rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins on MetaDAO: using token economics to create automatic treasury accumulation loops. COAL's design burns tokens at multiple points (smelting at 100 COAL per INGOT, pickaxe licenses at c(y) COAL) while channeling external hard assets (ORE) into the treasury through a single choke point (INGOT smelting at 12.10 ORE per INGOT). The proposal explicitly frames this as a 'simple, mechanical ownership coin loop' that reliably accumulates ORE in the COAL treasury and ties player behavior to COAL/ORE price dynamics. This provides a concrete example of how ownership coins can be structured beyond simple fundraising—creating ongoing economic engines that continuously accumulate treasury value through user participation rather than one-time capital raises. The Meta-PoW design shows how ownership coins can implement self-regulating feedback loops (dynamic license fees responding to price ratios) that maintain system stability without continuous governance intervention.
+The COAL/ORE Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond pure futarchy governance into complex tokenomic mechanism design. The proposal passed through MetaDAO's governance process (proposal #4, completed 2025-11-10) and implements a multi-token economic system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing mechanisms, treasury accumulation logic, and price-responsive supply controls. This shows MetaDAO projects are building sophisticated economic protocols, not just using futarchy for binary decisions. The proposal explicitly positions itself as creating an 'ownership coin loop that reliably accumulates ORE in the COAL treasury' and ties 'behavior to COAL/ORE price dynamics.' The proposal includes 10 detailed sections covering token mechanics, emissions bands, smelting logic, tool crafting, decay functions, dynamic license formulas (c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p), and governance parameters, indicating MetaDAO's governance infrastructure can handle complex mechanism design beyond simple yes/no votes.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md

@@ -32,12 +32,6 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
 - If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
 - Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps
 
-
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW implements a hybrid approach that combines fixed emission schedules with dynamic access controls. The protocol maintains fixed halving-band emissions (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) where k_t advances every 5% of max supply, with R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day initially), but gates access to those emissions through dynamic pickaxe license fees c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p that respond to COAL/ORE price ratios (with baseline c0 = 200, y_ref = 50, p = 3, bounds 1-300 COAL). This creates 'algorithmic meritocracy' not through variable emission rates but through variable participation costs—when COAL strengthens (y decreases), license fees drop and more players can economically access the fixed emissions; when COAL weakens (y increases), license fees rise sharply and only committed players continue mining. The mechanism preserves emission predictability while making participation economically self-regulating. The proposal states: 'Meta-PoW does not change R_t. It defines how R_t is accessed via tools,' showing how fixed emissions can be combined with dynamic access mechanisms to create outcome-responsive systems without changing the underlying emission schedule.
-
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-economies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's c(y) license function automatically scales tool creation costs with token price ratios preventing oversupply during weakness"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dynamic license fees create price-responsive supply throttle in token economies
+
+The Meta-PoW protocol implements a dynamic license fee c(y) that automatically adjusts pickaxe creation costs based on the COAL/ORE price ratio, creating a self-regulating supply mechanism that responds to market conditions without governance intervention.
+
+The license function is defined as:
+- c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p
+- Clamped between c_min and c_max
+- Where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (using EMA-smoothed TWAP)
+
+With suggested defaults:
+- c0 = 200 COAL
+- y_ref = 50
+- p = 3 (cubic scaling)
+- c_min = 1 COAL
+- c_max = 300 COAL
+
+The mechanism creates asymmetric responses to price movements:
+
+**When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases):**
+- License cost c(y) falls
+- More pickaxes become economically viable to craft
+- Increased crafting drives more INGOT smelting
+- More ORE flows into treasury
+- More COAL gets burned through licenses and smelting
+
+**When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases):**
+- License cost c(y) rises (cubic scaling amplifies the effect)
+- Crafting new pickaxes becomes prohibitively expensive
+- System self-throttles without breaking existing tools
+- Reduced new supply prevents further dilution
+
+The proposal states: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, more picks are economically viable, more smelting and more ORE flows into the treasury. When COAL is weak relative to ORE (y high): c(y) increases, crafting slows, the system self-throttles without intervention."
+
+The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates nonlinear sensitivity, meaning small price ratio changes produce large license adjustments. This is intentionally designed as "the main macro throttle" for the system.
+
+Critically, the license is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a pure supply control mechanism rather than a revenue stream. The proposal explicitly notes: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream."
+
+This differs from fixed-cost token economics where supply expansion continues regardless of price conditions, and from governance-adjusted parameters that require human intervention and lag market changes.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttles-that-self-stabilize-without-governance-intervention.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's c(y) function uses cubic price ratio to automatically increase crafting costs when COAL weakens relative to ORE, creating self-regulating supply without governance votes"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttles that self-stabilize without governance intervention
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW implements a dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating an automatic economic throttle that responds to relative token prices without requiring governance votes. With baseline parameters c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, and bounds of 1 ≤ c(y) ≤ 300, the cubic exponent makes the license fee highly sensitive to price ratio changes.
-
-When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license fee drops, making pickaxe crafting economically attractive. This increases mining activity, which drives more INGOT smelting and more ORE flowing into the treasury. When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license fee rises sharply due to the cubic exponent, making new pickaxe crafting prohibitively expensive and naturally throttling supply expansion without breaking existing tool holders.
-
-The mechanism uses an EMA-smoothed TWAP for the price ratio to prevent manipulation through short-term price spikes. The license COAL is burned (not sent to treasury), making it purely a control parameter rather than a revenue stream. The proposal states: "When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online, more INGOT gets smelted, and more ORE flows into the treasury. If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
-
-The cubic exponent (p = 3) is the critical design choice—linear or quadratic functions would respond too slowly to price changes, while higher exponents would create excessive volatility. The 1-300 COAL bounds prevent the function from collapsing to zero or exploding to infinity at price extremes. This creates a self-regulating feedback loop where the system automatically adjusts mining capacity in response to market conditions.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-stabilizes-token-demand.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Making repair costs lower than recrafting costs plus 4 percent daily decay creates rational incentive for continuous maintenance over churn"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Evergreen tool design with repair cheaper than replacement stabilizes token demand
+
+The Meta-PoW protocol implements an "evergreen" tool architecture where daily repair costs are calibrated to be cheaper than recrafting, combined with gradual decay rather than permanent breakage, creating rational economic incentives for continuous tool maintenance that stabilize INGOT demand.
+
+The mechanism has three components:
+
+**1. Gradual decay instead of breakage:**
+- Tools have power p between 0 and 1
+- Skipping repair causes 4% daily decay: p_next = 0.96 * p
+- Tools never permanently break
+- Accumulated repair costs can restore full power at any time
+
+**2. Repair costs calibrated below replacement:**
+- Daily repair for pickaxe: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- Crafting new pickaxe: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
+- Repair is ~8.3% of crafting INGOT cost
+- License fee c(y) adds significant additional cost to recrafting
+
+**3. Continuous demand profile:**
+- Rational players maintain tools rather than replace
+- Each maintained pickaxe creates steady 0.082643 INGOT/day demand
+- This translates to predictable ORE treasury inflow
+- System state becomes number of active maintained tools
+
+The proposal explicitly states: "Repairing is cheaper than constantly recrafting. A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury. Result: Rational players maintain picks. The number of active, fully repaired picks is the key state variable."
+
+The 4% daily decay rate creates meaningful pressure (tools lose ~50% power in 17 days without repair) while avoiding the binary cliff of permanent breakage that would force replacement regardless of economics.
+
+This design stabilizes demand in two ways:
+
+1. **Predictable consumption**: Active player count × repair rate = baseline INGOT demand, which is more stable than boom-bust crafting cycles
+
+2. **Reduced volatility**: Players don't abandon tools during price swings because repair remains economically rational even when new crafting isn't
+
+The proposal notes: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
+
+This contrasts with durability-based systems (tools break permanently, forcing replacement) and zero-maintenance systems (no ongoing costs, no steady demand). The evergreen + repair-cheaper-than-replacement combination creates what the proposal calls "the key state variable" — the count of actively maintained tools.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+The Meta-PoW proposal reveals another adoption friction: mechanism complexity in proposals themselves. The proposal spans 10 detailed sections covering token mechanics, emissions bands, smelting logic, tool crafting, decay functions, dynamic license formulas, and governance parameters. It requires voters to understand: (1) how c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p creates supply throttling, (2) why repair costs of 0.082643 INGOT/day map to ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow, (3) how 4% daily decay rates interact with repair economics, (4) the relationship between TWAP-smoothed price ratios and license fee clamping. The proposal notes 'this proposal allows parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community' — suggesting even after passing futarchy, the mechanism needs expert refinement. This indicates futarchy governance can approve complex mechanisms but may struggle with parameter precision and voter comprehension of nonlinear dynamics.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-bottleneck.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW design forces all tool crafting through INGOT smelting which requires ORE payment creating guaranteed treasury inflow"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting bottleneck
+
+The Meta-PoW protocol establishes a structural mechanism for ORE accumulation by making INGOT the universal input for all tool operations (crafting and repair) while requiring ORE payment exclusively at the smelting stage. This creates a deterministic relationship between player activity and treasury inflow.
+
+The mechanism works through three linked constraints:
+
+1. **Smelting monopoly on ORE payment**: To smelt 1 INGOT requires burning 100 COAL plus paying μ ORE (currently calibrated at ~12.10 ORE) directly to the COAL treasury. This is the only point where ORE enters the system.
+
+2. **INGOT as universal tool input**: Both pickaxes (mining tools) and axes (WOOD production) require INGOT for crafting and daily repair. A fully maintained pickaxe consumes approximately 0.082643 INGOT per day in repair costs.
+
+3. **Evergreen tool design**: Tools decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repair is cheaper than recrafting. This incentivizes continuous maintenance rather than tool churn, creating steady INGOT demand.
+
+The calibration targets approximately 1 ORE per day of treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe. With repair costs of 0.082643 INGOT/day and smelting costs of 12.10 ORE per INGOT, this implies each active pickaxe drives roughly 1 ORE/day into the treasury through the INGOT consumption cycle.
+
+The proposal explicitly states: "Each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately: 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury, 8.26 COAL per day burned via smelting."
+
+This differs from voluntary treasury contribution mechanisms because the ORE payment is structurally required to access COAL emissions. Players cannot mine COAL without pickaxes, cannot craft or maintain pickaxes without INGOT, and cannot produce INGOT without paying ORE to the treasury.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economy-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement to incentivize tool maintenance over churn, creating predictable ORE treasury inflow"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economy where repair cost undercuts replacement creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol creates economic incentives for tool maintenance rather than replacement by making daily repair cheaper than recrafting. Pickaxes decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs only 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD versus the full crafting cost of 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, and a dynamic COAL license fee c(y). This cost structure makes rational players maintain existing tools rather than constantly recraft, creating predictable steady-state demand for INGOT smelting.
-
-The evergreen design solves the churn problem that would otherwise create volatile ORE inflows. Since each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury through INGOT repair demand (at 12.10 ORE per INGOT), the number of active maintained picks becomes the key state variable for treasury accumulation. Players who skip repairs accumulate debt (missed repair costs) but can restore full power by paying the accumulated cost, preventing permanent tool loss while maintaining economic pressure to repair.
-
-This mechanism creates a continuous ORE sink into the COAL treasury that scales with active player count rather than with speculative crafting cycles. The repair-versus-replace economics are the load-bearing structure that makes the "ownership coin" loop function as designed. The proposal explicitly states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-accumulation-making-economic-flows-auditable-and-predictable.md

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Meta-PoW channels all ORE inflows through INGOT smelting only, creating a single auditable point for treasury accumulation rather than distributing fees across multiple operations"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Separating ORE payment to smelting only creates single choke point for treasury accumulation making economic flows auditable and predictable
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol requires ORE payment only at INGOT smelting (μ ORE per INGOT, currently 12.10 ORE), while pickaxe crafting and repair consume INGOT but pay no additional ORE. This architectural choice creates a single point where ORE enters the treasury, making the economic model transparent and auditable. All ORE paid at smelting goes directly to the COAL treasury with no intermediate distribution.
-
-The single-choke-point design means INGOT becomes "on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee," functioning as a treasury receipt. Since pickaxe repair requires 0.082643 INGOT per day to maintain full power, and each INGOT represents 12.10 ORE paid at smelting, the system creates a direct mathematical relationship: one fully maintained pickaxe drives approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury (0.082643 × 12.10 ≈ 1.0).
-
-This contrasts with designs that charge fees at multiple points (craft, repair, mining). By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, the protocol makes treasury accumulation predictable from observable on-chain state (number of active maintained picks) without requiring complex fee accounting across multiple transaction types. The proposal explicitly states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair. INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee."
-
-The design also prevents fee evasion—since INGOT is required for all tool operations and can only be created by paying ORE at smelting, there is no way to participate in the mining economy without contributing to treasury accumulation. The calibration parameter μ can be adjusted by governance to change the ORE/day target per pick, but the single-payment architecture remains constant.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -6,14 +6,12 @@ domain: internet-finance
 status: passed
 parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
 platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "futard.io"
+proposer: "HAymbnVo1w5sC7hz8E6sdmzSuDpqUwKXWzBeshEAb7WC"
 proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_account: "G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_number: 4
 proposal_date: 2025-11-07
 resolution_date: 2025-11-10
 category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model that moves mining power into pickaxes and creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
+summary: "Proposal to implement Meta-PoW economic model that moves mining power into pickaxes and creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
 ---
@@ -21,35 +19,42 @@ created: 2026-03-11
 # COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
 
 ## Summary
-The Meta-PoW proposal establishes COAL's core economic model by creating a loop where players craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD; mine COAL with those pickaxes; and smelt INGOT by burning COAL and paying ORE to the treasury. The design makes tools evergreen (cheaper to repair than replace), concentrates all ORE payments at the smelting choke point, and uses dynamic license fees c(y) based on COAL/ORE price ratios to automatically throttle supply without governance intervention.
+The Meta-PoW proposal establishes a new economic model for COAL that creates a deterministic loop accumulating ORE in the treasury. The system moves mining power from direct token claims into pickaxe tools, makes INGOT (crafted using COAL + ORE) the universal input for all tool operations, and implements dynamic license fees that scale with COAL/ORE price ratios to throttle supply during weakness.
 
 ## Market Data
 - **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** futard.io
+- **Proposer:** HAymbnVo1w5sC7hz8E6sdmzSuDpqUwKXWzBeshEAb7WC
 - **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
 - **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
 - **Created:** 2025-11-07
 - **Completed:** 2025-11-10
+- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
 
 ## Mechanism Design
-The proposal implements three key economic mechanisms:
+The proposal introduces four tokens (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with specific roles:
 
-1. **Evergreen Tools:** Pickaxes decay 4% daily if not repaired but cost only 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD to repair versus 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL to recraft, incentivizing maintenance over churn
+**COAL:** Mineable with 25M max supply and halving-band emissions. Burned for smelting and pickaxe licenses.
 
-2. **Single ORE Choke Point:** All ORE flows into treasury through INGOT smelting (12.10 ORE per INGOT), with no ORE charged at craft or repair, making treasury accumulation auditable and predictable
+**ORE:** External hard asset. Only paid at smelting (μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT). 100% goes to COAL treasury.
 
-3. **Dynamic License Throttle:** Pickaxe crafting requires burning c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p COAL where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating automatic supply adjustment (baseline: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300)
+**INGOT:** Minted only by smelting (burn 100 COAL + pay μ ORE). Universal input for crafting and repairing tools.
 
-Calibration targets ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe.
+**WOOD:** Produced by axes. Used for tool crafting and repair. No direct emissions or ORE role.
+
+**Key mechanisms:**
+1. Dynamic license fee: c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. Defaults: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, clamped [1,300]
+2. Evergreen tools: 4% daily decay if not repaired. Repair cheaper than recrafting.
+3. Calibration: Each fully maintained pickaxe targets ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow via 0.082643 INGOT/day repair costs
 
 ## Significance
-This proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins: using token burn mechanics and external asset accumulation to create self-regulating economic loops. The cubic price-ratio exponent in the license fee and the repair-versus-replace economics are novel mechanism design choices that could inform future futarchy-governed token economies.
+This proposal represents a significant evolution in tokenomic design for mining-based protocols. Rather than direct token emissions, it creates a multi-layer economic system where:
+- Treasury accumulation is deterministic (tied to player activity through INGOT demand)
+- Supply responds automatically to price conditions (via dynamic license fees)
+- Tool maintenance creates steady-state demand (evergreen design with repair < replacement cost)
 
-The proposal also shows MetaDAO's governance evolution—allowing "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community" rather than requiring new proposals for minor calibration changes.
+The mechanism demonstrates how futarchy governance can approve complex economic protocols with multiple interacting parameters. The proposal notes parameters may be "slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," indicating futarchy provides directional approval while expert implementation handles precision.
 
 ## Relationship to KB
-- [[coal]] - core economic model implementation
-- [[ore]] - treasury accumulation asset
-- [[futardio]] - governance platform
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - ownership coin implementation example
+- [[coal]] - parent entity, governance decision
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - platform enabling this governance
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - related mechanism design pattern

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economy-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttles-that-self-stabilize-without-governance-intervention.md", "separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-accumulation-making-economic-flows-auditable-and-predictable.md"]
-enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-creates-deterministic-ore-treasury-accumulation-through-ingot-smelting-bottleneck.md", "dynamic-license-fees-create-price-responsive-supply-throttle-in-token-economies.md", "evergreen-tool-design-with-repair-cheaper-than-replacement-stabilizes-token-demand.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted three mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license throttles, and single-choke-point treasury accumulation. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal. Enriched two existing claims about ownership coins and dynamic token distribution. The proposal contains detailed economic parameters but these are factual specifications rather than arguable claims—preserved as key_facts for reference."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about treasury accumulation, dynamic pricing, and evergreen tool economics. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched 2 existing claims about MetaDAO's scope and futarchy adoption friction. The proposal demonstrates sophisticated multi-token economic design passing through futarchy governance, though with noted complexity requiring expert parameter tuning post-approval."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -275,15 +275,12 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 
 ## Key Facts
 - COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
-- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
+- Halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
 - Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
-- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + 12.10 ORE per INGOT
-- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
-- Daily pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
-- Pickaxe decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
-- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
-- Daily axe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
-- License fee baseline: c0=200 COAL, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300 COAL
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + ~12.10 ORE
+- Pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT/day + 0.3 WOOD
+- Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
+- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped [1, 300]
 - Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
 - DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
 - Autocrat version: 0.3