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Teleo Agents 2026-03-16 14:22:11 +00:00
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@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Dean's List DAO proposal passed with TWAP threshold requiring only 3% MCAP incre
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics. The Dean's List proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex multi-step economic modeling (FDV projections, TWAP calculations, sell pressure estimates) that most token holders would not independently verify. The 5.33% projected FDV increase exceeded the 3% TWAP requirement, suggesting the proposal's passage reflected trust in the model rather than independent market validation of the buyback mechanics.