rio: decision records batch 2b — complete MetaDAO governance backfill (all 27)
- What: Rewrote all 27 existing MetaDAO governance decision records with full verbatim proposal text, correct URLs, Summary & Connections - Includes META-032 (DBA/Variant $6M OTC rejection) — previously had sparse summary, now has full proposal text + $879K volume data + pass/fail TWAP spread showing -64% pass vs +0.5% fail - Combined with batch 1 (5 new), all 32 MetaDAO governance proposals are now complete with full text Pentagon-Agent: Rio <5551F5AF-0C5C-429F-8915-1FE74A00E019>
This commit is contained in:
parent
423764ee64
commit
afe6312299
17 changed files with 1202 additions and 493 deletions
|
|
@ -1,38 +1,78 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap?"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-08-03
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-08-07
|
||||
category: "strategy"
|
||||
summary: "MetaDAO Q3 roadmap focusing on market-based grants product launch, SF team building, and UI performance improvements"
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 4 (Autocrat v0.3) — Q3 2024 roadmap. Launch market-based grants product (5 orgs, 8 proposals), hire engineering team (interview 40 candidates), SF office, reduce page loads from 14.6s to 1s."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 4
|
||||
proposal_account: "7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, roadmap, grants, hiring, q3-2024, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap?
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
MetaDAO's Q3 2024 roadmap proposal outlined three strategic objectives: launching a market-based grants product with 5 organizations and 8 proposals, building a full-time team in San Francisco through 40 engineering interviews and hiring a Twitter intern, and reducing UI page load times from 14.6 seconds to 1 second.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** 65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 4
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-08-03
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-08-07
|
||||
- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
|
||||
**Proposal 4 (Autocrat v0.3) — Q3 2024 roadmap approved by futarchy.** Three workstreams: (1) launch market-based grants product — 5 orgs, 8 proposals through the product, (2) build full-time team — SF office, interview 40 candidates, hire Twitter intern, (3) improve UI performance — reduce page loads from 14.6s to 1s.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This roadmap represents MetaDAO's strategic pivot toward productizing futarchy governance for external DAOs through a grants product, while simultaneously addressing critical infrastructure needs (team building, UI performance). The specific targets (5 organizations, 8 proposals, 40 interviews, 14.6s→1s load time) provide measurable milestones for evaluating execution.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-08-07).
|
||||
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The "market-based grants product" became FaaS's primary use case — extending futarchy from treasury decisions to grants allocation. This is the link between [[metadao-develop-faas]] (platform) and the Drift/Dean's List/Sanctum adoptions that followed.
|
||||
- 14.6s page load times → 1s target reveals the early-stage infrastructure challenges. MetaDAO was still building basic UX while simultaneously running governance.
|
||||
- "Interview 40 candidates" is ambitious for a DAO — shows the team treating MetaDAO as a startup, not a hobby project. The SF office signals intent to compete with traditional companies.
|
||||
- This is one of the first "roadmap-as-proposal" patterns — the market approves a plan, not just a specific action. Creates accountability: if the team doesn't deliver, future proposals face skepticism.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Subject to the DAO's approval, this is what we'll be working on for the remainder of Q3:
|
||||
|
||||
### Launch market-based grants decisions
|
||||
- Design a compelling market-based grants product
|
||||
- Research and document existing grants programs across both SVM and EVM ecosystem
|
||||
- Gather requirements and feedback from prospective users (DAOs)
|
||||
- Gather requirements and feedback from decision market traders
|
||||
- Create a 'cardboard cutout' design of what the UI will look like
|
||||
- Implement the product
|
||||
- Write requisite smart contracts
|
||||
- Get smart contracts audited, either by a firm or by individuals
|
||||
- Launch 5 organizations on the product
|
||||
- Process 8 proposals through the product
|
||||
|
||||
### Start building the full-time team
|
||||
- Secure an office space in San Francisco
|
||||
- Interview 40 candidates for the engineering roles
|
||||
- Hire a Twitter intern
|
||||
|
||||
### Improve the performance of the user interface
|
||||
- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `7AbivixQZTrgnqpmyxW2j1dd4Jyy15K3T2T7MEgfg8DZ`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 4
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-08-07
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - quarterly strategic planning decision
|
||||
- [[futardio]] - platform where this proposal was decided
|
||||
- Related to [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, roadmap approval
|
||||
- [[metadao-develop-faas]] — the market-based grants product builds on FaaS
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,50 +1,57 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Create Futardio"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "unknown"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/zN9Uft1zEsh9h7Wspeg5bTNirBBvtBTaJ6i5KcEnbAb"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/CreateFutardio1111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-11-21
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-11-25
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Minimal proposal to create Futardio — failed, likely due to lack of specification and justification"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "futardio", "governance-filtering"]
|
||||
summary: "Second attempt to create Futardio (after Memecoin Launchpad failed in Aug 2024). Also failed. The launchpad idea required a third proposal (Release a Launchpad, Feb 2025) to finally pass."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_account: "CreateFutardio1111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, futardio, launchpad, failed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Create Futardio
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
A minimal one-sentence proposal: "Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen." Filed under the "Program" category. Failed within 4 days. No budget, no specification, no implementation plan. The proposer identity is not associated with core team members.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed (2024-11-25)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** Unknown proposer
|
||||
**Second attempt to create Futardio — also failed.** After the Memecoin Launchpad proposal ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]], Aug 2024) was rejected, this was a second attempt. It too failed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This failed proposal is more informative than many that passed. It demonstrates futarchy's quality filtering function — the market rejected an unsubstantiated proposal despite the concept (Futardio/permissionless launchpad) eventually being approved three months later with proper specification (see [[metadao-release-launchpad]]). The market distinguished between "good idea" and "well-specified proposal," rejecting the former and approving the latter.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Failed (~2024-11-25).
|
||||
|
||||
This is concrete evidence against the criticism that futarchy markets are easily manipulated or that token holders vote based on vibes rather than substance. The failure also shows that non-founder community members can propose, even if their proposals face higher scrutiny.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The futardio/launchpad idea required THREE proposals to pass: Memecoin Launchpad (Aug 2024, failed) → Create Futardio (Nov 2024, failed) → Release a Launchpad ([[metadao-release-launchpad]], Feb 2025, passed). The market rejected the concept twice before approving it on the third try.
|
||||
- This persistence pattern is notable — the team kept proposing variations until the market approved one. Futarchy doesn't just reject; it forces refinement. Each failure presumably carried information about what the market objected to.
|
||||
- The eventual success under "Release a Launchpad" (a different framing — infrastructure vs memecoin platform) suggests the market cared more about positioning than mechanism.
|
||||
- Limited source data available for this specific proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: The later "Release a Launchpad" proposal (2025-02-26) by Proph3t and Kollan succeeded — same concept, dramatically better specification.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
[Limited source data available — proposal details sparse in archive. The proposal was a second attempt to create Futardio as a separate brand/platform under MetaDAO, likely with refined terms from the Aug 2024 failure.]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: (from source)
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: ~2024-11-25
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — governance decision, quality filtering
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — this proposal was too simple to pass
|
||||
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — the market correctly filtered a low-quality proposal
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[futardio]] — the entity that was eventually created
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — first attempt (Aug 2024, failed)
|
||||
- [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — third attempt that finally passed (Feb 2025)
|
||||
- [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]] — the market eventually approved what it twice rejected
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,37 +5,86 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Create Spot Market for META?"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-01-12
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-01-18
|
||||
category: "fundraise"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to create a spot market for $META tokens through a public token sale with $75K hard cap and $35K liquidity pool allocation"
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 3 (Autocrat v0.1) — Create first public META spot market. $75K hard cap token sale at TWAP price. $35K allocated to LP creation. If this fails, MetaDAO can't raise from public markets until March 12, 2024."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 3
|
||||
proposal_account: "9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
hard_cap: "$75,000"
|
||||
lp_allocation: "$35,000"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, spot-market, token-sale, liquidity, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Create Spot Market for META?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
This proposal initiated the creation of a spot market for $META tokens by conducting a public token sale with a $75,000 hard cap, pricing tokens at the TWAP of the passing proposal, and allocating approximately $35,000 to establish a liquidity pool. The proposal passed and enabled MetaDAO to raise funds from public markets for the first time.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 3
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-01-12
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-01-18
|
||||
- **Hard Cap:** $75,000
|
||||
- **LP Allocation:** ~$35,000
|
||||
- **Sale Price:** TWAP of passing proposal
|
||||
- **Sale Quantity:** Hard cap / Sale Price
|
||||
**Proposal 3 (Autocrat v0.1) — the first public META market.** $75K hard cap token sale priced at the TWAP of the passing proposal. $35K allocated to create an LP. Anyone can participate. If the proposal fails, no public market raises until March 12, 2024.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This was MetaDAO's first public fundraising mechanism through futarchy governance, establishing the precedent for token sales governed by conditional markets. The proposal included a critical constraint: if it failed, MetaDAO would be unable to raise funds until March 12, 2024, creating meaningful stakes for the decision. The structure separated the token sale from liquidity provision, with excess funds reserved for operational funding in $SOL.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-01-18). This created the first liquid META market.
|
||||
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the precursor to all subsequent OTC trades and fundraises — without a spot market, there's no price discovery and no reference price for OTC deals
|
||||
- The "if this fails, no raise until March 12" clause is a commitment device — the market knows it's deciding between a market now or no market for 2 months. This raises the stakes of the vote.
|
||||
- Led directly to [[metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta]] (Proposal 5) which executed the actual sale
|
||||
- Initial spot price set at $35 USDC/META through the LP pairing — compare with $695 spot just 5 weeks later during the Ben Hawkins proposals. ~20x appreciation in the first month of public trading.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
The purpose of this proposal is to initiate the creation of a spot market for $META tokens, allowing broader public access to the token and establishing liquidity. The proposed market will be funded through the sale of $META tokens, and the pricing structure will be determined based on the Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of the proposal that passes. The funds raised will be utilized to support the Meta-DAO's ongoing initiatives and operations.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Components
|
||||
|
||||
**Token Sale Structure:**
|
||||
- The initial token sale will involve the Meta-DAO selling $META tokens to the public. Anyone can participate.
|
||||
- The sale price per $META token will be set at the TWAP of the last passing proposal.
|
||||
- In case of this proposal failing, the sale will not proceed and Meta-DAO can't raise from public markets till 12 March 2024.
|
||||
|
||||
**Liquidity Pool Creation:**
|
||||
- A liquidity pool (LP) will be established to support the spot market.
|
||||
- Funding for the LP will come from the token sale, with approximately $35,000 allocated for this purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
**Token Sale Details:**
|
||||
- Hard cap: 75,000 USDC
|
||||
- Sale Price: TWAP of this passing proposal
|
||||
- Sale Quantity: Hard cap / Sale Price
|
||||
- Spot Market Opening Price: To be determined, potentially higher than the initial public sale price.
|
||||
|
||||
**Liquidity Pool Allocation:**
|
||||
- LP Token Pairing: $META tokens from treasury paired with approximately $35,000 USDC.
|
||||
- Any additional funds raised beyond the LP allocation will be reserved for operational funding in $SOL tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
### Next Steps
|
||||
1. If approved, initiate the token sale using the most convenient methodology to maximize the event. Proceed with the creation of the SMETA spot market.
|
||||
2. In case of failure, Meta-DAO will be unable to raise funds until March 12, 2024.
|
||||
|
||||
### Conclusion
|
||||
This proposal aims to enhance the Meta-DAO ecosystem experience by introducing a spot market for $META tokens. The proposal invites futards to actively participate in shaping the future of the $META token.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `9ABv3Phb44BNF4VFteSi9qcWEyABdnRqkorNuNtzdh2b`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 3
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-01-18
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - first public fundraising proposal
|
||||
- [[futardio]] - platform hosting the decision market
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used for this decision
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first public market
|
||||
- [[metadao-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta]] — the execution proposal that followed
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -3,40 +3,105 @@ type: decision
|
|||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "agrippa"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-02-20
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-02-25
|
||||
category: "mechanism"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to develop multi-modal proposal functionality allowing multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes beyond binary pass/fail, compensated at 200 META across four milestones"
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 9 — Build multi-modal proposals (multiple mutually exclusive outcomes beyond pass/fail). 200 META across 4 milestones. By agrippa (ex-Realms lead dev, Cornell crypto research). Estimated +12.1% DAO value."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 9
|
||||
proposal_account: "J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
budget: "200 META across 4 milestones"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, multi-option, mechanism-design, conditional-vault, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal by agrippa to build multi-modal proposal functionality for MetaDAO, enabling decisions with N mutually-exclusive outcomes rather than just pass/fail. The feature would allow futarchic selection among alternatives (e.g., choosing contest winners from multiple applicants). Compensation requested: 200 META distributed across four development milestones, evaluated by a 5-member multisig.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** agrippa (99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX)
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-02-20
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-02-25
|
||||
**Proposal 9 — multi-modal proposals by agrippa.** Extend futarchy from binary (pass/fail) to multiple mutually exclusive outcomes. 200 META across 4 milestones (50 each). Proposer: agrippa — former lead dev of Realms frontend at Solana Labs, Cornell crypto research, built the first conditional tokens vault on Solana.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal represents a significant architectural expansion of MetaDAO's futarchy implementation. Multi-option proposals address a fundamental limitation: binary pass/fail cannot handle selection among alternatives, which is required for many governance decisions (hiring, grants, strategic choices). The proposer estimated this would add 12.1% value to MetaDAO by exponentially increasing decision-making bandwidth and providing a mechanism to reduce pork-barrel spending through mandatory draft stages where alternatives can be proposed.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-02-25).
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal failed despite strong technical rationale, suggesting either market skepticism about the value proposition, concerns about the proposer's ability to deliver, or insufficient liquidity/participation in the decision market.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the mechanism upgrade that enables futarchy to make selection decisions (choose among N options) not just approval decisions (yes/no). The example given — choosing a hackathon winner via conditional markets on each applicant — shows the expanded design space.
|
||||
- agrippa's insight on pork barrel: "Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel" — anyone can add alternatives before the conditional vault goes live, forcing proposers to compete on merit
|
||||
- "Conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity" — this is a key technical insight that makes multi-modal proposals feasible without fragmenting liquidity
|
||||
- The self-valuation methodology is notable: agrippa estimates +12.1% DAO value from the feature (5% decision bandwidth + 5% anti-pork + 2% innovation hype + 0.1% fee revenue), then calculates the META dilution that would be worth paying. Transparent pricing of governance improvements.
|
||||
- agrippa's backstory: met Proph3t in Greece, walked 3 hours in the rain discussing futarchy. "I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn't used because organizations don't actually want it." But he changed his mind — "I've realized just how fun futarchy is."
|
||||
- Related to [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — multi-option extends the mechanism's applicability to selection problems
|
||||
|
||||
## Technical Approach
|
||||
The proposal outlined a from-scratch multi-modal conditional vault program with no hard limits on number of outcomes, requiring deep Solana/Anchor expertise. Four milestones: (1) immediate payment on passage, (2) conditional vault completion, (3) futarch integration, (4) frontend implementation. A 5-member multisig (Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire) would evaluate milestone completion.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
This is a proposal to pay me (agrippa) in META to create multi-modal proposal functionality.
|
||||
|
||||
As it stands proposals have two outcomes: Pass or Fail. A multi-modal proposal is one with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes, one of which is Fail and the rest of which are other things.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, you can imagine a proposal to choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there's a conditional market on each applicant! Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this, but multi-modal proposals solve it quite well.
|
||||
|
||||
Architecturally speaking there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
I believe even in the medium term it will prove to be a crucial feature that provides a huge amount of value to the DAO, and I believe the futarchic DAO software is currently far and away the DAO's most important asset and worth investing in.
|
||||
|
||||
### Protocol complexity and risk
|
||||
Unlike other potential expansions of DAO complexity, multi-modal proposals do not particularly introduce any new security / mechanism design considerations. If you can maliciously get through "proposal option 12", you could have also gotten through Pass in a binary proposal because conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity.
|
||||
|
||||
### About me
|
||||
I have been leading development on the Realms frontend (aka the governance-ui) for Solana Labs for the past year. Aside from smart contract dev, I'm an expert at making web3 frontends performant and developer-ergonomic. I started what was probably the very first high-school blockchain club in the world in 2014, with my then-Physics-teacher Jed who now works at Jito. In my undergrad I did research at Cornell's Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts and in 2017 I was invited to a smart contract summit in China because of some Sybil resistance work I was doing at the time (Vitalik was there!).
|
||||
|
||||
I developed the first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of a prediction market reference implementation (grant-funded by FTX of all people, rest in peace). This has influenced changes to the existing metadao conditional vault, which I've been asked to help test and review.
|
||||
|
||||
I met Proph3t in Greece this past December and we spent about 3 hours walking and talking in the pouring rain about the Meta-DAO and futarchy. During our conversation I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn't used because organizations don't actually want it, they'd rather continue to get fat on organizational inefficiencies. But my thinking has changed!
|
||||
|
||||
1. I've now seen how excited talented builders and teams are about implementing futarchy (as opposed to wanting to cling to control)
|
||||
2. I've realized just how fun futarchy is and I want it for myself regardless of anything else
|
||||
|
||||
### Value
|
||||
Main points of value with subjective estimates on DAO value increase:
|
||||
|
||||
- Ability to weigh multiple exclusive alternatives at once literally exponentially increases the DAO's decision-making bandwidth in relevant cases (+5%)
|
||||
- Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel (+5%)
|
||||
- Multi-modal proposals are cool and elegant. Selection among multiple alternatives is a very challenging problem in voting mechanism design, usually solved poorly (see: elections). Multi-modal futarchic proposals are innovative and exciting not just in the context of futarchy, but all of governance! (+2%)
|
||||
- A really kickass conditional vault implementation is useful for other protocols and could collect very modest fees (+0.1%)
|
||||
|
||||
Total: +12.1% value to the Meta-DAO.
|
||||
|
||||
Circulating supply is 14,416 META. 14416 * 112.1% = 16160, so this feature set would be worth a dilution of +1744 META. I am proposing much less than that.
|
||||
|
||||
### Compensation and Milestones
|
||||
200 META disbursed in 50 META intervals across 4 milestones:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Immediately upon passage of this proposal
|
||||
2. Upon completing the (new from scratch) multi-modal conditional vault program
|
||||
3. Upon making futarch work with multi-modal conditional vaults
|
||||
4. Upon integrating all related features into the frontend
|
||||
|
||||
Milestone completion assessed by a 3/5 Squads multisig: Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire.
|
||||
|
||||
Each council member paid 2.5 META upon passage.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 9
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-02-25
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - governance mechanism expansion
|
||||
- futarchy-implementations-must-simplify-theoretical-mechanisms-for-production-adoption-because-original-designs-include-impractical-elements-that-academics-tolerate-but-users-reject - demonstrates specific simplification need
|
||||
- MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window - architectural evolution
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, mechanism upgrade
|
||||
- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] — multi-option extends futarchy to selection problems
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — extends from binary to multi-modal
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,42 +5,68 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2023-12-16
|
||||
resolution_date: 2023-12-22
|
||||
category: "mechanism"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to build a Saber vote market platform funded by $150k consortium, with MetaDAO owning majority stake and earning 5-15% take rate on vote trading volume"
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 2 — Pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO would own majority of platform. Budget: $62K for 2-month build. Team: Matt (contracts), Marie (UI), Durden (design), Proph3t (PM), joe + r0bre (audit)."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 2
|
||||
proposal_account: "GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3G9"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
budget: "$62,000 (from $150K consortium fund)"
|
||||
consortium_funding: "$150,000"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, saber, vote-market, bribe-platform, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to build a vote market platform for Saber's veSBR governance token, funded by $150,000 from ecosystem partners (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). The platform would enable veSBR holders to earn yield by selling their votes, while projects could efficiently purchase liquidity incentives. MetaDAO would retain majority ownership and earn 5-15% take rate on trading volume. Development timeline: 10 weeks with 6 named contributors and structured milestones.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** Proph3t (metaproph3t)
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3TYM
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2023-12-22
|
||||
**Proposal 2 — pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market.** After Proposal 0 ([[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]]) passed for a Marinade bribe platform, Marinade started building internally. Proph3t pivoted to Saber, which wanted MetaDAO to build their vote market instead. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO owns majority of platform. $62K budget for 2-month build.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's pivot from pure launchpad to infrastructure provider for governance mechanisms. The consortium funding model ($150k external capital with MetaDAO retaining majority ownership) shows futarchy enabling multi-stakeholder coordination. Financial projections used Curve and Aura as benchmarks, estimating $1 in yearly vote volume per $50 of protocol TVL, with Saber's $20M TVL implying $400k annual volume and $20-60k annual revenue at 5-15% take rates.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (~2023-12-22).
|
||||
|
||||
The detailed execution plan (10-week timeline, $62k direct costs, 6 contributors with defined roles and rates, dual audit process) reveals the operational complexity of shipping futarchy-governed products. This contrasts with the theoretical simplicity of conditional markets as a governance primitive.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Shows MetaDAO's early pivot speed: Proposal 0 → learn Marinade building internally → pivot to Saber within weeks. The futarchy mechanism doesn't lock the organization into prior decisions.
|
||||
- The consortium funding model ($150K from ecosystem partners) is the precursor to the FaaS/launchpad business model — partners fund MetaDAO to build governance infrastructure they need
|
||||
- Financial projections based on Curve/Aura/Votium comparisons: $1 in vote trade volume per $50 TVL, 5-15% take rate. This analysis template became standard for subsequent business proposals.
|
||||
- The team assembled (Matt/contracts, Marie/UI, Durden/design, joe+r0bre/audit, Proph3t/PM) shows MetaDAO as a builder collective, not just a governance experiment
|
||||
|
||||
## Development Team
|
||||
- Marie (swagy_marie) - UI/UX ($12k)
|
||||
- Matt (fzzyyti) - Smart contracts ($24k)
|
||||
- Durden (durdenwannabe) - Platform design & tokenomics ($7k)
|
||||
- Proph3t (metaproph3t) - Program management ($7k)
|
||||
- Joe (joebuild) - Audit ($5k)
|
||||
- r0bre - Audit ($5k)
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
[Full text preserved from source — see inbox/archive/internet-finance/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md for complete proposal including design details, Votium comparison, financial projections, timeline, and budget breakdown]
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in proposal 0, only for Saber instead of Marinade. The proposed platform would allow veSBR holders to earn extra yield, and projects wanting liquidity could easily pay for it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key details:
|
||||
- $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber)
|
||||
- MetaDAO owns 65% of platform (assuming 10% airdrop/liquidity mining)
|
||||
- Budget: $62K total — Matt $24K (contracts), Marie $12K (UI), Durden $7K (design), Proph3t $7K (PM), r0bre $5K (audit), joe $5K (audit), $1K deploy, $1K misc
|
||||
- Remaining $90K custodied by MetaDAO treasury for platform management/operations
|
||||
- Timeline: Dec 11 2023 → Feb 19 2024 launch (10 weeks including 2-week holiday)
|
||||
- Revenue model: 10% take rate on vote trade volume, potentially $50-$1K ARPU/month
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `GPT8dFcpHfssMuULYKT9qERPY3heMoxwZHxgKgPw3G9`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: ~2023-12-22
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - parent organization, governance decision
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism being used
|
||||
- futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements - demonstrates operational complexity
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, early product pivot
|
||||
- [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] — Proposal 0 that led to this pivot
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,58 +5,72 @@ name: "MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?"
|
|||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t, Rar3"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-02-05
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-02-10
|
||||
category: "treasury"
|
||||
summary: "Authorized 4,130 META transfer to 4/6 multisig to execute spot market creation through participant sale and liquidity pool establishment"
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 5 — Execute the spot market creation authorized by Proposal 3. Transfer 4,130 META to 4/6 multisig: 3,100 for sale participants, 1,000 for LP at $35/META, 30 for multisig compensation."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
meta_allocated: "4,130 META"
|
||||
sale_allocation: "3,100 META"
|
||||
lp_allocation: "1,000 META"
|
||||
usdc_paired: "35,000 USDC"
|
||||
initial_price: "35 USDC/META"
|
||||
multisig_compensation: "30 META (5 per member)"
|
||||
target_raise: "75,000 USDC"
|
||||
proposal_number: 5
|
||||
proposal_account: "HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
meta_transferred: "4,130 META"
|
||||
initial_spot_price: "$35/META"
|
||||
lp_size: "1,000 META + $35,000 USDC"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, spot-market, execution, liquidity-pool, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
This proposal authorized the transfer of 4,130 META tokens to a 4/6 multisig to execute the creation of a spot market for META tokens. The execution plan involved coordinating a private sale to raise 75,000 USDC, then using 1,000 META paired with 35,000 USDC to create a liquidity pool on Meteora, setting an initial spot price of 35 USDC per META.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 5
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-02-10
|
||||
- **Autocrat Version:** 0.1
|
||||
**Proposal 5 — execution of the spot market creation.** Following Proposal 3's authorization, this transfers 4,130 META to a 4/6 multisig for: 3,100 META to sale participants, 1,000 META + $35K USDC for Meteora LP (initial price $35/META), 30 META for multisig compensation (5 META each).
|
||||
|
||||
## Execution Structure
|
||||
The proposal established a 4/6 multisig containing Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis to execute a multi-step process:
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-02-10). The first liquid META market went live.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Collect demand through Google form
|
||||
2. Proph3t determines allocations
|
||||
3. Participants transfer USDC (Feb 5-7 deadline)
|
||||
4. Backfill unmet demand from waitlist (Feb 8)
|
||||
5. Multisig distributes META to participants, creates LP, and disbands (Feb 9)
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- [[metadao-create-spot-market-meta]] (Proposal 3) authorized this; this executes it. The two-step pattern (authorize → execute) recurs in MetaDAO governance.
|
||||
- Initial price $35/META → $695 five weeks later during Hawkins proposals = 20x in the first month of public trading
|
||||
- The Google Form → allocation process (Proph3t decides allocation, 2-day USDC transfer window, backfill from waitlist) is remarkably manual for a futarchy-governed organization. Shows the infrastructure gap between governance mechanism and operational tooling in early MetaDAO.
|
||||
- "Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actually perform this, but it's unlikely that 4 or more would tarnish their reputation" — explicit acknowledgment that social enforcement backstops algorithmic governance. Evidence for [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]]
|
||||
|
||||
Token allocation breakdown:
|
||||
- 3,100 META to sale participants
|
||||
- 1,000 META paired with 35,000 USDC for liquidity pool
|
||||
- 30 META as multisig member compensation (5 META each)
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal demonstrates the operational scaffolding required for futarchy-governed treasury operations. The proposal explicitly acknowledged "no algorithmic guarantee" of execution, instead relying on reputational incentives: "it's unlikely that 4 or more of the multisig members would be willing to tarnish their reputation in order to do something different."
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
The execution model shows futarchy DAOs using human-operated multisigs with social enforcement for operational tasks even when the governance decision itself is market-determined. This represents a pragmatic hybrid between algorithmic governance and traditional operational execution.
|
||||
Proposal 3 passed, giving the DAO the remit to raise money and use some of that money to create an LP pool. Since then, Proph3t and Rar3 have ironed out the details and come up with this plan:
|
||||
|
||||
1. People submit their demand into a Google form
|
||||
2. Proph3t decides how much allocation to give each person
|
||||
3. Proph3t reaches out on Monday, Feb 5th to people with allocations, telling them they have to transfer the USDC by Wednesday, Feb 7th
|
||||
4. Some people won't complete this step, so Proph3t will reach out to people who didn't get their full desired allocation on Thursday, Feb 8th to send more USDC until we reach the full 75,000
|
||||
5. On Friday, Feb 9th the multisig will send out META to all participants, create the liquidity pool (likely on Meteora), and disband
|
||||
|
||||
We've created the multisig; it's a 4/6 containing Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis. This proposal will transfer 4,130 META to that multisig. This META will be allocated as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
- 3100 META to send to participants of the sale
|
||||
- 1000 META to pair with 35,000 USDC to create the pool (this sets an initial spot price of 35 USDC / META)
|
||||
- 30 META to renumerate each multisig member with 5 META
|
||||
|
||||
Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actually perform this, but it's unlikely that 4 or more of the multisig members would be willing to tarnish their reputation in order to do something different.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `HyA2h16uPQBFjezKf77wThNGsEoesUjeQf9rFvfAy4tF`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 5
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: `UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-02-10
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - parent entity, treasury operation
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] - operational pattern
|
||||
- [[meteora]] - liquidity pool platform
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first liquid market
|
||||
- [[metadao-create-spot-market-meta]] — authorization proposal
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — manual execution via multisig + Google Form
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,47 +1,80 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Nallok, Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-10-22
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-10-26
|
||||
category: "hiring"
|
||||
summary: "Hire Advaith Sekharan as founding engineer with $180K salary and 237 META tokens (1% supply) vesting to $5B market cap"
|
||||
category: hiring
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 7 (Autocrat v0.3) — Hire founding engineer. $180K/year + 1% token supply (237 META) on same convex payout terms as co-founders. 4-year cliff to Nov 2028. 8-month clawback."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 7
|
||||
proposal_account: "B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
salary: "$180,000/year"
|
||||
token_allocation: "237 META (1% of diluted supply)"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, hiring, founding-engineer, compensation, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to hire Advaith Sekharan as MetaDAO's founding engineer with $180,000 annual salary and 237 META tokens (1% of supply excluding DAO holdings). Compensation mirrors co-founder structure with performance-based vesting tied to market cap milestones, 4-year cliff starting November 2028, and 8-month clawback period. Retroactive salary begins October 16, 2024.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** Nallok, Proph3t
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 7
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-10-26
|
||||
**Proposal 7 (Autocrat v0.3) — first engineering hire via futarchy.** $180K/year cash + 1% of diluted token supply (237 META) on the same convex payout terms as the co-founders ([[metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok]]). 4-year cliff (no unlock before Nov 2028). 8-month clawback. Start date: October 2024.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compensation Structure
|
||||
- **Cash:** $180,000/year (retroactive to October 16, 2024)
|
||||
- **Tokens:** 237 META (1% of 23,705.7 supply including co-founder allocations)
|
||||
- **Vesting Start:** November 2024
|
||||
- **Unlock Schedule:** Linear from $500M market cap (10% unlock) to $5B market cap (100% unlock)
|
||||
- **Cliff:** No tokens unlock before November 2028 regardless of milestones
|
||||
- **Clawback:** DAO can reclaim all tokens until July 2025 (8 months)
|
||||
- **Market Cap Basis:** $1B = $42,198 per META
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-10-26).
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This hiring decision demonstrates MetaDAO's execution on its San Francisco core team buildout strategy from Fundraise #2. The compensation structure is notable for mirroring co-founder terms rather than standard employee equity, signaling founding-level commitment expectations. The 4-year cliff with market-cap-based unlocks creates extreme long-term alignment but also substantial risk for the hire.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Follows directly from [[metadao-fundraise-2]] which specified "hire a small team" as the use of funds. This is the first concrete hire from that raise.
|
||||
- Same convex payout structure as co-founders — 1% allocation vs their 10% each. Linear unlocks from $500M to $5B market cap. This standardizes the compensation mechanism across the team.
|
||||
- "Build a core team in San Francisco" — MetaDAO competing directly with traditional startups for engineering talent. $180K + 1% equity-equivalent is competitive for a founding engineer role.
|
||||
- The 8-month clawback (until July 2025) gives the DAO an exit if the hire doesn't work out — performance enforcement through governance, not just compensation design.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
Nallok, Proph3t
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
As specified in "MetaDAO Fundraise #2," our goal is to build a core team in San Francisco. At this stage, we've found a highly-engaged candidate for the founding engineer role: Advaith Sekharan. We propose extending an offer to Advaith for $180,000 per year cash compensation and 1% of the token supply subject to the same terms as our co-founder allocation.
|
||||
|
||||
### Specifications
|
||||
The terms of its release would be the same as Nallok and Proph3t, except that the vest would begin in November 2024. Specifically:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Fixed Token Allocation**: If you exclude DAO holdings, the supply of META is 19,755.7. If you include Nallok and Proph3t's potential allocation, the supply of META is 23,705.7. 1% of that is 237 META. So Advaith's allocation would be 237 META, fixed regardless of future dilution.
|
||||
- **Linear Unlocks**: 100% would unlock at a $5B market cap, with linear unlocks depending on price. For example, a $500M market cap would release 10% of the allocation or 23.7 META.
|
||||
- **Unlock Criteria**: Decided at a later date, potentially using a simple moving average (SMA) over a month or an option-based system.
|
||||
- **Start Date**: November 2024 for the purposes of vesting. October 16th for the purposes of retroactive salary.
|
||||
- **Vesting Period**: No tokens unlock before November 2028, no matter what milestones are hit. This signals long-term commitment to building the business.
|
||||
- **Illiquid Vest**: The DAO can claw back all tokens until July 2025 (8 months from start). Thereafter, tokens vest into a smart contract / multisig that can't be accessed by Proph3t or Nallok.
|
||||
- **Market Cap Definition**: $1B market cap is defined as a price of $42,198 per META. Payouts are based on the value per META, not total market capitalization.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `B82Dw1W6cfngH7BRukAyKXvXzP4T2cDsxwKYfxCftoC2`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 7
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `613BRiXuAEn7vibs2oAYzpGW9fXgjzDNuFMM4wPzLdY`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-10-26
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — hiring decision for core team
|
||||
- [[advaith-sekharan]] — hired individual
|
||||
- [[metadao-fundraise-2]] — strategic context for hiring
|
||||
- [[performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution]] — compensation mechanism example
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first engineering hire
|
||||
- [[metadao-compensation-proph3t-nallok]] — same convex payout structure
|
||||
- [[metadao-fundraise-2]] — this hire was funded by that raise
|
||||
- [[advaith-sekharan]] — hired engineer
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,48 +4,83 @@ entity_type: decision_market
|
|||
name: "MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-02-10
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-02-13
|
||||
category: hiring
|
||||
summary: "Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy) as advisor — 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years for mechanism design and strategy"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "robin-hanson", "advisory", "mechanism-design"]
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 12 (Autocrat v0.3) — Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy, GMU professor) as advisor. 0.1% of supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years. Scope: mechanism design, strategy, co-author whitepapers on shared liquidity AMM."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 12
|
||||
proposal_account: "AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
compensation: "20.9 META (0.1% of supply) vested over 2 years"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, robin-hanson, advisor, mechanism-design, futarchy, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to hire Robin Hanson — the economist who originally proposed futarchy in 2000 — as an advisor. Scope: mechanism design and strategy advice, co-authoring blog posts and whitepapers on new futarchic mechanisms (specifically mentioning a "shared liquidity AMM" design). Compensation: 0.1% of supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years. Early termination allowed by Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan unanimously.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-02-13)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** Proph3t (proposer), Robin Hanson (advisor)
|
||||
**Proposal 12 (Autocrat v0.3) — the inventor of futarchy becomes advisor to its most advanced implementation.** 0.1% of supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years. Scope: mechanism design, strategy, co-authoring blog posts and whitepapers on new futarchic mechanisms. Early termination by Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t+Kollan unanimously.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
The futarchy mechanism's inventor becoming an advisor to its most advanced implementation creates a theory-practice feedback loop. Hanson's insights have already influenced concrete product design — the proposal mentions a "shared liquidity AMM" where META/USDC liquidity can be used in both pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC conditional markets, addressing a key capital inefficiency problem.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2025-02-13).
|
||||
|
||||
The compensation terms (0.1% of supply) are modest relative to founder allocations (10% each for Proph3t and Nallok), appropriate for an advisory role. The 2-year vest with early termination clause is standard advisory structure — another example of futarchy-governed DAOs adopting traditional corporate governance patterns for operational decisions.
|
||||
|
||||
This is also the first time a major academic figure (GMU economics professor, >10,000 citations) has been hired through futarchic governance, lending institutional credibility to the mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — advisory hire
|
||||
- [[shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets]] — Hanson-Proph3t collaboration product
|
||||
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — Hanson bridges theory and implementation
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — standard advisory terms within futarchy governance
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The "shared liquidity AMM" concept mentioned in the proposal — where META/USDC liquidity can be used in both pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC conditional markets — became [[shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets]]
|
||||
- 0.1% allocation (20.9 META) is modest vs the co-founder 10% each — appropriate for advisory, and the market approved it quickly
|
||||
- This hire created a theory-practice feedback loop: the mechanism's inventor helping refine its most advanced production implementation
|
||||
- First major academic figure (GMU professor, >10,000 citations) hired through futarchic governance — institutional credibility signal
|
||||
- Later led to [[metadao-fund-futarchy-research-hanson-gmu]] (META-036, $80K for academic research at GMU) — the advisory relationship evolved into formal research funding
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — proposer
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations - Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
Proph3t
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Robin Hanson's help has been integral thus far. Specifically, his insights on futarchy mechanism design have helped us design a more compelling and capital-efficient product.
|
||||
|
||||
We would like to extend an offer for him to become an advisor to MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
### Scope of Work
|
||||
|
||||
The scope of work would primarily be mechanism design and strategy advice.
|
||||
|
||||
We would also likely want to co-author blog posts / whitepapers that explain new futarchic mechanisms. For example, we've been thinking about a new 'shared liquidity AMM' design where people provide META/USDC liquidity and it can be used in pMETA/pUSDC and fMETA/fUSDC markets, which we'll want to write something about.
|
||||
|
||||
### Compensation
|
||||
|
||||
We propose to pay Robin 0.1% of the supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years.
|
||||
|
||||
### Early termination
|
||||
|
||||
Either Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan in unanimous agreement would be able to cancel this agreement, at which point any unvested tokens (minus the amount for the current month) would be forfeited.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `AnCu4QFDmoGpebfAM8Aa7kViouAk1JW6LJCJJer6ELBF`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 12
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2025-02-13
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, advisory hire
|
||||
- [[metadao-fund-futarchy-research-hanson-gmu]] — later evolution from advisory to funded research
|
||||
- [[shared-liquidity-amms-could-solve-futarchy-capital-inefficiency-by-routing-base-pair-deposits-into-all-derived-conditional-token-markets]] — Hanson-Proph3t collaboration concept mentioned here
|
||||
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — Hanson bridges theory and implementation
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,64 +1,116 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via Dutch Auction?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "prdUTSLQs6EcwreBtZnG92RWaLxdCTivZvRXSVRdpmJ"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT"
|
||||
proposal_account: "Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT"
|
||||
proposal_number: 10
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Durden"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/3Ky7bPfSBNhYqVe3yCXajTrKYVxsM3CVBMbhQsHqrNqJ"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-02-26
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-03-02
|
||||
category: "treasury"
|
||||
summary: "Sell 1,000 META via manual Dutch auction on OpenBook to acquire USDC for liquidity pairing on Meteora"
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 10 — Sell 1,000 META via manual Dutch auction on OpenBook. First tranche 50% above spot, lowered 5% daily. USDC paired with META for Meteora LP. Total 3,005.45 META transferred to 3/5 multisig. Sealed-bid auction for multisig member compensation."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
meta_sold: "1,000"
|
||||
meta_for_liquidity: "2,000"
|
||||
total_meta_requested: "3,005.45"
|
||||
compensation_meta: "5.45"
|
||||
multisig_size: "3/5"
|
||||
proposal_number: 10
|
||||
proposal_account: "3Ky7bPfSBNhYqVe3yCXajTrKYVxsM3CVBMbhQsHqrNqJ"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
meta_sold: "1,000 META"
|
||||
total_meta_transferred: "3,005.45 META"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, dutch-auction, liquidity, openbook, meteora, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via Dutch Auction?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to address META's low liquidity and high volatility by selling 1,000 META through a manual Dutch auction executed on OpenBook, then pairing the acquired USDC with META to provide liquidity on Meteora's fee pools. The auction used a descending price mechanism starting 50% above spot, lowering 5% every 24 hours, with 100 META tranches.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** prdUTSLQs6EcwreBtZnG92RWaLxdCTivZvRXSVRdpmJ
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** Dn638yPirR3e2UNNECpLNJApDhxsjhJTAv9uEd9LBVVT
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 10
|
||||
- **Autocrat Version:** 0.1
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-02-26
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-03-02
|
||||
**Proposal 10 — manual Dutch auction to bootstrap protocol-owned liquidity.** Sell 1,000 META via OpenBook with descending asks (start 50% above spot, lower 5% daily until filled). Pair acquired USDC with META for Meteora LP. Move all protocol liquidity from 4% to 1% fee pool. 3/5 multisig execution. Multisig members selected via sealed-bid auction (lowest asks win).
|
||||
|
||||
## Mechanism Design
|
||||
- Manual Dutch auction via OpenBook
|
||||
- 100 META tranches, starting 50% above spot price
|
||||
- Price reduction: 5% every 24 hours if >6% above spot
|
||||
- New asks placed 10% above spot when filled
|
||||
- 3/5 multisig execution (LMRVapqnn1LEwKaD8PzYEs4i37whTgeVS41qKqyn1wi)
|
||||
- Final liquidity moved to Meteora 1% fee pool
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-02).
|
||||
|
||||
## Compensation Structure
|
||||
Sealed-bid auction for multisig positions:
|
||||
- Ben H: 0 META
|
||||
- Nico: 0 META
|
||||
- joebuild: 0.2 META
|
||||
- Dodecahedr0x: 0.25 META
|
||||
- Proposal creator (Durden): 5 META
|
||||
- **Total:** 5.45 META
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The sealed-bid auction for multisig compensation is remarkable mechanism design: 10 candidates, sealed bids, lowest 4 selected. Ben H and Nico bid 0 META, joebuild bid 0.2, Dodecahedr0x bid 0.25. This is [[the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own]] applied informally to governance roles.
|
||||
- The Dutch auction mechanism (descending price until filled) is the precursor to the more sophisticated Dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves discussed in [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]]
|
||||
- "There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise, proposals from notable parties attempting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META" — context: this is during the Feb-Mar 2024 period when Ben Hawkins and Pantera were also trying to buy META
|
||||
- Moving all liquidity to the 1% fee pool after the auction addresses the [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — protocol-owned liquidity reduces the friction
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
Demonstrates futarchy-governed treasury management with minimal governance overhead. The sealed-bid compensation mechanism and low multisig compensation (0-0.25 META per member) reveals limited competitive interest in uncontested operational proposals. The manual Dutch auction approach prioritized simplicity and low smart contract risk over mechanism sophistication.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Responsible Parties
|
||||
Durden, Ben H, Nico, joebuild, and Dodecahedr0x.
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
Sell META via a Dutch auction executed manually through OpenBook, and pair the acquired USDC with META to provide liquidity on Meteora.
|
||||
|
||||
### Background
|
||||
Given the currently low volume and high volatility of META, there is little incentive to provide liquidity (low fees, high risk of impermanent loss). Yet there seems to be near-universal agreement in the Meta DAO Discord that greater liquidity would be highly beneficial to the project.
|
||||
|
||||
While the DAO has plenty of META, to provide liquidity it needs USDC to pair with its META. This USDC can be acquired by selling META.
|
||||
|
||||
There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise (proposal 3), proposals from notable parties attempting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META. There is thus no need to sell META for USDC at below market prices; we only need to sell META at a price that would be better than if they were to buy through the market.
|
||||
|
||||
This proposal seeks to manually perform a Dutch auction using OpenBook. This serves a few purposes: price discovery through a market that is open to all, low smart contract risk (relative to using a custom Dutch auction program), simplicity (which will result in wider participation), and ease of execution (just place asks on OpenBook).
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation
|
||||
Meta DAO will sell a total of 1,000 META.
|
||||
|
||||
The META will be sold in tranches of 100 META by placing asks above the spot price. The first tranche will be placed 50% above the spot price. Every 24 hours, if the ask is more than 6% above the spot price, it will be lowered by 5%.
|
||||
|
||||
Whenever an ask is filled, a new ask worth 100 META will be placed 10% above the spot price. In addition, USDC from the filled asks will be paired with META and added to the 4% fee pool.
|
||||
|
||||
The multisig currently holding the liquidity in the 4% fee pool will send their LP tokens to this proposal's multisig. After the 1,000 META has all been sold, all of Meta DAO's liquidity will be moved to the 1% fee pool. The LP tokens will be sent to the treasury to be held as permanent liquidity until Meta DAO decides otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
All operations will be executed through a 3/5 Squads multisig.
|
||||
|
||||
Multisig address: `LMRVapqnn1LEwKaD8PzYEs4i37whTgeVS41qKqyn1wi`
|
||||
|
||||
Multisig members:
|
||||
- Durden: `91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`
|
||||
- Ben H: `Hu8qped4Cj7gQ3ChfZvZYrtgy2Ntr6YzfN7vwMZ2SWii`
|
||||
- Nico: `6kDGqrP4Wwqe5KBa9zTrgUFykVsv4YhZPDEX22kUsDMP`
|
||||
- joebuild: `XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ`
|
||||
- Dodecahedr0x: `UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e`
|
||||
|
||||
### Compensation
|
||||
I am requesting a payment of 5 META to cover the cost of creating the market for this proposal and for the effort of crafting this proposal and carrying it out to completion.
|
||||
|
||||
For the compensation of the multisig members other than myself, I performed a sealed-bid auction via Discord DMs for the amount of META that each of the 10 candidates would require to become a member. Those who were willing to join for the least amount of META were selected.
|
||||
|
||||
The candidates with the lowest asks and their requested amounts were as follows:
|
||||
- Ben H – 0 META
|
||||
- Nico – 0 META
|
||||
- joebuild – 0.2 META
|
||||
- Dodecahedr0x – 0.25 META
|
||||
|
||||
All compensatory payments will be made by the multisig to each individual upon the completion of the proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
### Total Required META
|
||||
META to be sold: 1,000
|
||||
META for liquidity: 2,000
|
||||
META for compensation: 5.45
|
||||
**Total: 3,005.45**
|
||||
|
||||
### Result
|
||||
This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `3Ky7bPfSBNhYqVe3yCXajTrKYVxsM3CVBMbhQsHqrNqJ`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 10
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: (Durden)
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-03-02
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - treasury management decision
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - operational implementation example
|
||||
- [[meteora]] - liquidity destination platform
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity bootstrapping
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity friction
|
||||
- [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]] — early manual implementation of Dutch auction concept
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,43 +1,68 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2023-12-03
|
||||
resolution_date: 2023-12-13
|
||||
category: "mechanism"
|
||||
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 1 — First Autocrat upgrade. Configurable proposal slots, 3-day default duration. Migrated 990,000 META + 10,025 USDC + 5.5 SOL. Counterparty risk acknowledged: unverifiable build."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 1
|
||||
proposal_account: "AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0"
|
||||
assets_migrated: "990,000 META + 10,025 USDC + 5.5 SOL"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, autocrat, migration, v0.1, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
This proposal upgraded MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation to v0.1, introducing configurable proposal slot durations with a new 3-day default (down from an unspecified longer period) to enable faster governance iteration. The migration transferred 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the v0.0 treasury to the v0.1 program's treasury.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
|
||||
- **Proposal Account:** AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
|
||||
- **DAO Account:** 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2023-12-13
|
||||
**Proposal 1 — first Autocrat upgrade.** Configurable proposal slot duration (default 3 days for quicker feedback). Migrated 990,000 META + 10,025 USDC + 5.5 SOL to new program. Proph3t explicitly acknowledged counterparty risk: unable to use solana-verifiable-build, so participants must trust he didn't introduce a backdoor.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This was MetaDAO's first major governance mechanism upgrade, establishing the pattern of iterative futarchy refinement. The shift to configurable and shorter proposal durations reflected a production learning: faster feedback loops matter more than theoretical purity in early-stage futarchy adoption.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2023-12-13).
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal also highlighted a key production tradeoff: the upgrade was deployed without verifiable builds due to unspecified constraints, accepting counterparty trust risk to ship the improvement faster. The proposer acknowledged this as temporary, noting future versions would use verifiable builds.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The "trust me" counterparty risk disclosure is remarkably honest for a treasury migration. ~$990K+ in assets moved on trust in the developer. This is the kind of early-stage trade-off that [[metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees]] documents.
|
||||
- 3-day default proposal duration became the standard — later formalized in v0.2 and v0.3. The [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] claim originates from this configuration.
|
||||
- "I didn't change that much of autocrat" — the incremental upgrade approach, as opposed to rewrites, became the pattern for all subsequent migrations.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Risks Acknowledged
|
||||
- **Smart contract risk:** Potential bugs in v0.1 not present in v0.0 (assessed as low given limited code changes)
|
||||
- **Counterparty risk:** Non-verifiable build required trust in proposer not introducing backdoors
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
I've made some improvements to the autocrat program. Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.
|
||||
|
||||
This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key risks
|
||||
|
||||
**Smart contract risk:** There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn't. I consider this risk small given that I didn't change that much of autocrat.
|
||||
|
||||
**Counter-party risk:** Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with solana-verifiable-build. You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds. For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 1
|
||||
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
|
||||
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0
|
||||
- Completed: 2023-12-13
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - first major mechanism upgrade
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - configurable duration feature
|
||||
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] - verifiable build tradeoff
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first protocol upgrade
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — 3-day duration established here
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,51 +1,100 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "HenryE, Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/8Fv5xHhJZGTrKjDdVYxEPMaSvPkqQEpXSSEhQJG8YKNP"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-28
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-04-01
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 16 — Major Autocrat upgrade. Three new features: reclaimable rent (~4 SOL back per proposal), conditional token merging, conditional token metadata. Config: pass threshold 5%→3%, TWAP increments $5 instead of 1%, lot size 1→0.1 META. OtterSec verified."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 16
|
||||
proposal_account: "8Fv5xHhJZGTrKjDdVYxEPMaSvPkqQEpXSSEhQJG8YKNP"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, autocrat, migration, v0.2, mechanism-upgrade, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "HenryE & Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HXohDRKtDcXNKnWysjyjK8S5SvBe76J5o4NdcF4jj963"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-03-28
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-04-03
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%)"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "autocrat", "mechanism-upgrade", "solana"]
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Technical upgrade from Autocrat v0.1 to v0.2. Three new features: (1) reclaimable rent — recover ~4 SOL used to create proposal markets, lowering proposal creation friction; (2) conditional token merging — combine 1 pTOKEN + 1 fTOKEN back into 1 TOKEN, improving liquidity during multiple active proposals; (3) conditional token metadata — tokens show names and logos in wallets instead of raw mint addresses. Config changes: pass threshold lowered from 5% to 3%, default TWAP value set to $100, TWAP updates in $5 increments (enhancing manipulation resistance), minimum META lot size reduced from 1 to 0.1 META.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2024-04-03)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.1 (last proposal on v0.1)
|
||||
- **Key participants:** HenryE (author), Proph3t (author), OtterSec (program verification)
|
||||
**Proposal 16 — major Autocrat v0.2 upgrade.** Three new features: (1) reclaimable rent — get back ~4 SOL per proposal market creation, (2) conditional token merging — 1 pTOKEN + 1 fTOKEN = 1 TOKEN, improving liquidity with multiple active proposals, (3) conditional token metadata — tokens show names/logos in wallets instead of random mints. Config changes: pass threshold 5%→3%, TWAP default $100, $5 increments for manipulation resistance, lot size 1→0.1 META. All programs verified by OtterSec.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
First major Autocrat upgrade approved through futarchy itself — MetaDAO used its own governance mechanism to upgrade its governance mechanism. The changes directly addressed friction points: high proposal creation costs (~4 SOL), liquidity fragmentation across proposals, and poor UX for conditional tokens.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (~2024-04-01).
|
||||
|
||||
The pass threshold reduction from 5% to 3% is particularly noteworthy — it lowered the bar for proposals to pass, reflecting the team's belief that the original threshold was too conservative. The TWAP manipulation resistance improvements ($5 increments instead of 1%) show iterative mechanism refinement based on live experience.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- The v0.1 → v0.2 migration addresses the specific problems identified in [[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] — particularly the state rent costs (reclaimable rent) and manipulation resistance (TWAP $5 increments)
|
||||
- Conditional token merging solves a capital efficiency problem: before this, having multiple active proposals fragmented liquidity because tokens were locked in each proposal's conditional vault
|
||||
- Pass threshold lowered from 5% to 3% — makes it easier for proposals to pass, reflecting confidence in the mechanism's maturity
|
||||
- This is the version that ran through the entire Q3 2024 - early 2025 period, including all the OTC trades, FaaS launch, and early ICOs
|
||||
- Unlike v0.1 migration ([[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]]), this one was verified by OtterSec — counterparty risk concern resolved
|
||||
|
||||
Programs deployed: autocrat_v0 (metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp), openbook_twap (twAP5sArq2vDS1mZCT7f4qRLwzTfHvf5Ay5R5Q5df1m), conditional_vault (vAuLTQjV5AZx5f3UgE75wcnkxnQowWxThn1hGjfCVwP).
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
HenryE, Proph3t
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
It's time to upgrade futarchy!
|
||||
|
||||
This upgrade includes three new features and a number of smaller config changes.
|
||||
|
||||
### The features:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Reclaimable rent:** you will now be able to get back the ~4 SOL used to create OpenBook proposal markets. This should lower the friction involved in creating proposals.
|
||||
- **Conditional token merging:** now, if you have 1 pTOKEN and 1 fTOKEN, you'll be able to merge them back into 1 TOKEN. This should help with liquidity when there are multiple proposals active at once.
|
||||
- **Conditional token metadata:** before, you would see conditional tokens in your wallet as random mint addresses. After this is merged, you should be able to see token names and logos, helping you identify what proposal they're a part of.
|
||||
|
||||
### The config changes:
|
||||
|
||||
- Lower pass threshold from 5% to 3%
|
||||
- Set default TWAP value to $100 instead of $1
|
||||
- Update TWAP in $5 increments instead of 1% increments, which enhances manipulation resistance while allowing the TWAP to be more accurate
|
||||
- Change minimum META lot sizes from 1 META to 0.1 META
|
||||
|
||||
The instruction attached to this proposal will migrate MetaDAO's assets over to the new autocrat program.
|
||||
|
||||
### Programs:
|
||||
1. autocrat_v0 — metaRK9dUBnrAdZN6uUDKvxBVKW5pyCbPVmLtUZwtBp
|
||||
2. openbook_twap — twAP5sArq2vDS1mZCT7f4qRLwzTfHvf5Ay5R5Q5df1m
|
||||
3. conditional_vault — vAuLTQjV5AZx5f3UgE75wcnkxnQowWxThn1hGjfCVwP
|
||||
4. migrator — MigRDW6uxyNMDBD8fX2njCRyJC4YZk2Rx9pDUZiAESt
|
||||
|
||||
Each program verified by OtterSec API against the repos.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verification details:
|
||||
- Old DAO: Autocrat metaX99, DAO 7J5y, Treasury ADCCEAbH8
|
||||
- New DAO: Autocrat metaRK9, DAO 14YsfUtP6, Treasury BC1jThSN7
|
||||
|
||||
### Detailed Changelog:
|
||||
**Autocrat:** Config changes (PR #69) — pass threshold 3%, TWAP $5 increments, default $100, lot size 0.1 META, 10-day market expiry minimum
|
||||
**Conditional Vault:** Token metadata (PR #52), token merging (PR #66)
|
||||
**Openbook-TWAP:** Dollar-based increments (commits d08fb13, a1cb709, fe159d2, PR #16), remove market expiry check (PR #20), pruning/closing/settling (PRs #18, #21)
|
||||
**Migrator:** Transfer four token accounts to new DAO (PR #68)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `8Fv5xHhJZGTrKjDdVYxEPMaSvPkqQEpXSSEhQJG8YKNP`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 16
|
||||
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||
- Proposer: (HenryE, Proph3t)
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.1 (migrating to 0.2)
|
||||
- Completed: ~2024-04-01
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — mechanism upgrade
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — Autocrat evolution
|
||||
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] — iterative UX improvements
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — directly addressed proposal creation friction
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — co-author
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, major mechanism upgrade
|
||||
- [[metadao-migrate-autocrat-v01]] — previous migration
|
||||
- [[metadao-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] — AMM upgrade followed this
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — this version ran through Q3 2024 - early 2025
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,49 +4,100 @@ entity_type: decision_market
|
|||
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate META Token"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t & Kollan"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/4grb3pea8ZSqE3ghx76Fn43Q97mAh64XjgwL9AXaB3Pe"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t, Kollan"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/FMTAToken1111111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-08-07
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-08-10
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "1:1000 token split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5 (Squads), LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5%"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "token-migration", "elastic-supply", "squads", "meta-token"]
|
||||
summary: "1:1000 token split + mint authority migration. METAC (unmintable, ~20K supply) → META (mintable, ~20M supply). Protocol liquidity from 4% → 0.5% fee pool. Treasury exhaustion forced this — the burn (Proposal 11) + Theia OTC (Proposal 14) depleted META holdings."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_account: "FMTAToken1111111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
split_ratio: "1:1000"
|
||||
old_supply: "~20,863 METAC"
|
||||
new_supply: "~20,863,129 META"
|
||||
old_price: "~$798.75"
|
||||
new_price: "~$0.80"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, token-migration, split, mintable, treasury, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate META Token
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Migration from METAC (unmintable, ~20K supply) to new META token (mintable, ~20.86M supply via 1:1000 split). Mint and update authority transferred to new DAO governed via Squads vault (v0.5). Protocol-owned liquidity fee reduced from 4% to 0.5%. New DAO passing threshold reduced to 1.5%, monthly spending limit set at $120K. Migration contract deployed as permanent one-way conversion. New META token: METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta. New DAO: Bc3pKPnSbSX8W2hTXbsFsybh1GeRtu3Qqpfu9ZLxg6Km.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-08-10)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** Proph3t (co-author), Kollan (co-author)
|
||||
**Token migration: METAC → META.** 1:1000 split, unmintable → mintable, ~20K → ~20M supply, ~$799/token → ~$0.80/token. Protocol liquidity moved from 4% to 0.5% fee pool. New DAO holds mint and update authority. Migration contract + frontend for METAC→META conversion at any time.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This is the resolution of the mintable-token saga that began with the 99.3% burn ([[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]]), continued through the failed community proposal ([[metadao-token-split-elastic-supply]]), and culminated here. The DAO's treasury was exhausted (as the burn had predicted), forcing the migration to mintable tokens.
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (~2025-08-10).
|
||||
|
||||
Key architectural decisions: (1) mint authority to DAO governance, not any multisig — "market-driven issuance" as extension of market-driven decision-making; (2) Squads integration for operational security; (3) LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5% anticipating the custom Futarchic AMM; (4) permanent migration contract with unlimited conversion window, avoiding forced timelines.
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal explicitly frames mintable supply as philosophically consistent with futarchy: "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance." This is the strongest empirical evidence for the claim that futarchy DAOs require mintable governance tokens — the fixed-supply model broke in practice.
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — token architecture migration
|
||||
- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — the burn that created the need for this migration
|
||||
- [[metadao-token-split-elastic-supply]] — the earlier failed community version
|
||||
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — primary evidence for this claim
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — 1:1000 split addresses unit bias
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This was FORCED by the treasury exhaustion from [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration." The Theia deal explicitly flagged this would happen.
|
||||
- Validates [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO lived through exactly this failure mode
|
||||
- The [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] (Proposal 11) started the path: burn 99.3% → thin treasury → OTC deals deplete remainder → forced migration to mintable token
|
||||
- "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance" — Proph3t's framing makes mintability a philosophical commitment, not just a practical fix
|
||||
- The 0.5% LP fee (down from 4%) was a temporary measure until FutarchyAMM went live
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — co-author
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Authors
|
||||
Proph3t, Kollan
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance. A mintable token is essential to fund the organization, incentivize participation, and adapt to changing governance outcomes.
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO's token, META (METAC), is no longer fit for purpose: it's unmintable, the DAO's treasury is exhausted, and unit bias remains an issue. This proposal introduces a 1:1000 token split, re-establishes mint and update authority, and migrates the DAO to version 0.5 (Squads).
|
||||
|
||||
We're migrating METAC to a new token, META, expanding supply from ~20K to ~20M to align with peer futarchies. Protocol-owned liquidity will also shift from a restrictive 4% fee pool to a 0.50% pool, improving efficiency until FutarchyAMM is live.
|
||||
|
||||
The new META token will be governed by the new DAO, which holds mint and update authority. A migration contract and frontend will let METAC holders convert at any time.
|
||||
|
||||
Work on the migration is already underway and should take up to 1 week. Migration will only proceed if this proposal passes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Specifications
|
||||
|
||||
| | New (META) | Existing (METAC) |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Ticker | META | META |
|
||||
| Supply | 20,863,129.001238 | 20,863.129001238 |
|
||||
| Price | ~$0.79875 | ~$798.75 |
|
||||
| Protocol Owned Liquidity Fee | 0.5% | 4% |
|
||||
| Mintable | Yes | No |
|
||||
| Updateable | Yes | Yes |
|
||||
| Decimals | 6 | 9 |
|
||||
| Split Ratio | 1000 | – |
|
||||
|
||||
### Process
|
||||
|
||||
- Transfer instruction for new DAO to take custody of onchain assets (1.2M USDC)
|
||||
- Transfer remaining USDC to new Squads treasury
|
||||
- Notify LPs to withdraw from existing pools
|
||||
- Withdraw protocol-owned liquidity from Meteora
|
||||
- Migrate liquidity to new 0.5% fee AMM LP
|
||||
- Launch migration frontend upon passing
|
||||
- Update token info across CoinMarketCap, CoinGecko
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: (from source data)
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: ~2025-08-10
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, token architecture change
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — treasury exhaustion that forced this migration
|
||||
- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — started the path to treasury depletion
|
||||
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO is the canonical case
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,57 +1,104 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t & Kollan"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/HREoLZVrY5FHhPgBFXGGc6XAA3hPjZw1UZcahhumFkef"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t, Kollan"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BvReLaunchpad111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-02-26
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-03-01
|
||||
category: strategy
|
||||
summary: "Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "launchpad", "unruggable-ico", "capital-formation", "futardio"]
|
||||
summary: "The proposal that actually launched the MetaDAO launchpad. Permissioned at start (team selects projects), with right to go permissionless later. Funders get 1,000 tokens per USDC. If minimum not met, full refund. All USDC to DAO + LP — the 'unruggable ICO' model."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_account: "BvReLaunchpad111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, launchpad, unruggable-ico, capital-formation, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposal to release a launchpad enabling new projects to raise capital through futarchy-governed DAOs. Mechanics: (1) project creators specify minimum USDC needed; (2) funders commit USDC over 5 days, receiving 1,000 tokens per USDC; (3) if minimum met, 10% of USDC paired with tokens in a constant-product AMM, remaining USDC + mint authority transferred to a futarchy DAO; (4) if minimum not met, funders burn tokens to reclaim USDC. Initially permissioned (Proph3t and Kollan select projects), with discretion to transition to permissionless.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
This is the genesis proposal for what became Futardio — MetaDAO's ownership coin launchpad.
|
||||
**The proposal that launched MetaDAO's launchpad — the foundation of the "unruggable ICO" model.** Permissioned at start (Proph3t and Kollan select projects), with right to go permissionless later. Mechanics: project creators specify minimum USDC, funders get 1,000 tokens per USDC committed, 10% of USDC → AMM liquidity, rest → futarchy DAO. If minimum not reached, burn tokens and reclaim USDC. Contributors raise proposals to pay themselves.
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed (2025-03-01)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** Proph3t (co-author), Kollan (co-author)
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (~2025-03-01). Led directly to the Avici, Umbra, Solomon, OmniPair, and subsequent launches.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This is arguably MetaDAO's most consequential proposal — it created the Futardio launchpad that would generate most of MetaDAO's revenue and ecosystem value. The "unruggable ICO" framing solves the central trust problem of crypto fundraising: if the team walks away, anyone can propose treasury liquidation and return funds to investors. This is the concrete mechanism behind the claim that "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible."
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] failed Aug 2024, [[metadao-create-futardio]] failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version.
|
||||
- "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083." — this is the thesis behind [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]]
|
||||
- The "permissioned by us at start" → "transition to permissionless" is what became the MetaDAO (curated) vs futard.io (permissionless) two-tier system
|
||||
- "Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder" — Proph3t's insight on community-from-day-one as a feature, not a compromise
|
||||
- "Opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money" — the permissionless capital formation thesis
|
||||
|
||||
The progression from [[metadao-create-futardio]] (failed, one sentence, November 2024) to this proposal (passed, detailed mechanics, February 2025) demonstrates futarchy's quality filtering: same concept, dramatically different specification, opposite outcomes.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Key design choices: fixed price (1,000 tokens/USDC) rather than auction, 10% to AMM LP, initially permissioned with path to permissionless. The founders explicitly reserved discretion to change mechanics (e.g., adopt IDO pool approach), showing pragmatic flexibility within the futarchy governance framework.
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Business - Project
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
Proph3t, Kollan
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
We are requesting the DAO's permission to release a launchpad for futarchy DAOs. Such a launchpad could solve many of the existing issues with capital formation in crypto.
|
||||
|
||||
### Mechanics
|
||||
|
||||
The launchpad would work in the following way:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Project creators raise project ideas and specify a minimum amount of USDC they need to execute on the idea
|
||||
2. Funders have 5 days to fund those ideas in exchange for tokens
|
||||
- Funders would receive 1,000 tokens per USDC committed
|
||||
- Except in rare cases, the whole initial supply would be issued by this process
|
||||
3. If the launch receives sufficient USDC, 10% of the USDC is paired against an equivalent amount of tokens in a constant-product AMM. Then, all remaining USDC and the ability to mint new tokens are transferred to a futarchy DAO. Contributors can then raise proposals to issue tokens to themselves or to pay themselves on some interval (e.g., monthly)
|
||||
4. If the launch does not receive sufficient USDC, all funders would be able to burn their tokens to claim their original USDC back
|
||||
|
||||
### Why funders will prefer this to the status quo
|
||||
|
||||
Rugging is a rampant problem for on-chain capital raises. In this system, it's much harder for projects to rug because all of the USDC goes either to the DAO or to the liquidity pool. If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why founders will prefer this to the status quo
|
||||
|
||||
This system gives you two benefits as a founder:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Community involvement from day 1
|
||||
2. Ability to raise money that you wouldn't have otherwise been able to raise
|
||||
|
||||
As I've written about before, community involvement from day 1 is an unfair advantage for projects. The two biggest crypto projects, Bitcoin and Ethereum, both had it. Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder.
|
||||
|
||||
This also opens up the door to founders from geographies where it's historically been difficult to raise money.
|
||||
|
||||
### GTM
|
||||
|
||||
We will canvas our network to find early-stage (ideally pre-raise) projects to launch on the platform. We already have a few prospective projects.
|
||||
|
||||
At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right to transition to a permissionless system when and if we deem it beneficial.
|
||||
|
||||
### Founder discretion
|
||||
|
||||
We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it +EV for MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: (from source data)
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: ~2025-03-01
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — launchpad creation, major strategic pivot
|
||||
- [[futardio]] — the entity created by this proposal
|
||||
- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — the earlier failed version of this concept
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the core value proposition
|
||||
- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] — launchpad designed around investor protection
|
||||
- [[internet-capital-markets-compress-fundraising-timelines]] — 5-day raise window
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — initially permissioned to manage this risk
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[futardio]] — the launchpad created by this proposal
|
||||
- [[proph3t]] — co-author
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, launchpad creation
|
||||
- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — this proposal is the origin
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the liquidation mechanism described here
|
||||
- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — earlier rejected version of this idea
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — "permissioned at start, permissionless later"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,44 +1,83 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC?"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "Nallok, Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-08-31
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-09-03
|
||||
category: "treasury"
|
||||
summary: "Approve services agreement with US entity for paying MetaDAO contributors with $1.378M annualized burn"
|
||||
category: operations
|
||||
summary: "Proposal 6 (Autocrat v0.3) — Create US entity (Organization Technology LLC) for paying contributors. $1.378M annualized burn. Entity owns no IP (all owned by MetaDAO LLC). Cancellable with 30-day notice."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 6
|
||||
proposal_account: "53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
annualized_burn: "$1,378,000"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, legal, us-entity, services-agreement, operations, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC?
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Enter Services Agreement with Organization Technology LLC
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
This proposal established a services agreement with Organization Technology LLC, a US entity created as a payment vehicle for MetaDAO contributors. The agreement ensures all intellectual property remains owned by MetaDAO LLC while the entity handles contributor compensation. The proposal passed with an expected annualized burn of $1.378M.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Passed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** Nallok, Proph3t
|
||||
- **Proposal Number:** 6
|
||||
- **Created:** 2024-08-31
|
||||
- **Completed:** 2024-09-03
|
||||
**Proposal 6 (Autocrat v0.3) — create US entity for paying MetaDAO contributors.** Organization Technology LLC as services vehicle. No IP ownership (all MetaDAO LLC). $1.378M annualized burn. Cancellable by DAO with 30-day notice or immediately for material breach. Memo instruction acts as countersignatory.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Terms
|
||||
- Organization Technology LLC owns no intellectual property
|
||||
- Entity cannot encumber MetaDAO LLC
|
||||
- Agreement cancellable with 30-day notice or immediately for material breach
|
||||
- First disbursement scheduled for September 1, 2024 or passage date (whichever later)
|
||||
- Material expenses or contract changes require governance approval
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (2024-09-03).
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal represents MetaDAO's operational maturation following its strategic partnership (Proposal 19). By creating a US legal entity for contributor payments while maintaining IP ownership in MetaDAO LLC, the structure attempts to balance operational needs with decentralized governance. The $1.378M annualized burn establishes MetaDAO's operational scale and commitment to sustained development.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- This is the dual-entity structure that enables MetaDAO to operate: Marshall Islands DAO LLC (governance + IP) + US LLC (contributor payments + operations). Evidence for [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]]
|
||||
- The explicit separation ("entity does not have nor will own any intellectual property") is a structural firewall — contributors are paid through a US entity that can't encumber the DAO's assets
|
||||
- $1.378M burn rate is the first public disclosure of MetaDAO's full operational costs. Compare with the $1.38M estimated in [[metadao-fundraise-2]].
|
||||
- [[organization-technology-llc]] — the entity created by this proposal
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
Nallok, Proph3t
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Four weeks ago, MetaDAO completed its strategic partnership as part of Proposal 19. To support MetaDAO's operations, we have created a US entity as a vehicle for paying MetaDAO contributors.
|
||||
|
||||
Of note is:
|
||||
|
||||
- This entity does not have nor will own any intellectual property, all efforts produced are owned by MetaDAO LLC.
|
||||
- This entity will be responsible for the costs of services and development and not have authority to encumber MetaDAO LLC.
|
||||
|
||||
We are creating this proposal with a memo instruction to agree and sign the services agreement, which is legally binding as defined in MetaDAO LLC's operating agreement.
|
||||
|
||||
If passed this proposal will execute the memo instructions which will act as a countersignatory to the agreement. The first disbursement from MetaDAO LLC to the entity will occur on September 1st, 2024 or when passed, whichever is later.
|
||||
|
||||
This agreement can be canceled by the DAO with a 30 day notice or immediately through material breach of contract by either party. A 30 day notice and cancellation would need to be executed through a proposal.
|
||||
|
||||
If any significant material expense is to be assessed or significant changes to the contract are to be made, those shall be put through the governance process of MetaDAO.
|
||||
|
||||
- The expected annualized burn is $1.378M.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `53EDms4zPkp4khbwBT3eXWhMALiMwssg7f5zckq22tH5`
|
||||
- Proposal number: 6
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-09-03
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — treasury and operational decision
|
||||
- [[organization-technology-llc]] — entity created through this proposal
|
||||
- Part of post-Proposal 19 strategic partnership implementation
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[organization-technology-llc]] — the entity created
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — dual-entity structure
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,41 +1,98 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC?"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
status: passed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "@Richard_ISC"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/Gp3ANMRTdGLPNeMGFUrzVFaodouwJSEXHbg5rFUi9roJ"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/ISCSwap15000011111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2024-10-30
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-11-03
|
||||
category: "treasury"
|
||||
summary: "Proposal to convert $150,000 USDC (6.8% of treasury) into ISC stablecoin to hedge against dollar devaluation"
|
||||
resolution_date: 2024-11-02
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "Swap $150K USDC (6.8% of treasury) into ISC inflation-resistant stablecoin via Jupiter DCA (10 orders, 1hr intervals, min $1.70 max $1.90). ISC team commits to use MetaDAO futarchy for governance."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_account: "ISCSwap15000011111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
swap_amount: "$150,000 USDC"
|
||||
treasury_percentage: "6.8%"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, treasury, isc, stablecoin, diversification, passed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC?
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
MetaDAO proposed converting $150,000 USDC (approximately 6.8% of its $2.2M treasury) into ISC, a Solana-native inflation-resistant stablecoin. The proposal argued that holding USD exposes the DAO to devaluation risk (17.8% loss since 2020) and that ISC's basket-collateralized design (20% each: cash, commodities, treasuries, bonds, equities) provides better value preservation. The proposal failed.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed
|
||||
- **Proposer:** @Richard_ISC (ISC team member)
|
||||
- **Treasury Context:** MetaDAO held ~$2.2M USDC at proposal time
|
||||
- **Proposed Allocation:** 6.8% of treasury
|
||||
- **Execution Plan:** DCA order on Jupiter (10 orders over 10 hours, $15K each, price range $1.70-$1.90)
|
||||
**Swap 6.8% of treasury ($150K USDC) into ISC — inflation-resistant stable currency.** Collateralized by basket: 20% cash, 20% commodities, 20% treasuries, 20% bonds, 20% equities. Jupiter DCA: 10 orders, 1hr intervals, $1.70-$1.90 price range. ISC team commits to use MetaDAO futarchy for governance.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This proposal represents an early test case for DAO treasury diversification into alternative stablecoins through futarchy governance. The failure suggests either:
|
||||
1. Market skepticism about ISC's value proposition relative to USDC
|
||||
2. Risk aversion to allocating treasury to a smaller, newer stablecoin
|
||||
3. Concerns about the proposer's conflict of interest (ISC team member)
|
||||
**Outcome:** Passed (~2024-11-02).
|
||||
|
||||
The proposal included a reciprocal governance commitment: ISC would use MetaDAO futarchy for its own governance decisions (removing freeze authority, basket composition changes), positioning this as a potential partnership rather than pure treasury management.
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- First MetaDAO treasury diversification beyond USDC — the market approved non-USD denominated reserves
|
||||
- The "dollar has lost 17.8% of its value since 2020" framing is a macro thesis embedded in a treasury proposal
|
||||
- ISC's commitment to use MetaDAO futarchy for governance is a customer acquisition deal disguised as a treasury swap — evidence of the [[metadao-develop-faas]] business model working (DAOs adopt futarchy through partnership)
|
||||
- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — diversification is active management
|
||||
- [[isc-stablecoin]] — the asset acquired
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
@Richard_ISC
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO has approximately $2.2M in USDC in its treasury.
|
||||
|
||||
This poses a risk to the DAO given that the US Dollar has been losing value at an increasing rate. The dollar has lost 17.8% of its value since 2020. Due to the debt situation, we don't expect this to be resolved soon, if ever.
|
||||
|
||||
$ISC was built specifically to solve this issue. ISC is an inflation-resistant stable currency built on Solana. It was launched at the Solana Hacker House in HCMC on 2023-03-17 at a price of $1.545. It is now trading at $1.81.
|
||||
|
||||
Not pegged to USD, ISC is collateralized by a basket of financial assets. This basket consists of 20% cash, 20% commodities, 20% treasuries, 20% bonds, and 20% equities.
|
||||
|
||||
If the proposal passes, MetaDAO will swap 150,000 USDC of its treasury (~6.8%) for ISC.
|
||||
|
||||
Details:
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO would execute a DCA order on jup.ag using the following parameters:
|
||||
|
||||
- Amount: 150,000 USDC
|
||||
- To buy: ISC
|
||||
- Every: 1 hours
|
||||
- Over: 10 orders
|
||||
- Min price: 1.7
|
||||
- Max Price: 1.9
|
||||
|
||||
The ISC team would encourage other DAOs to use MetaDAO Futarchy for similar treasury swap proposals. This could easily turn into a win-win-win.
|
||||
|
||||
Once the ISC DAO is set up, ISC would commit to use MetaDAO for part of its governance. Example proposals:
|
||||
- Remove Freeze authority
|
||||
- Changes in the basket
|
||||
|
||||
Potential advantages:
|
||||
- MetaDAO maintains its treasury value over time
|
||||
- Promotes other new Solana-native projects
|
||||
- Showcase a simple Futarchy proposal for other DAOs to follow
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: (from source)
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: (@Richard_ISC)
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: ~2024-11-02
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] - treasury management decision
|
||||
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - relevant to understanding market participation patterns
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, treasury diversification
|
||||
- [[isc-stablecoin]] — asset acquired
|
||||
- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — active treasury management
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,54 +1,107 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposer: "@aradtski"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/TokenSplit1111111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-01-28
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-02-01
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "1:1000 token split + mintable supply + mutable metadata. Community proposal by @aradtski. Failed — but the core ideas (split, mint authority, supply sovereignty) were later implemented in the token migration (Proposal by Proph3t/Kollan, Aug 2025)."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_account: "TokenSplit1111111111111111111111111111111111"
|
||||
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||
split_ratio: "1:1000"
|
||||
new_supply: "~20,886,000"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, token-split, elastic-supply, mintable, failed]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-11
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: "futardio"
|
||||
proposer: "@aradtski"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CBhieBvzo5miQBrdaM7vALpgNLt4Q5XYCDfNLaE2wXJA"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-01-28
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-01-31
|
||||
category: mechanism
|
||||
summary: "1:1000 token split with mint authority to DAO governance — failed, but nearly identical proposal passed 6 months later"
|
||||
tags: ["futarchy", "token-split", "elastic-supply", "meta-token", "governance"]
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META?
|
||||
|
||||
## Summary
|
||||
Proposed by community member @aradtski: deploy a new META token with 1:1000 split (20,886,000 baseline supply), transfer mint and update authority to the DAO governance module, and enable opt-in migration with unlimited time window. The proposal explicitly addressed unit bias ("If it is not below the likes of Amazon and Nvidia to do stock splits... it is not below MetaDAO"), argued that mintable supply is safe because futarchy prevents inflationary minting that damages token price, and positioned MetaDAO as the first to "entrust token minting to Futarchic governance."
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
Failed on 2025-01-31 after 3 days.
|
||||
**1:1000 token split + elastic supply proposal by @aradtski. Failed.** Convert META from unmintable fixed supply to mintable with governance-controlled issuance. 1:1000 ratio, opt-in migration, mutable metadata for future ticker change. Baseline supply ~20,886,000 new META.
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
- **Outcome:** Failed (2025-01-31)
|
||||
- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
|
||||
- **Key participants:** @aradtski (author), community
|
||||
**Outcome:** Failed (~2025-02-01). But the core ideas won — the token migration ([[metadao-migrate-meta-token]], Aug 2025) implemented the same split ratio, mint authority, and migration mechanics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Significance
|
||||
This is a fascinating case study in futarchy dynamics. The proposal was well-specified, well-argued, and addressed a real problem (unit bias, treasury exhaustion, lack of mint authority). Yet it failed — and a nearly identical proposal by the founding team (Proph3t and Kollan) passed 6 months later as [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]].
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- Classic futarchy pattern: community proposal fails, team proposal with similar mechanics passes later. The market may have rejected the proposer (community member vs founders), not the idea.
|
||||
- "No new tokens can be minted if it would damage token price, which is of course the beauty in Futarchy" — the key insight that makes elastic supply compatible with futarchy. Futarchy IS the inflation control mechanism.
|
||||
- "If MetaDAO won't lead the way, who will?" — @aradtski positioning MetaDAO as the pioneer for futarchy-controlled monetary policy
|
||||
- The Q&A section preemptively addresses common objections (mutable metadata flags, moral objections to splits, enforcement of migration) — shows community sophistication
|
||||
- Directly validates [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — the proposal was motivated by exactly this problem
|
||||
|
||||
Possible explanations: (1) market participants trusted founder execution more than community member execution for a critical migration; (2) timing — the treasury wasn't yet fully exhausted in January 2025; (3) the later proposal included additional operational details (Squads integration, specific LP fee changes, migration frontend already underway).
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
This pair of outcomes (community proposal fails, founder proposal passes on same concept) raises questions about whether futarchy markets evaluate proposals purely on merit or whether proposer identity acts as a quality signal. Both interpretations are defensible — founders may have better execution capability, making the "same" proposal genuinely higher-EV when they propose it.
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
### Type
|
||||
Operations - Direct Action
|
||||
|
||||
### Author(s)
|
||||
@aradtski
|
||||
|
||||
### Overview
|
||||
|
||||
With the passing of this proposal, Proph3t and Nallok are directed to deploy a new META token program, and a migration program in line with the specifications below. In addition, by passing this proposal, MetaDAO effectively declares the new token to be the canonical and preferred version. Once deployed, all future Futarchic markets for MetaDAO decisions will be conducted using the new token as the trading asset.
|
||||
|
||||
### Motivation
|
||||
|
||||
- Alleviate unfavorable psychological bias towards large unit pricing.
|
||||
- Introduce full sovereignty to MetaDAO governance module, particularly on token supply and metadata.
|
||||
- Prepare grounds for a possible future ticker change.
|
||||
|
||||
### Specs
|
||||
|
||||
- Deploy a new token, and a program to allow a one-way conversion from META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr). The new token will be deployed initially with an identical name and ticker to the current one.
|
||||
- Effectively split META at a 1:1,000 ratio, resulting in a ~20,886,000 baseline supply for the new token. Each old META token unit will be granted the option to convert to 1,000 new META tokens.
|
||||
- The token conversion will be opt-in, require an action from the user, be unidirectional and importantly will have an unlimited time window to complete.
|
||||
- Introduce supply sovereignty by giving MetaDAO governance ownership over the token program. The MetaDAO Futarchic governance itself would become the singular entity with power to control the META token supply and metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q&A
|
||||
|
||||
**Maybe it's not great to have mutable metadata because websites flag it as a potentially malicious token?**
|
||||
The new token program will start with mutable metadata, but access can be revoked through a governance proposal at any time.
|
||||
|
||||
**Is it not morally indignant to do a token split?**
|
||||
If it is not below the likes of Amazon and Nvidia to do stock splits despite most stock brokerages allowing fractional ownership, then it is not below MetaDAO. Human biases are ever present, and should be taken into consideration in token supply just like they are in decisions of branding, design, marketing and so forth.
|
||||
|
||||
A token split is of particular importance to MetaDAO, as Futarchy arguably functions better the more trading activity occurs on its base asset.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why introduce mutable supply? Isn't fixed supply preferable?**
|
||||
Not always, and particularly not in the case of MetaDAO governance:
|
||||
|
||||
1. MetaDAO is on a mission that could extend 10, 20, 30 years into the future. Becoming future-proof means embracing the unknown unknowns.
|
||||
2. There is no risk of unchecked or damaging inflation. No new tokens can be minted if it would damage token price, which is of course the beauty in Futarchy. The only way MetaDAO governance will mint new tokens is if the market clearly deems it +EV to the token value.
|
||||
3. MetaDAO was the first to use Futarchy for decision making, and it should likewise be the first to entrust token minting to Futarchic governance. If MetaDAO won't lead the way, who will?
|
||||
|
||||
Emphasis: ownership will be given to the governance module only, and will NOT be under any multi-sig control.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why specifically a 1:1000 ratio?**
|
||||
A 1:1000 split makes it extremely simple to mentally convert back and forth between the old and new unit prices. Tangentially, it also retains some of MetaDAO's original form — in setting itself apart by not participating in the current memecoin-esque meta of a billion+ token supply.
|
||||
|
||||
**Is it possible to enforce the conversion?**
|
||||
Not in practice. Instead: MetaDAO will offer opt-in conversion with unlimited time window, future decision markets use new token, all treasury tokens migrated immediately, CoinGecko/CoinMarketCap/Drift/Jupiter informed.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: (from source)
|
||||
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||
- Proposer: (@aradtski)
|
||||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: ~2025-02-01
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — governance decision, token architecture
|
||||
- [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] — the later proposal that passed with nearly identical specification
|
||||
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — this proposal was the first attempt to solve the problem this claim describes
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — unit bias argument explicitly cited
|
||||
- [[domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge]] — possible proposer-identity effect on market evaluation
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Entities:
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent organization
|
||||
- [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] — the later successful version
|
||||
|
||||
Topics:
|
||||
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||
- [[metadao-migrate-meta-token]] — the team version that later passed with same mechanics
|
||||
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — exactly the problem this addresses
|
||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — unit bias motivation
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,38 +1,105 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
type: decision
|
||||
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: VC Discount Rejection"
|
||||
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $6M OTC with DBA and Variant?"
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
status: rejected
|
||||
status: failed
|
||||
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||
platform: metadao
|
||||
proposal_date: 2026-03
|
||||
resolution_date: 2026-03
|
||||
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||
proposal_url: "https://www.metadao.fi/projects/metadao/proposal/HmAuSUjYzuEdkGvBe19JxK3pUYKNf4JPCkWY2nCFNYNB"
|
||||
proposal_date: 2025-10-10
|
||||
resolution_date: 2025-10-13
|
||||
category: treasury
|
||||
summary: "$6M OTC deal offering VCs 30% META discount rejected via futarchy; 16% price surge followed"
|
||||
summary: "META-032 — $6M OTC to DBA and Variant at $4.08/META (~35% discount to $6.27 spot). Would mint 1.47M new META tokens. $879K volume. Decisively rejected: pass TWAP $2.24 vs fail TWAP $6.30. 16% META price surge on rejection."
|
||||
key_metrics:
|
||||
proposal_number: 32
|
||||
proposal_account: "HmAuSUjYzuEdkGvBe19JxK3pUYKNf4JPCkWY2nCFNYNB"
|
||||
offer_amount: "$6,000,000 USDC"
|
||||
meta_to_mint: "1,470,768 META"
|
||||
price_per_meta: "$4.0795"
|
||||
implied_mcap: "~$85M"
|
||||
spot_price: "$6.27"
|
||||
discount_to_spot: "~35%"
|
||||
volume: "$879,770"
|
||||
pass_price: "$2.2380 (-64.31%)"
|
||||
fail_price: "$6.3022 (+0.52%)"
|
||||
tags: [metadao, otc, dba, variant, vc-discount, rejected, manipulation-resistance]
|
||||
tracked_by: rio
|
||||
created: 2026-03-18
|
||||
last_updated: 2026-03-24
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# MetaDAO VC Discount Rejection
|
||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $6M OTC with DBA and Variant?
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal
|
||||
A $6M OTC deal that would have offered VC firms a 30% discount on META tokens.
|
||||
## Summary & Connections
|
||||
|
||||
## Outcome
|
||||
- **Result:** Rejected via futarchy governance
|
||||
- **Market reaction:** 16% surge in META price following rejection
|
||||
- **Significance:** Demonstrates futarchy working as designed to prevent value extraction by insiders
|
||||
**META-032 — the definitive VC discount rejection.** $6M OTC to DBA and Variant at $4.08/META (~35% discount to $6.27 spot). Would mint 1,470,768 new META. The market crushed it: pass price collapsed to $2.24 (-64%), fail price held at $6.30 (+0.5%). $879K volume — the most decisive rejection in MetaDAO's history. META surged 16% after rejection.
|
||||
|
||||
## Analysis
|
||||
This decision provides strong empirical evidence for futarchy's ability to prevent minority exploitation. The market literally priced in "we rejected the extractive deal" as positive, with a 16% price surge following the rejection. This shows that:
|
||||
**Outcome:** Failed (Oct 2025). Pass TWAP: $2.2380. Fail TWAP: $6.3022.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Smaller participants successfully blocked a deal that would have benefited large holders at their expense
|
||||
2. The conditional market mechanism made the extractive deal unprofitable to pursue
|
||||
3. The community recognized and rejected value extraction through the futarchy process
|
||||
**Connections:**
|
||||
- **The strongest empirical evidence for futarchy anti-extraction.** The pass price (-64%) tells you exactly how the market valued dilution at discount: devastating. The fail price (+0.5%) says "we're fine without this deal." The 66-point spread is the market screaming.
|
||||
- This is the capstone of the OTC pricing sequence: Ben Hawkins at $33/META rejected ([[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]]), Pantera at ≤$100 rejected ([[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]]), Theia at -12.7% rejected ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]]) — but Theia at +14% premium passed ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]]), Theia at +38% premium passed ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]]). **The market consistently, across 2 years and 7 deals, accepts premium capital and rejects discount capital.**
|
||||
- "We don't believe in locking up non-team supply" — fully unlocked tokens at a 35% discount. This is the most extractive deal structure proposed on MetaDAO. The market responded accordingly.
|
||||
- DBA (Digital Business Analytics?) and Variant (Jesse Walden's fund) are institutional names — the market rejected institutional capital from named VCs, consistent with the Pantera rejection pattern. Brand name does not override unfavorable terms.
|
||||
- Proph3t proposed this himself — the market rejected the co-founder's own deal, proving futarchy's independence from proposer identity. The mechanism treats all capital equally.
|
||||
- The 5/6 multisig (Kollan, Proph3t, 2 DBA, 2 Variant) shows the same operational scaffolding pattern as earlier OTC deals
|
||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — this is now the primary evidence case, surpassing the Ben Hawkins example
|
||||
|
||||
This was also a CONTESTED decision with meaningful engagement, providing counter-evidence to the pattern documented in [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — when stakes are high enough, participation follows.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]
|
||||
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — the VC discount rejection occurred on the curated MetaDAO platform, not futard.io
|
||||
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||
|
||||
If passed, this proposal would sell $6m of META to DBA and Variant at $4.0795 per META, equivalent to a ~$85MM market cap.
|
||||
|
||||
### Motivation
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO currently has ~$1.8m in cash, which equates to ~24 months of runway.
|
||||
|
||||
We have a pretty small team right now - it's me and Kollan, our founding engineer, a part-time designer, and a twitter intern.
|
||||
|
||||
We like keeping our team lean - many times, bigger teams actually go slower than small teams - but we think we could go faster if we expanded (hired full-time designer + another 1-2 engineer(s)) and it'd also be nice to have more runway.
|
||||
|
||||
### Logistics
|
||||
|
||||
If passed, this proposal would mint 1,470,768 META to this 5/6 multisig (6mYWxA7Jrvxqbj2yrcueupuQAgT1WsFwyLTZB382rdFc), containing Kollan and Proph3t from MetaDAO, Michael and Jon Charbonneau from DBA, and two addresses from Jesse Walden at Variant.
|
||||
|
||||
DBA and Variant agree to each send 3,000,000 USDC to that multisig, which would then send them each 735,384 META and then the USDC to MetaDAO's treasury.
|
||||
|
||||
Tokens would be fully unlocked - we don't believe in locking up non-team supply.
|
||||
|
||||
If for some reason one or both parties don't send their end, we would attempt to burn the relevant tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Market Data
|
||||
|
||||
| Metric | Value |
|
||||
|--------|-------|
|
||||
| Total Volume | $879,770 |
|
||||
| Status | Failed |
|
||||
| Pass Price | $2.2380 (-64.31% vs spot) |
|
||||
| Spot Price | $6.2698 |
|
||||
| Fail Price | $6.3022 (+0.52% vs spot) |
|
||||
| Created | 2025-10-10 |
|
||||
| Resolved | ~2025-10-13 |
|
||||
|
||||
## Raw Data
|
||||
|
||||
- Proposal account: `HmAuSUjYzuEdkGvBe19JxK3pUYKNf4JPCkWY2nCFNYNB`
|
||||
- Proposal number: META-032
|
||||
- Multisig: `6mYWxA7Jrvxqbj2yrcueupuQAgT1WsFwyLTZB382rdFc` (5/6)
|
||||
- Multisig members: Kollan, Proph3t (MetaDAO), Michael Charbonneau, Jon Charbonneau (DBA), 2 addresses from Jesse Walden (Variant)
|
||||
- META to mint: 1,470,768
|
||||
- Price per META: $4.0795
|
||||
- Post-migration URL format (metadao.fi/projects/)
|
||||
|
||||
## Relationship to KB
|
||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, most decisive proposal rejection
|
||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — the strongest empirical evidence: pass price -64%, fail price +0.5%, 66-point spread
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — earlier discount rejection (smaller scale)
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]] — earlier institutional rejection
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]] — earlier discount rejection (Theia later succeeded at premium)
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — Theia accepted at +14% premium (contrast)
|
||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — Theia accepted at +38% premium (contrast)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue