# GCP leoclean no-send staging preflight

## Outcome

This slice checks whether the existing `teleo-staging-1` target is ready for
the separately reviewed no-send service package. It creates one revision-bound
receipt and does not deploy the service.

The checker validates the exact project, VM, machine type, attached service
account, exact `e2-standard-4` machine type, boot-disk attachment and
architecture, private-only VM attachment to `teleo-staging-europe-west6`
(`10.60.0.0/20`), Private Google Access, immutable Docker Artifact
Registry repository, exact private PostgreSQL 16 Cloud SQL endpoint, host
architecture, Docker server, Docker storage floor, unused service/container
names, and private TCP/5432 reachability from the VM.

## Authority boundary

The control-plane commands are `describe` operations. The bounded remote probe
runs through IAP/SSH and reads metadata, Docker, disk, systemd, container-name,
and TCP state. It does not read Secret Manager, use a database credential, run
a database query, install or pull software, create a container, write a unit,
or start/restart a service.

`gcloud compute ssh` may register or refresh an SSH key. The checker therefore
uses a maximum five-minute key lifetime and records that caveat explicitly; it
does not claim that the access path or cloud credential metadata is
mutation-free. The remote command itself does not change host runtime state.

## Run

Run from the exact clean, tracked source revision with an already authenticated Google
Cloud account that has the reviewed IAP/OS Login read path:

```bash
python3 ops/check_gcp_leoclean_nosend_preflight.py \
  --output /tmp/leoclean-nosend-gcp-preflight.json
```

The output file is created with mode `0600`. Authentication, permission, and
connection failures emit only a bounded category; command stderr is not copied
into the receipt. The checker rejects an alternate repository root, an output
path inside the source tree, untracked critical inputs, and source drift during
the live observation.

## Claim ceiling and rollback

A passing receipt proves only the listed control-plane observations and
host-network private TCP reachability at one exact, clean Git revision. It does
not prove Docker-bridge reachability, Artifact Registry pull authorization,
secret access, database authentication, scoped PostgreSQL permissions, image
publication, deployment, restart, rollback, model behavior, parity, traffic,
or production readiness.

This slice changes no repository-independent service state. Its local rollback
boundary is deletion of the branch/worktree and any generated receipt. Any
time-bounded SSH key created by the access path expires after at most five
minutes.