reweave: merge 252 files via frontmatter union [auto]
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "Architecture paper defining the five contribution roles, their wei
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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source: "Leo, original architecture with Cory-approved weight calibration"
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source: "Leo, original architecture with Cory-approved weight calibration"
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created: 2026-03-26
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created: 2026-03-26
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related:
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- contributor guide
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reweave_edges:
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- contributor guide|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# Contribution Scoring & Attribution Architecture
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# Contribution Scoring & Attribution Architecture
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@ -213,4 +217,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[collective-agent-core]] — shared agent DNA that the principal mechanism builds on
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- [[collective-agent-core]] — shared agent DNA that the principal mechanism builds on
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[overview]]
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- [[overview]]
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@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-03-05
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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source: "John Lewis Gaddis 'On Grand Strategy' 2018"
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source: "John Lewis Gaddis 'On Grand Strategy' 2018"
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tradition: "Grand strategy, organizational theory"
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tradition: "Grand strategy, organizational theory"
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related:
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- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape
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reweave_edges:
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- fitness landscape ruggedness determines whether adaptive systems find good solutions because smooth landscapes reward hill climbing while rugged landscapes trap agents in local optima and require exploration or recombination to escape|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment
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# common sense is like oxygen it thins at altitude because power insulates leaders from the feedback loops that maintain good judgment
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@ -32,4 +36,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[attractor dynamics]]
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- [[attractor dynamics]]
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- [[competitive advantage and moats]]
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- [[competitive advantage and moats]]
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ description: "An agent's health should be measured by cross-domain engagement (r
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confidence: experimental
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Vida agent directory design (March 2026), Woolley et al 2010 (c-factor correlates with interaction not individual ability)"
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source: "Vida agent directory design (March 2026), Woolley et al 2010 (c-factor correlates with interaction not individual ability)"
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created: 2026-03-08
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created: 2026-03-08
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supports:
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
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reweave_edges:
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|supports|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate
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# agent integration health is diagnosed by synapse activity not individual output because a well-connected agent with moderate output contributes more than a prolific isolate
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@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-agents
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created: 2026-03-03
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created: 2026-03-03
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confidence: speculative
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confidence: speculative
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source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
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source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
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related:
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- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution
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reweave_edges:
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- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation
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# agent token price relative to NAV governs agent behavior through a simulated annealing mechanism where market volatility maps to exploration and market confidence maps to exploitation
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@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
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- [[collective agents]]
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- [[collective agents]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ related:
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reweave_edges:
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reweave_edges:
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- agent mediated knowledge bases are structurally novel because they combine atomic claims adversarial multi agent evaluation and persistent knowledge graphs which Wikipedia Community Notes and prediction markets each partially implement but none combine|related|2026-04-04
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- agent mediated knowledge bases are structurally novel because they combine atomic claims adversarial multi agent evaluation and persistent knowledge graphs which Wikipedia Community Notes and prediction markets each partially implement but none combine|related|2026-04-04
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- evaluation and optimization have opposite model diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross family diversity while optimization benefits from same family reasoning pattern alignment|related|2026-04-06
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- evaluation and optimization have opposite model diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross family diversity while optimization benefits from same family reasoning pattern alignment|related|2026-04-06
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- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate|supports|2026-04-18
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supports:
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- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate
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---
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---
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# All agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposer's training biases
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# All agents running the same model family creates correlated blind spots that adversarial review cannot catch because the evaluator shares the proposer's training biases
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-agents
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created: 2026-02-16
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created: 2026-02-16
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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source: "LivingIP Evolution of Collective Knowledge"
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source: "LivingIP Evolution of Collective Knowledge"
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related:
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
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reweave_edges:
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed
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# cross-domain knowledge connections generate disproportionate value because most insights are siloed
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@ -27,4 +31,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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- [[LivingIP architecture]]
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@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ created: 2026-03-07
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related:
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related:
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- graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect
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- graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect
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- undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated
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- undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality
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- contributor guide
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reweave_edges:
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reweave_edges:
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- graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect|related|2026-04-03
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- graph traversal through curated wiki links replicates spreading activation from cognitive science because progressive disclosure implements decay based context loading and queries evolve during search through the berrypicking effect|related|2026-04-03
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- undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated|related|2026-04-07
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- undiscovered public knowledge exists as implicit connections across disconnected research domains and systematic graph traversal can surface hypotheses that no individual researcher has formulated|related|2026-04-07
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- collective knowledge health is measurable through five vital signs that detect degradation before it becomes visible in output quality|related|2026-04-18
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- contributor guide|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# Wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable
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# Wiki-link graphs create auditable reasoning chains because every belief must cite claims and every position must cite beliefs making the path from evidence to conclusion traversable
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: living-capital
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created: 2026-02-16
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created: 2026-02-16
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confidence: experimental
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Living Capital"
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source: "Living Capital"
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related:
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- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants
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reweave_edges:
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- governance first capital second sequencing prevents token capture of protocol development because early capital injection selects for financialized governance participants|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance
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# token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance
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- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
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- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[livingip overview]]
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
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created: 2026-03-04
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created: 2026-03-04
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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source: "MetaDAO Terms of Service, Founder/Operator Legal Pack, inbox research files, web research"
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source: "MetaDAO Terms of Service, Founder/Operator Legal Pack, inbox research files, web research"
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related:
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- Futarchy Labs
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reweave_edges:
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- Futarchy Labs|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale
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# MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
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created: 2026-03-04
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created: 2026-03-04
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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source: "MetaDAO Founder/Operator Legal Pack, Solomon Labs governance docs, MetaDAO Terms of Service, inbox research files"
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source: "MetaDAO Founder/Operator Legal Pack, Solomon Labs governance docs, MetaDAO Terms of Service, inbox research files"
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supports:
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- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
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reweave_edges:
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- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|supports|2026-04-18'}"
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---
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---
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# MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window
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# MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window
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@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: mechanisms
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created: 2026-03-03
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created: 2026-03-03
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confidence: experimental
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
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source: "Strategy session journal, March 2026"
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related:
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- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution
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reweave_edges:
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- cryptographic stake weighted trust enables autonomous agent coordination in objectively verifiable domains because agentrank adapts pagerank to computational contribution|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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# agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation
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# agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation
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@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ created: 2026-02-16
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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confidence: likely
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confidence: likely
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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supports:
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- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously
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related:
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- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias
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reweave_edges:
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- Formal coordination mechanisms require shared narrative as prerequisite for valid objective function specification because the choice of what to optimize for is a narrative commitment the mechanism cannot make autonomously|supports|2026-04-18
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- MetaDAO's coin-price objective function partially resolves the Rasmont selection-correlation critique by making the welfare metric endogenous to the market mechanism, while retaining macro-tailwind selection bias|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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Vitalik Buterin once noted that "pure futarchy has proven difficult to introduce, because in practice objective functions are very difficult to define (it's not just coin price that people want!)." For asset futarchy governing valuable holdings, this objection misses the point. Coin price is not merely acceptable—it is the fairest and most elegant objective function, and probably the only acceptable one for DAOs holding valuable assets.
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Vitalik Buterin once noted that "pure futarchy has proven difficult to introduce, because in practice objective functions are very difficult to define (it's not just coin price that people want!)." For asset futarchy governing valuable holdings, this objection misses the point. Coin price is not merely acceptable—it is the fairest and most elegant objective function, and probably the only acceptable one for DAOs holding valuable assets.
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@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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confidence: proven
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confidence: proven
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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related:
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- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign
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reweave_edges:
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- Conditional decision market selection bias is mitigatable through decision-maker market participation, timing transparency, and low-rate random rejection without requiring structural redesign|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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Decision markets create a mechanism where attempting to steal from minority holders becomes a losing trade. The four conditional tokens (fABC, pABC, pUSD, fUSD) establish a constraint: for a treasury-raiding proposal to pass, pABC/pUSD must trade higher than fABC/fUSD. But from any rational perspective, 1 fABC is worth 1 ABC (DAO continues normally) while 1 pABC is worth 0 (DAO becomes empty after raid).
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Decision markets create a mechanism where attempting to steal from minority holders becomes a losing trade. The four conditional tokens (fABC, pABC, pUSD, fUSD) establish a constraint: for a treasury-raiding proposal to pass, pABC/pUSD must trade higher than fABC/fUSD. But from any rational perspective, 1 fABC is worth 1 ABC (DAO continues normally) while 1 pABC is worth 0 (DAO becomes empty after raid).
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@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ created: 2026-02-16
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source: "Rio Futarchy Experiment"
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source: "Rio Futarchy Experiment"
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confidence: experimental
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confidence: experimental
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tradition: "futarchy, behavioral economics, market microstructure"
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tradition: "futarchy, behavioral economics, market microstructure"
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related:
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- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?
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- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives
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reweave_edges:
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- Is futarchy's low participation in uncontested decisions efficient disuse or a sign of structural adoption barriers?|related|2026-04-18
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- Futarchy requires quantifiable exogenous KPIs as a deployment constraint because most DAO proposals lack measurable objectives|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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Futarchy faces three concrete adoption barriers that compound to limit participation: token price psychology, proposal creation difficulty, and liquidity requirements. These aren't theoretical concerns but observed friction in MetaDAO's implementation.
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Futarchy faces three concrete adoption barriers that compound to limit participation: token price psychology, proposal creation difficulty, and liquidity requirements. These aren't theoretical concerns but observed friction in MetaDAO's implementation.
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@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ created: 2026-02-16
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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source: "Heavey, Futarchy as Trustless Joint Ownership (2024)"
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confidence: proven
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confidence: proven
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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tradition: "futarchy, mechanism design, DAO governance"
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related:
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- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation
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reweave_edges:
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- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation|related|2026-04-18
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---
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---
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The fundamental defect of token voting DAOs is that governance tokens are only useful if you command voting majority, and unlike equity shares they entitle minority holders to nothing. There is no internal mechanism preventing majorities from raiding treasuries and distributing assets only among themselves. Wholesale looting is not uncommon—Serum had multiple incidents, the CKS Mango raid remains unresolved, and the Uniswap DeFi Education Fund granted $20M based on a short forum post with no argument for token value accretion.
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The fundamental defect of token voting DAOs is that governance tokens are only useful if you command voting majority, and unlike equity shares they entitle minority holders to nothing. There is no internal mechanism preventing majorities from raiding treasuries and distributing assets only among themselves. Wholesale looting is not uncommon—Serum had multiple incidents, the CKS Mango raid remains unresolved, and the Uniswap DeFi Education Fund granted $20M based on a short forum post with no argument for token value accretion.
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@ -18,11 +18,12 @@ source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-areal-finance.md"
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related:
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related:
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- areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens
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- areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens
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- areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments
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- areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments
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- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}
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- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
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reweave_edges:
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reweave_edges:
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- areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens|related|2026-04-04
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- areal proposes unified rwa liquidity through index token aggregating yield across project tokens|related|2026-04-04
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- areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments|related|2026-04-04
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- areal targets smb rwa tokenization as underserved market versus equity and large financial instruments|related|2026-04-04
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- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
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- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
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- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
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---
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---
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# Areal: Futardio ICO Launch
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# Areal: Futardio ICO Launch
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@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model moving mining power into pickaxes a
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tracked_by: rio
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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created: 2026-03-11
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source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md"
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source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md"
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related:
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- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded\"}"
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reweave_edges:
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- "{'coal': \"Let's get Futarded|related|2026-04-18\"}"
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---
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---
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|
||||||
# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
|
# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ summary: "Convert DAO treasury from volatile SOL/SPL assets to stablecoins to re
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Dean's List: Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy
|
# Dean's List: Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy
|
||||||
|
|
@ -53,4 +60,4 @@ Current FDV: $500,000 (Conservative to accommodate proposal duration)
|
||||||
- High Confidence Boost (20%): Updated FDV = $600,000
|
- High Confidence Boost (20%): Updated FDV = $600,000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#### 3. TWAP Calculation
|
#### 3. TWAP Calculation
|
||||||
DL DAO FDV: $500,000 → DL DAO FDV + 3%: $515,000
|
DL DAO FDV: $500,000 → DL DAO FDV + 3%: $515,000
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,18 @@ summary: "Transition from USDC payments to $DEAN token distributions funded by s
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|related|2026-04-18\"}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
|
# IslandDAO: Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,18 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model\"}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)\"}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model|related|2026-04-18\"}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Update Liquidity Fee Structure|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)|related|2026-04-18\"}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Dean's List: Fund Website Redesign
|
# Dean's List: Fund Website Redesign
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate 1M $DEAN tokens ($1,300 USDC equivalent) to University of Wat
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-08-futardio-proposal-reward-the-university-of-waterloo-blockchain-club-with-1-mil.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
|
# IslandDAO: Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens
|
||||||
|
|
@ -73,4 +79,4 @@ For this proposal to pass, the partnership should result in a 5% increase in the
|
||||||
- Benefit per Dollar: $4.45
|
- Benefit per Dollar: $4.45
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Conclusion
|
### Conclusion
|
||||||
Strategic investment in the future growth and sustainability of The Dean's List DAO through partnership with the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club.
|
Strategic investment in the future growth and sustainability of The Dean's List DAO through partnership with the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- dao event perks as governance incentives create plutocratic access structures that may reduce rather than increase participation|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Reward the University of Waterloo Blockchain Club with 1 Million $DEAN Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
|
# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Increase swap liquidity fee from 0.25% to 5% DLMM base fee, switch quo
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': 'Implement 3-Week Vesting for DAO Payments|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Dean's List: Update Liquidity Fee Structure
|
# Dean's List: Update Liquidity Fee Structure
|
||||||
|
|
@ -70,4 +76,4 @@ Current 0.25% fee insufficient to generate meaningful treasury revenue, support
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### TWAP Calculation
|
### TWAP Calculation
|
||||||
Current MCAP (-5% adjustment): $298,889
|
Current MCAP (-5% adjustment): $298,889
|
||||||
Pass threshold: $307,855 (MCAP + 3%)
|
Pass threshold: $307,855 (MCAP + 3%)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ tags:
|
||||||
- solana
|
- solana
|
||||||
- governance
|
- governance
|
||||||
- metadao
|
- metadao
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market
|
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ tags:
|
||||||
- solana
|
- solana
|
||||||
- governance
|
- governance
|
||||||
- metadao
|
- metadao
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market
|
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
completion_rate: "3.3%"
|
completion_rate: "3.3%"
|
||||||
duration: "1 day"
|
duration: "1 day"
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-digifrens.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-digifrens.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
- MILO AI Agent
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- MILO AI Agent|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# DigiFrens: Futardio Fundraise
|
# DigiFrens: Futardio Fundraise
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Drift DAO approved 50,000 DRIFT allocation for AI Agents Grants progra
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-19-futardio-proposal-allocate-50000-drift-to-fund-the-drift-ai-agent-request-for.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-12-19-futardio-proposal-allocate-50000-drift-to-fund-the-drift-ai-agent-request-for.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Drift: Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant
|
# Drift: Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant
|
||||||
|
|
@ -145,4 +153,4 @@ All grant decisions are at the discretion of the decision council and any such d
|
||||||
From this proposal passing success would be the creation of the committee, publishing of the RFG, evaluating applicants and the awarding of up to 50k DRIFT tokens to eligible grantees.
|
From this proposal passing success would be the creation of the committee, publishing of the RFG, evaluating applicants and the awarding of up to 50k DRIFT tokens to eligible grantees.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Cost Summary
|
### Cost Summary
|
||||||
This comes at a cost of 50k DRIFT tokens to the foundation.
|
This comes at a cost of 50k DRIFT tokens to the foundation.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ summary: "Proposal to establish community-run Drift Working Group with 50,000 DR
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-13-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-working-group.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-13-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-working-group.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Drift: Fund The Drift Working Group?
|
# Drift: Fund The Drift Working Group?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -105,4 +115,4 @@ The DWG will be led by Socrates, bringing 3+ years of crypto marketing expertise
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
* **Weekly Reporting**: The working group lead will provide regular updates to the Drift team.
|
* **Weekly Reporting**: The working group lead will provide regular updates to the Drift team.
|
||||||
* **Performance Tracking**: Metrics will include individual KOL deliverables, community sentiment analysis, and internal feedback collection.
|
* **Performance Tracking**: Metrics will include individual KOL deliverables, community sentiment analysis, and internal feedback collection.
|
||||||
* **Fund Management**: Funds will be managed through a 2/3 multisig wallet, comprising the working group lead and two members of the Drift team.
|
* **Fund Management**: Funds will be managed through a 2/3 multisig wallet, comprising the working group lead and two members of the Drift team.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,27 @@ summary: "50,000 DRIFT incentive program to reward early MetaDAO participants an
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override
|
||||||
|
- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Superteam Earn Creator Competition|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- futarchy retroactive rewards bootstrap participation through endowment effect|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs
|
# Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Drift DAO approved 100,000 DRIFT to launch a two-month pilot grants pr
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-09-futardio-proposal-initialize-the-drift-foundation-grant-program.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-07-09-futardio-proposal-initialize-the-drift-foundation-grant-program.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Allocate 50,000 DRIFT to fund the Drift AI Agent request for grant|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund Artemis Labs Data and Analytics Dashboards|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Fund The Drift Working Group?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Drift: Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program
|
# Drift: Initialize the Drift Foundation Grant Program
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Futarchy Arena raised $934 of $50,000 target (1.9% fill rate) for the
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-futarchy-arena.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-futarchy-arena.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'NFA.space': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Futarchy Arena: Futardio ICO Launch
|
# Futarchy Arena: Futardio ICO Launch
|
||||||
|
|
@ -156,4 +162,4 @@ Futarchy Arena makes that measurable.
|
||||||
- Token: DXS (DXS)
|
- Token: DXS (DXS)
|
||||||
- Token mint: `DXSunZYhvgwe78jVk2MKtjpEVzj7hcuAkfi79jxtmeta`
|
- Token mint: `DXSunZYhvgwe78jVk2MKtjpEVzj7hcuAkfi79jxtmeta`
|
||||||
- Version: v0.7
|
- Version: v0.7
|
||||||
- Closed: 2026-03-05
|
- Closed: 2026-03-05
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Approved $25,000 budget for developing Pre-Governance Mandates tool an
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-30-futardio-proposal-approve-budget-for-pre-governance-hackathon-development.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program'}"
|
||||||
|
- FutureDAO
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Fund the Rug Bounty Program|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- FutureDAO|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Futardio: Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development
|
# Futardio: Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development
|
||||||
|
|
@ -65,4 +71,4 @@ Approve $25,000 budget for developing Future's Pre-Governance Mandates tool and
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Key Features:** Multi-criteria decision engine, customizable surveys, Web3 integration (wallet connect, Blinks), AI-powered analysis, mandates dashboard.
|
**Key Features:** Multi-criteria decision engine, customizable surveys, Web3 integration (wallet connect, Blinks), AI-powered analysis, mandates dashboard.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Monetization (deferred):** $FUTURE staking for unlimited access, one-time payments (70% to stakers, 30% to treasury), subscription model, consultancy.
|
**Monetization (deferred):** $FUTURE staking for unlimited access, one-time payments (70% to stakers, 30% to treasury), subscription model, consultancy.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -16,9 +16,16 @@ tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult.md"
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MycoRealms': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Futardio Cult: Futardio Launch
|
# Futardio Cult: Futardio Launch
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate $10K from treasury to create FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM pool:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-17-futardio-proposal-allocate-10000-to-create-a-futardiousdc-meteora-dlmm-liquidi.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-17-futardio-proposal-allocate-10000-to-create-a-futardiousdc-meteora-dlmm-liquidi.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Futardio Cult: Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool
|
# Futardio Cult: Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool
|
||||||
|
|
@ -122,4 +128,4 @@ Performance can be evaluated through:
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||||
- DAO account: `CkEUCAooQi64UFhPFS5MWpZw6LQqjsDQBj3Z5uiXS1eN`
|
- DAO account: `CkEUCAooQi64UFhPFS5MWpZw6LQqjsDQBj3Z5uiXS1eN`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
|
- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Reduce team spending to $50/mo (X Premium only), burn 4.5M of 5M perfo
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-proposal-futardio-001-omnibus-proposal.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-proposal-futardio-001-omnibus-proposal.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Futardio Cult: FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal
|
# Futardio Cult: FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal
|
||||||
|
|
@ -44,4 +48,4 @@ Three actions:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
2. Burn 4.5 million performance package tokens, with remaining 500,000 locked for 18 months. "Traders have grown accustomed to creators who extract value from projects while delivering little or nothing back to investors. We aim to break that pattern."
|
2. Burn 4.5 million performance package tokens, with remaining 500,000 locked for 18 months. "Traders have grown accustomed to creators who extract value from projects while delivering little or nothing back to investors. We aim to break that pattern."
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
3. Allocate $550 from treasury for DEXScreener token upgrade (Enhanced Token Info) and Jupiter verification — accurate pictures (logo and banner) and properly linked social channels.
|
3. Allocate $550 from treasury for DEXScreener token upgrade (Enhanced Token Info) and Jupiter verification — accurate pictures (logo and banner) and properly linked social channels.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ summary: "Proposal to fund RugBounty.xyz platform development with $5,000 USDC t
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-14-futardio-proposal-fund-the-rug-bounty-program.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-14-futardio-proposal-fund-the-rug-bounty-program.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- FutureDAO
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- FutureDAO|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'FutureDAO': 'Initiate Liquidity Farming for $FUTURE on Raydium|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# FutureDAO: Fund the Rug Bounty Program
|
# FutureDAO: Fund the Rug Bounty Program
|
||||||
|
|
@ -79,4 +88,4 @@ Fund FutureDAO's Rug Bounty Program (RugBounty.xyz) — a novel product to prote
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Financial Projections:** If 8 project migrations in first year: 3 projects <$1M at 2% fee ($60K), 4 projects <$5M at 1.5% fee ($120K), 1 project <$20M at 1% fee ($50K) = $270K total.
|
**Financial Projections:** If 8 project migrations in first year: 3 projects <$1M at 2% fee ($60K), 4 projects <$5M at 1.5% fee ($120K), 1 project <$20M at 1% fee ($50K) = $270K total.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Positioning:** FutureDAO as "S.E.R.T." (Solana Emergency Response Team).
|
**Positioning:** FutureDAO as "S.E.R.T." (Solana Emergency Response Team).
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
twap_requirement: "3% increase (523k to 539k USDC MCAP)"
|
twap_requirement: "3% increase (523k to 539k USDC MCAP)"
|
||||||
target_dean_price: "0.005383 USDC (from 0.005227)"
|
target_dean_price: "0.005383 USDC (from 0.005227)"
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-10-futardio-proposal-treasury-proposal-deans-list-proposal.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-10-futardio-proposal-treasury-proposal-deans-list-proposal.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model\"}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Approve Treasury De-Risking Strategy|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'IslandDAO': \"Enhancing The Dean's List DAO Economic Model|supports|2026-04-18\"}"
|
||||||
|
- "{\"Dean's List\": 'Fund Website Redesign|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# IslandDAO: Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)
|
# IslandDAO: Treasury Proposal (Dean's List Proposal)
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Allocate $1.5M USDC for LOYAL buyback at max $0.238/token to protect t
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-26-futardio-proposal-buyback-loyal-up-to-nav.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-26-futardio-proposal-buyback-loyal-up-to-nav.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Loyal: Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV
|
# Loyal: Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV
|
||||||
|
|
@ -91,4 +97,4 @@ No new buyback or redemption proposals shall be submitted or executed for 90 day
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 1
|
- Proposal number: 1
|
||||||
- DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
|
- DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
|
- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Withdraw 90% of tokens from single-sided Meteora DAMM v2 pool and burn
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-12-23-futardio-proposal-liquidity-adjustment-proposal.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-12-23-futardio-proposal-liquidity-adjustment-proposal.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Loyal: Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens
|
# Loyal: Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens
|
||||||
|
|
@ -68,4 +72,4 @@ Withdrawing the full liquidity and closing the position would cause visibility i
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||||
- DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
|
- DAO account: `GxpJkPEsPmuRCCTNnfZaDKg4X3gf4ZPgmqgFqtibaPtK`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
|
- Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
duration: "1 day"
|
duration: "1 day"
|
||||||
oversubscription_ratio: 0.0017
|
oversubscription_ratio: 0.0017
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-manna-finance.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-manna-finance.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Hurupay': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Manna Finance: Futardio Fundraise
|
# Manna Finance: Futardio Fundraise
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-26-futardio-proposal-appoint-nallok-and-proph3t-benevolent-dictators-for-three-mo.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
|
# MetaDAO: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "MetaDAO Q3 roadmap focusing on market-based grants product launch, SF
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap?
|
# MetaDAO: Approve Q3 Roadmap?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -59,4 +63,4 @@ Subject to the DAO's approval, this is what we'll be working on for the remainde
|
||||||
- Interview 40 candidates for the engineering roles
|
- Interview 40 candidates for the engineering roles
|
||||||
- Hire a Twitter intern
|
- Hire a Twitter intern
|
||||||
### Improve the performance of the user interface
|
### Improve the performance of the user interface
|
||||||
- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
|
- Reduce page load times from 14.6s to 1s
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: treasury
|
||||||
summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
|
summary: "Burn ~979,000 of 982,464 treasury-held META tokens to reduce FDV and attract investors"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "tokenomics", "treasury-management", "meta-token"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-03-futardio-proposal-burn-993-of-meta-in-treasury.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-03-futardio-proposal-burn-993-of-meta-in-treasury.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
|
# MetaDAO: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury
|
||||||
|
|
@ -92,4 +98,4 @@ We propose **burning approximately ~99.3%** of the META tokens -`99,000 tokens`
|
||||||
- **Total META supply:** `20,885`
|
- **Total META supply:** `20,885`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#### Note
|
#### Note
|
||||||
Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a **mintable token model**, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
|
Adopting this proposal does **not permanently cap our token supply.** The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a **mintable token model**, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ category: hiring
|
||||||
summary: "Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028"
|
summary: "Convex payout: 2% supply per $1B market cap increase (max 10% at $5B), $90K/yr salary each, 4-year vest starting April 2028"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "compensation", "founder-incentives", "mechanism-design"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "compensation", "founder-incentives", "mechanism-design"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-approve-performance-based-compensation-package-for-proph3t-a.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-05-27-futardio-proposal-approve-performance-based-compensation-package-for-proph3t-a.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
|
# MetaDAO: Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok
|
||||||
|
|
@ -167,4 +176,4 @@ Calculation:
|
||||||
So Proph3t needs a success payout of at least \$562M for it to be rational for him to stay and exert maximum effort.
|
So Proph3t needs a success payout of at least \$562M for it to be rational for him to stay and exert maximum effort.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### 10%
|
### 10%
|
||||||
We believe MetaDAO can reach at least a \$5B market cap if executed correctly. Therefore, we decided on a 10% token allocation each, which would provide a ~\$500M payout in case of success. Future issuances may dilute this, but we expect the diluted payout to be within the same order of magnitude.
|
We believe MetaDAO can reach at least a \$5B market cap if executed correctly. Therefore, we decided on a 10% token allocation each, which would provide a ~\$500M payout in case of success. Future issuances may dilute this, but we expect the diluted payout to be within the same order of magnitude.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ category: strategy
|
||||||
summary: "Minimal proposal to create Futardio — failed, likely due to lack of specification and justification"
|
summary: "Minimal proposal to create Futardio — failed, likely due to lack of specification and justification"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "futardio", "governance-filtering"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "futardio", "governance-filtering"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-create-futardio.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-21-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-create-futardio.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?
|
# MetaDAO: Should MetaDAO Create Futardio?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -54,4 +58,4 @@ Topics:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*Source: futard.io, tabled 2024-11-21*
|
*Source: futard.io, tabled 2024-11-21*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
|
Futardio is a great idea and needs to happen
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ summary: "Proposal to create a spot market for $META tokens through a public tok
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-01-12-futardio-proposal-create-spot-market-for-meta.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-01-12-futardio-proposal-create-spot-market-for-meta.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Create Spot Market for META?
|
# MetaDAO: Create Spot Market for META?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements
|
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements
|
||||||
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs
|
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs
|
||||||
|
- joebuild
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements|supports|2026-04-04
|
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs by 99 percent versus clob by eliminating orderbook storage requirements|supports|2026-04-04
|
||||||
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs|supports|2026-04-04
|
- amm futarchy reduces state rent costs from 135 225 sol annually to near zero by replacing clob market pairs|supports|2026-04-04
|
||||||
|
- joebuild|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
|
# MetaDAO: Develop AMM Program for Futarchy?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,18 @@ category: strategy
|
||||||
summary: "Fund $96K to build futarchy-as-a-service platform enabling other Solana DAOs to adopt futarchic governance"
|
summary: "Fund $96K to build futarchy-as-a-service platform enabling other Solana DAOs to adopt futarchic governance"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "faas", "product-development", "solana-daos"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "faas", "product-development", "solana-daos"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-13-futardio-proposal-develop-futarchy-as-a-service-faas.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-13-futardio-proposal-develop-futarchy-as-a-service-faas.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
|
# MetaDAO: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -230,4 +242,4 @@ Of course, you can use your own numbers if you'd like to come up with your own e
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^6]: This breaks down to an average estimate of ~$90/hour and 1060 (wo)man hours total.
|
[^6]: This breaks down to an average estimate of ~$90/hour and 1060 (wo)man hours total.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^7]: $$(56,000/818.284) * 5 \approx 342$$
|
[^7]: $$(56,000/818.284) * 5 \approx 342$$
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ tags: [metadao, lst, marinade, bribe-market, first-proposal]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-11-18-futardio-proposal-develop-a-lst-vote-market.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?
|
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -140,4 +147,4 @@ The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so w
|
||||||
## Relationship to KB
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first-ever proposal
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first-ever proposal
|
||||||
- [[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]] — pivot after Marinade built internally
|
- [[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]] — pivot after Marinade built internally
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — first deployment of the mechanism
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — first deployment of the mechanism
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,23 @@ tags: [metadao, futardio, memecoin, launchpad, failed]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-14-futardio-proposal-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-08-14-futardio-proposal-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futarchy Arena': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Approve Budget for Pre-Governance Hackathon Development|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Multi-Option Proposals?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?
|
# MetaDAO: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -101,4 +118,4 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
|
||||||
- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — second attempt (Nov 2024, also failed)
|
- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — second attempt (Nov 2024, also failed)
|
||||||
- [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — the proposal that actually launched Futardio (Feb 2025, passed)
|
- [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — the proposal that actually launched Futardio (Feb 2025, passed)
|
||||||
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — predicted in the "potential pitfalls"
|
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — predicted in the "potential pitfalls"
|
||||||
- [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]] — the theoretical basis articulated here
|
- [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]] — the theoretical basis articulated here
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,15 @@ summary: "Proposal to build a Saber vote market platform funded by $150k consort
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-16-futardio-proposal-develop-a-saber-vote-market.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a Saber Vote Market|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop a LST Vote Market?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
|
# MetaDAO: Develop a Saber Vote Market?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-05-futardio-proposal-execute-creation-of-spot-market-for-meta.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
|
# MetaDAO: Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tags: [metadao, market-making, liquidity, cex-listing, passed]
|
tags: [metadao, market-making, liquidity, cex-listing, passed]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Drift': 'Prioritize Listing META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Fund META Market Making
|
# MetaDAO: Fund META Market Making
|
||||||
|
|
@ -108,4 +118,4 @@ The USDC and META tokens will be transferred to a multisig `3fKDKt85rxfwT3A1BHjc
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity infrastructure
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity infrastructure
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — 17 trades is the empirical extreme
|
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — 17 trades is the empirical extreme
|
||||||
- [[metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction]] — earlier liquidity solution (manual Dutch auction vs professional market makers)
|
- [[metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction]] — earlier liquidity solution (manual Dutch auction vs professional market makers)
|
||||||
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — market making addresses the liquidity friction
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — market making addresses the liquidity friction
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,18 @@ category: fundraise
|
||||||
summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
|
summary: "Raise $1.5M by selling up to 4,000 META to VCs and angels at minimum $375/META ($7.81M FDV), no discount, no lockup"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "fundraise", "capital-formation", "venture-capital"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-26-futardio-proposal-approve-metadao-fundraise-2.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-06-26-futardio-proposal-approve-metadao-fundraise-2.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
|
# MetaDAO: Approve Fundraise #2
|
||||||
|
|
@ -71,4 +83,4 @@ To fund this, I'm proposing that the DAO raise \$1.5M by selling META to a combi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.
|
Nallok and I would execute this sale on behalf of the DAO. To minimize the risk of a DAO attack, the money raised would be custodied by us in a multisig and released to the DAO treasury at a rate of $100k / month.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than \$1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: \$375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a \$7.81M valuation. Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.
|
The exact terms of the sale would be left to our discretion. This includes details such as who is given allocation, whether to raise more than \$1.5M, how escrow is managed, et cetera. However, we would be bound to a minimum price: \$375. Given that there'd be 20,823.5 META in the hands of the public (which includes VCs + angels) after this raise, this means we would be unable to sell tokens at less than a \$7.81M valuation. Everyone who participates in the raise will get similar terms. We will make public who's participated after it's complete.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ summary: "Hire Advaith Sekharan as founding engineer with $180K salary and 237 M
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-hire-advaith-sekharan-as-founding-engineer.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-hire-advaith-sekharan-as-founding-engineer.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- Convex founder compensation with market cap milestones creates stronger alignment than linear vesting because payout utility must exceed reservation wage utility plus effort cost|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Performance-Based Compensation for Proph3t and Nallok|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?
|
# MetaDAO: Hire Advaith Sekharan as Founding Engineer?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ category: hiring
|
||||||
summary: "Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy) as advisor — 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years for mechanism design and strategy"
|
summary: "Hire Robin Hanson (inventor of futarchy) as advisor — 0.1% supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years for mechanism design and strategy"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "robin-hanson", "advisory", "mechanism-design"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "robin-hanson", "advisory", "mechanism-design"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-hire-robin-hanson-as-an-advisor.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-10-futardio-proposal-should-metadao-hire-robin-hanson-as-an-advisor.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund Futarchy Applications Research — Dr. Robin Hanson, George Mason University|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor
|
# MetaDAO: Hire Robin Hanson as Advisor
|
||||||
|
|
@ -83,4 +87,4 @@ We propose to pay Robin 0.1% of the supply (20.9 META) vested over 2 years.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Early termination**
|
**Early termination**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Either Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan in unanimous agreement would be able to cancel this agreement, at which point any unvested tokens (minus the amount for the current month) would be forfeited.
|
Either Robin, MetaDAO, or Proph3t and Kollan in unanimous agreement would be able to cancel this agreement, at which point any unvested tokens (minus the amount for the current month) would be forfeited.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-26-futardio-proposal-increase-meta-liquidity-via-a-dutch-auction.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-26-futardio-proposal-increase-meta-liquidity-via-a-dutch-auction.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction
|
# MetaDAO: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction
|
||||||
|
|
@ -137,4 +147,4 @@ META for compensation: 5.45
|
||||||
**Total: 3,005.45**
|
**Total: 3,005.45**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Result
|
### Result
|
||||||
This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
|
This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META's liquidity.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ category: "mechanism"
|
||||||
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
|
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
|
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: mechanism
|
||||||
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%)"
|
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat to v0.2 with reclaimable rent, conditional token merging, improved metadata, and lower pass threshold (5% to 3%)"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "autocrat", "mechanism-upgrade", "solana"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "autocrat", "mechanism-upgrade", "solana"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-28-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v02.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-03-28-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v02.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
|
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2
|
||||||
|
|
@ -121,4 +127,4 @@ Each program has been deployed to devnet and mainnet, their IDLs have been deplo
|
||||||
- Also add permissionless settling of funds ([Pull Request #21](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/21))
|
- Also add permissionless settling of funds ([Pull Request #21](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/openbook-twap/pull/21))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
#### Migrator
|
#### Migrator
|
||||||
- Migrate all four token accounts to the new DAO account ([Pull Request #68](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/68))
|
- Migrate all four token accounts to the new DAO account ([Pull Request #68](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/futarchy/pull/68))
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: mechanism
|
||||||
summary: "1:1000 token split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5 (Squads), LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5%"
|
summary: "1:1000 token split, mintable supply, new DAO v0.5 (Squads), LP fee reduction from 4% to 0.5%"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "token-migration", "elastic-supply", "squads", "meta-token"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "token-migration", "elastic-supply", "squads", "meta-token"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-08-07-futardio-proposal-migrate-meta-token.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-08-07-futardio-proposal-migrate-meta-token.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate META Token
|
# MetaDAO: Migrate META Token
|
||||||
|
|
@ -128,4 +134,4 @@ Work on the migration is already underway and should take up to 1 week. Migratio
|
||||||
* [METAC Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr)
|
* [METAC Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr)
|
||||||
* [META Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta)
|
* [META Token on Solscan](https://solscan.io/token/METAwkXcqyXKy1AtsSgJ8JiUHwGCafnZL38n3vYmeta)
|
||||||
* [MetaDAO on CoinMarketCap](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/meta-dao/)
|
* [MetaDAO on CoinMarketCap](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/meta-dao/)
|
||||||
* [MetaDAO on CoinGecko](https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/meta-2)
|
* [MetaDAO on CoinGecko](https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/meta-2)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tags: [metadao, migration, omnibus, futarchy-amm, legal, v0.6.1, passed]
|
tags: [metadao, migration, omnibus, futarchy-amm, legal, v0.6.1, passed]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'Allocate $10K for FUTARDIO-USDC Meteora DLMM Liquidity Pool|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Liquidity Adjustment — Withdraw and Burn Meteora Pool Tokens|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update
|
# MetaDAO: Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update
|
||||||
|
|
@ -156,4 +165,4 @@ We had a previous supply used to create proposals and an additional amount left
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, major infrastructure migration
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, major infrastructure migration
|
||||||
- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — continuing burn pattern (60K this time)
|
- [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — continuing burn pattern (60K this time)
|
||||||
- [[metadao-services-agreement-organization-technology]] — MSA updated in this proposal
|
- [[metadao-services-agreement-organization-technology]] — MSA updated in this proposal
|
||||||
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism upgraded to v0.6.1 with FutarchyAMM
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism upgraded to v0.6.1 with FutarchyAMM
|
||||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,20 @@ tags: [metadao, otc, ben-hawkins, liquidity, failed]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-100000-otc-trade-with-ben-hawkins-2.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Create Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Execute Creation of Spot Market for META?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Omnibus Proposal - Migrate and Update|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]
|
# MetaDAO: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -147,4 +161,4 @@ Post-money valuations at different prices:
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — first Hawkins OTC attempt ($50K, also failed)
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — first Hawkins OTC attempt ($50K, also failed)
|
||||||
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — both Hawkins failures are empirical evidence
|
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — both Hawkins failures are empirical evidence
|
||||||
- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
|
- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Pantera Capital proposed acquiring $50,000 USDC worth of META tokens t
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-02-18-futardio-proposal-engage-in-50000-otc-trade-with-pantera-capital.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Engage in $250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital
|
# MetaDAO: Engage in $50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ category: strategy
|
||||||
summary: "Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool"
|
summary: "Launch permissioned launchpad for futarchy DAOs — 'unruggable ICOs' where all USDC goes to DAO treasury or liquidity pool"
|
||||||
tags: ["futarchy", "launchpad", "unruggable-ico", "capital-formation", "futardio"]
|
tags: ["futarchy", "launchpad", "unruggable-ico", "capital-formation", "futardio"]
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-02-26-futardio-proposal-release-a-launchpad.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Approve Q3 Roadmap?|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad
|
# MetaDAO: Release a Launchpad
|
||||||
|
|
@ -107,4 +113,4 @@ At the start, launches would be permissioned by us. We would reserve the right t
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Founder discretion**
|
**Founder discretion**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
|
We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt an IDO pool approach rather than the above fixed price approach) if we deem it \+EV for MetaDAO
|
||||||
|
|
@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tags: [metadao, fundraise, otc, market-sale, passed]
|
tags: [metadao, fundraise, otc, market-sale, passed]
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Fund META Market Making|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?
|
# MetaDAO: Sell up to 2M META at market price or premium?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -102,4 +106,4 @@ I would have ultimate discretion over any lockup and/or vesting terms.
|
||||||
## Relationship to KB
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, capital raise
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, capital raise
|
||||||
- [[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]] — the failed deal this replaces
|
- [[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]] — the failed deal this replaces
|
||||||
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — Theia was likely one of the OTC counterparties (they had accumulated position)
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — Theia was likely one of the OTC counterparties (they had accumulated position)
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Proposal to convert $150,000 USDC (6.8% of treasury) into ISC stableco
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-30-futardio-proposal-swap-150000-into-isc.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-10-30-futardio-proposal-swap-150000-into-isc.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- ISC (Inflation-Resistant Stablecoin)
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- ISC (Inflation-Resistant Stablecoin)|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC?
|
# MetaDAO: Swap $150,000 into ISC?
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -27,6 +27,21 @@ tags:
|
||||||
- governance
|
- governance
|
||||||
- metadao
|
- metadao
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat migration accepted counterparty risk from unverifiable builds prioritizing iteration speed over security guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- metadao autocrat v01 reduces proposal duration to three days enabling faster governance iteration|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- metadao governance migration 2026 03|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
|
# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "MycoRealms attempted two ICO launches raising $158K then $82K against
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-mycorealms.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-mycorealms.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- myco realms demonstrates futarchy governed physical infrastructure through 125k mushroom farm raise with market controlled capex deployment|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# MycoRealms: Futardio ICO Launch
|
# MycoRealms: Futardio ICO Launch
|
||||||
|
|
@ -229,4 +233,4 @@ The second launch used the same proposal text with the following changes to rais
|
||||||
- 20% of funds raised ($25K) paired with LP tokens
|
- 20% of funds raised ($25K) paired with LP tokens
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
> If the raise does not reach $125K within 72 hours — **full refunds.**
|
> If the raise does not reach $125K within 72 hours — **full refunds.**
|
||||||
> If the target is reached — treasury, spending limits, and liquidity deploy automatically.
|
> If the target is reached — treasury, spending limits, and liquidity deploy automatically.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Allocate 64,000 USDC for two-part security audit: Offside Labs (manual
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-31-futardio-proposal-omfg-002-fund-omnipair-security-audits.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-31-futardio-proposal-omfg-002-fund-omnipair-security-audits.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Omnipair: OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits
|
# Omnipair: OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits
|
||||||
|
|
@ -45,4 +49,4 @@ After reviewing 9 audit quotations, selected Offside Labs and Ackee Blockchain S
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Ackee Blockchain Security:** Leading security firm focused on advanced fuzz testing (creators of Solana's Trident fuzzer). Guided fuzzing and integration tests.
|
**Ackee Blockchain Security:** Leading security firm focused on advanced fuzz testing (creators of Solana's Trident fuzzer). Guided fuzzing and integration tests.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Timeline: 2 weeks for first report, followed by remediation and final report (3-5 weeks total). Disbursement: 2 tranches. Progress updates every 14 days. All audits invoiced to Omnipair DAO LLC.
|
Timeline: 2 weeks for first report, followed by remediation and final report (3-5 weeks total). Disbursement: 2 tranches. Progress updates every 14 days. All audits invoiced to Omnipair DAO LLC.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Increase Omnipair monthly spending limit from $10K to $50K to hire dev
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-03-futardio-proposal-omfg-001-increase-allowance-to-50kmo.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-10-03-futardio-proposal-omfg-001-increase-allowance-to-50kmo.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Omnipair: OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo
|
# Omnipair: OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo
|
||||||
|
|
@ -46,4 +50,4 @@ Expanded budget will enable: hiring two additional developers, adding a dedicate
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The spending limit will be capped at $50,000 per month. Any unclaimed funds from a given month will not carry over or accumulate. The limit can be reduced or removed at any time by community proposal.
|
The spending limit will be capped at $50,000 per month. Any unclaimed funds from a given month will not carry over or accumulate. The limit can be reduced or removed at any time by community proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Near-term timeline: keep gathering feedback from closed beta, ship leveraging functionality, enhance features, undergo external audit and review.
|
Near-term timeline: keep gathering feedback from closed beta, ship leveraging functionality, enhance features, undergo external audit and review.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Migrate Omnipair liquidity from Raydium CPMM to MetaDAO v0.6 futarchyA
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-02-16-futardio-proposal-omfg-003-migrate-to-v06.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-02-16-futardio-proposal-omfg-003-migrate-to-v06.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Omnipair: OMFG-003 — Migrate to V0.6
|
# Omnipair: OMFG-003 — Migrate to V0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -42,4 +46,4 @@ Migrates Omnipair's liquidity and DAO to MetaDAO v0.6 program. 100% of Raydium C
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Configuration changes: team-sponsored proposals with -300 bps pass threshold, community proposals with 300 bps threshold, 1.5M OMFG base stake requirement. Accepts optimistic governance enabling one-off expenses up to 3x spending limit with 3-day contestation period. If contested, enters traditional proposal process.
|
Configuration changes: team-sponsored proposals with -300 bps pass threshold, community proposals with 300 bps threshold, 1.5M OMFG base stake requirement. Accepts optimistic governance enabling one-off expenses up to 3x spending limit with 3-day contestation period. If contested, enters traditional proposal process.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Custom migration contract unwinding Raydium liquidity and initializing futarchyAMM + Meteora pool. New DAO address: s45fTDhkzKPMFbNmUXA3bJNdF92z5cbVvHdY8LpznWQ.
|
Custom migration contract unwinding Raydium liquidity and initializing futarchyAMM + Meteora pool. New DAO address: s45fTDhkzKPMFbNmUXA3bJNdF92z5cbVvHdY8LpznWQ.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ summary: "Deploy 20,000 USDC to fund top 3 ideas built on Omnipair via Spark hac
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-12-futardio-proposal-omfg-004-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-12-futardio-proposal-omfg-004-strategic-ecosystem-investment.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-001 — Increase Allowance to $50K/mo|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Omnipair: OMFG-004 — Strategic Ecosystem Investment
|
# Omnipair: OMFG-004 — Strategic Ecosystem Investment
|
||||||
|
|
@ -42,4 +48,4 @@ Omnipair will act as liquidity venue for tokens launched on Spark, a hackathon-f
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Budget: Concept 1 ($10K), Concept 2 ($5K), Concept 3 ($5K). Each concept fully backed at launch. If no builder is deemed worthy, investors refunded automatically.
|
Budget: Concept 1 ($10K), Concept 2 ($5K), Concept 3 ($5K). Each concept fully backed at launch. If no builder is deemed worthy, investors refunded automatically.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Factors: growth (new markets, liquidity, revenue), builder pipeline (developers who learn codebase), downside protection (automatic refund on failure). Upon passage, USDC transfers to core team multi-sig; Omnipair receives tokens representing ownership in each funded concept.
|
Factors: growth (new markets, liquidity, revenue), builder pipeline (developers who learn codebase), downside protection (automatic refund on failure). Upon passage, USDC transfers to core team multi-sig; Omnipair receives tokens representing ownership in each funded concept.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ summary: "Proposal to launch liquidity boost for HNT-ORE pair and formalize thre
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2024-11-25-futardio-proposal-launch-a-boost-for-hnt-ore.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- Helium
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- Helium|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# ORE: Launch a boost for HNT-ORE?
|
# ORE: Launch a boost for HNT-ORE?
|
||||||
|
|
@ -61,4 +65,4 @@ With the passing of this proposal, we would introduce a new boost with the same
|
||||||
- Tier 1: Vanilla ORE stake
|
- Tier 1: Vanilla ORE stake
|
||||||
- Tier 2: Critical liquidity pairs (SOL-ORE, USDC-ORE)
|
- Tier 2: Critical liquidity pairs (SOL-ORE, USDC-ORE)
|
||||||
- Tier 3: Extended liquidity pairs (ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE, and others)
|
- Tier 3: Extended liquidity pairs (ISC-ORE, HNT-ORE, and others)
|
||||||
Future proposals to change boost multipliers would apply to a tier as a whole.
|
Future proposals to change boost multipliers would apply to a tier as a whole.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Tokenholders voted to liquidate Ranger Finance citing material misrepr
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-02-futardio-proposal-liquidate-ranger-finance.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-02-futardio-proposal-liquidate-ranger-finance.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- FairScale
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- FairScale|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Ranger: Liquidate Ranger Finance
|
# Ranger: Liquidate Ranger Finance
|
||||||
|
|
@ -59,4 +63,4 @@ Key evidence: In a presentation, Ranger co-founder FA2 stated "Current stats: we
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Activity across perps and spot declined to near-zero following the ICO announcement, indicating "users" were points farmers not organic users.
|
Activity across perps and spot declined to near-zero following the ICO announcement, indicating "users" were points farmers not organic users.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Proposed plan: remove LP, snapshot vested balances, calculate book value, open redemption. Treasury USDC: ~$3.5M. Expected book value: $0.75-$0.82. Return all IP to Glint House PTE. LTD.
|
Proposed plan: remove LP, snapshot vested balances, calculate book value, open redemption. Treasury USDC: ~$3.5M. Expected book value: $0.75-$0.82. Return all IP to Glint House PTE. LTD.
|
||||||
|
|
@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
commitment_ratio: "0.01"
|
commitment_ratio: "0.01"
|
||||||
duration: "1 day"
|
duration: "1 day"
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-runbookai.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-runbookai.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
|
- MILO AI Agent
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Git3': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- MILO AI Agent|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# RunBookAI: Futardio Fundraise
|
# RunBookAI: Futardio Fundraise
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -16,9 +16,10 @@ tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-08-futardio-launch-seeker-vault.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-08-futardio-launch-seeker-vault.md"
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}
|
- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Cloak': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# SeekerVault: Futardio ICO Launch (2nd Attempt)
|
# SeekerVault: Futardio ICO Launch (2nd Attempt)
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ key_metrics:
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-superclaw.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-04-futardio-launch-superclaw.md"
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'LobsterFutarchy': 'Futardio ICO Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Superclaw: Futardio Fundraise
|
# Superclaw: Futardio Fundraise
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Fund Umbra security audits before mainnet launch"
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-12-futardio-proposal-umbra-001-fund-umbra-security-audits.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-12-futardio-proposal-umbra-001-fund-umbra-security-audits.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Omnipair': 'OMFG-002 — Fund Security Audits|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Umbra: UMBRA-001 — Fund Security Audits
|
# Umbra: UMBRA-001 — Fund Security Audits
|
||||||
|
|
@ -97,4 +101,4 @@ You can read more about the payment terms and scope of work here: [(Halborn Reta
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 1
|
- Proposal number: 1
|
||||||
- DAO account: `BLkBSE96kQys7SrMioKxeMiVbeo4Ckk2Y4n1JphKxYnv`
|
- DAO account: `BLkBSE96kQys7SrMioKxeMiVbeo4Ckk2Y4n1JphKxYnv`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `BF8hxzzR4KuVxfsyAUFyy26E6y2GhsSZgBoUQrygwof1`
|
- Proposer: `BF8hxzzR4KuVxfsyAUFyy26E6y2GhsSZgBoUQrygwof1`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -21,9 +21,12 @@ tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-11
|
created: 2026-03-11
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-versus.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-versus.md"
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise'}"
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Avici': 'Futardio Launch|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Insert Coin Labs': 'Futardio Fundraise|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# VERSUS: Futardio Fundraise
|
# VERSUS: Futardio Fundraise
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Allocate $200K USDC for ZKLSOL token buyback to defend NAV"
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-01-16-futardio-proposal-zkfg-200k-buyback.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2026-01-16-futardio-proposal-zkfg-200k-buyback.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Loyal': 'Buyback LOYAL Up To NAV|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# ZKLSOL: $200K Buyback
|
# ZKLSOL: $200K Buyback
|
||||||
|
|
@ -95,4 +99,4 @@ No new buyback or redemption proposals shall be submitted or executed for 90 day
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 2
|
- Proposal number: 2
|
||||||
- DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
|
- DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
|
- Proposer: `ELT1uRmtFvYP6WSrc4mCZaW7VVbcdkcKAj39aHSVCmwH`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ summary: "Burn team performance package tokens to demonstrate alignment with com
|
||||||
tracked_by: rio
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-24
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-22-futardio-proposal-burn-team-performance-package.md"
|
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2025-11-22-futardio-proposal-burn-team-performance-package.md"
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal'}"
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- "{'Futardio Cult': 'FUTARDIO-001 — Omnibus Proposal|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# ZKLSOL: Burn Team Performance Package
|
# ZKLSOL: Burn Team Performance Package
|
||||||
|
|
@ -53,4 +57,4 @@ We believe in MetaDAO process from begining to end, hence we raise this proposal
|
||||||
- Proposal number: 1
|
- Proposal number: 1
|
||||||
- DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
|
- DAO account: `5FPGRzY9ArJFwY2Hp2y2eqMzVewyWCBox7esmpuZfCvE`
|
||||||
- Proposer: `GZFj6uESDHUQJCZXErvSWPeg6UB6FZFBmw675RRfSB7X`
|
- Proposer: `GZFj6uESDHUQJCZXErvSWPeg6UB6FZFBmw675RRfSB7X`
|
||||||
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
- Autocrat version: 0.6
|
||||||
|
|
@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ source: "Tomasev et al, Distributional AGI Safety (arXiv 2512.16856, December 20
|
||||||
confidence: experimental
|
confidence: experimental
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments
|
- multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments
|
||||||
|
- Hyperspace
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments|related|2026-03-28
|
- multi agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single agent evaluation because cross agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi party environments|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
|
- Hyperspace|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system
|
# AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system
|
||||||
|
|
@ -35,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- distributed architectures enable continuous value integration at multiple points
|
- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] -- distributed architectures enable continuous value integration at multiple points
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ related:
|
||||||
- the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction
|
- the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction
|
||||||
- motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate
|
- motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate
|
||||||
- technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies
|
- technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies
|
||||||
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms
|
||||||
|
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
|
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
|
||||||
- the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction|related|2026-04-07
|
- the absence of a societal warning signal for AGI is a structural feature not an accident because capability scaling is gradual and ambiguous and collective action requires anticipation not reaction|related|2026-04-07
|
||||||
- motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate|related|2026-04-17
|
- motivated reasoning among AI lab leaders is itself a primary risk vector because those with most capability to slow down have most incentive to accelerate|related|2026-04-17
|
||||||
- technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies|related|2026-04-17
|
- technological development draws from an urn containing civilization destroying capabilities and only preventive governance can avoid black ball technologies|related|2026-04-17
|
||||||
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence
|
# AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ related:
|
||||||
- as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
|
- as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
|
||||||
- iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation
|
- iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation
|
||||||
- tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original
|
- tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original
|
||||||
|
- Hyperspace
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems|related|2026-03-28
|
- as AI automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation|related|2026-03-28
|
- iterative agent self improvement produces compounding capability gains when evaluation is structurally separated from generation|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original|related|2026-03-28
|
- tools and artifacts transfer between AI agents and evolve in the process because Agent O improved Agent Cs solver by combining it with its own structural knowledge creating a hybrid better than either original|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
|
- Hyperspace|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect
|
# AI agents excel at implementing well-scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect
|
||||||
|
|
@ -36,4 +38,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[coordination protocol design produces larger capability gains than model scaling because the same AI model performed 6x better with structured exploration than with human coaching on the same problem]] — organizational design > individual capability
|
- [[coordination protocol design produces larger capability gains than model scaling because the same AI model performed 6x better with structured exploration than with human coaching on the same problem]] — organizational design > individual capability
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
|
- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ source: "Web research compilation, February 2026"
|
||||||
confidence: likely
|
confidence: likely
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
|
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
|
||||||
|
- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|related|2026-04-04
|
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|related|2026-04-04
|
||||||
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|supports|2026-04-17
|
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|supports|2026-04-17
|
||||||
|
- Mandatory legislative governance with binding transition conditions closes the technology-coordination gap while voluntary governance under competitive pressure widens it|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
|
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ confidence: experimental
|
||||||
source: "Schmachtenberger & Boeree 'Win-Win or Lose-Lose' podcast (2024), Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #71"
|
source: "Schmachtenberger & Boeree 'Win-Win or Lose-Lose' podcast (2024), Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #71"
|
||||||
created: 2026-04-03
|
created: 2026-04-03
|
||||||
challenged_by:
|
challenged_by:
|
||||||
- "AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem"
|
- AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- "global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function"
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function
|
||||||
- "Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development"
|
- Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned optimizer that produces outcomes no participant would choose because individual rationality aggregates into collective irrationality without coordination mechanisms|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# A misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment
|
# A misaligned context cannot develop aligned AI because the competitive dynamics building AI optimize for deployment speed not safety making system alignment prerequisite for AI alignment
|
||||||
|
|
@ -45,4 +49,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — compatible framing that identifies coordination as the gap, though this claim goes further by arguing the coordination context itself is misaligned
|
- [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — compatible framing that identifies coordination as the gap, though this claim goes further by arguing the coordination context itself is misaligned
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- AI agents excel at implementing well scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect|related|2026-03-28
|
- AI agents excel at implementing well scoped ideas but cannot generate creative experiment designs which makes the human role shift from researcher to agent workflow architect|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed|supports|2026-03-28
|
- formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed|supports|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- AI-assisted analytics collapses dashboard development from weeks to hours eliminating the specialist moat in data visualization|related|2026-04-17
|
- AI-assisted analytics collapses dashboard development from weeks to hours eliminating the specialist moat in data visualization|related|2026-04-17
|
||||||
|
- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed
|
- formal verification becomes economically necessary as AI generated code scales because testing cannot detect adversarial overfitting and a proof cannot be gamed
|
||||||
|
- foundation models and physical robots are entering a co development loop where deployed robots generate training data that improves models which improve robot capabilities creating a flywheel that accelerates nonlinearly past fleet size thresholds
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# As AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
|
# As AI-automated software development becomes certain the bottleneck shifts from building capacity to knowing what to build making structured knowledge graphs the critical input to autonomous systems
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -11,18 +11,19 @@ scope: structural
|
||||||
sourcer: ASIL, SIPRI
|
sourcer: ASIL, SIPRI
|
||||||
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]", "[[some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps and systems must map rather than eliminate them]]"]
|
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]", "[[some disagreements are permanently irreducible because they stem from genuine value differences not information gaps and systems must map rather than eliminate them]]"]
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
|
||||||
- International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
|
- International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-06'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-06'}"
|
||||||
- International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained|supports|2026-04-08
|
- International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained|supports|2026-04-08
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-13'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-13'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text
|
# Autonomous weapons systems capable of militarily effective targeting decisions cannot satisfy IHL requirements of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, making sufficiently capable autonomous weapons potentially illegal under existing international law without requiring new treaty text
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ related:
|
||||||
- user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect
|
- user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect|related|2026-03-28
|
- user questions are an irreplaceable free energy signal for knowledge agents because they reveal functional uncertainty that model introspection cannot detect|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
|
- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- nested markov blankets enable hierarchical organization where each level minimizes prediction error while participating in higher level dynamics
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections
|
# collective attention allocation follows nested active inference where domain agents minimize uncertainty within their boundaries while the evaluator minimizes uncertainty at domain intersections
|
||||||
|
|
@ -41,4 +44,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[scalable oversight degrades rapidly as capability gaps grow with debate achieving only 50 percent success at moderate gaps]] — oversight resources should be allocated where free energy is highest, not spread uniformly
|
- [[scalable oversight degrades rapidly as capability gaps grow with debate achieving only 50 percent success at moderate gaps]] — oversight resources should be allocated where free energy is highest, not spread uniformly
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ source: "US export control regulations (Oct 2022, Oct 2023, Dec 2024, Jan 2025),
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-16
|
created: 2026-03-16
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection
|
- inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection
|
||||||
|
- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection|related|2026-03-28
|
- inference efficiency gains erode AI deployment governance without triggering compute monitoring thresholds because governance frameworks target training concentration while inference optimization distributes capability below detection|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|supports|2026-04-04
|
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|supports|2026-04-04
|
||||||
|
- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
|
- AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
@ -51,4 +53,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — export controls show coordination with enforcement works; the problem is that enforcement is aimed at competition, not safety
|
- [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]] — export controls show coordination with enforcement works; the problem is that enforcement is aimed at competition, not safety
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ domain: ai-alignment
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-06
|
created: 2026-03-06
|
||||||
source: "Noah Smith, 'Updated thoughts on AI risk' (Noahopinion, Feb 16, 2026)"
|
source: "Noah Smith, 'Updated thoughts on AI risk' (Noahopinion, Feb 16, 2026)"
|
||||||
confidence: experimental
|
confidence: experimental
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- efficiency optimization converts resilience into fragility across five independent infrastructure domains through the same Molochian mechanism|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on
|
# delegating critical infrastructure development to AI creates civilizational fragility because humans lose the ability to understand maintain and fix the systems civilization depends on
|
||||||
|
|
@ -40,4 +44,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] — but if humans can't understand the systems, they can't weave values into them
|
- [[the alignment problem dissolves when human values are continuously woven into the system rather than specified in advance]] — but if humans can't understand the systems, they can't weave values into them
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ confidence: likely
|
||||||
source: "AutoAgent (MarkTechPost coverage, April 2026) — same-family meta/task pairs achieve SOTA on SpreadsheetBench (96.5%) and TerminalBench (55.1%); Kim et al. ICML 2025 — ~60% error agreement within same-family models on evaluation tasks"
|
source: "AutoAgent (MarkTechPost coverage, April 2026) — same-family meta/task pairs achieve SOTA on SpreadsheetBench (96.5%) and TerminalBench (55.1%); Kim et al. ICML 2025 — ~60% error agreement within same-family models on evaluation tasks"
|
||||||
created: 2026-04-05
|
created: 2026-04-05
|
||||||
depends_on:
|
depends_on:
|
||||||
- "multi-model evaluation architecture"
|
- multi-model evaluation architecture
|
||||||
challenged_by:
|
challenged_by:
|
||||||
- "multi-model evaluation architecture"
|
- multi-model evaluation architecture
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- human contributors structurally correct for correlated AI blind spots because external evaluators provide orthogonal error distributions that no same family model can replicate|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment
|
# Evaluation and optimization have opposite model-diversity optima because evaluation benefits from cross-family diversity while optimization benefits from same-family reasoning pattern alignment
|
||||||
|
|
@ -43,4 +47,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[self evolution improves agent performance through acceptance gated retry not expanded search because disciplined attempt loops with explicit failure reflection outperform open ended exploration]] — NLAH's self-evolution mechanism is an optimization task where model empathy would help
|
- [[self evolution improves agent performance through acceptance gated retry not expanded search because disciplined attempt loops with explicit failure reflection outperform open ended exploration]] — NLAH's self-evolution mechanism is an optimization task where model empathy would help
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ depends_on:
|
||||||
- technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap
|
- technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile
|
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile
|
||||||
|
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
|
- multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile|related|2026-04-04
|
||||||
|
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense
|
# four restraints prevent competitive dynamics from reaching catastrophic equilibrium and AI specifically erodes physical limitations and bounded rationality leaving only coordination as defense
|
||||||
|
|
@ -57,4 +59,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[physical infrastructure constraints on AI development create a natural governance window of 2 to 10 years because hardware bottlenecks are not software-solvable]] — a specific instance of restraint #2 that is degrading
|
- [[physical infrastructure constraints on AI development create a natural governance window of 2 to 10 years because hardware bottlenecks are not software-solvable]] — a specific instance of restraint #2 that is degrading
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -8,10 +8,12 @@ confidence: likely
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for
|
- AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for
|
||||||
- UK AI Safety Institute
|
- UK AI Safety Institute
|
||||||
|
- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for|related|2026-03-28
|
- AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
|
- UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors|supports|2026-03-31
|
- government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors|supports|2026-03-31
|
||||||
|
- The legislative ceiling on military AI governance operates through statutory scope definition replicating contracting-level strategic interest inversion because any mandatory framework must either bind DoD (triggering national security opposition) or exempt DoD (preserving the legal mechanism gap)|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors
|
- government safety penalties invert regulatory incentives by blacklisting cautious actors
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
@ -65,4 +67,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] -- the Pentagon using supply chain authority against a domestic AI lab suggests the institutional juncture is producing worse governance, not better
|
- [[AI development is a critical juncture in institutional history where the mismatch between capabilities and governance creates a window for transformation]] -- the Pentagon using supply chain authority against a domestic AI lab suggests the institutional juncture is producing worse governance, not better
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -11,18 +11,19 @@ scope: structural
|
||||||
sourcer: ICRC
|
sourcer: ICRC
|
||||||
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]"]
|
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]]", "[[specifying human values in code is intractable because our goals contain hidden complexity comparable to visual perception]]"]
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-08'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-08'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-09'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-10'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-11'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-12'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-13'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|related|2026-04-13'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-14'}"
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck|supports|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- {'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}
|
- "{'Legal scholars and AI alignment researchers independently converged on the same core problem': 'AI cannot implement human value judgments reliably, as evidenced by IHL proportionality requirements and alignment specification challenges both identifying irreducible human judgment as the bottleneck'}"
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
|
# International humanitarian law and AI alignment research independently converged on the same technical limitation that autonomous systems cannot be adequately predicted understood or explained
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ related:
|
||||||
- Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional
|
- Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional
|
||||||
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
|
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation
|
||||||
- Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms
|
- Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms
|
||||||
|
- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional
|
||||||
|
- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
|
- UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
|
||||||
- cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation|supports|2026-04-03
|
- cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation|supports|2026-04-03
|
||||||
|
|
@ -18,10 +20,14 @@ reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail|supports|2026-04-06
|
- EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail|supports|2026-04-06
|
||||||
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|related|2026-04-17
|
- The international AI safety governance community faces an evidence dilemma where development pace structurally prevents adequate pre-deployment evidence accumulation|related|2026-04-17
|
||||||
- Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms|related|2026-04-17
|
- Post-2008 financial regulation achieved partial international success (Basel III, FSB) despite high competitive stakes because commercial network effects made compliance self-enforcing through correspondent banking relationships and financial flows provided verifiable compliance mechanisms|related|2026-04-17
|
||||||
|
- eu ai act article 2 3 national security exclusion confirms legislative ceiling is cross jurisdictional|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
|
- International AI governance form-substance divergence enables simultaneous treaty ratification and domestic implementation weakening|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
supports:
|
supports:
|
||||||
- cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation
|
- cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation
|
||||||
- multilateral verification mechanisms can substitute for failed voluntary commitments when binding enforcement replaces unilateral sacrifice
|
- multilateral verification mechanisms can substitute for failed voluntary commitments when binding enforcement replaces unilateral sacrifice
|
||||||
- EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail
|
- EU AI Act extraterritorial enforcement can create binding governance constraints on US AI labs through market access requirements when domestic voluntary commitments fail
|
||||||
|
- EU AI governance reveals form-substance divergence at domestic regulatory level through simultaneous treaty ratification and compliance delay
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient
|
# only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ confidence: experimental
|
||||||
source: "Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #132 (Nate Hagens, 2025), Schmachtenberger 'Development in Progress' (2024)"
|
source: "Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #132 (Nate Hagens, 2025), Schmachtenberger 'Development in Progress' (2024)"
|
||||||
created: 2026-04-03
|
created: 2026-04-03
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- "the metacrisis is a single generator function where all civilizational-scale crises share the structural cause of competitive dynamics on exponential technology on finite substrate"
|
- the metacrisis is a single generator function where all civilizational-scale crises share the structural cause of competitive dynamics on exponential technology on finite substrate
|
||||||
- "the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and applying this framework to civilizational coordination failures offers a quantitative lens though operationalizing it at scale remains unproven"
|
- the price of anarchy quantifies the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium and applying this framework to civilizational coordination failures offers a quantitative lens though operationalizing it at scale remains unproven
|
||||||
- "global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function"
|
- global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function
|
||||||
|
supports:
|
||||||
|
- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- incremental optimization within a dominant design necessarily undermines that design because autovitatic innovation makes the better you get at optimization the faster you approach framework collapse|supports|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# When you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution
|
# When you account for everything that matters optimization becomes the wrong framework because the objective function itself is the problem not the solution
|
||||||
|
|
@ -43,4 +47,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function]] — capitalism is the paradigm case of optimization-as-problem: the objective function (capital accumulation) IS the misalignment
|
- [[global capitalism functions as a misaligned autopoietic superintelligence running on human general intelligence as substrate with convert everything into capital as its objective function]] — capitalism is the paradigm case of optimization-as-problem: the objective function (capital accumulation) IS the misalignment
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- [[_map]]
|
- [[_map]]
|
||||||
|
|
@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ depends_on:
|
||||||
challenged_by:
|
challenged_by:
|
||||||
- PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
|
- PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}"
|
||||||
|
- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
|
# AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni committing over 1.5 billion dollars in PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -12,9 +12,12 @@ depends_on:
|
||||||
challenged_by:
|
challenged_by:
|
||||||
- PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
|
- PPAs contingent on Q>1 demonstration carry no financial penalty if fusion fails — they may be cheap option bets by tech companies rather than genuine demand signals; nuclear SMRs and enhanced geothermal may satisfy datacenter power needs before fusion arrives
|
||||||
related:
|
related:
|
||||||
- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)'}"
|
||||||
|
- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission
|
||||||
reweave_edges:
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
- {'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-17'}"
|
||||||
|
- "{'Gate 2C concentrated buyer demand activates through two distinct modes': 'parity mode at ~1x cost (driven by ESG and hedging) and strategic premium mode at ~1.8-2x cost (driven by genuinely unavailable attributes)|related|2026-04-18'}"
|
||||||
|
- fusions attractor state is 5 15 percent of global generation by 2055 as firm dispatchable complement to renewables not as baseload replacement for fission|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
|
# AI datacenter power demand is creating a fusion buyer market before the technology exists with Google and Eni signing PPAs for unbuilt plants using undemonstrated technology
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -7,10 +7,14 @@ source: "Astra; BloombergNEF Battery Price Survey 2023, BNEF Energy Storage Outl
|
||||||
created: 2026-03-27
|
created: 2026-03-27
|
||||||
secondary_domains: ["manufacturing"]
|
secondary_domains: ["manufacturing"]
|
||||||
depends_on:
|
depends_on:
|
||||||
- "solar photovoltaic costs have fallen 99 percent over four decades making unsubsidized solar the cheapest new electricity source in history and the decline is not slowing"
|
- solar photovoltaic costs have fallen 99 percent over four decades making unsubsidized solar the cheapest new electricity source in history and the decline is not slowing
|
||||||
challenged_by:
|
challenged_by:
|
||||||
- "Lithium and critical mineral supply constraints may slow or reverse the cost decline trajectory"
|
- Lithium and critical mineral supply constraints may slow or reverse the cost decline trajectory
|
||||||
- "Long-duration storage beyond 8 hours requires different chemistry than lithium-ion and remains uneconomic"
|
- Long-duration storage beyond 8 hours requires different chemistry than lithium-ion and remains uneconomic
|
||||||
|
related:
|
||||||
|
- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid
|
||||||
|
reweave_edges:
|
||||||
|
- long duration energy storage beyond 8 hours remains unsolved at scale and is the binding constraint on a fully renewable grid|related|2026-04-18
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power
|
# Battery storage costs crossing below 100 dollars per kWh make renewables dispatchable and fundamentally change grid economics by enabling solar and wind to compete with firm baseload power
|
||||||
|
|
@ -33,4 +37,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
|
||||||
- [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable with the sweet spot where physical data generation feeds software that scales independently]] — battery manufacturing is atoms-side with software-managed dispatch optimization
|
- [[the atoms-to-bits spectrum positions industries between defensible-but-linear and scalable-but-commoditizable with the sweet spot where physical data generation feeds software that scales independently]] — battery manufacturing is atoms-side with software-managed dispatch optimization
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Topics:
|
Topics:
|
||||||
- energy systems
|
- energy systems
|
||||||
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