Merge pull request 'extract: 2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma' (#1321) from extract/2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma into main
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3 changed files with 29 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -32,10 +32,16 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
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*Source: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
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The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma]] | Added: 2026-03-18*
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The mechanism requires actual capital commitment sustained over time rather than vote counting. Manipulators cannot simply stuff a ballot box - they must put real money at stake and maintain that position over the duration needed to move time-weighted prices. However, this remains at experimental confidence as there are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments and how the system responded.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -27,13 +27,19 @@ This creates a fundamental tradeoff for futarchy adoption: play money enables pe
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- Behavioral pattern: 41% hedged positions in final days to avoid losses
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- Play-money structure: no real capital at risk
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma]] | Added: 2026-03-18*
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Play-money futarchy fails because there's no downside risk - people participate but the predictions are uncalibrated since nobody loses anything for being wrong. This serves as indirect evidence that the skin-in-the-game mechanism matters for manipulation resistance, though it's not direct proof of manipulation resistance in real-money systems.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
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- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
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- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
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- speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md
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- MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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- core/mechanisms/_map
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@ -7,13 +7,17 @@ url: ""
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date: 2026-03-18
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domain: internet-finance
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format: conversation
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status: unprocessed
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status: enrichment
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priority: high
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intake_tier: directed
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rationale: "what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?"
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proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
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tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
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created: 2026-03-18
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-18
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enrichments_applied: ["liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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---
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## Conversation
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@ -35,3 +39,9 @@ Built on: liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation (exper
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**Rationale from contributor:** what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?
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**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
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**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.
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## Key Facts
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- The KB currently tags futarchy manipulation resistance claims at experimental confidence
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- There are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments captured in the KB
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- The theoretical logic for manipulation resistance is sound but empirical validation at scale is thin
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