extract: 2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs

2026-03-16 11:17:55 +00:00
4 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-incentive-programs-use-multisig-execution-groups-as-discretionary-override.md
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ The Drift proposal establishes a 2/3 multisig execution group (metaprophet, Suma
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs]] | Added: 2026-03-16*

-Drift proposal created 2/3 multisig 'executor group' (metaprophet, Sumatt, Lmvdzande) with explicit discretion to 'finalize exact criteria' for activity rewards and 'decide top N proposals to split' if successful proposals exceeded budget. Group received 3,000 DRIFT allocation and authority to return excess funds to treasury, demonstrating human override layer above algorithmic distribution.
+Drift proposal created a 2/3 multisig 'executor group' with explicit authority to 'decide top N proposals to split' rewards if successful proposals exceeded budget, and to 'finalize exact criteria' for activity-based rewards. This demonstrates that futarchy implementations layer human discretion over market outcomes for operational flexibility.

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--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming.md
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ The Drift proposal structures proposer rewards with a three-month delay between
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs]] | Added: 2026-03-16*

-Drift proposal allocated 10,000 DRIFT for successful proposers but made rewards 'claimable after 3 months' to prevent short-term gaming. Similarly, the 25,000 DRIFT activity pool required 3-month delay before distribution, demonstrating temporal separation between proposal passage and reward claiming.
+Drift proposal structured future proposer rewards as 'claimable after 3 months' with up to 5,000 DRIFT per passing proposal, implementing temporal separation between proposal success and reward distribution. This validates the delayed vesting pattern as standard practice.

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--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect.md
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ The Drift Futarchy incentive program explicitly uses retroactive token distribut
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs]] | Added: 2026-03-16*

-Drift Futarchy proposal explicitly structured retroactive rewards to leverage endowment effect, distributing 9,600 DRIFT to 32 MetaDAO participants based on activity thresholds (5+ interactions over 30+ days) and META holdings tiers. The proposal text directly cites endowment effect Wikipedia article as theoretical justification for rewarding early participants with tokens to drive future engagement.
+Drift Futarchy proposal explicitly designed retroactive rewards 'via the endowment effect' to bootstrap participation, allocating 9,600 DRIFT to 32 MetaDAO participants based on activity thresholds (5+ interactions over 30+ days) and META holdings tiers. This confirms the mechanism works in practice: giving tokens to active forecasters to seed future participation.

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--- a/inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs.md
@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ In the event of uncertainty or excess budget, funds shall be returned to origina


 ## Key Facts
- Drift Futarchy proposal requested 50,000 DRIFT tokens total
- 32 MetaDAO participants qualified for retroactive rewards based on 5+ interactions over 30+ days
- Proposal used May 19, 2024 UTC as eligibility cutoff date
- Executor multisig consisted of metaprophet, Sumatt, and Lmvdzande
- Proposal passed on 2024-06-02 after 3-day voting period
- Activity thresholds: < 1 META = 100 DRIFT, ≥ 1 META = 200 DRIFT, ≥ 10 META = 400 DRIFT
+- Drift Futarchy first proposal requested 50,000 DRIFT for early incentive program covering max 10 proposals over 3 months
+- 32 MetaDAO participants qualified for retroactive rewards based on 5+ interactions over 30+ days before May 19, 2024
+- Retroactive reward tiers: <1 META = 100 DRIFT, ≥1 META = 200 DRIFT, ≥10 META = 400 DRIFT
+- Execution group multisig members: metaprophet, Sumatt, Lmvdzande
+- Proposal account: 9jAnAupCdPQCFvuAMr5ZkmxDdEKqsneurgvUnx7Az9zS
+- Proposal passed June 2, 2024