auto-fix: strip 7 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-amodei-red-lines-two-restrictions-formal-statement.md

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Georgia Tech analysis (March 11, 2026): "the tech doesn't lessen the need for hu
 - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — this source shows voluntary alignment constraints being penalized by government coercive instruments, not competitive pressure from other labs
 
 **Extraction hints:**
-1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — add government coercive instrument as a second mechanism for voluntary constraint failure, distinct from competitive pressure
+1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — add government coercive instrument as a second mechanism for voluntary constraint failure, distinct from competitive pressure
-2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks]] — add Amodei's formal statement as primary evidence of what the supply chain designation was targeting
+2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks — add Amodei's formal statement as primary evidence of what the supply chain designation was targeting
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
 

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-claude-maven-maduro-iran-designation-sequence.md

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. **NEW CLAIM CANDIDATE:** "The Anthropic supply chain designation followed the Maduro capture operation in which Claude-Maven was used, revealing the designation as a retroactive coercive instrument to compel removal of alignment constraints rather than a prospective security enforcement measure" — strengthens Mode 2 with causal specificity
-2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic]] — add the Maduro → designation → Iran → DC Circuit "active military conflict" causal chain as evidence
+2. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic — add the Maduro → designation → Iran → DC Circuit "active military conflict" causal chain as evidence
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
 

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-jensen-huang-open-source-safe-dod-doctrine.md

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ By signing NVIDIA Nemotron and Reflection AI (pre-model, based on open-weight co
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[no research group is building alignment through collective intelligence infrastructure despite the field converging on problems that require it]] — extends to: no research group is developing governance architecture that functions without centralized accountability
-- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — open-weight deployment eliminates the entity that would make voluntary safety pledges
+- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — open-weight deployment eliminates the entity that would make voluntary safety pledges
 - [[the alignment tax creates a structural race to the bottom because safety training costs capability and rational competitors skip it]] — extends: open-weight deployment eliminates even the structure in which an alignment tax could exist
 
 **Extraction hints:**

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-mode6-emergency-exception-second-case-search.md

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The danger of Mode 6 is not that it requires extraordinary conditions — it req
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] — Mode 6 is what fills that window during emergencies
-- [[nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function]] — Mode 6 is the judicial expression of this claim
+- nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function — Mode 6 is the judicial expression of this claim
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. **NO EXTRACTION YET** — Mode 6 at experimental confidence (one case). Second case search negative. Flag for future sessions: if DC Circuit rules on May 19 with continued emergency rationale reliance, update Mode 6 confidence upward (now two data points — April 8 stay denial + May 19 ruling if consistent).

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-reflection-ai-zero-models-il7-precommitment.md

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Anthropic has Claude (widely deployed, AISI-evaluated, highest benchmark perform
 - [[no research group is building alignment through collective intelligence infrastructure despite the field converging on problems that require it]] — the institutional gap now extends to procurement
 
 **Extraction hints:**
-1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** The existing [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks]] claim — Reflection AI's deal is the positive-form corollary: government endorsement of non-safety-constrained labs.
+1. **ENRICHMENT CANDIDATE:** The existing government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks claim — Reflection AI's deal is the positive-form corollary: government endorsement of non-safety-constrained labs.
 2. **NEW CLAIM CANDIDATE (lower priority):** "DoD pre-committed to open-weight AI deployment at IL7 classification before any capability evaluation by signing Reflection AI (zero released models), revealing that procurement decisions are selecting governance architecture rather than assessed capabilities."
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)

inbox/queue/2026-05-07-white-house-eo-pre-release-cybersecurity-framing.md

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ This is a form of "compliance theater at the executive branch level." The EO cre
 **What I expected but didn't find:** I expected the EO to include specific language about Anthropic's status (re-admitting them to federal procurement). The pre-release review framing doesn't address the supply chain designation at all — it's a new regulatory instrument on top of the existing designation, not a replacement for it. B1 disconfirmation target (EO with red lines preserved) remains NOT DISCONFIRMED.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — the EO is the government version of this: the review mechanism is designed around the politically salient Mythos cybersecurity crisis, not the structural alignment problems the KB has documented
+- voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — the EO is the government version of this: the review mechanism is designed around the politically salient Mythos cybersecurity crisis, not the structural alignment problems the KB has documented
 - [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] — the EO is an example of governance responding to the wrong signal
 - EU AI Act compliance theater (Session 39-40 archives) — same structural pattern at federal executive level