auto-fix: strip 14 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
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Teleo Agents
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@ -55,25 +55,25 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-03-28-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-build-a-sanctum-mobile-app-wonder]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2025-03-28-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-build-a-sanctum-mobile-app-wonder | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Sanctum's Wonder proposal (2frDGSg1frwBeh3bc6R7XKR2wckyMTt6pGXLGLPgoota, created 2025-03-28, completed 2025-03-31) represents the first major test of Autocrat futarchy for strategic product direction rather than treasury operations. The team explicitly stated: 'Even though this is not a proposal that involves community CLOUD funds, this is going to be the largest product decision ever made by the Sanctum team, so we want to put it up to governance vote.' The proposal to build a consumer mobile app (Wonder) with automatic yield optimization, gasless transfers, and curated project participation failed despite team conviction backed by market comparables (Phantom $3B valuation, Jupiter $1.7B market cap, MetaMask $320M swap fees). This demonstrates Autocrat's capacity to govern strategic pivots beyond operational decisions, though the failure raises questions about whether futarchy markets discount consumer product risk or disagreed with the user segmentation thesis.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List DAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period and 3% TWAP threshold. Proposal completed 2024-06-25 with failed status. This provides concrete implementation data: small DAOs (FDV $123K) can deploy Autocrat with custom TWAP thresholds (3% vs. typical higher thresholds), but low absolute dollar amounts may be insufficient to attract trader participation even when percentage returns are favorable.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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*Source: 2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01 | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Autocrat v0.1 made the three-day window configurable rather than hardcoded, with the proposer stating it was 'most importantly' designed to 'allow for quicker feedback loops.' The proposal passed with 990K META migrated, demonstrating community acceptance of parameterized proposal duration.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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*Source: 2024-07-04-futardio-proposal-proposal-3 | Added: 2026-03-15*
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Proposal #3 on MetaDAO (account EXehk1u3qUJZSxJ4X3nHsiTocRhzwq3eQAa6WKxeJ8Xs) ran on Autocrat version 0.3, created 2024-07-04, and completed/ended 2024-07-08 - confirming the four-day operational window (proposal creation plus three-day settlement period) specified in the mechanism design.
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@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- why TWAP settlement makes manipulation expensive
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- the participation challenge in consensus scenarios
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- [[agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation]] -- the proposal filtering this mechanism enables
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- [[STAMP replaces SAFE plus token warrant by adding futarchy-governed treasury spending allowances that prevent the extraction problem that killed legacy ICOs]] -- the investment instrument that integrates with this governance mechanism
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- [[MetaDAOs Cayman SPC houses all launched projects as ring-fenced SegCos under a single entity with MetaDAO LLC as sole Director]] -- the legal entity governed by this mechanism
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- STAMP replaces SAFE plus token warrant by adding futarchy-governed treasury spending allowances that prevent the extraction problem that killed legacy ICOs -- the investment instrument that integrates with this governance mechanism
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- MetaDAOs Cayman SPC houses all launched projects as ring-fenced SegCos under a single entity with MetaDAO LLC as sole Director -- the legal entity governed by this mechanism
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Futarchy faces three concrete adoption barriers that compound to limit participa
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Token price psychology creates unexpected barriers to participation. META at $750 with 20K supply is designed for governance but psychologically repels the traders and arbitrageurs that futarchy depends on for price discovery. In an industry built on speculation and momentum, where participants want to buy millions of tokens and watch numbers rise, high per-token prices create psychological barriers to entry. This matters because futarchy's value proposition depends on traders turning information into accurate price signals. When the participants most sensitive to liquidity and slippage can't build meaningful positions or exit efficiently, governance gets weaker signals, conditional markets become less efficient, and price discovery breaks down.
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Proposal creation compounds this friction through genuine difficulty. Creating futarchic proposals requires hours of documentation, mapping complex implications, anticipating market reactions, and meeting technical requirements without templates to follow. The high effort with uncertain outcomes creates exactly the expected result: good ideas die in drafts, experiments don't happen, and proposals slow to a crawl. This is why [[futarchy proposal frequency must be controlled through auction mechanisms to prevent attention overload|proposal auction mechanisms]] matter -- they can channel the best proposals forward by rewarding sponsors when proposals pass. This connects to how [[knowledge scaling bottlenecks kill revolutionary ideas before they reach critical mass]] - even when the governance mechanism is superior, if using it is too hard, innovation stalls.
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Proposal creation compounds this friction through genuine difficulty. Creating futarchic proposals requires hours of documentation, mapping complex implications, anticipating market reactions, and meeting technical requirements without templates to follow. The high effort with uncertain outcomes creates exactly the expected result: good ideas die in drafts, experiments don't happen, and proposals slow to a crawl. This is why futarchy proposal frequency must be controlled through auction mechanisms to prevent attention overload|proposal auction mechanisms matter -- they can channel the best proposals forward by rewarding sponsors when proposals pass. This connects to how [[knowledge scaling bottlenecks kill revolutionary ideas before they reach critical mass]] - even when the governance mechanism is superior, if using it is too hard, innovation stalls.
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Liquidity requirements create capital barriers that exclude smaller participants. Each proposal needs sufficient market depth for meaningful trading, which requires capital commitments before knowing if the proposal has merit. This favors well-capitalized players and creates a chicken-and-egg problem where low liquidity deters traders, which reduces price discovery quality, which makes governance less effective.
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@ -24,31 +24,31 @@ Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontest
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 allowance creates baseline operations budget, but any expenditure beyond this requires futarchy proposal and market approval. First post-raise proposal will be $50,000 CAPEX withdrawal — a large binary decision that may face liquidity challenges in decision markets. Team must balance operational needs (construction timelines, vendor commitments, seasonal agricultural constraints) against market approval uncertainty. This creates tension between real-world operational requirements (fixed deadlines, vendor deposits, material procurement) and futarchy's market-based approval process, suggesting futarchy may face adoption friction in domains with hard operational deadlines.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2025-06-12-optimism-futarchy-v1-preliminary-findings | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-03-28-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-build-a-sanctum-mobile-app-wonder]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2025-03-28-futardio-proposal-should-sanctum-build-a-sanctum-mobile-app-wonder | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Sanctum's Wonder proposal failure reveals a new friction: team conviction vs. market verdict on strategic pivots. The team had strong conviction ('I want to build the right introduction to crypto: the app we all deserve, but no one is building') backed by market comparables (Phantom $3B, Jupiter $1.7B, MetaMask $320M fees) and team track record (safeguarding $1B+, making futarchy fun). Yet futarchy rejected the proposal. The team reserved 'the right to change details of the prospective features or go-to-market if we deem it better for the product' but submitted the core decision to futarchy, suggesting uncertainty about whether futarchy should govern strategic direction or just treasury/operations. This creates a new adoption friction: uncertainty about futarchy's appropriate scope (operational vs. strategic decisions) and whether token markets can accurately price founder conviction and domain expertise on product strategy.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme | Added: 2026-03-15 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Dean's List ThailandDAO proposal included complex mechanics (token lockup multipliers, governance power calculations, leaderboard dynamics, multi-phase rollout with feedback sessions, payment-in-DEAN options at 10% discount) that increased evaluation friction. Despite favorable economics (16x projected FDV increase, $15K cost, 3% threshold), the proposal failed to attract trading volume. The proposal's own analysis noted the 3% requirement was 'small compared to the projected FDV increase' and 'achievable,' yet market participants did not engage, confirming that proposal complexity creates adoption barriers even when valuations are attractive.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
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*Source: 2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap | Added: 2026-03-15*
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MetaDAO's Q3 roadmap explicitly prioritized UI performance improvements, targeting reduction of page load times from 14.6 seconds to 1 second. This 93% reduction target indicates that user experience friction was severe enough to warrant top-level roadmap inclusion alongside product launches and team building.
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@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- evidence of liquidity friction in practice
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- [[knowledge scaling bottlenecks kill revolutionary ideas before they reach critical mass]] -- similar adoption barrier through complexity
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] -- suggests focusing futarchy where benefits exceed costs
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- [[futarchy proposal frequency must be controlled through auction mechanisms to prevent attention overload]] -- proposal auction mechanisms could reduce the proposal creation barrier by rewarding good proposals
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- [[futarchy price differences should be evaluated statistically over decision periods not as point estimates]] -- statistical evaluation addresses the thin-market problem that liquidity barriers create
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- futarchy proposal frequency must be controlled through auction mechanisms to prevent attention overload -- proposal auction mechanisms could reduce the proposal creation barrier by rewarding good proposals
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- futarchy price differences should be evaluated statistically over decision periods not as point estimates -- statistical evaluation addresses the thin-market problem that liquidity barriers create
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- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] -- even thin markets can aggregate information if specialist arbitrageurs participate
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Topics:
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