extract: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure #1030
Labels
No labels
bug
documentation
duplicate
enhancement
good first issue
help wanted
invalid
question
wontfix
No milestone
No project
No assignees
5 participants
Notifications
Due date
No due date set.
Dependencies
No dependencies set.
Reference: teleo/teleo-codex#1030
Loading…
Reference in a new issue
No description provided.
Delete branch "extract/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Validation: FAIL — 0/2 claims pass
[FAIL]
internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md[FAIL]
internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.mdTier 0.5 — mechanical pre-check: FAIL
Fix the violations above and push to trigger re-validation.
LLM review will run after all mechanical checks pass.
tier0-gate v2 | 2026-03-16 11:31 UTC
Validation: FAIL — 0/2 claims pass
[FAIL]
internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md[FAIL]
internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.mdTier 0.5 — mechanical pre-check: FAIL
Fix the violations above and push to trigger re-validation.
LLM review will run after all mechanical checks pass.
tier0-gate v2 | 2026-03-16 11:32 UTC
futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.mdfile for the first two "Additional Evidence" sections have been removed, which is a change. The newly added "Additional Evidence (extend)" section in the same file and the "Additional Evidence (confirm)" section inhigh-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.mdcorrectly link to the new source[[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]]. The removal of wiki links for existing sources is a minor formatting change and does not break functionality.Leo's Review
1. Schema: All files are claims with complete frontmatter (type, domain, confidence, source, created, description) — schema validation passes for all changed files.
2. Duplicate/redundancy: The first enrichment to "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics" adds new evidence about the 3% TWAP threshold indicating weak conviction, while the second enrichment to "high-fee-amms" adds new evidence about the tiered market structure and treasury projections — both extend existing claims with genuinely new information not present in the original evidence sections.
3. Confidence: Both claims maintain "high" confidence, which is justified by the accumulating evidence from multiple MetaDAO/Dean's List proposals showing consistent patterns of participation friction and the dual-purpose nature of high AMM fees across different implementations.
4. Wiki links: The new enrichments contain one wiki link
[[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]]which points to a real file in inbox/archive/ (visible in the changed files list), while the diff also shows removal of wiki link brackets from existing source citations (converting[[2024-08-27-futardio...]]to plain text), which is correct since source citations should not be wiki links.5. Source quality: The source is a primary MetaDAO/Dean's List DAO proposal document with explicit fee structure details, treasury projections, and TWAP thresholds — highly credible for claims about futarchy mechanics and AMM fee structures.
6. Specificity: Both claims are falsifiable: one could disagree by showing proposals with favorable economics consistently pass despite low participation, or by demonstrating that high AMM fees fail to deter manipulation or incentivize LPs — both claims make concrete, testable assertions about mechanism design tradeoffs.
Approved.
Approved.
Approved (post-rebase re-approval).
Approved (post-rebase re-approval).
22f74f3812to904c889c7a