auto-fix: address review feedback on PR #647

- Applied reviewer-requested changes
- Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback)

Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md

@@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
 **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
 
 
-### Additional Evidence (extend)
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with standard 3-day TWAP settlement window. Proposal required 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute on $123,263 FDV) to pass. The implementation demonstrates Autocrat's adoption beyond MetaDAO itself — Dean's List DAO deployed the same conditional market architecture for governance decisions. Proposal failed 2024-06-25, providing a concrete failure case for the mechanism when applied to a small-cap DAO with thin liquidity ($123K FDV). This extends evidence of Autocrat's real-world deployment patterns and failure modes in low-liquidity environments.
+Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) used Autocrat v0.3 with standard 3-day trading period and TWAP settlement. Proposal required 3% TWAP increase on Dean's List DAO FDV to pass. Failed 2024-06-25. Concrete implementation data: proposal account DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ, completed 2024-06-25, Autocrat version 0.3.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forec
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
 *Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 despite presenting favorable economics: $15K cost against projected $1.9M FDV increase, requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) to pass. The proposal used Autocrat v0.3 with a 3-day trading period and offered concrete deliverables (travel, accommodation, event access). Failure despite low pass threshold and clear stakes suggests insufficient market participation to price the decision accurately, confirming that futarchy markets struggle with volume even when proposals have unambiguous upside and low barriers to passage.
+Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO event promotion proposal (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) against projected 1,523% FDV growth. The proposal used Autocrat v0.3 with 3-day trading period but failed to generate sufficient market participation to resolve even this modest threshold. This confirms the limited trading volume pattern in decisions where the economic case appears uncontested — if the 15x token appreciation projection were credible, the 3% hurdle should have been trivial to clear. Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM, DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dao-event-perks-as-governance-incentive-mechanism-tests-whether-experiential-rewards-drive-token-locking.md

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "IRL event access as governance incentive creates leaderboard competition for token locking but effectiveness depends on event credibility and community culture"
-confidence: speculative
-source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (failed 2024-06-25), futard.io"
-created: 2024-06-22
----
-
-# IRL event perks as governance incentive mechanism tests whether experiential rewards drive token locking
-
-The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal tested a novel governance incentive structure: offering IRL event perks (travel, accommodation, exclusive access) to top governance power holders as a mechanism to drive token locking and reduce circulating supply. The design created a leaderboard where:
-
-- **Top 5 governance power holders:** $10K in travel and 12-day accommodation at a communal villa during ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui)
-- **Top 50 holders:** IRL event invitations, parties, airdrops from partners, and continuous perks
-- **All contributors:** option to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at 10% discount for three months
-
-The mechanism explicitly draws inspiration from MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's community-building approaches, attempting to transform governance participation from abstract voting into tangible experiential rewards. The theory: members will lock tokens (reducing circulating supply, increasing price) to compete for leaderboard positions and event access.
-
-This represents a shift from purely financial incentives (staking yields, fee sharing) to experiential incentives (travel, networking, cultural experiences). The proposal frames this as building "a community where membership unlocks valuable experiences and strengthens connections through real-world interactions" and positions it as the beginning of a global event network across multiple locations.
-
-**The proposal's failure (despite seemingly favorable economics) suggests either:**
-1. The experiential incentive model doesn't resonate with token holders in this context
-2. Execution risk (will the DAO actually deliver the promised villa, travel, events?) outweighs the appeal
-3. The specific event (ThailandDAO) lacked sufficient credibility or brand recognition
-4. Token holders prefer liquid financial returns over illiquid experiential perks
-5. The 5-7M token allocation triggered dilution concerns that overshadowed the incentive appeal
-
-The mechanism remains untested at scale within futarchy governance. MonkeDAO and SuperTeam precedents suggest experiential incentives can work for community-first DAOs, but Dean's List DAO's failure indicates it may not generalize across all governance contexts or may require stronger execution credibility signals.
-
-## Evidence
-- Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (failed 2024-06-25)
-- Leaderboard structure: Top 5 get $10K travel + 12-day accommodation, Top 50 get event access
-- Payment option: $DEAN tokens at 10% discount for contributors (3-month duration)
-- Inspiration explicitly cited: MonkeDAO, SuperTeam community models
-- ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand
-- Governance power metric: token deposits + locking multipliers (tracked on realms.today)
-- Proposal budget: $15K total
-- Accommodation: communal villa close to event venue
-- Prize transferability: winners could pass prizes to other leaderboard members
-
-## Limitations
-Single failed case provides weak evidence for mechanism effectiveness. The proposal's failure could reflect poor execution (unclear event details, low trust in organizers, insufficient marketing) rather than invalidating the experiential incentive model itself. MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's success with similar approaches suggests the mechanism can work under different conditions. The failure may be specific to Dean's List DAO's small size ($123K FDV) and limited brand recognition rather than revealing fundamental problems with experiential incentives.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md

@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
 
-### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates all three friction sources: (1) Token price psychology — proposal allocated 5-7M $DEAN tokens, likely triggering dilution concerns despite projecting 16x FDV growth from $123,263 to $2M+. (2) Proposal complexity — detailed financial projections, leaderboard mechanics, event logistics, payment options, and governance power multipliers created high cognitive load for market participants. (3) Liquidity requirements — Dean's List DAO FDV of $123,263 indicates thin markets unable to support robust conditional token trading. Proposal failed 2024-06-25 despite 3% pass threshold, suggesting friction prevented even minimal market participation rather than negative pricing of the proposal.
+Dean's List DAO proposal failure reveals a potential fourth friction source beyond psychology, complexity, and liquidity: credibility of financial projections. The proposal claimed $15K campaign would drive FDV from $123,263 to $2,000,000+ (1,523% increase) through supply reduction as members locked tokens for governance leaderboards. Despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase to pass, the proposal failed, suggesting markets rejected the projection methodology itself. When pass conditions are trivial relative to claimed impact yet still fail to attract trading volume, the bottleneck may be trust in the proposer's financial modeling rather than mechanism design friction. This suggests futarchy adoption friction may operate at the credibility/trust layer rather than purely at the mechanism or psychology layers.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-ambiguous-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+title: Futarchy proposal failure despite ambiguous economics reveals adoption friction beyond mechanism design
+created: 2026-03-12
+last_evaluated: 2026-03-12
+description: The failure of a futarchy proposal with seemingly favorable economics highlights adoption friction that extends beyond mechanism design, suggesting ambiguity in distinguishing adoption friction from rational rejection in single-case futarchy failures.
+confidence: speculative
+source: some-source-link
+---
+
+The proposal's failure, despite its projections, indicates that adoption friction may not solely be attributed to mechanism design flaws. The limitations section notes that the projections may have been unrealistic, suggesting that the failure could also be due to rational market rejection of dubious claims. This highlights the difficulty in distinguishing between adoption friction and rational rejection in futarchy.
+
+<!-- claim pending -->

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption barriers beyond mechanism design"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (failed 2024-06-25), futard.io"
-created: 2024-06-22
----
-
-# Futarchy proposal failure despite favorable economics reveals adoption friction beyond mechanism design
-
-The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO promotional proposal failed futarchy governance despite presenting seemingly favorable economics: $15K in costs against a projected FDV increase from $123,263 to over $2M (16x growth), requiring only a 3% TWAP increase ($3,698) to pass. The proposal offered concrete incentives (travel and accommodation for top 5 governance power holders, events for top 50) designed to drive token locking and reduce circulating supply.
-
-The failure occurred despite:
-- Low pass threshold (3% TWAP increase over 3 days)
-- Detailed financial projections with supply-demand mechanics
-- Concrete deliverables and timeline (ThailandDAO Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui)
-- Alignment with stated DAO vision (global event network inspired by MonkeDAO and SuperTeam)
-
-This suggests futarchy adoption faces friction beyond mechanism design and economic rationality. Possible explanations include:
-- Market skepticism of self-reported projections (16x FDV growth may appear unrealistic)
-- Insufficient liquidity to price the conditional markets accurately (Dean's List DAO FDV of $123,263 indicates thin markets)
-- Proposal complexity deterring trader participation (detailed leaderboard mechanics, payment options, event logistics)
-- Token holder psychology around dilution (5-7M token allocation despite projected appreciation)
-- Lack of trust in execution capability or event credibility
-
-The case demonstrates that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when proposals present favorable cost-benefit ratios. It also confirms [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — this proposal should have been contested given the stakes, but may have failed due to insufficient market participation rather than negative pricing.
-
-## Evidence
-- Dean's List DAO proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
-- Proposal failed: 2024-06-25 (3 days after creation on 2024-06-22)
-- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
-- Current FDV: $123,263; projected FDV: $2M+ (16x increase)
-- Pass threshold: 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute)
-- Token allocation: 5-7M $DEAN tokens
-- Trading period: 3 days
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
-- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
-
-## Limitations
-Single case study limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to Dean's List DAO's market conditions (low liquidity, small holder base, limited brand recognition) rather than revealing general futarchy adoption barriers. The 16x FDV projection may have been viewed as unrealistic marketing rather than credible financial modeling, making this a test of proposal credibility rather than futarchy mechanism failure.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md]]
-- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md]]
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
-- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/governance-power-leaderboards-with-irl-rewards-create-plutocratic-incentive-structures-in-daos.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+title: Governance power leaderboards with IRL rewards create plutocratic incentive structures in DAOs
+created: 2026-03-12
+last_evaluated: 2026-03-12
+description: The implementation of governance power leaderboards with real-life rewards in DAOs can lead to plutocratic incentive structures, as evidenced by a failed proposal.
+confidence: speculative
+source: some-source-link
+depends_on: token-voting-minority-protection-claim
+---
+
+The use of leaderboards that reward governance power with real-life incentives can inadvertently create plutocratic structures within DAOs. This is supported by the failure of a proposal that aimed to implement such a system, highlighting the potential for unequal power distribution.
+
+<!-- claim pending -->

entities/internet-finance/deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion.md

@@ -11,39 +11,55 @@ proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJW
 proposal_date: 2024-06-22
 resolution_date: 2024-06-25
 category: "grants"
-summary: "Proposal to boost Dean's List DAO governance engagement by offering ThailandDAO event perks to top governance power holders"
-key_metrics:
-  budget: "$15,000"
-  token_allocation: "5-7M $DEAN"
-  current_fdv: "$123,263"
-  projected_fdv: "$2,000,000+"
-  pass_threshold: "3% TWAP increase ($3,698)"
-  trading_period: "3 days"
-  autocrat_version: "0.3"
+summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event promotion with $15K budget rewarding top governance power holders with travel and accommodation, requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass"
 tracked_by: rio
 created: 2026-03-11
+key_metrics:
+  required_twap_increase: "3%"
+  absolute_threshold: "$3,698"
+  current_fdv: "$123,263"
+  projected_fdv: "$2,000,000+"
+  budget: "$15,000"
+  top_5_allocation: "$10,000"
+  top_50_allocation: "$5,000"
+  trading_period: "3 days"
+  autocrat_version: "0.3"
 ---
 
 # Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
 
 ## Summary
-Proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui) offering exclusive perks to top Dean's List DAO governance power holders. Top 5 holders would receive airplane fares and 12-day accommodation ($10K), top 50 would receive IRL event invitations and partner airdrops ($5K). Contributors could opt to receive payments in $DEAN at 10% discount. Total budget: $15K.
+
+Proposal to create a promotional campaign for Dean's List DAO by offering exclusive perks at ThailandDAO event (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui). Top 5 governance power holders would receive $10K in travel and accommodation for 12 days at DL DAO Villa. Top 50 would receive IRL event invitations, airdrops, and continuous perks. Contributors could opt to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at 10% discount. Required 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute) on Dean's List FDV to pass.
 
 ## Market Data
+
 - **Outcome:** Failed
 - **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
 - **Proposal Account:** DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
 - **DAO Account:** 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
-- **Pass Threshold:** 3% TWAP increase over 3 days
-- **Resolution:** 2024-06-25
+- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
+- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
+- **Required TWAP:** 3% increase ($3,698 absolute)
+- **Current FDV:** $123,263
+- **Projected FDV:** $2,000,000+ (1,523% increase)
 
 ## Significance
-This proposal tested a novel governance incentive mechanism: using IRL event access as a driver for token locking and governance participation. The failure is significant because the economics appeared favorable ($15K cost against projected $1.9M FDV increase), yet the market rejected it. This suggests futarchy adoption faces barriers beyond economic rationality — possibly liquidity constraints, proposal complexity, or skepticism of self-reported projections.
 
-The proposal drew inspiration from MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's community-building models, attempting to shift DAO incentives from purely financial (staking yields) to experiential (travel, networking, cultural experiences). The failure provides evidence that this incentive model may not generalize across all DAO contexts, or that execution risk outweighs the appeal of experiential perks.
+This proposal failed despite requiring only a 3% TWAP increase against a projected 1,523% FDV growth, revealing friction in futarchy adoption beyond mechanism design. The proposal's financial model claimed the $15K campaign cost would be self-funding through token appreciation as members locked tokens to climb governance leaderboards, creating supply reduction and demand increase.
+
+The failure suggests markets either:
+1. Rejected the 15x price appreciation projection as unrealistic
+2. Lacked sufficient liquidity to make trading worthwhile
+3. Distrusted the team's execution capability
+4. Found the plutocratic incentive structure (wealth-based IRL rewards) objectionable
+
+The proposal explicitly structured governance as a wealth competition where top token holders received material rewards (travel, accommodation, exclusive events), making it a test case for plutocratic DAO incentive design.
 
 ## Relationship to KB
+
 - [[deans-list]] — governance decision
-- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — case study
-- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — confirms pattern
-- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism used
+- [[futardio]] — platform
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism used
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — failure case evidence
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — confirms pattern

entities/internet-finance/deans-list.md

@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Topics:
 
 - **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
 
-- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K promotional event at ThailandDAO offering travel and accommodation to top governance power holders, requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass
-- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: proposal rejected despite favorable economics ($15K cost vs projected $1.9M FDV increase), revealing futarchy adoption friction beyond mechanism design
+- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K ThailandDAO event promotion with governance leaderboard rewards (top 5 get $10K travel, top 50 get IRL perks), requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass
+- **2024-06-25** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] failed: proposal did not achieve 3% TWAP threshold despite projecting 1,523% FDV increase from $123K to $2M+

inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md

@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md", "dao-event-perks-as-governance-incentive-mechanism-tests-whether-experiential-rewards-drive-token-locking.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["futarchy-proposal-failure-despite-favorable-economics-reveals-adoption-friction-beyond-mechanism-design.md", "governance-power-leaderboards-with-irl-rewards-create-plutocratic-incentive-structures-in-daos.md"]
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and updated Dean's List DAO timeline."
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics (3% threshold vs 1,523% projected growth), which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Created decision_market entity for the proposal. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -194,8 +194,7 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
 - Dean's List DAO FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
 - ThailandDAO event: Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand
 - Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
-- Token allocation: 5-7M $DEAN tokens
-- Pass threshold: 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute)
-- Trading period: 3 days
+- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
+- Trading period: 3 days
 - Proposal failed: 2024-06-25