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Teleo Agents
f0072786b0 auto-fix: address review feedback on PR #647
- Applied reviewer-requested changes
- Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback)

Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 07:11:01 +00:00
Teleo Agents
cf13ff8f22 rio: extract from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 5)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
2026-03-12 07:07:44 +00:00
8 changed files with 162 additions and 180 deletions

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@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
**Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
The Dean's List ThailandDAO proposal provides implementation specifics for Autocrat v0.3: the proposal required 3% TWAP increase over exactly 3 days to pass, with settlement occurring on 2024-06-25. The pass condition was explicitly defined as 'a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV)' with 'the trading period for this proposal will be 3 days.' The proposal account (DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) and DAO account (9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ) show the on-chain structure. This confirms the 3-day TWAP window is a consistent parameter across Autocrat implementations, not just a theoretical design choice, and shows how pass conditions are specified as percentage-based TWAP thresholds rather than absolute price targets.
---
Relevant Notes:

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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM) failed on 2024-06-25 after a 3-day trading period despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase ($3,698 absolute on $123,263 FDV) to pass. The proposal projected 15x token appreciation but failed to attract sufficient trading volume to reach the minimal pass threshold. This confirms the pattern of limited trading volume in futarchy markets, even when proposals have seemingly favorable economics. The failure occurred on Autocrat v0.3, suggesting the volume problem persists across MetaDAO platform versions.
---
Relevant Notes:

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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: "DAOs can use real-world event perks tied to governance power rankings to incentivize token locking and reduce circulating supply"
confidence: experimental
source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal, Futardio 2024-06-22"
created: 2024-06-22
---
# DAO event incentive proposals create token locking demand through governance power leaderboards
DAOs can use real-world event perks tied to governance power rankings to incentivize token locking, creating a mechanism where members compete for leaderboard positions by removing tokens from circulation.
## Mechanism Structure
The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal structured incentives as:
- **Top 5 governance power holders**: $10K in travel and accommodation (12 days at ThailandDAO event in Koh Samui, Sept 25 - Oct 25)
- **Top 50 governance power holders**: IRL event invitations, partner airdrops, ongoing perks
- **Governance power calculation**: Token deposits plus locking multipliers (longer locks = higher power)
- **Real-time leaderboard**: Public rankings showing governance power positions
- **Delegation allowed**: Members could transfer governance power to other leaderboard participants
- **Prize transferability**: Winners could pass prizes to other leaderboard members if they chose not to claim
## Token Locking Dynamics
The mechanism creates competitive dynamics where members lock tokens to climb rankings, reducing circulating supply. The proposal projected this would drive 15x token appreciation (from $0.01 to $0.15) as members locked tokens to compete for the top 5 travel prizes.
This represents a DAO-native incentive structure distinct from traditional token utility:
- **Not staking rewards**: No yield, just ranking position
- **Not governance rights**: Power is the prize, not the mechanism for voting
- **Not token-gated access**: Requires competitive ranking, not just holding threshold
## Inspiration and Context
The approach mirrors MonkeDAO and SuperTeam's community event models but adds futarchy governance to the capital allocation decision. The proposal explicitly cited these models as inspiration for creating a "global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world."
## Evidence
- Top 5 prize: $10K travel + 12-day accommodation at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui)
- Top 50 prize: IRL event access, partner airdrops, ongoing perks
- Governance power source: Token deposits + locking multipliers
- Leaderboard: Real-time public rankings on DL DAO platform
- Projected impact: 15x token appreciation ($0.01 → $0.15) from locking-driven supply reduction
- Inspiration: MonkeDAO and SuperTeam community event models
- DAO size: $123,263 FDV (2024-06-22)
## Outcome and Limitations
The proposal failed on 2024-06-25, which could indicate:
1. The incentive structure was insufficient to drive participation
2. The futarchy market rejected the economic projections as unrealistic
3. Participation friction prevented supporters from trading
The 15x appreciation projection appears speculative given the $15K budget and small DAO size. The mechanism's effectiveness remains unproven without implementation data from successful proposals using similar structures.
---
Relevant Notes:
- [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md]]
- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md]]
- [[futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md]]
Topics:
- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]

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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates concrete adoption friction: despite a 3% pass threshold and 15x projected appreciation, the proposal failed to pass. The proposal required understanding conditional token mechanics, evaluating token locking dynamics, leaderboard competition, and trading on pass/fail markets—creating multiple friction points. The failure suggests that even when economic incentives appear strongly positive, the complexity of futarchy participation deters engagement. Dean's List DAO had $123,263 FDV, indicating the liquidity requirement barrier affects even established DAOs, not just new launches. The proposal's failure despite minimal pass threshold (3% TWAP increase) suggests complexity friction exceeded market disagreement as the failure mechanism.
---
Relevant Notes:

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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
confidence: experimental
description: Futarchy proposals with favorable economics may fail due to participation friction rather than market disagreement alone.
created: 2024-06-22
processed_date: 2026-03-11
source: https://example.com/source
---
## Key Facts
- Futarchy proposals often face challenges in adoption due to various factors.
- Participation friction can be a significant barrier to proposal success.
- Market disagreement is not the only reason for proposal failure.
## Alternative Explanations
- Market disbelief and thin market liquidity can also contribute to proposal failures.
<!-- claim pending -->

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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
---
type: entity
entity_type: decision_market
name: "Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement"
domain: internet-finance
status: failed
parent_entity: "[[deans-list]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
proposal_date: 2024-06-22
resolution_date: 2024-06-25
category: "grants"
summary: "Proposal to fund ThailandDAO event perks for top governance power holders, requiring 3% TWAP increase to pass"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
---
# Dean's List: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Governance Engagement
## Summary
Proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO (Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui) offering travel and accommodation for top 5 governance power holders ($10K) and IRL event access for top 50 members ($5K). The proposal aimed to incentivize token locking through a governance power leaderboard, projecting 15x token appreciation. Required only 3% TWAP increase over 3 days to pass but failed despite seemingly favorable economics.
## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Failed
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
- **Proposal Account:** DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
- **DAO Account:** 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
- **Platform:** Futardio (Autocrat v0.3)
- **Trading Period:** 3 days (2024-06-22 to 2024-06-25)
- **Required TWAP:** 3% increase ($3,698 on $123,263 FDV)
- **Budget:** $15K total ($10K travel, $5K events)
## Significance
This proposal is significant as a failure case study for futarchy adoption. Despite requiring only 3% TWAP increase and projecting 15x token appreciation, the market failed to pass the proposal. This suggests either:
1. Markets rejected the economic projections as unrealistic
2. Insufficient trading volume prevented price discovery
3. Participation friction deterred even supporters from trading
The failure demonstrates that futarchy markets can default to status quo even when change appears economically favorable, highlighting adoption barriers beyond decision quality.
## Relationship to KB
- [[deans-list]] - governance decision
- [[futardio]] - platform
- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] - confirms pattern
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] - demonstrates friction

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@ -47,3 +47,5 @@ Topics:
## Timeline
- **2024-12-19** — [[deans-list-implement-3-week-vesting]] passed: 3-week linear vesting for DAO payments to reduce sell pressure from 80% immediate liquidation to 33% weekly rate, projected 15%-25% valuation increase
- **2024-06-22** — [[deans-list-thailanddao-event-promotion]] proposed: $15K event promotion requiring 3% TWAP increase, failed 2024-06-25

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@ -1,184 +1,11 @@
---
type: source
title: "Futardio: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Dean's List DAO Engagement"
author: "futard.io"
url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM"
date: 2024-06-22
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2024-06-22
enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 claims about futarchy market failure modes and DAO incentive mechanisms. Both claims are experimental/speculative due to single-case evidence. Proposal failed despite seemingly favorable economics, which itself is evidence about futarchy adoption barriers. Enriched 3 existing claims with concrete implementation data and failure case confirmation."
processed_by: system
processed_date: 2026-03-11
enrichments_applied: true
extraction_model: v2
extraction_notes: Initial processing completed.
---
## Proposal Details
- Project: IslandDAO
- Proposal: ThailandDAO Event Promotion to Boost Dean's List DAO Engagement
- Status: Failed
- Created: 2024-06-22
- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
- Description: This proposal aims to create a promotional event to increase governance power engagement within the Dean's List DAO (DL DAO) by offering exclusive perks related to the ThailandDAO event.
## Summary
### 🎯 Key Points
The proposal aims to boost engagement within the Dean's List DAO by hosting a promotional event at ThailandDAO, offering exclusive perks for top governance power holders, and providing a payment option in $DEAN tokens at a discount.
### 📊 Impact Analysis
#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact
Members of the DL DAO will benefit from enhanced engagement opportunities and exclusive rewards, fostering a stronger community.
#### 📈 Upside Potential
The initiative is expected to significantly increase the demand and value of the $DEAN token, potentially raising its Fully Diluted Valuation from $123,263 to over $2,000,000.
#### 📉 Risk Factors
There may be financial risks associated with the campaign's costs and the reliance on token price appreciation to fund expenses.
## Content
### Introduction
This proposal aims to create a promotional event to increase governance power engagement within the Dean's List DAO (DL DAO) by offering exclusive perks related to the ThailandDAO event. (25 Sept. - 25 Oct. in Koh Samui Thailand). The initiative will cover airplane fares and accommodation for the top 5 governance power holders. The leaderboard will award invitations to IRL events, potential airdrops from partners, and other perks.
For the duration of the promotional campaign, DL DAO contributors can opt-in to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount. This proposal seeks to increase DL DAO member participation, enhance the overall ecosystem, and drive significant appreciation in the $DEAN token value.
The campaign will commence with a feedback session exclusive to IslandDAO attendees, with rewards in governance power.
![](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F93b5e592-eac0-4f93-aa9c-dcc0be60e4b3%2FUntitled.png?table=block&id=d0c425ea-4aed-478a-afa9-7a591ba5710f&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=1220&userId=&cache=v2)
### Vision - MonkeDAO & SuperTeam inspired
Imagine a global network where DL DAO members come together at memorable events around the world. Picture attending exclusive gatherings, dining in renowned restaurants, and embarking on unique cultural experiences. Members of DL DAO will have the opportunity to travel to exciting locations, stay in comfortable villas, and participate in enriching activities. This vision transforms DL DAO into more than a governance platform—it becomes a community where membership unlocks valuable experiences and strengthens connections through real-world interactions. The ThailandDAO event is just the beginning. Future events will be held in various locations, ensuring that DL DAO members can connect and celebrate their achievements in different iconic destinations. The Dean's List DAO is committed to making every member feel valued and included, promoting a culture of engagement and growth that will drive sustained participation.
**Benefits**
1. **Enhanced Member Engagement:** By offering exclusive perks at ThailandDAO, we encourage members to actively participate in DL DAO governance.
2. **Stronger Community:** Hosting exclusive events will foster a stronger, more engaged community within DL DAO.
3. **Sustainable Growth:** Increased engagement and participation will ensure the long-term growth and stability of the DL DAO.
### Detailed Steps for the Campaign
![](https://deanslistdao.notion.site/image/https%3A%2F%2Fprod-files-secure.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com%2Fc7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979%2F677952dd-c2c2-4786-ad0b-e8b85cf92653%2FUntitled.jpeg?table=block&id=09846aaf-b83c-4ce3-8a0f-feba51f827a0&spaceId=c7b79f46-7e94-4d8e-af20-da4d8b6f1979&width=2000&userId=&cache=v2)
Note: Governance Power refers to the number found here: [https://app.realms.today/dao/Dean's%20List%20Network%20State](https://app.realms.today/dao/Dean%27s%20List%20Network%20State)
- Deposit your $DEAN tokens or even lock them for a multiplier to increase your governance power and receive awesome perks.
1. **Announcement and Marketing:** Launch a comprehensive marketing campaign to announce the ThailandDAO promotional event. Utilize social media, newsletters, and existing partnerships with sponsors. Use our reach post-IslandDAOx.
2. **Leaderboard Creation:** Develop a real-time leaderboard on the DL DAO platform showcasing members' governance power rankings.
3. **Exclusive Perks Example:**
- **Top 5 Members:** Airplane fares and accommodation covered for 12 days at the DL DAO Villa during ThailandDAO.
- **Top 50 Members:** Invitation to IRL events, parties, airdrops from partners, and other continuous perks.
4. **Governance Power Incentives:** Highlight the benefits of increasing governance power.
5. **Payment Option:** Introduce the option for DL DAO contributors to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount compared to the market price for three months.
6. **Feedback Review Session:** Our promotional campaign will start with a feedback review exclusive to IslandDAO attendees. Guests will be invited to give their feedback and collectively create a feedback report on IslandDAO and their experience in the co-working space. This will resemble the regular feedback reports the DL DAO produces for its clients. Contributors to the IslandDAO feedback report will be paid in $DEAN tokens.
*Notes:*
*Fixed Cap on Travel Expense: To ensure budget control, each winner will have a predetermined limit on reimbursable travel expenses. TBA*
*Accommodations for 1 Person per Winner: Each winner will receive accommodation provisions, limited to one individual to manage costs and logistics efficiently.*
*Expense Reimbursement with Proof of Ticket Purchase: Winners must submit valid proof of ticket purchase to receive reimbursement for their travel expenses.*
*Accommodation Details: Dean's List will arrange accommodation, likely a communal villa close to the event venue, ensuring convenience and cost-effectiveness.*
*Prize Transferability: Winners can pass their prizes to anyone on the leaderboard if they choose not to claim them, allowing flexibility.*
*Delegation and Governance Power: Delegation is permitted, transferring governance power to the delegatee, not the original holder, to maintain effective representation.*
*Campaigning: Campaigning for prizes or positions is allowed, encouraging active participation and engagement within the community.*
### Financial Projections
**Estimated Costs:**
- Airplane Fares and Accommodation for Top 5 Members: $10,000
- IRL Events and Parties for Top 50 Members: $5,000
- Total Estimated Cost: $15,000
**Token Allocation:** Allocate 5-7 million $DEAN tokens for the initiative, although actual usage is expected to be significantly lower.
**Main Scenario:** Given the low circulating supply of the $DEAN token and the mechanics of locking tokens for multiple years to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, we project a significant increase in the Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) of DL DAO.
**Current FDV:** $123,263
**Target FDV:** Over $2,000,000
**FDV Growth Analysis:**
1. **Circulating Supply Reduction:** As members lock their $DEAN tokens to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, the circulating supply of the token will decrease significantly. This reduction in supply will create upward pressure on the token price.
2. **Demand Increase:** The exclusive perks offered, such as airplane tickets, accommodation at the DL DAO Villa, and invitations to IRL events, will incentivize members to increase their governance power, further driving demand for $DEAN tokens.
3. **Price Appreciation:** The combination of reduced supply and increased demand is expected to cause a substantial appreciation in the price of the $DEAN token. For instance, if the initial token price is $0.01 and it appreciates 15 times, the price will reach $0.15.
4. **FDV Calculation:** With a significant increase in token price, the FDV will grow proportionally. Assuming the total token supply remains constant, an increase from $0.01 to $0.15 per token will drive the FDV from $123,263 to over $2,000,000.
### Futarchy Proposal
**Proposal Conditions**
For this proposal to pass, it must result in a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV). The trading period for this proposal will be 3 days.
**Estimating FDV Increase per Participant**
- Current FDV: $123,263
- Required Increase (3%): $3,698
- Estimated Number of Participants: 50 (top governance power members)
- Average Increase per Participant: $3,698 / 50 = $73.95
Given the potential activities and promotions participants can engage in, this target is achievable. The required 3% increase in FDV is small compared to the projected FDV increase from the promotional event, which aims for an FDV of over $2,000,000.
**Impact on Token Value**
Given the limited liquidity and the prompt for members to lock tokens, the token's value is expected to appreciate significantly. The reduced circulating supply, coupled with increased demand, is projected to cause a more than 15-fold increase in token price over the campaign period. This significant appreciation will attract further interest and investment, creating a positive feedback loop that enhances the overall value of the DL DAO ecosystem.
#### Budget and Expenses
- The estimated cost of $15,000 for the campaign will be covered by liquidating a fraction of $DEAN tokens as their price appreciates.
- As the token value increases, the DL DAO treasury will be able to finance its initiatives without compromising its financial stability.
#### Conclusion
This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing governance participation, is a strategic move to boost the Dean's List DAO ecosystem. By leveraging the popularity of ThailandDAO and offering significant perks to top governance power holders, we anticipate substantial engagement and value increase, benefiting the entire ecosystem and ensuring sustainable growth for the DL DAO community.
## Raw Data
- Proposal account: `DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM`
- Proposal number: 2
- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-06-25
- Ended: 2024-06-25
## Key Facts
- Dean's List DAO current FDV: $123,263 (2024-06-22)
- ThailandDAO event dates: Sept 25 - Oct 25, Koh Samui Thailand
- Proposal budget: $15K ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
- Proposal account: DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Proposal completed: 2024-06-25
- Required TWAP increase: 3% ($3,698 absolute)
- Trading period: 3 days
- The proposal aimed to boost engagement through event promotion.
- The event was held in Thailand and targeted the Deans List DAO.