Merge pull request 'extract: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure' (#1030) from extract/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure into main

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
 
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
 
 Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP increase ($307,855 vs $298,889 baseline), suggesting the market viewed the fee increase as marginally positive but not strongly so. The conservative 3% threshold indicates either low participation or weak conviction despite clear revenue projections showing 20x fee increase.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md

@@ -38,10 +38,16 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+*Source: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
 MetaDAO's AMM proposal sets fees at 3-5% explicitly to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The mechanism works because high fees make price manipulation through wash trading expensive while creating strong incentives for liquidity provision.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+Dean's List DAO increased swap fees from 0.25% to 5% base (up to 10%) specifically to create a tiered market structure where large trades accept higher fees for deep liquidity while small trades use individual LP pools with lower fees. The proposal explicitly states this creates 'earning opportunities for DAO contributors' through the fee differential, with projected annual treasury growth of $19,416-$24,960 despite expected 20-30% volume decrease.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
 date: 2025-01-14
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -165,3 +169,13 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-01-17
 - Ended: 2025-01-17
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Dean's List DAO had ~$80,000 treasury and $298,889 MCAP as of January 11, 2025
+- Dean's List DAO monthly trading volume was 46,228 USDC (Dec 6 - Jan 6)
+- Current 0.25% fee generated ~3.85 USDC daily revenue
+- Proposed 5% fee would generate ~77 USDC daily at current volume
+- Proposal used -5% MCAP buffer to account for volatility: $314,620 - $15,731 = $298,889
+- Pass threshold set at current MCAP + 3% = $307,855
+- Proposal also changed quote token from mSOL back to SOL