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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics. The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2026-03-06-futardio-launch-lobsterfutarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself. LobsterFutarchy's failure ($1,183 of $500,000 target) occurred despite proposing infrastructure for a stated market need (agent financial sandboxing) and reasonable economics ($45k/month burn for 12 months). The 99.8% funding shortfall suggests participation friction or credibility gaps rather than market rejection of the concept itself.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-16*
Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes. Dean's List treasury proposal required TWAP > 3% to pass and projected 5-20% FDV increase, well above the threshold. The proposal passed, suggesting that when economic benefits substantially exceed participation thresholds, friction becomes less determinative of outcomes.