extract: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure
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Teleo Agents
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@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ The mechanism addresses the "lack of liquidity" problem identified with CLOBs, w
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Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liquidity bootstrapping logic is sound but requires real-world validation.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Dean's List DAO proposal explicitly uses 5% base fee (vs 0.25% baseline) to incentivize LP provision, with projected annual treasury growth of $19,416-$24,960 demonstrating how high fees create sustainable LP incentives
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Single-case evidence limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to:
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However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when the economics appear favorable.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal passed with clear economic benefits (42-54x revenue increase) but required explicit TWAP threshold design and volatility buffers, showing that even obviously beneficial proposals need careful mechanism design to overcome participation friction
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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{
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"rejected_claims": [
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{
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"filename": "high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md",
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"issues": [
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"no_frontmatter"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md",
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"issues": [
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"no_frontmatter"
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]
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},
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{
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"filename": "futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md",
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"issues": [
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"no_frontmatter"
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]
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}
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],
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"validation_stats": {
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"total": 3,
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"kept": 0,
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"fixed": 6,
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"rejected": 3,
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"fixes_applied": [
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"high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
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"dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent",
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"futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:set_created:2026-03-15",
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"futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-condit"
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],
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"rejections": [
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"high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:no_frontmatter",
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"dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:no_frontmatter",
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"futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:no_frontmatter"
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]
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},
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"model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5",
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"date": "2026-03-15"
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}
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
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date: 2025-01-14
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-15
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enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -165,3 +169,12 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-01-17
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- Ended: 2025-01-17
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO treasury was approximately $80,000 including native tokens as of January 2025
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- Dean's List DAO market cap was $298,889 (volatility-adjusted) at proposal creation on January 11, 2025
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- Dean's List DAO monthly trading volume was 46,228 USDC for the period December 6, 2024 to January 6, 2025
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- Dean's List DAO proposal B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP was proposal number 8
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- Dean's List DAO treasurer wallet address is 3YW5dxM6u8TG8bZR6ShSiDS8aTfZPG72vUFuGuBVQA2z
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- Dean's List DAO uses Autocrat version 0.3 for futarchy governance
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