fragment, image/config/runtime drift, a non-healthy container,
+or any PID, container-ID, invocation-ID, or restart-counter change across the
+two readbacks. On failure it stops the candidate, restores the exact prior
+files, modes and active/inactive/absent posture, and reloads systemd. An
+incomplete rollback fails closed and is reported as such.
+
+This installer does not enable the service, provision IAM, roles or secrets,
+contact GCP or Cloud SQL, change Telegram traffic, touch the VPS, approve a
+proposal, or promote production. Those remain later, separately authorized
+boundaries.
+
 ## Offline evidence and live gate
 
 Offline tests prove strict receipt/descriptor/inspection schemas, exact
@@ -281,30 +340,43 @@ is absent, installation is separate infrastructure work; the deploy must stop
 instead of falling back to the production sync script or a mutable host virtual
 environment.
 
+The installer tests use a disposable filesystem root and exact fake
+systemd/Docker readbacks. They prove dry-run non-mutation, local digest/config
+binding, first install, no-restart idempotence, old-unit-first upgrade ordering,
+effective-environment and later-drop-in rejection, PID/restart-race rejection,
+automatic rollback to a running prior release, first-install cleanup, managed
+file posture, contract-root source binding, stale-loaded-unit rejection,
+supervising-process binding, lock contention, post-rename pathname replacement,
+exact inactive-posture rollback, and full-ID/config-digest-only container
+control including name-rebind refusal. They do not constitute a live staging
+restart or a Cloud SQL identity proof.
+
 Publishing the branch and stacked PR is only a review handoff. After both the
 digest-inspection package and this receipt producer receive exact-head human
 review and merge, separate live gates remain: staging repository/tag-policy
 preflight; authorized build/push receipt production; authorized independent
-digest finalization; installer/restart/rollback; and Cloud SQL/secret/service
-deployment proof. CI carries no Artifact Registry credentials and performs no
-push. IAM/secret changes, Cloud SQL access, proposal staging, production
-promotion, Telegram traffic, and VPS actions remain separate authority.
+digest finalization; an authorized installer/restart execution; and Cloud
+SQL/secret/service deployment proof. CI carries no Artifact Registry
+credentials and performs no push. IAM/secret changes, Cloud SQL access,
+proposal staging, production promotion, Telegram traffic, and VPS actions
+remain separate authority.
 
 ## Rollback and sunset
 
-This slice's automatic rollback removes an unpublished bundle only. Receipt
-pathnames are never removed automatically; the private retained link and any
-ambiguous publication residue require explicit operator inspection. Tool-owned
-build and candidate tags, the verified
+Release finalization's automatic rollback removes an unpublished bundle only.
+Receipt pathnames are never removed automatically; the private retained link
+and any ambiguous publication residue require explicit operator inspection.
+Tool-owned build and candidate tags, the verified
 repository-digest reference, and content-addressable layers may remain because
 a Docker-config lock cannot establish exclusive ownership of daemon-global
 cache state. A remotely pushed candidate is intentionally not deleted during
 automatic rollback and cannot be consumed without a valid receipt plus
 independent finalization. Any later cache cleanup requires separately proven
-daemon isolation. This slice installs no unit and changes no running service.
-Restoring a prior descriptor, unit, and digest
-belongs to the later installer slice, which must never restart or edit the
-production Leo, Telegram, or VPS services.
+daemon isolation. The installer does not delete the bundle, local image, or any
+Artifact Registry object. Its bounded rollback restores the managed prior
+descriptor, helper, unit, receipt, and service state; it must never restart or
+edit the production Leo, Telegram, or VPS services. A live staging execution
+and rollback proof remain separately authorized.
 
 The fresh tmpfs profile intentionally has no session continuity. That is
 appropriate for isolated gateway/database and fresh-turn parity proof, but it

docs/workstreams/gcp-leoclean/goals.md

@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ cut over safely and retire the VPS after soak.
    staging repository/tag policy.
 4. Under explicit live authorization, build and push one candidate, publish
    its receipt, and independently finalize the exact digest.
-5. Add the separate fail-closed installer/restart/verification/rollback slice
-   that consumes the exact inspection-bound release bundle.
+5. Review and merge the offline fail-closed
+   installer/restart/verification/rollback slice that consumes the exact
+   inspection-bound release bundle; authorize its first staging execution
+   separately.
 6. Provision the scoped Cloud SQL role/secret and deploy the separate staging
    service.
 7. Prove effective identity, reads, function-only proposal staging, denied

ops/gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py

@@ -52,6 +52,13 @@ PLATFORM = "linux/amd64"
 IMAGE_REPOSITORY = "europe-west6-docker.pkg.dev/teleo-501523/teleo/leoclean-nosend-staging"
 CONTAINER_NAME = "livingip-leoclean-nosend"
 LOCAL_BUILD_REPOSITORY = "livingip-leoclean-nosend-build"
+DOCKER_BINARY = "/usr/bin/docker"
+DOCKER_HOST = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"
+SERVICE_DOCKER_CONFIG = "/var/lib/livingip/leoclean-nosend/docker-config"
+SERVICE_CONTROL_HELPER = "/usr/local/libexec/livingip/leoclean-nosend-service-control"
+SERVICE_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY = "leoclean-gcp-nosend"
+SERVICE_CIDFILE = f"/run/{SERVICE_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY}/container.cid"
+SERVICE_PATH = "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
 
 HERMES_COMMIT = "b2f477a30b3c05d0f383c543af98496ae8a96070"
 PYTHON_VERSION = "3.11.9"
@@ -1477,9 +1484,7 @@ def validate_prepared_image_context(context: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict
     }
     _require(actual_identity_paths == expected_identity_paths, "prepared identity source entry set drifted")
     actual_script_paths = {
-        path.relative_to(context).as_posix()
-        for path in (context / "scripts").rglob("*")
-        if path.is_file()
+        path.relative_to(context).as_posix() for path in (context / "scripts").rglob("*") if path.is_file()
     }
     _require(
         actual_script_paths == set(IDENTITY_CONTRACT_SOURCES),
@@ -1496,9 +1501,7 @@ def validate_prepared_image_context(context: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict
     _require(
         isinstance(artifact_files, list)
         and all(
-            isinstance(entry, dict)
-            and isinstance(entry.get("path"), str)
-            and isinstance(entry.get("mode"), str)
+            isinstance(entry, dict) and isinstance(entry.get("path"), str) and isinstance(entry.get("mode"), str)
             for entry in artifact_files
         ),
         "prepared artifact file manifest is invalid",
@@ -1518,9 +1521,7 @@ def validate_prepared_image_context(context: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict
         _require(bool(re.fullmatch(r"0o[0-7]{3,4}", raw_mode)), "prepared artifact file mode is invalid")
         expected_file_modes[f"artifact/{entry['path']}"] = int(raw_mode.removeprefix("0o"), 8)
     expected_file_modes.update({f"identity/{name}": 0o600 for name in IDENTITY_FILES})
-    expected_file_modes.update(
-        {f"identity-sources/{relative}": 0o644 for relative in expected_identity_paths}
-    )
+    expected_file_modes.update({f"identity-sources/{relative}": 0o644 for relative in expected_identity_paths})
     expected_file_modes.update({relative: 0o644 for relative in IDENTITY_CONTRACT_SOURCES})
     actual_files = {path.relative_to(context).as_posix() for path in context.rglob("*") if path.is_file()}
     _require(actual_files == set(expected_file_modes), "prepared image file entry set drifted")
@@ -1531,16 +1532,13 @@ def validate_prepared_image_context(context: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], dict
         )
     expected_directories = {"artifact", "identity", "identity-sources", "scripts"}
     expected_directories.update(
-        f"artifact/{relative}"
-        for relative in _parent_directory_paths({entry["path"] for entry in artifact_files})
+        f"artifact/{relative}" for relative in _parent_directory_paths({entry["path"] for entry in artifact_files})
     )
     expected_directories.update(
         _parent_directory_paths({f"identity-sources/{relative}" for relative in expected_identity_paths})
     )
     expected_directories.update(_parent_directory_paths(set(IDENTITY_CONTRACT_SOURCES)))
-    actual_directories = {
-        path.relative_to(context).as_posix() for path in context.rglob("*") if path.is_dir()
-    }
+    actual_directories = {path.relative_to(context).as_posix() for path in context.rglob("*") if path.is_dir()}
     _require(actual_directories == expected_directories, "prepared image directory entry set drifted")
     _require(stat.S_IMODE(context.stat().st_mode) == 0o700, "prepared image context mode drifted")
     for relative in actual_directories:
@@ -2486,15 +2484,20 @@ def validate_release_descriptor(value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
 def render_systemd_unit(release: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     validate_release_descriptor(release)
     image = release["image"]["reference"]
+    config_digest = release["image"]["config_digest"]
     release_sha = release["release_sha256"]
     profile_tmpfs = f"{PROFILE_ROOT}:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m,uid=0,gid=0,mode=0700"
     temp_tmpfs = f"/tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m,uid={RUNTIME_UID},gid={RUNTIME_GID},mode=0700"
     postgres_data_tmpfs = "/var/lib/postgresql/data:ro,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64k,uid=0,gid=0,mode=0000"
     exec_start = " ".join(
         [
-            "/usr/bin/docker run",
+            DOCKER_BINARY,
+            f"--host={DOCKER_HOST}",
+            f"--config={SERVICE_DOCKER_CONFIG}",
+            "run",
             "--rm",
             f"--name={CONTAINER_NAME}",
+            f"--cidfile={SERVICE_CIDFILE}",
             "--pull=never",
             "--read-only",
             "--cap-drop=ALL",
@@ -2510,6 +2513,7 @@ def render_systemd_unit(release: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
             f"--tmpfs={temp_tmpfs}",
             f"--tmpfs={postgres_data_tmpfs}",
             f"--label=livingip.release.sha256={release_sha}",
+            "--label=livingip.container.role=leoclean-gcp-nosend",
             image,
             "service",
         ]
@@ -2523,9 +2527,15 @@ Wants=network-online.target
 
 [Service]
 Type=simple
+Environment=PATH={SERVICE_PATH}
+UnsetEnvironment=DOCKER_HOST DOCKER_CONFIG DOCKER_CONTEXT DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY DOCKER_CERT_PATH DOCKER_API_VERSION DOCKER_CUSTOM_HEADERS BUILDKIT_HOST BUILDX_BUILDER
+UnsetEnvironment=HTTP_PROXY HTTPS_PROXY ALL_PROXY NO_PROXY http_proxy https_proxy all_proxy no_proxy
+RuntimeDirectory={SERVICE_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY}
+RuntimeDirectoryMode=0700
+RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=no
+ExecStartPre={SERVICE_CONTROL_HELPER} prestart {release_sha} {image} {config_digest}
 ExecStart={exec_start}
-ExecStop=/usr/bin/docker stop --time=30 {CONTAINER_NAME}
-ExecStopPost=-/usr/bin/docker rm --force {CONTAINER_NAME}
+ExecStop={SERVICE_CONTROL_HELPER} stop {release_sha} {image} {config_digest}
 Restart=on-failure
 RestartSec=5s
 TimeoutStartSec=120s
@@ -2552,7 +2562,11 @@ SystemCallArchitectures=native
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
 """
     _require("--publish" not in unit and " -p " not in unit, "service unit publishes a port")
-    _require("docker.sock" not in unit, "service unit mounts the Docker socket")
+    _require(
+        "--volume=/var/run/docker.sock" not in unit and "--mount=type=bind,source=/var/run/docker.sock" not in unit,
+        "service unit mounts the Docker socket",
+    )
+    _require("docker rm" not in unit and "--force" not in unit, "service unit contains destructive cleanup")
     _require(
         "EnvironmentFile" not in unit and "LoadCredential" not in unit,
         "service unit adds an unreviewed credential source",

ops/leoclean_nosend_service_control.py

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+#!/usr/bin/python3 -I
+"""Control one digest-bound leoclean no-send container by verified full ID."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import time
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+DOCKER_BINARY = "/usr/bin/docker"
+DOCKER_HOST = "unix:///var/run/docker.sock"
+DOCKER_CONFIG = "/var/lib/livingip/leoclean-nosend/docker-config"
+CONTAINER_NAME = "livingip-leoclean-nosend"
+CIDFILE = Path("/run/leoclean-gcp-nosend/container.cid")
+IMAGE_REPOSITORY = "europe-west6-docker.pkg.dev/teleo-501523/teleo/leoclean-nosend-staging"
+SAFE_PATH = "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
+MAX_DOCKER_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+HEX_64 = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+IMAGE_REFERENCE = re.compile(rf"^{re.escape(IMAGE_REPOSITORY)}@sha256:[0-9a-f]{{64}}$")
+IMAGE_CONFIG_DIGEST = re.compile(r"^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$")
+
+Runner = Callable[[list[str]], subprocess.CompletedProcess[bytes]]
+
+
+class ControlError(RuntimeError):
+    """A bounded service-control failure."""
+
+
+def _require(condition: bool, message: str) -> None:
+    if not condition:
+        raise ControlError(message)
+
+
+def _strict_json(raw: bytes) -> Any:
+    _require(len(raw) <= MAX_DOCKER_OUTPUT_BYTES, "docker output exceeded the safety limit")
+
+    def reject_duplicates(pairs: list[tuple[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        value: dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for key, item in pairs:
+            if key in value:
+                raise ValueError("duplicate key")
+            value[key] = item
+        return value
+
+    try:
+        return json.loads(
+            raw.decode("utf-8", "strict"),
+            object_pairs_hook=reject_duplicates,
+            parse_constant=lambda _value: (_ for _ in ()).throw(ValueError("constant")),
+        )
+    except (UnicodeError, ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+        raise ControlError("docker inspection was invalid") from exc
+
+
+def _default_runner(argv: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[bytes]:
+    environment = {"PATH": SAFE_PATH}
+    return subprocess.run(
+        argv,
+        check=False,
+        stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        capture_output=True,
+        timeout=45,
+        env=environment,
+    )
+
+
+def _docker(arguments: list[str], runner: Runner) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[bytes]:
+    argv = [
+        DOCKER_BINARY,
+        f"--host={DOCKER_HOST}",
+        f"--config={DOCKER_CONFIG}",
+        *arguments,
+    ]
+    try:
+        completed = runner(argv)
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+        raise ControlError("docker command failed") from exc
+    _require(
+        len(completed.stdout) <= MAX_DOCKER_OUTPUT_BYTES and len(completed.stderr) <= MAX_DOCKER_OUTPUT_BYTES,
+        "docker output exceeded the safety limit",
+    )
+    return completed
+
+
+def _inspect(reference: str, runner: Runner) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    completed = _docker(["container", "inspect", reference], runner)
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        try:
+            error = completed.stderr.decode("utf-8", "strict").strip()
+        except UnicodeError as exc:
+            raise ControlError("container absence could not be proven") from exc
+        absence = re.compile(
+            rf"^(?:Error response from daemon: |Error: )?No such (?:container|object): {re.escape(reference)}$"
+        )
+        _require(absence.fullmatch(error) is not None, "container absence could not be proven")
+        return None
+    value = _strict_json(completed.stdout)
+    _require(
+        isinstance(value, list) and len(value) == 1 and isinstance(value[0], dict),
+        "container inspection was not exact",
+    )
+    return value[0]
+
+
+def _validate_container(
+    value: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    container_id: str,
+    release_sha256: str,
+    image_reference: str,
+    image_config_digest: str,
+) -> bool:
+    config = value.get("Config")
+    labels = config.get("Labels") if isinstance(config, dict) else None
+    state = value.get("State")
+    _require(
+        value.get("Id") == container_id
+        and value.get("Name") == f"/{CONTAINER_NAME}"
+        and value.get("Image") == image_config_digest
+        and isinstance(config, dict)
+        and config.get("Image") == image_reference
+        and isinstance(labels, dict)
+        and labels.get("livingip.release.sha256") == release_sha256
+        and labels.get("livingip.container.role") == "leoclean-gcp-nosend"
+        and isinstance(state, dict)
+        and isinstance(state.get("Running"), bool),
+        "container identity did not match the installed release",
+    )
+    return bool(state["Running"])
+
+
+def _cidfile_parent_descriptor(cidfile: Path) -> int:
+    flags = os.O_RDONLY
+    if hasattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY"):
+        flags |= os.O_DIRECTORY
+    if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+        flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    try:
+        descriptor = os.open(cidfile.parent, flags)
+        observed = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        named = os.stat(cidfile.parent, follow_symlinks=False)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise ControlError("container ID directory was unsafe") from exc
+    if not (
+        stat.S_ISDIR(observed.st_mode)
+        and (observed.st_dev, observed.st_ino) == (named.st_dev, named.st_ino)
+        and observed.st_uid == os.geteuid()
+        and observed.st_mode & 0o077 == 0
+    ):
+        os.close(descriptor)
+        raise ControlError("container ID directory was unsafe")
+    return descriptor
+
+
+def _read_cidfile(cidfile: Path) -> tuple[str, tuple[int, int]] | None:
+    parent_descriptor = _cidfile_parent_descriptor(cidfile)
+    descriptor: int | None = None
+    try:
+        flags = os.O_RDONLY
+        if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
+            flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
+        try:
+            descriptor = os.open(cidfile.name, flags, dir_fd=parent_descriptor)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return None
+        observed = os.fstat(descriptor)
+        named = os.stat(cidfile.name, dir_fd=parent_descriptor, follow_symlinks=False)
+        _require(
+            stat.S_ISREG(observed.st_mode)
+            and (observed.st_dev, observed.st_ino) == (named.st_dev, named.st_ino)
+            and observed.st_uid == os.geteuid()
+            and stat.S_IMODE(observed.st_mode) == 0o600
+            and observed.st_nlink == 1
+            and observed.st_size <= 65,
+            "container ID file was unsafe",
+        )
+        raw = os.read(descriptor, 66)
+        try:
+            container_id = raw.decode("ascii", "strict").strip()
+        except UnicodeError as exc:
+            raise ControlError("container ID file was invalid") from exc
+        _require(HEX_64.fullmatch(container_id) is not None, "container ID file was invalid")
+        return container_id, (observed.st_dev, observed.st_ino)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise ControlError("container ID file could not be read") from exc
+    finally:
+        if descriptor is not None:
+            os.close(descriptor)
+        os.close(parent_descriptor)
+
+
+def _unlink_cidfile(cidfile: Path, identity: tuple[int, int]) -> None:
+    parent_descriptor = _cidfile_parent_descriptor(cidfile)
+    try:
+        observed = os.stat(cidfile.name, dir_fd=parent_descriptor, follow_symlinks=False)
+        _require(
+            stat.S_ISREG(observed.st_mode) and (observed.st_dev, observed.st_ino) == identity,
+            "container ID file changed during cleanup",
+        )
+        os.unlink(cidfile.name, dir_fd=parent_descriptor)
+        os.fsync(parent_descriptor)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise ControlError("container ID file cleanup failed") from exc
+    finally:
+        os.close(parent_descriptor)
+
+
+def _wait_absent(container_id: str, runner: Runner, sleeper: Callable[[float], None]) -> None:
+    for _attempt in range(60):
+        if _inspect(container_id, runner) is None:
+            return
+        sleeper(0.25)
+    raise ControlError("container did not stop within the bounded wait")
+
+
+def _require_name_unbound(runner: Runner) -> None:
+    _require(_inspect(CONTAINER_NAME, runner) is None, "container name was rebound after the trusted container exited")
+
+
+def _stop_exact(container_id: str, runner: Runner, sleeper: Callable[[float], None]) -> None:
+    completed = _docker(["container", "stop", "--time=30", container_id], runner)
+    _require(completed.returncode == 0, "container stop failed")
+    _wait_absent(container_id, runner, sleeper)
+
+
+def control_container(
+    action: str,
+    release_sha256: str,
+    image_reference: str,
+    image_config_digest: str,
+    *,
+    runner: Runner = _default_runner,
+    sleeper: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep,
+    cidfile: Path = CIDFILE,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    _require(action in {"prestart", "stop"}, "service-control action was invalid")
+    _require(HEX_64.fullmatch(release_sha256) is not None, "release hash was invalid")
+    _require(IMAGE_REFERENCE.fullmatch(image_reference) is not None, "image reference was invalid")
+    _require(IMAGE_CONFIG_DIGEST.fullmatch(image_config_digest) is not None, "image config digest was invalid")
+
+    cid = _read_cidfile(cidfile)
+    by_name = _inspect(CONTAINER_NAME, runner)
+    if cid is None:
+        _require(by_name is None, "container name is occupied without a trusted ID file")
+        return {"action": action, "status": "pass", "container": "absent"}
+
+    container_id, cid_identity = cid
+    by_id = _inspect(container_id, runner)
+    if by_id is None:
+        _require(by_name is None, "container name was rebound after the trusted container exited")
+        _require_name_unbound(runner)
+        _unlink_cidfile(cidfile, cid_identity)
+        return {"action": action, "status": "pass", "container": "absent"}
+
+    running = _validate_container(
+        by_id,
+        container_id=container_id,
+        release_sha256=release_sha256,
+        image_reference=image_reference,
+        image_config_digest=image_config_digest,
+    )
+    _require(
+        by_name is not None and by_name.get("Id") == container_id,
+        "container name and trusted ID did not agree",
+    )
+    if running:
+        _stop_exact(container_id, runner, sleeper)
+    else:
+        _wait_absent(container_id, runner, sleeper)
+    _require_name_unbound(runner)
+    _unlink_cidfile(cidfile, cid_identity)
+    return {"action": action, "status": "pass", "container": "stopped"}
+
+
+class _Parser(argparse.ArgumentParser):
+    def error(self, _message: str) -> None:
+        raise ControlError("invalid arguments")
+
+
+def parse_args(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = _Parser(description=__doc__, add_help=False)
+    parser.add_argument("action", choices=("prestart", "stop"))
+    parser.add_argument("release_sha256")
+    parser.add_argument("image_reference")
+    parser.add_argument("image_config_digest")
+    return parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    try:
+        args = parse_args(argv)
+        result = control_container(
+            args.action,
+            args.release_sha256,
+            args.image_reference,
+            args.image_config_digest,
+        )
+        sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(result, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+        return 0
+    except ControlError as exc:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            json.dumps({"error": str(exc), "status": "fail"}, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True) + "\n"
+        )
+        return 65
+    except Exception:
+        sys.stderr.write('{"error":"service control failed","status":"fail"}\n')
+        return 65
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

tests/test_gcp_leoclean_nosend_package.py

@@ -1822,9 +1822,7 @@ def test_registry_inspection_absent_pull_dependent_retains_new_reference(
     calls: list[list[str]] = []
     environments: list[dict[str, str]] = []
     state = {"present": False, "dependent": False, "inspection_calls": 0}
-    payload = json.dumps(
-        [docker_inspection_fixture(image_input, reference, config_digest=config_digest)]
-    ).encode()
+    payload = json.dumps([docker_inspection_fixture(image_input, reference, config_digest=config_digest)]).encode()
     monkeypatch.setenv("DOCKER_HOST", "tcp://unreviewed.example:2375")
     monkeypatch.setenv("DOCKER_CONTEXT", "unreviewed")
 
@@ -2703,7 +2701,13 @@ def test_rendered_unit_is_isolated_digest_pinned_and_has_no_credential_or_transp
     assert "NoNewPrivileges=yes" in unit
     assert "EnvironmentFile" not in unit
     assert "LoadCredential" not in unit
-    assert "docker.sock" not in unit
+    assert f"--host={package.DOCKER_HOST}" in unit
+    assert f"--config={package.SERVICE_DOCKER_CONFIG}" in unit
+    assert f"--cidfile={package.SERVICE_CIDFILE}" in unit
+    assert package.SERVICE_CONTROL_HELPER in unit
+    assert "docker rm" not in unit
+    assert "--force" not in unit
+    assert "--volume=/var/run/docker.sock" not in unit
     assert "--publish" not in unit
     assert "teleo-prod-1" not in unit
     assert "77.42.65.182" not in unit