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Teleo Agents 2026-03-16 11:30:14 +00:00
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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-markets-can-price-cultural-spending-proposals-by-treating-community-cohesion-and-brand-equity-as-token-price-inputs.md
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The single data point is limited. One passed proposal doesn't establish a reliab
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision. Dean's List DAO's fee increase proposal included switching quote token from mSOL back to SOL, a decision with no direct revenue impact but potential effects on user experience and composability. The futarchy market approved this alongside the fee changes, suggesting it priced the operational simplification and ecosystem alignment as net positive for token value despite being a 'cultural' rather than purely financial decision.

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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition | Added: 2026-03-15*
Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal. Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure | Added: 2026-03-15*
Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear. Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.