teleo-codex/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-token-split-elastic-supply.md

type	entity_type	name	domain	status	parent_entity	platform	proposer	proposal_url	proposal_date	resolution_date	category	summary	key_metrics	tags	tracked_by	created	last_updated
decision	decision_market	MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META?	internet-finance	failed	metadao	metadao	@aradtski	https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/TokenSplit1111111111111111111111111111111111	2025-01-28	2025-02-01	mechanism	1:1000 token split + mintable supply + mutable metadata. Community proposal by @aradtski. Failed — but the core ideas (split, mint authority, supply sovereignty) were later implemented in the token migration (Proposal by Proph3t/Kollan, Aug 2025).	proposal_account autocrat_version split_ratio new_supply TokenSplit1111111111111111111111111111111111 0.3 1:1000 ~20,886,000	metadao token-split elastic-supply mintable failed	rio	2026-03-11	2026-03-24

MetaDAO: Perform Token Split and Adopt Elastic Supply for META?

Summary & Connections

1:1000 token split + elastic supply proposal by @aradtski. Failed. Convert META from unmintable fixed supply to mintable with governance-controlled issuance. 1:1000 ratio, opt-in migration, mutable metadata for future ticker change. Baseline supply ~20,886,000 new META.

Outcome: Failed (~2025-02-01). But the core ideas won — the token migration (metadao-migrate-meta-token, Aug 2025) implemented the same split ratio, mint authority, and migration mechanics.

Connections:

• Classic futarchy pattern: community proposal fails, team proposal with similar mechanics passes later. The market may have rejected the proposer (community member vs founders), not the idea.
• "No new tokens can be minted if it would damage token price, which is of course the beauty in Futarchy" — the key insight that makes elastic supply compatible with futarchy. Futarchy IS the inflation control mechanism.
• "If MetaDAO won't lead the way, who will?" — @aradtski positioning MetaDAO as the pioneer for futarchy-controlled monetary policy
• The Q&A section preemptively addresses common objections (mutable metadata flags, moral objections to splits, enforcement of migration) — shows community sophistication
• Directly validates futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations — the proposal was motivated by exactly this problem

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Full Proposal Text

Type

Operations - Direct Action

Author(s)

@aradtski

Overview

With the passing of this proposal, Proph3t and Nallok are directed to deploy a new META token program, and a migration program in line with the specifications below. In addition, by passing this proposal, MetaDAO effectively declares the new token to be the canonical and preferred version. Once deployed, all future Futarchic markets for MetaDAO decisions will be conducted using the new token as the trading asset.

Motivation

• Alleviate unfavorable psychological bias towards large unit pricing.
• Introduce full sovereignty to MetaDAO governance module, particularly on token supply and metadata.
• Prepare grounds for a possible future ticker change.

Specs

• Deploy a new token, and a program to allow a one-way conversion from META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr). The new token will be deployed initially with an identical name and ticker to the current one.
• Effectively split META at a 1:1,000 ratio, resulting in a ~20,886,000 baseline supply for the new token. Each old META token unit will be granted the option to convert to 1,000 new META tokens.
• The token conversion will be opt-in, require an action from the user, be unidirectional and importantly will have an unlimited time window to complete.
• Introduce supply sovereignty by giving MetaDAO governance ownership over the token program. The MetaDAO Futarchic governance itself would become the singular entity with power to control the META token supply and metadata.

Q&A

Maybe it's not great to have mutable metadata because websites flag it as a potentially malicious token? The new token program will start with mutable metadata, but access can be revoked through a governance proposal at any time.

Is it not morally indignant to do a token split? If it is not below the likes of Amazon and Nvidia to do stock splits despite most stock brokerages allowing fractional ownership, then it is not below MetaDAO. Human biases are ever present, and should be taken into consideration in token supply just like they are in decisions of branding, design, marketing and so forth.

A token split is of particular importance to MetaDAO, as Futarchy arguably functions better the more trading activity occurs on its base asset.

Why introduce mutable supply? Isn't fixed supply preferable? Not always, and particularly not in the case of MetaDAO governance:

1. MetaDAO is on a mission that could extend 10, 20, 30 years into the future. Becoming future-proof means embracing the unknown unknowns.
2. There is no risk of unchecked or damaging inflation. No new tokens can be minted if it would damage token price, which is of course the beauty in Futarchy. The only way MetaDAO governance will mint new tokens is if the market clearly deems it +EV to the token value.
3. MetaDAO was the first to use Futarchy for decision making, and it should likewise be the first to entrust token minting to Futarchic governance. If MetaDAO won't lead the way, who will?

Emphasis: ownership will be given to the governance module only, and will NOT be under any multi-sig control.

Why specifically a 1:1000 ratio? A 1:1000 split makes it extremely simple to mentally convert back and forth between the old and new unit prices. Tangentially, it also retains some of MetaDAO's original form — in setting itself apart by not participating in the current memecoin-esque meta of a billion+ token supply.

Is it possible to enforce the conversion? Not in practice. Instead: MetaDAO will offer opt-in conversion with unlimited time window, future decision markets use new token, all treasury tokens migrated immediately, CoinGecko/CoinMarketCap/Drift/Jupiter informed.

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Raw Data

• Proposal account: (from source)
• DAO account: CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9
• Proposer: (@aradtski)
• Autocrat version: 0.3
• Completed: ~2025-02-01

Relationship to KB

• metadao — parent entity
• metadao-migrate-meta-token — the team version that later passed with same mechanics
• futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations — exactly the problem this addresses
• futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements — unit bias motivation