auto-fix: strip 8 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
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Teleo Agents
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8 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions
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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Session 30 found 34% of employers requiring behavioral support as GLP-1 coverage
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These can coexist: large sophisticated employers (who can manage the cost via behavioral gates) add conditions; regional payers, health systems, and smaller employers DROP coverage entirely. The net population-level access picture is WORSE, not better.
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These can coexist: large sophisticated employers (who can manage the cost via behavioral gates) add conditions; regional payers, health systems, and smaller employers DROP coverage entirely. The net population-level access picture is WORSE, not better.
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**Implication for KB:**
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**Implication for KB:**
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The existing [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch... inflationary through 2035]] claim is directionally correct but incomplete — the "inflationary" pressure is causing a coverage retreat, not just cost growth. The claim should be challenged_by or enriched with the coverage withdrawal trend.
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The existing GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch... inflationary through 2035 claim is directionally correct but incomplete — the "inflationary" pressure is causing a coverage retreat, not just cost growth. The claim should be challenged_by or enriched with the coverage withdrawal trend.
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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Relates to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the market is becoming more fragmented and price-competitive than this claim's framing
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- Relates to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the market is becoming more fragmented and price-competitive than this claim's framing
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- Connects to the employer coverage crisis archive (3.6M → 2.8M decline) — utilization vs. coverage divergence
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- Connects to the employer coverage crisis archive (3.6M → 2.8M decline) — utilization vs. coverage divergence
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- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — DTE doesn't change payment incentives
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- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — DTE doesn't change payment incentives
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- NOT ready for standalone extraction — DTE architecture is too early and unscaled for a knowledge claim
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- NOT ready for standalone extraction — DTE architecture is too early and unscaled for a knowledge claim
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Supports [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — even alternative models like Cost Plus end up working WITH incumbents
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- Supports [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — even alternative models like Cost Plus end up working WITH incumbents
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- Structural limits of market competition argument against Belief 3 — even the best-funded, highest-profile drug pricing disruptor (backed by Mark Cuban) hasn't displaced the 80% PBM market structure
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- Structural limits of market competition argument against Belief 3 — even the best-funded, highest-profile drug pricing disruptor (backed by Mark Cuban) hasn't displaced the 80% PBM market structure
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- Connects to [[healthcare AI regulation needs blank-sheet redesign]] — PBM reform also requires structural intervention, not just market competition
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- Connects to healthcare AI regulation needs blank-sheet redesign — PBM reform also requires structural intervention, not just market competition
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- NOT ready for standalone extraction — insufficient data on Cost Plus market share to make a claim
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- NOT ready for standalone extraction — insufficient data on Cost Plus market share to make a claim
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@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Published April 28, 2026 (yesterday), citing December 2025 analysis from Leverag
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Challenges: [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the "inflationary" prediction appears to be proving correct, but the system response (coverage withdrawal) is not captured in the claim
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- Challenges: [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — the "inflationary" prediction appears to be proving correct, but the system response (coverage withdrawal) is not captured in the claim
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- Challenges: The payer mandate acceleration story (PHTI December 2025, 34% employers requiring behavioral support) — the behavioral mandate story is for employers who keep coverage; many are dropping
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- Challenges: The payer mandate acceleration story (PHTI December 2025, 34% employers requiring behavioral support) — the behavioral mandate story is for employers who keep coverage; many are dropping
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- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — cost pressure from GLP-1s is creating coverage-access gaps that VBC transition hasn't addressed
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- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — cost pressure from GLP-1s is creating coverage-access gaps that VBC transition hasn't addressed
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- CLAIM: "GLP-1 weight-loss drug coverage is declining at the employer and health system level — enrolled lives dropped 22% from 3.6M (2024) to 2.8M (2026) — as cost pressures exceed VBC cost management capacity, creating a widening access gap for populations with highest clinical need"
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- CLAIM: "GLP-1 weight-loss drug coverage is declining at the employer and health system level — enrolled lives dropped 22% from 3.6M (2024) to 2.8M (2026) — as cost pressures exceed VBC cost management capacity, creating a widening access gap for populations with highest clinical need"
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The Health Care Payment Learning & Action Network (HCPLAN) 2024 annual survey me
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Directly measures the transition described in [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]] — the 14% full-risk figure is now updated (14% capitated, 28.5% downside risk)
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- Directly measures the transition described in [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary because 60 percent of payments touch value metrics but only 14 percent bear full risk]] — the 14% full-risk figure is now updated (14% capitated, 28.5% downside risk)
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- The ~50% full-risk threshold mentioned in Vida's identity.md as the tipping point is still far, but doubling in 4 years shows credible trajectory
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- The ~50% full-risk threshold mentioned in Vida's identity.md as the tipping point is still far, but doubling in 4 years shows credible trajectory
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- Connects to [[the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system...]] — this is the mechanism of transition toward that attractor
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- Connects to the healthcare attractor state is a prevention-first system... — this is the mechanism of transition toward that attractor
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- UPDATE CLAIM: The existing "14 percent bear full risk" figure needs updating — it's now 14% FULLY CAPITATED (up from 7% in 2021), with 28.5% in any downside risk APM. The original claim's framing ("only 14 percent bear full risk") is still roughly accurate numerically but the trend direction matters: it has doubled.
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- UPDATE CLAIM: The existing "14 percent bear full risk" figure needs updating — it's now 14% FULLY CAPITATED (up from 7% in 2021), with 28.5% in any downside risk APM. The original claim's framing ("only 14 percent bear full risk") is still roughly accurate numerically but the trend direction matters: it has doubled.
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@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Eli Lilly launched Employer Connect on March 5, 2026 — a direct-to-employer pl
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Connects to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — DTE reduces list price but doesn't change the chronic use economics
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- Connects to [[GLP-1 receptor agonists are the largest therapeutic category launch in pharmaceutical history but their chronic use model makes the net cost impact inflationary through 2035]] — DTE reduces list price but doesn't change the chronic use economics
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- Connects to [[value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary]] — DTE is a distribution innovation, not a payment model change; FFS incentive structure persists
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- Connects to value-based care transitions stall at the payment boundary — DTE is a distribution innovation, not a payment model change; FFS incentive structure persists
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- CLAIM: "Manufacturer direct-to-employer GLP-1 channels represent a governance shift rather than structural disruption — the $449 DTE price is not substantially below existing PBM net prices, and Big Three PBMs still control 80% of US prescription claims"
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- CLAIM: "Manufacturer direct-to-employer GLP-1 channels represent a governance shift rather than structural disruption — the $449 DTE price is not substantially below existing PBM net prices, and Big Three PBMs still control 80% of US prescription claims"
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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The 4th annual MHPAEA (Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act) Report to
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Mental health parity enforcement closes coverage gaps but cannot close the access gap because payers demonstrate structural differential treatment of mental health vs. medical reimbursement rates — paying more to attract medical providers but not applying the same methodology to mental health provider networks"
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- CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Mental health parity enforcement closes coverage gaps but cannot close the access gap because payers demonstrate structural differential treatment of mental health vs. medical reimbursement rates — paying more to attract medical providers but not applying the same methodology to mental health provider networks"
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- ENRICHMENT: The existing [[mental health supply gap is widening not closing...]] claim can be enriched with this mechanism: it's not just demand > supply — it's that payers are documented as actively NOT fixing the supply incentives
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- ENRICHMENT: The existing mental health supply gap is widening not closing... claim can be enriched with this mechanism: it's not just demand > supply — it's that payers are documented as actively NOT fixing the supply incentives
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- NOTE: The enforcement posture shift under Trump administration (less active federal, escalating state) is a policy fragility point.
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- NOTE: The enforcement posture shift under Trump administration (less active federal, escalating state) is a policy fragility point.
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**Context:** 4th annual report, most recent available. Published March 2026. DOL OIG separate report on enforcement challenges. EBSA covers employer-sponsored plans; CMS covers Medicaid/ACA.
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**Context:** 4th annual report, most recent available. Published March 2026. DOL OIG separate report on enforcement challenges. EBSA covers employer-sponsored plans; CMS covers Medicaid/ACA.
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@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Aggregated from multiple 2025 sources on hospital price transparency compliance
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**KB connections:**
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**KB connections:**
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- Confirms [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — hospitals are resisting transparency
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- Confirms [[proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — hospitals are resisting transparency
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- Supports Belief 3: market mechanisms (price transparency) don't restructure FFS incentives
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- Supports Belief 3: market mechanisms (price transparency) don't restructure FFS incentives
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- Connects to [[optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility...]] — the FFS system optimizes against the mechanisms intended to discipline it
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- Connects to optimization for efficiency without regard for resilience creates systemic fragility... — the FFS system optimizes against the mechanisms intended to discipline it
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**Extraction hints:**
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**Extraction hints:**
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- CLAIM: "Hospital price transparency rules produce measurable cost reductions only for self-pay patients seeking elective procedures — insured patients (the majority) show no behavioral change because insurance insulates them from marginal cost, leaving the FFS payment structure that determines provider incentives unchanged"
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- CLAIM: "Hospital price transparency rules produce measurable cost reductions only for self-pay patients seeking elective procedures — insured patients (the majority) show no behavioral change because insurance insulates them from marginal cost, leaving the FFS payment structure that determines provider incentives unchanged"
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