extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model

Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liqui
 
 Coal's v0.6 migration sets minimum liquidity requirements of 1500 USDC and 2000 coal for proposals, with OTC buyer lined up to purchase dev fund tokens and seed the futarchy AMM. This shows the liquidity bootstrapping pattern extends beyond initial launch to governance upgrades, where projects must arrange capital to meet minimum depth requirements before migration.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The proposal describes the bootstrapping mechanism: 'These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets. With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.'
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This cost differential becomes material at scale: a DAO running 50 proposals ann
 - AMM state requirements described as "almost nothing"
 - State rent recovery requires autocrat program migration (feedback section)
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG quantifies the cost reduction: CLOB market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent per proposal (135-225 SOL annually at 3-5 proposals/month), while AMMs cost 'almost nothing' in state rent. At January 2024 SOL prices ($85), this represents $11,475-$19,125 annual savings.
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume
 - Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses
 - CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The proposal identifies that 'estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' This is cited as 'the main reason for switching to AMMs.'
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md

@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
 
 Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed economic modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement, yet required extensive documentation (detailed price impact analysis, FDV projections, worked examples) to achieve passage. The proposal's complexity—explaining tax distribution, purchase mechanics, sell pressure calculations, and multi-step price impact scenarios—suggests that even economically favorable proposals face adoption friction from comprehension barriers.
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
 - May reduce legitimate trading volume
 - LP attraction depends on base trading activity
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+MetaDAO's AMM proposal sets fees at 3-5% explicitly to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The mechanism works because high fees make price manipulation through wash trading expensive while creating strong incentives for liquidity provision.
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by de
 - No empirical data on manipulation resistance
 - High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement.
+
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 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md

@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
 
 The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+
+The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback mechanics with specific parameters: 20% DAO tax retained in USDC for treasury stability, 80% of revenue used to purchase governance tokens, with 80% of distributed tokens expected to be sold by recipients. The model projects net positive price action because buys exceed sells by 20% per cycle, creating 'higher lows' through systematic buy pressure that outweighs predictable sell pressure from token recipients liquidating for operational expenses.
+
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 Relevant Notes:

inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P
 date: 2024-01-24
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-clob-by-eliminating-orderbook-storage-requirements.md", "futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md", "liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -128,3 +132,14 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re
 - Autocrat version: 0.1
 - Completed: 2024-01-29
 - Ended: 2024-01-29
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO Proposal #4 (CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG) passed on 2024-01-24
+- Proposal completed on 2024-01-29
+- Budget: 400 META on passing + 800 META on completion
+- CLOB minimum order size was 1 META as spam filter
+- AMM implementation timeline: 3 weeks development + 1 week review
+- Proposer: XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ
+- DAO account: 7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy
+- Autocrat version: 0.1

inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
 date: 2024-07-18
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: enrichment
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-16
+enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -146,3 +150,12 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2024-07-22
 - Ended: 2024-07-22
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- The Dean's List DAO had FDV of $337,074 and daily trading volume of $500 at proposal time
+- The Dean's List DAO charges 2,500 USDC per dApp review
+- Proposal modeled scenario of 6 dApp reviews per month generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
+- Proposal projected 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement for passage
+- Proposal assumed 80% of distributed $DEAN tokens would be sold by recipients
+- Circulating supply was 100,000,000 $DEAN tokens at $0.00337 price