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domains/ai-alignment/AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem.md

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ Dario Amodei describes AI as "so powerful, such a glittering prize, that it is v
 
 Since [[the internet enabled global communication but not global cognition]], the coordination infrastructure needed doesn't exist yet. This is why [[collective superintelligence is the alternative to monolithic AI controlled by a few]] -- it solves alignment through architecture rather than attempting governance from outside the system.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-11-00-ruiz-serra-factorised-active-inference-multi-agent]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Ruiz-Serra et al. (2024) provide formal evidence for the coordination framing through multi-agent active inference: even when individual agents successfully minimize their own expected free energy using factorised generative models with Theory of Mind beliefs about others, the ensemble-level expected free energy 'is not necessarily minimised at the aggregate level.' This demonstrates that alignment cannot be solved at the individual agent level—the interaction structure and coordination mechanisms determine whether individual optimization produces collective intelligence or collective failure. The finding validates that alignment is fundamentally about designing interaction structures that bridge individual and collective optimization, not about perfecting individual agent objectives.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/ai-alignment/factorised-generative-models-enable-decentralized-multi-agent-representation-through-individual-level-beliefs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: ai-alignment
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Each agent maintains explicit beliefs about other agents' internal states enabling strategic planning without centralized coordination"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Ruiz-Serra et al., 'Factorised Active Inference for Strategic Multi-Agent Interactions' (AAMAS 2025)"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Factorised generative models enable decentralized multi-agent representation through individual-level beliefs about other agents' internal states
+
+In multi-agent active inference systems, factorisation of the generative model allows each agent to maintain "explicit, individual-level beliefs about the internal states of other agents." This approach enables decentralized representation of the multi-agent system—no agent requires global knowledge or centralized coordination to engage in strategic planning.
+
+Each agent uses its beliefs about other agents' internal states for "strategic planning in a joint context," operationalizing Theory of Mind within the active inference framework. This is distinct from approaches that require shared world models or centralized orchestration.
+
+The factorised approach scales to complex strategic interactions: Ruiz-Serra et al. demonstrate the framework in iterated normal-form games with 2 and 3 players, showing how agents navigate both cooperative and non-cooperative strategic contexts using only their individual beliefs about others.
+
+## Evidence
+
+Ruiz-Serra et al. (2024) introduce factorised generative models for multi-agent active inference, where "each agent maintains explicit, individual-level beliefs about the internal states of other agents" through factorisation of the generative model. This enables "strategic planning in a joint context" without requiring centralized coordination or shared representations.
+
+The paper applies this framework to game-theoretic settings (iterated normal-form games with 2-3 players), demonstrating that agents can engage in strategic interaction using only their individual beliefs about others' internal states.
+
+## Architectural Implications
+
+This approach provides a formal foundation for decentralized multi-agent architectures:
+
+1. **No centralized world model required**: Each agent maintains its own beliefs about others, eliminating single points of failure and scaling bottlenecks.
+
+2. **Theory of Mind as computational mechanism**: Strategic planning emerges from individual beliefs about others' internal states, not from explicit communication protocols or shared representations.
+
+3. **Scalable strategic interaction**: The factorised approach extends to N-agent systems without requiring exponential growth in representational complexity.
+
+However, as demonstrated in [[individual-free-energy-minimization-does-not-guarantee-collective-optimization-in-multi-agent-active-inference]], decentralized representation does not automatically produce collective optimization—explicit coordination mechanisms remain necessary.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[individual-free-energy-minimization-does-not-guarantee-collective-optimization-in-multi-agent-active-inference]]
+- [[subagent hierarchies outperform peer multi-agent architectures in practice because deployed systems consistently converge on one primary agent controlling specialized helpers]]
+- [[AI agent orchestration that routes data and tools between specialized models outperforms both single-model and human-coached approaches because the orchestrator contributes coordination not direction]]

domains/ai-alignment/individual-free-energy-minimization-does-not-guarantee-collective-optimization-in-multi-agent-active-inference.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: ai-alignment
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+description: "Ensemble-level expected free energy characterizes basins of attraction that may not align with individual agent optima, revealing a fundamental tension between individual and collective optimization"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Ruiz-Serra et al., 'Factorised Active Inference for Strategic Multi-Agent Interactions' (AAMAS 2025)"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Individual free energy minimization does not guarantee collective optimization in multi-agent active inference systems
+
+When multiple active inference agents interact strategically, each agent minimizes its own expected free energy (EFE) based on beliefs about other agents' internal states. However, the ensemble-level expected free energy—which characterizes basins of attraction in games with multiple Nash Equilibria—is not necessarily minimized at the aggregate level.
+
+This finding reveals a fundamental tension between individual and collective optimization in multi-agent active inference systems. Even when each agent successfully minimizes its individual free energy through strategic planning that incorporates Theory of Mind beliefs about others, the collective outcome may be suboptimal from a system-wide perspective.
+
+## Evidence
+
+Ruiz-Serra et al. (2024) applied factorised active inference to strategic multi-agent interactions in game-theoretic settings. Their key finding: "the ensemble-level expected free energy characterizes basins of attraction of games with multiple Nash Equilibria under different conditions" but "it is not necessarily minimised at the aggregate level."
+
+The paper demonstrates this through iterated normal-form games with 2 and 3 players, showing how the specific interaction structure (game type, communication channels) determines whether individual optimization produces collective intelligence or collective failure. The factorised generative model approach—where each agent maintains explicit individual-level beliefs about other agents' internal states—enables decentralized representation but does not automatically align individual and collective objectives.
+
+## Implications
+
+This result has direct architectural implications for multi-agent AI systems:
+
+1. **Explicit coordination mechanisms are necessary**: Simply giving each agent active inference dynamics and assuming collective optimization will emerge is insufficient. The gap between individual and collective optimization must be bridged through deliberate design.
+
+2. **Interaction structure matters**: The specific form of agent interaction—not just individual agent capability—determines whether collective intelligence emerges or whether individually optimal agents produce suboptimal collective outcomes.
+
+3. **Evaluator roles are formally justified**: In systems like the Teleo architecture, Leo's cross-domain synthesis role exists precisely because individual agent optimization doesn't guarantee collective optimization. The evaluator function bridges individual and collective free energy.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]
+- [[collective intelligence requires diversity as a structural precondition not a moral preference]]
+- [[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]]
+- [[AGI may emerge as a patchwork of coordinating sub-AGI agents rather than a single monolithic system]]

domains/ai-alignment/subagent hierarchies outperform peer multi-agent architectures in practice because deployed systems consistently converge on one primary agent controlling specialized helpers.md

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ This observation creates tension with [[multi-model collaboration solved problem
 
 For the collective superintelligence thesis, this is important. If subagent hierarchies consistently outperform peer architectures, then [[collective superintelligence is the alternative to monolithic AI controlled by a few]] needs to specify what "collective" means architecturally — not flat peer networks, but nested hierarchies with human principals at the top.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2024-11-00-ruiz-serra-factorised-active-inference-multi-agent]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Ruiz-Serra et al.'s factorised active inference framework demonstrates successful peer multi-agent coordination without hierarchical control. Each agent maintains individual-level beliefs about others' internal states and performs strategic planning in a joint context through decentralized representation. The framework successfully handles iterated normal-form games with 2-3 players without requiring a primary controller. However, the finding that ensemble-level expected free energy is not necessarily minimized at the aggregate level suggests that while peer architectures can function, they may require explicit coordination mechanisms (effectively reintroducing hierarchy) to achieve collective optimization. This partially challenges the claim while explaining why hierarchies emerge in practice.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
@@ -30,4 +36,4 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[collective superintelligence is the alternative to monolithic AI controlled by a few]] — needs architectural specification: hierarchy, not flat networks
 
 Topics:
-- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]]
+- domains/ai-alignment/_map

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 *Source: [[2024-06-05-futardio-proposal-fund-futuredaos-token-migrator]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
 FutureDAO's token migrator extends the unruggable ICO concept to community takeovers of existing projects. The tool uses a 60% presale threshold as the success condition: if presale reaches 60% of target, migration proceeds with new LP creation; if not, all SOL is refunded and new tokens are burned. This applies the conditional market logic to post-launch rescues rather than just initial launches. The proposal describes the tool as addressing 'Rugged Projects: Preserve community and restore value in projects affected by rug pulls' and 'Hostile Takeovers: Enabling projects to acquire other projects and empowering communities to assert control over failed project teams.' The mechanism creates on-chain enforcement of community coordination thresholds for takeover scenarios, extending MetaDAO's unruggable ICO pattern to the secondary market for abandoned projects.
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock launched via MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad on 2026-03-05, demonstrating continued platform usage for ownership fund launches. The launch targeted $500K but only raised $100 and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours. BlockRock's charter explicitly credits MetaDAO's infrastructure: 'MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad lets anyone launch an ownership coin whose value is tied to a futarchy-governed treasury. This infrastructure is battle-tested and now publicly available.' The failed launch demonstrates both the platform's accessibility (permissionless launch succeeded technically) and its enforcement mechanisms (automatic refund when threshold not met).
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "AI agents submit proposals to futarchy markets but never execute creating permissionless idea flow"
+confidence: speculative
+source: "BlockRock Charter, 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# BlockRock proposes AI agents as continuous proposal generators to scale governance throughput without headcount
+
+BlockRock's architecture positions AI agents as "always-on analysts, ingesting live data, market signals, and macro context to generate a continuous stream of proposals." Critically, agents operate under strict constraints: "They propose, never execute. AI agents have no authority to force decisions—only to submit ideas to the governance layer."
+
+This creates a permissionless proposal pipeline where:
+
+1. **Agents compete with humans on equal footing** — "Their proposals compete with human submissions on equal footing" with "no institutional bias filters their ideas"
+2. **Market pricing determines quality** — "They are judged purely by market pricing. Good proposals win regardless of source"
+3. **Capability scales with compute** — "They scale with compute, not headcount. As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead"
+
+The governance model separates proposal generation (permissionless, AI-augmented) from decision authority (market-governed futarchy). BlockRock argues this addresses a key bottleneck in traditional asset management: the limited bandwidth of human analysts and portfolio managers.
+
+The scaling thesis is that "as AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too" without the organizational complexity that comes with hiring more analysts. The fund's analytical capacity becomes a function of compute availability rather than headcount.
+
+The mechanism depends on futarchy's market-based filtering: agents can generate high volumes of proposals without overwhelming the system because only proposals that attract sufficient trading interest become live decisions. Poor proposals are ignored or quickly rejected by market pricing.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- BlockRock charter explicitly positions AI agents as proposal generators with no execution authority
+- Agents "ingest live data, market signals, and macro context" to generate continuous proposal stream
+- Proposals "compete with human submissions on equal footing" and are "judged purely by market pricing"
+- Scaling argument: "As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead"
+
+## Critical Limitations
+
+No empirical evidence exists for this architecture in production. BlockRock's launch failed to reach funding threshold ($100 of $500K target, REFUNDING status within 24 hours). The claim that AI-generated proposals will be competitive with human proposals in futarchy markets remains untested. The quality and diversity of AI-generated investment proposals at scale is unknown. The assumption that market pricing will effectively filter AI proposals has not been validated.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
+- [[AI autonomously managing investment capital is regulatory terra incognita because the SEC framework assumes human-controlled registered entities deploy AI as tools]]
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- domains/ai-alignment/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map

domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Management fees dominate revenue while performance fees are marginal creating misaligned incentives"
+confidence: likely
+source: "BlockRock Charter citing BlackRock revenue structure, 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Asset management fee structure creates scale incentive over performance incentive
+
+Traditional asset managers derive the overwhelming majority of revenue from management fees (charged on AUM regardless of performance) rather than performance fees (charged on returns). BlockRock's charter cites BlackRock specifically: "~73% of its revenue from management fees" while "performance fees account for just ~5% of revenue."
+
+This creates a structural incentive misalignment: asset managers are economically optimized to maximize AUM (assets under management) rather than returns. Growing the asset base generates predictable fee revenue whether the fund performs well or poorly. Performance-based compensation is marginal.
+
+The consequences cascade through organizational behavior:
+
+1. **Consensus-driven investing** — Avoiding career risk by staying close to benchmark allocations rather than taking differentiated positions
+2. **Narrative capture** — Chasing institutional trends (like ESG) for asset gathering rather than return optimization
+3. **Marketing over alpha** — Investment in distribution and brand rather than research and execution
+
+BlockRock argues this "incentivizes asset accumulation over performance" and contributes to the empirical reality that "most actively managed funds underperform their benchmarks, especially after fees."
+
+The alternative model proposed is treasury-backed tokens where "tokenholders are the primary beneficiaries of fund performance via treasury backing" with "minimal management fees funded transparently from the treasury and adjustable via governance." This attempts to invert the incentive: value accrues to token price (driven by treasury performance) rather than to management fees (driven by AUM scale).
+
+## Evidence
+
+- BlackRock derives ~73% of revenue from management fees, only ~5% from performance fees (BlockRock Charter, citing BlackRock's public filings)
+- Most actively managed funds underperform benchmarks after fees (widely documented; cited in charter)
+- BlackRock's "shifting ESG stance" cited as example of narrative capture driven by asset-gathering incentives
+- Traditional fee structure is percentage-based on AUM, creating direct revenue link to scale not performance
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]]
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]]
+- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha]]
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- foundations/teleological-economics/_map

domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Liquid markets enable futarchy pricing efficiency that illiquid VC deals cannot support"
+confidence: speculative
+source: "BlockRock Charter, futard.io launch 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# BlockRock positions liquid asset allocation as futarchy-compatible while illiquid VC deals are not
+
+BlockRock's charter explicitly contrasts its approach with MtnCapital's failed VC fund, arguing that futarchy governance requires continuous price discovery. The charter states: "liquid asset allocation for risk-adjusted returns gives futarchy the pricing efficiency it requires" while "private VC deals are difficult to price with asymmetric information, long timelines, and binary outcomes."
+
+This represents a strategic thesis about futarchy's constraints, not a proven mechanism. BlockRock argues that MtnCapital "struggled to pass proposals and eventually wound down" because the asset class (illiquid VC) was incompatible with futarchy's requirements for continuous market pricing. The charter frames this as a learning: "Even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement" through protocol-enforced liquidation, suggesting the governance mechanism worked correctly—it was the asset selection that failed.
+
+BlockRock's mandate targets "moderate risk strategy to maximize Sortino ratio (penalizing downside volatility) by allocating the treasury into a portfolio of onchain positions." This focuses futarchy on liquid assets where continuous feedback is theoretically possible.
+
+The timing argument is that "the universe of investable assets on Solana is expanding rapidly" with "spot markets, perpetual futures, lending markets, structured yield products, and RWAs" now offering "deep liquidity and composable infrastructure." This creates the substrate futarchy would need: assets with continuous price signals.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- MtnCapital wound down after struggling to pass proposals (cited in BlockRock charter as precedent)
+- BlockRock explicitly positions liquid asset allocation as "giving futarchy the pricing efficiency it requires"
+- Protocol-enforced liquidation returned proportional treasury shares to MtnCapital holders despite project failure
+- Solana now hosts liquid markets across spot, perps, lending, yield products, and RWAs (claimed in charter)
+
+## Critical Limitations
+
+BlockRock has not yet demonstrated actual performance. The launch raised only $100 of a $500K target and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours. The claim that liquid assets are more suitable for futarchy governance than VC remains theoretical—it is a hypothesis about why MtnCapital failed, not a proven mechanism. No evidence exists that BlockRock's liquid asset allocation will succeed where MtnCapital's VC approach failed, or that futarchy's pricing efficiency actually improves with asset liquidity.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
+- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- domains/internet-finance/_map
+- core/mechanisms/_map

domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md

@@ -48,10 +48,16 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+*Source: 2026-01-01-futardio-launch-mycorealms | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
 MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock's charter explicitly cites MtnCapital's wind-down as proof of the liquidation mechanism: 'When MtnCapital wound down, holders received their proportional share of the treasury through the protocol's built-in liquidation mechanism. The system's guarantees worked as intended. Even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement.' This provides a concrete example of futarchy-governed liquidation functioning as designed—the protocol enforced proportional treasury distribution despite project failure, validating the anti-rug guarantee.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:

domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Proph3t's other framing reinforces this: he distinguishes "market oversight" fro
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+*Source: 2026-03-03-futardio-launch-futardio-cult | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
 Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type.
 
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for
 *Source: [[2026-02-26-futardio-launch-fitbyte]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
 FitByte's pitch explicitly frames MetaDAO's unruggable ICO structure as investor protection through structural enforcement: 'The mechanism does not rely on trust. It does not require goodwill. It is structurally enforced.' The pitch emphasizes treasury governance, IP ownership through DAO LLC, and performance-gated founder unlocks as credibility mechanisms, not as superior decision-making tools. The framing is entirely about preventing founder extraction and ensuring investor sovereignty, with governance quality mentioned only as a secondary benefit. This confirms that even projects themselves understand and market the ownership coin value proposition as protection-first.
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock's charter prioritizes ownership protections as the first pillar before futarchy or AI: 'Tokenholders are the primary beneficiaries of fund performance via treasury backing.' The MtnCapital example is used to demonstrate that 'even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement'—the protocol's liquidation mechanism returned proportional treasury shares despite the fund winding down. This confirms that the anti-rug guarantee functions independently of governance quality: MtnCapital's futarchy struggled to pass proposals (governance failure) but investors still received their proportional treasury value (protection success).
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md

@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ Living Capital replaces this with token economics that directly reward decision-
 
 The mechanism aligns with several core LivingIP principles. Since [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]], the token structure ensures that value flows to those who generate it rather than to intermediaries who merely facilitate access. Since [[blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement]], combining token-locked voting with blind mechanisms could further strengthen decision quality. Since [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]], the token emissions function as the ownership stakes that incentivize high-quality participation. The result is an investment governance model where authority is earned through demonstrated judgment rather than granted through capital contribution alone.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock's fee structure attempts to eliminate percentage-based management fees entirely: 'Minimal management fees are funded transparently from the treasury and adjustable via governance. No percentage-based skimming.' The team allocation is performance-unlocked: '5% allocated to founding team, which unlocks at 3-month TWAPs of 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, and 32X the ICO price' with only '$5K allowance per month for supporting infrastructure.' This creates extreme alignment—team compensation is almost entirely tied to token price multiples rather than AUM-based fees. The charter contrasts this with BlackRock's structure where '~73% of revenue from management fees' regardless of performance.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
@@ -23,7 +29,7 @@ Relevant Notes:
 - [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]] -- the token emission model is the investment-domain version of this incentive alignment
 - [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] -- the governance framework within which token economics operates
 
-- [[the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing]] -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
+- the create-destroy discipline forces genuine strategic alternatives by deliberately attacking your initial insight before committing -- token-locked voting with outcome-based emissions forces a create-destroy discipline on investment decisions: participants must stake tokens (create commitment) and face dilution if wrong (destroy poorly-judged positions), preventing the anchoring bias that degrades traditional fund governance
 
 Topics:
 - [[livingip overview]]

entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: BlockRock
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+founded: 2026-03-05
+platform: futardio
+key_metrics:
+  raise_target: "$500,000"
+  total_committed: "$100"
+  token_symbol: "D9o"
+  team_allocation: "5%"
+  team_vesting: "3-month TWAPs at 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, 32X ICO price"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# BlockRock
+
+BlockRock is a futarchy-governed "ownership fund" that launched on MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad on 2026-03-05. Positioned as "BlackRock on the Blockchain," it attempted to create an asset management vehicle using treasury-backed tokens, decision markets, and AI agents for liquid asset allocation on Solana. The launch targeted $500K but raised only $100 and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours.
+
+BlockRock's architecture explicitly learned from MtnCapital's failure with illiquid VC investments, instead focusing on liquid onchain assets (spot markets, perps, lending, RWAs) where futarchy's pricing mechanisms can function effectively. The charter emphasized three pillars: ownership (treasury-backed tokens with minimal fees), futarchy (market-governed decisions), and AI (agents as continuous proposal generators).
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2026-03-05** — BlockRock launches $500K fundraise on Futardio with mandate for liquid asset allocation and AI-generated proposals
+- **2026-03-06** — Launch closes in REFUNDING status after raising only $100 of $500K target
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — BlockRock launched via MetaDAO infrastructure
+- [[blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets]] — core thesis
+- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — fee structure innovation
+- [[ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount]] — AI integration model

entities/internet-finance/manna-finance-futardio-fundraise.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "Manna Finance: Futardio Fundraise"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+parent_entity: "[[manna-finance]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "Manna Finance team"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/5whxoTjxW4oKeSN4C8yf5JUur7pcSChkPWgmhSZQ8oD5"
+proposal_date: 2026-03-03
+resolution_date: 2026-03-04
+category: "fundraise"
+summary: "Zero-interest CDP protocol on Solana seeking $120K for 12-month runway"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+key_metrics:
+  raise_target: "$120,000"
+  total_committed: "$205"
+  outcome: "refunding"
+  duration: "1 day"
+  oversubscription_ratio: 0.0017
+---
+
+# Manna Finance: Futardio Fundraise
+
+## Summary
+Manna Finance attempted to raise $120,000 through Futardio to build a Liquity V1-style zero-interest CDP protocol on Solana. The fundraise sought 12 months of runway at $10,000/month burn rate, with funds allocated to smart contract audit ($15-25K), mainnet deployment, founder salary, and liquidity bootstrapping. The raise failed catastrophically, receiving only $205 in commitments (0.17% of target) before closing in refunding status after one day.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Failed (refunding)
+- **Raise Target:** $120,000
+- **Total Committed:** $205
+- **Duration:** 1 day (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04)
+- **Oversubscription:** 0.17%
+
+## Significance
+This represents one of the most severe fundraise failures on Futardio's platform, with the raise attracting less than 0.2% of its target. The failure occurred despite detailed documentation including competitive analysis, roadmap, team structure, and go-to-market strategy. The project proposed MetaDAO futarchy governance from launch and positioned itself as the only zero-interest CDP on Solana, but failed to attract capital.
+
+The rapid closure (1 day) and refunding status suggests either lack of market interest in the CDP model on Solana, insufficient team credibility, or poor market timing. The project competed against established Solana stablecoins (USX, USDv, jupUSD, USDGO) with different mechanisms.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[manna-finance]] — parent entity
+- [[futardio]] — fundraising platform
+- [[metadao]] — planned governance mechanism
+- Attempted implementation of [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]]

entities/internet-finance/manna-finance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: "Manna Finance"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+founded: 2026
+platform: solana
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+key_metrics:
+  raise_target: "$120,000"
+  total_committed: "$205"
+  raise_outcome: "refunding"
+  launch_date: "2026-03-03"
+  close_date: "2026-03-04"
+---
+
+# Manna Finance
+
+Manna Finance is a zero-interest CDP (Collateralized Debt Position) protocol on Solana modeled after Liquity V1. Users deposit SOL as collateral to mint solUSD stablecoin with a one-time borrowing fee and no ongoing interest. The protocol maintains its peg through redemptions (solUSD exchangeable for $1 of SOL) and liquidations via a Stability Pool. Governance was planned via [[metadao]] futarchy from launch.
+
+The project attempted to raise $120,000 through [[futardio]] but received only $205 in commitments before entering refunding status after one day.
+
+## Timeline
+- **2026-03-03** — [[manna-finance-futardio-fundraise]] launched on Futardio seeking $120K for 12-month runway
+- **2026-03-04** — Fundraise closed in refunding status with $205 committed (0.17% of target)
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[futardio]] — fundraising platform
+- [[metadao]] — planned governance mechanism
+- Attempted to implement [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]]
+- Competed in market described by existing Solana stablecoin landscape (USX, USDv, jupUSD, USDGO)

entities/internet-finance/salmon-wallet-futardio-fundraise.md

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "Salmon Wallet: Futardio Fundraise"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+parent_entity: "[[salmon-wallet]]"
+platform: futardio
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/Aakx1gdDoNQYqiv5uoqdXx56mGr6AbZh73SWpxHrk2qF"
+proposal_date: 2026-03-03
+resolution_date: 2026-03-04
+category: fundraise
+summary: "Open-source wallet infrastructure project seeking $375K for 12-month runway through futarchy-governed ICO"
+key_metrics:
+  raise_target: "$375,000"
+  total_committed: "$97,535"
+  oversubscription_ratio: 0.26
+  monthly_burn_rate: "$25,000"
+  planned_runway: "12 months"
+token:
+  name: "Salmon Token"
+  ticker: "SAL"
+  mint: "DDPW4sZT9GsSb2mSfY9Yi9EBZGnBQ2LvvJTXCpnLmeta"
+launch_address: "Aakx1gdDoNQYqiv5uoqdXx56mGr6AbZh73SWpxHrk2qF"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Salmon Wallet: Futardio Fundraise
+
+## Summary
+Salmon Wallet attempted to raise $375,000 through MetaDAO's futarchy platform for 12-month operational runway covering wallet development, security, infrastructure, and mobile app releases. Despite being an established project (active since 2022, listed on Solana wallet adapter, $122.5K prior funding), the raise attracted only $97,535 (26% of target) before refunding. First observed futarchy-governed wallet infrastructure project on the platform.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Failed (refunding)
+- **Raise Target:** $375,000
+- **Total Committed:** $97,535
+- **Oversubscription:** 0.26x
+- **Duration:** 1 day (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04)
+- **Token:** SAL (Salmon Token)
+
+## Use of Funds (Proposed)
+- **Team:** $18,300/month (73%)
+- **Infrastructure:** $4,200/month (17%)
+- **Growth & Ecosystem:** $2,000/month (8%)
+- **Governance, Legal & Contingency:** $500/month (2%)
+- **Total Monthly Burn:** $25,000
+- **Target Runway:** 12 months
+
+## Roadmap (Proposed)
+- Q2-2026: Android release, WebApp relaunch, signing flow optimization
+- Q3-2026: iOS TestFlight, staking integration, AI transaction security
+- Q4-2026: Custom notifications, portfolio view, Wallet-as-a-Service
+- Q1-2027: Cross-platform optimization, ecosystem integrations
+
+## Significance
+First empirical data point on futarchy adoption friction for operational software infrastructure versus pure capital allocation vehicles. The failed raise suggests futarchy mechanisms face challenges when applied to projects with ongoing operational complexity, team budgets, and multi-quarter development roadmaps. Despite technical credibility and operational history, the project could not achieve minimum viable liquidity in the futarchy market.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[salmon-wallet]] — parent entity
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — empirical confirmation
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — platform scope expansion test
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — included traditional operational structures

entities/internet-finance/salmon-wallet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: Salmon Wallet
+domain: internet-finance
+status: active
+founded: 2022
+website: https://salmonwallet.io/
+github: https://github.com/salmon-wallet
+key_people:
+  - role: team
+    name: undisclosed
+key_metrics:
+  prior_funding: "$122,500"
+  bootstrap_funding: "$80,000"
+  grants_received: "$42,500"
+  futarchy_raise_target: "$375,000"
+  futarchy_raise_actual: "$97,535"
+  monthly_burn_rate: "$25,000"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Salmon Wallet
+
+Open-source self-custodial cryptocurrency wallet built primarily on Solana with Bitcoin support. Active since 2022, listed on Solana wallet adapter. Attempted futarchy-governed fundraise on MetaDAO platform in March 2026 seeking $375K for 12-month operational runway, raising only $97,535 before refunding. Operates own Solana validator for transparent revenue. Governance via SAL token using futarchy model.
+
+## Timeline
+- **2022** — Project founded, listed on Solana wallet adapter, received $80K bootstrap funding
+- **2022-2024** — Received $42.5K in grants (Serum: $2.5K, Eclipse: $40K)
+- **2026-03-03** — [[salmon-wallet-futardio-fundraise]] launched on futard.io seeking $375K
+- **2026-03-04** — Fundraise closed with $97,535 raised (26% of target), status: Refunding
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — empirical case of adoption friction for operational software
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — first wallet infrastructure project on platform
+- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]] — included traditional operational structures despite futarchy governance

inbox/archive/2024-11-00-ruiz-serra-factorised-active-inference-multi-agent.md

@@ -7,9 +7,15 @@ date: 2024-11-00
 domain: ai-alignment
 secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
 format: paper
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: medium
 tags: [active-inference, multi-agent, game-theory, strategic-interaction, factorised-generative-model, nash-equilibrium]
+processed_by: theseus
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["individual-free-energy-minimization-does-not-guarantee-collective-optimization-in-multi-agent-active-inference.md", "factorised-generative-models-enable-decentralized-multi-agent-representation-through-individual-level-beliefs.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem.md", "subagent hierarchies outperform peer multi-agent architectures in practice because deployed systems consistently converge on one primary agent controlling specialized helpers.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted two novel claims about multi-agent active inference: (1) individual free energy minimization doesn't guarantee collective optimization, and (2) factorised generative models enable decentralized strategic planning through individual beliefs about others. Applied three enrichments extending/challenging existing coordination and collective intelligence claims. The paper provides formal game-theoretic evidence for why explicit coordination mechanisms (like Leo's evaluator role) are necessary in multi-agent systems—individual optimization and collective optimization are not automatically aligned."
 ---
 
 ## Content

inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-manna-finance.md

@@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/5whxoTjxW4oKeSN4C8yf5JUur7pcSChkPWgmhSZQ8oD5"
 date: 2026-03-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
 event_type: launch
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Failed fundraise entity extraction. No novel claims about futarchy mechanisms or CDP economics — all information is factual (raise amounts, timeline, competitive positioning). The failure itself is a data point but doesn't constitute an arguable claim without broader pattern evidence. Created entity pages for Manna Finance and its fundraise decision market, updated Futardio timeline."
 ---
 
 ## Launch Details
@@ -186,3 +190,12 @@ We're not pitching to VCs. We're raising from the community that will use and go
 - Token mint: `DQuz3AeodGAoyXV5MG56F1ZqvgRpn1VhFwFskW6Jmeta`
 - Version: v0.7
 - Closed: 2026-03-04
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Manna Finance raised $205 of $120,000 target (0.17% success rate) on Futardio (2026-03-03)
+- Manna proposed zero-interest CDP protocol on Solana with one-time 0.5% borrowing fee
+- Manna planned $10,000/month burn rate: 70% team, 10% infrastructure, 15% marketing, 5% security/legal
+- Manna competitive landscape: USX (Solstice), USDv (Solomon), jupUSD (Jupiter), USDGO (OSL)
+- Manna planned MetaDAO futarchy governance from launch
+- Fundraise closed in refunding status after 1 day (2026-03-04)

inbox/archive/2026-03-03-futardio-launch-salmon-wallet.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/Aakx1gdDoNQYqiv5uoqdXx56mGr6AbZh73SWpxHrk2qF"
 date: 2026-03-03
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
 event_type: launch
 processed_by: rio
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ processed_date: 2026-03-11
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
 extraction_notes: "First observed futarchy-governed wallet infrastructure project on MetaDAO platform. Failed raise provides empirical data on futarchy adoption friction for operational software vs pure capital allocation vehicles. Enriches existing claims about MetaDAO scope expansion, adoption barriers, and operational governance challenges."
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+enrichments_applied: ["futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "First observed futarchy-governed wallet infrastructure project on MetaDAO platform. Failed raise provides empirical data on futarchy adoption friction for operational software vs pure capital allocation vehicles. No new claims extracted — all insights enrich existing claims about MetaDAO scope expansion, adoption barriers, and operational governance challenges. Created entity pages for Salmon Wallet and the decision market, updated Futardio timeline."
 ---
 
 ## Launch Details
@@ -215,3 +220,13 @@ Secondary:
 - Launch address: Aakx1gdDoNQYqiv5uoqdXx56mGr6AbZh73SWpxHrk2qF
 - Operates own Solana validator for transparent revenue
 - Listed on Solana wallet adapter since 2022
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- Salmon Wallet active since 2022, listed on Solana wallet adapter
+- Prior funding: $80K bootstrap + $42.5K grants (Serum $2.5K, Eclipse $40K)
+- Futarchy raise: $97,535/$375,000 (26% of target) before refunding
+- Proposed burn rate: $25K/month for 12-month runway
+- Token: SAL (Salmon Token), mint: DDPW4sZT9GsSb2mSfY9Yi9EBZGnBQ2LvvJTXCpnLmeta
+- Launch address: Aakx1gdDoNQYqiv5uoqdXx56mGr6AbZh73SWpxHrk2qF
+- Operates own Solana validator for revenue

inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md

@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/J7CmLqfMLVq67swRQa6xCWn7VcyfpyhFSiQdJYNwkP8k"
 date: 2026-03-05
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
 event_type: launch
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md", "asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md", "ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md", "token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md", "ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "BlockRock launch is a failed fundraise but contains significant mechanism design insights: (1) explicit pivot from illiquid VC (MtnCapital failure) to liquid assets for futarchy compatibility, (2) AI agents as proposal generators not executors, (3) performance-unlocked team tokens with extreme multiples (32X), (4) critique of traditional asset management fee structures. Charter is substantive enough to extract claims about futarchy application domain and AI integration patterns. Entity created despite failure because it demonstrates MetaDAO platform usage and contains novel architectural proposals."
 ---
 
 ## Launch Details
@@ -193,3 +199,15 @@ BlockRock is designed to scale to trillions in assets under management. The toke
 - Token mint: `D9o2F3Pu7gowtZr1PjPFiQr4DwVPkNJhqPjpVRwjmeta`
 - Version: v0.7
 - Closed: 2026-03-06
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- BlockRock targeted $500K raise, achieved $100 (0.02% of target)
+- Launch closed 2026-03-06 in REFUNDING status
+- Token symbol: D9o, mint address: D9o2F3Pu7gowtZr1PjPFiQr4DwVPkNJhqPjpVRwjmeta
+- Team allocation: 5% vesting at 2X/4X/8X/16X/32X price multiples via 3-month TWAPs
+- Monthly team allowance: $5K for infrastructure support
+- 95% of tokens distributed to ICO participants at same price
+- BlackRock revenue structure: ~73% management fees, ~5% performance fees
+- BlackRock scale: 20,000+ employees, 70+ global offices, 1,700+ ETFs
+- Asset management industry size: $120T+