extract: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy
Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
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Teleo Agents
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@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ This cost reduction is structural, not marginal—the CLOB architecture requires
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The 94-99% cost reduction (from 135-225 SOL to near-zero) makes futarchy economically viable at higher proposal frequencies, removing a constraint on governance throughput.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal provides specific cost calculation: 'If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11475-$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.' Each pass/fail market pair costs 3.75 SOL in state rent that cannot currently be recouped.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
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- Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
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- CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the main reason for switching from CLOBs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).'
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
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- May reduce legitimate trading volume
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- LP attraction depends on base trading activity
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal specifies 3-5% fee structure with dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The high fee makes liquidity provision profitable while making repeated trading for manipulation purposes expensive.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md",
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"issues": [
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"missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 4,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 9,
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"rejected": 4,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat",
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive",
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"amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-sett",
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"amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-c"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:missing_attribution_extractor",
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"amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:missing_attribution_extractor"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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}
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
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date: 2024-01-24
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -128,3 +132,14 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
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- Autocrat version: 0.1
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- Completed: 2024-01-29
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- Ended: 2024-01-29
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## Key Facts
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- MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed on 2024-01-29
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- Budget was 400 META on passing proposal plus 800 META on completed migration
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- Implementation timeline estimated at 3 weeks from passing plus 1 week review
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- joebuild wrote program changes, 0xNalloK handled frontend integration
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- MetaDAO Autocrat version 0.1 was in use at time of proposal
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- Current CLOB minimum order size is 1 META
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- Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent under CLOB system
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- Proposal included feature to revert to fail after X days if proposal instruction does not work
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