auto-fix: strip 35 broken wiki links
Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
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@ -42,6 +42,6 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[AI autonomously managing investment capital is regulatory terra incognita because the SEC framework assumes human-controlled registered entities deploy AI as tools]]
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- [[AI autonomously managing investment capital is regulatory terra incognita because the SEC framework assumes human-controlled registered entities deploy AI as tools]]
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
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- domains/ai-alignment/_map
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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- core/mechanisms/_map
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@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha]]
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- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha]]
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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- [[foundations/teleological-economics/_map]]
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- foundations/teleological-economics/_map
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@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- domains/internet-finance/_map
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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- core/mechanisms/_map
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
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MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
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@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Proph3t's other framing reinforces this: he distinguishes "market oversight" fro
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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*Source: 2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type.
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Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type.
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Relevant Notes:
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- [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]] -- the token emission model is the investment-domain version of this incentive alignment
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- [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]] -- the token emission model is the investment-domain version of this incentive alignment
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- the governance framework within which token economics operates
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- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- the governance framework within which token economics operates
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- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
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- the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
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Topics:
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Topics:
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- [[livingip overview]]
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- [[livingip overview]]
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