rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Domain: internet-finance
- Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4)

Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-The Meta-PoW proposal (passed 2025-11-10) demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond simple fundraising into complex economic mechanism design. COAL's Meta-PoW implements a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing, decay mechanics, and treasury management—all governed through futarchy. The proposal explicitly allows 'parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community,' showing how futarchy governance extends into implementation details, not just binary funding decisions. This represents MetaDAO enabling not just capital formation but entire economic protocol design through prediction markets.
+COAL's Meta-PoW proposal (passed 2025-11-10) demonstrates MetaDAO's expansion beyond simple fundraising into complex game-theoretic token economies. The proposal introduces a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) with dynamic pricing mechanisms (c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p), decay functions (4% daily), and treasury accumulation logic—all governed through futarchy conditional markets. This extends the platform's scope from 'should we fund this?' to 'should we adopt this complex economic architecture?' showing that MetaDAO's conditional markets can handle sophisticated mechanism design decisions, not just binary funding choices.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
 *Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
 
-Meta-PoW implements a hybrid emission model that combines fixed halving bands with dynamic access control. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25,000,000 with emissions halving every 5% of supply added (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t), starting at 11,250 COAL/day). However, access to these emissions is gated by pickaxe ownership, and pickaxe crafting costs scale dynamically with the ORE/COAL price ratio through the license fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3. This creates a system where total emissions are predetermined but distribution is performance-based: only players who can economically justify the crafting cost and maintain their tools receive emissions. The proposal states: 'When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online... If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system.' This demonstrates how fixed emission schedules can be combined with dynamic access gating to achieve performance-based distribution without changing the total supply curve.
+Meta-PoW implements a hybrid emission model combining fixed halving bands with dynamic access control. COAL has a fixed max supply of 25M with emissions halving every 5% of supply added (1.25M COAL bands), but access to those emissions is gated by pickaxe ownership and tool power. The daily emission rate R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) is deterministic, but individual miner rewards depend on maintaining tool power through repair. This creates a performance-based distribution layer on top of a fixed emission schedule—miners who maintain their tools capture emissions, while those who let tools decay see their share diminish at 4% per day. The mechanism ties token distribution to measurable player behavior (tool maintenance) without making total supply elastic.
 
 ---
 

domains/internet-finance/dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p formula adjusts pickaxe crafting cost based on COAL/ORE price ratio with cubic sensitivity"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttling in token economies without governance intervention
+
+Meta-PoW introduces a dynamic license fee for crafting pickaxes that automatically adjusts based on the COAL/ORE price ratio, using the formula c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, where y = P_ORE / P_COAL. With default parameters of c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, and p = 3, the license fee exhibits cubic sensitivity to price changes.
+
+This creates automatic supply throttling: when COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license fee drops, making pickaxe crafting cheaper and encouraging more mining activity. When COAL weakens (y increases), the license fee rises sharply due to the cubic exponent, discouraging new pickaxe creation and reducing pressure on COAL emissions.
+
+The mechanism is clamped between c_min = 1 and c_max = 300 COAL to prevent extreme values. The cubic exponent (p = 3) means the fee is highly responsive to price changes—a 2x increase in the ORE/COAL ratio results in an 8x increase in the license fee, creating strong economic pressure against crafting during COAL weakness.
+
+Critically, this operates without governance intervention. The price ratio is derived from an EMA-smoothed TWAP oracle, and the formula executes automatically on-chain. This is a form of algorithmic monetary policy embedded in the token mechanics themselves.
+
+The license fee is paid in COAL and burned (not sent to treasury), making it a deflationary mechanism rather than a revenue stream. Its purpose is purely regulatory—to modulate mining tool supply in response to market conditions.
+
+## Evidence
+- Formula specification: "c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p, clamped so that c_min ≤ c(y) ≤ c_max"
+- Default parameters: "c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, c_min = 1, c_max = 300"
+- Price sensitivity: "When COAL is strong relative to ORE (y low): c(y) decreases, more picks are economically viable. When COAL is weak (y high): c(y) increases, crafting slows"
+- Governance independence: "The system self-throttles without intervention"
+- Oracle design: "y = P_ORE / P_COAL using an EMA-smoothed TWAP"
+
+## Challenges
+The cubic exponent creates high sensitivity, which could lead to instability if price volatility is extreme. The EMA smoothing is intended to dampen this, but the smoothing window is not specified in the proposal. Additionally, the mechanism assumes rational player response to price signals—if players craft pickaxes for non-economic reasons (speculation, gaming the system), the throttling effect may not work as intended. This is a proposed mechanism not yet deployed.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-is-cheaper-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs 82% cheaper than recrafting to incentivize tool maintenance over churn"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair cost is cheaper than recrafting creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol introduces "evergreen" pickaxe mechanics where tools never permanently break but decay by 4% per day if not repaired. The daily repair cost is calibrated at 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD, which is significantly cheaper than the full crafting cost of 1 INGOT plus 8 WOOD plus a dynamic COAL license fee c(y).
-
-This cost differential creates a strong economic incentive for rational players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting. The proposal explicitly states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
-
-The evergreen design serves two strategic purposes:
-
-**1. Stable treasury inflow**: Because each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE per day of smelting demand into the COAL treasury, and players maintain rather than churn tools, the number of active picks becomes a stable state variable that predicts ORE accumulation. The proposal notes: "In equilibrium: ORE per day to the treasury is approximately equal to the number of active, fully repaired picks."
-
-**2. Reduced system volatility**: By making repair the dominant strategy, the protocol avoids boom-bust cycles of mass crafting and abandonment that would create unpredictable swings in INGOT demand and ORE treasury flows.
-
-The 4% daily decay rate is carefully chosen: it's steep enough to require regular maintenance (creating consistent INGOT demand) but gradual enough that players who skip a few days can catch up by paying accumulated repair costs rather than losing the tool entirely. The proposal states: "If you decide to repair later, you pay the accumulated repair cost (INGOT + WOOD for each missed day) to restore full power. This makes tools evergreen (no permanent break)."
-
-This represents a novel approach to tokenomic stability in proof-of-work systems, where the economic incentive structure creates predictable resource flows without requiring hard caps or arbitrary lockups.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement to stabilize mining tool demand"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economics where repair cost undercuts replacement creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
+
+COAL's Meta-PoW mechanism introduces "evergreen" pickaxes that decay at 4% per day when not repaired but never permanently break. The daily repair cost is calibrated at 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD—deliberately set below the cost of crafting a new pickaxe (1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + dynamic COAL license fee). This creates a structural incentive for players to maintain existing tools rather than constantly recrafting.
+
+The evergreen design solves a core problem in token-based gaming economies: churn-driven volatility. When tools break permanently, demand for crafting materials spikes and crashes unpredictably. By making repair cheaper than replacement, Meta-PoW creates continuous, predictable demand for INGOT—which can only be produced by smelting (burning 100 COAL + paying ~12.10 ORE to the treasury).
+
+The mechanism ties this to a calibration target: each fully maintained pickaxe is designed to drive approximately 1 ORE per day into the COAL treasury through repair-driven INGOT demand. This creates a direct relationship between active player count (measured in maintained pickaxes) and treasury ORE accumulation.
+
+The 4% daily decay rate is the key tuning parameter. Too slow and players ignore repairs; too fast and the system feels punitive. At 4%, a pickaxe that goes unrepaired for a week drops to 73% power, creating meaningful pressure to maintain without forcing daily engagement.
+
+## Evidence
+- Meta-PoW proposal specifies: "Each pick has power p between 0 and 1. If repaired for the day, p stays at 1. If not repaired, p decays by 4% per day: p_next = 0.96 * p"
+- Repair cost calibration: "r_ing_total ≈ 0.082643 INGOT per day" versus crafting cost of "1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL burned as license"
+- Design intent: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it"
+- Treasury flow target: "A fully maintained pick effectively corresponds to about 1 ORE/day of smelt demand into the treasury"
+
+## Challenges
+This is a proposed mechanism that passed governance but has not yet launched. Real player behavior may deviate from the economic model—players might abandon tools during COAL price crashes, or bot farms might exploit the repair economics in unexpected ways. The 1 ORE/day calibration assumes rational maintenance behavior and stable INGOT demand, both untested assumptions.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-separates-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creating-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance.md

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "All ORE enters COAL treasury exclusively through INGOT smelting at rate μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT with zero ORE charged at craft or repair"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW separates ORE payment to smelting only creating single choke point for treasury inflow measurement and governance
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol concentrates all ORE treasury inflows at a single point: INGOT smelting. The proposal explicitly states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair."
-
-The smelting process requires:
-- Burn 100 COAL
-- Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury (currently calibrated at μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT)
-- Receive 1 INGOT
-
-This architectural choice creates several strategic advantages:
-
-**1. Transparent treasury accounting**: Because ORE only enters through one mechanism, the total ORE inflow is directly measurable as total INGOT minted × μ. There are no hidden flows or complex multi-path accounting. The proposal notes: "INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee."
-
-**2. Single governance parameter**: The treasury inflow rate can be adjusted by changing μ alone, rather than coordinating changes across multiple fee structures. The proposal states: "μ is chosen so a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow."
-
-**3. Predictable demand modeling**: Since INGOT is consumed by tool crafting and repair at known rates, and tools decay predictably, the protocol can estimate future ORE inflows based on the number of active pickaxes and axes. The proposal calibrates the system so that "each active, fully repaired pick is designed to support approximately 1 ORE per day of inflow to the treasury" through the repair cost of 0.082643 INGOT/day.
-
-**4. Clean separation of concerns**: 
-- COAL license fees (c(y)) regulate activity through burn, not revenue
-- ORE fees (μ) fund the treasury
-- INGOT serves as on-chain proof of both COAL burn and ORE payment
-
-This represents a novel approach to treasury design in tokenomic systems, where concentrating value capture at a single choke point enables simpler governance and more reliable forecasting than distributed fee structures.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/meta-pow-uses-dynamic-coal-license-fees-as-macro-throttle-where-crafting-cost-scales-with-ore-coal-price-ratio-creating-self-regulating-treasury-inflow.md

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
----
-type: claim
-domain: internet-finance
-description: "License fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3 clamped between 1-300 COAL makes pickaxe crafting expensive when COAL weakens and cheap when COAL strengthens"
-confidence: experimental
-source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# Meta-PoW uses dynamic COAL license fees as macro throttle where crafting cost scales with ORE-COAL price ratio creating self-regulating treasury inflow
-
-COAL's Meta-PoW protocol implements a dynamic pickaxe crafting license fee that automatically adjusts based on the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating a self-regulating mechanism that throttles mining activity in response to market conditions.
-
-The license fee formula is:
-- c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p
-- Where y = P_ORE / P_COAL (using EMA-smoothed TWAP)
-- Default parameters: c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3
-- Clamped between c_min = 1 and c_max = 300 COAL
-
-This creates asymmetric economic pressure:
-
-**When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases):**
-- License fee drops (potentially to the 1 COAL floor)
-- Pickaxe crafting becomes economically attractive
-- More players craft tools and enter mining
-- Increased INGOT demand drives more smelting
-- More ORE flows into the treasury
-
-**When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases):**
-- License fee rises (potentially to the 300 COAL cap)
-- Pickaxe crafting becomes prohibitively expensive
-- New player entry slows
-- INGOT demand stabilizes around existing tool maintenance
-- ORE inflow naturally throttles without breaking the system
-
-The proposal states: "When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online, more INGOT gets smelted, and more ORE flows into the treasury. If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
-
-The cubic exponent (p = 3) creates strong sensitivity to price movements, making the throttle responsive while the clamps prevent extreme values that could completely halt or flood the system.
-
-Critically, the license fee is burned COAL, not sent to the treasury. The proposal states: "The license is paid in COAL only. That COAL is burned, not sent to the treasury. It is a control parameter, not a revenue stream." This means the mechanism regulates activity through cost rather than extracting value, and the ORE treasury inflow comes entirely from smelting fees, not from the license.
-
-This represents a novel approach to tokenomic stability where the protocol uses price-responsive costs to create negative feedback loops that stabilize treasury inflows across market cycles.
-
----
-
-Relevant Notes:
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
-
-Topics:
-- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

domains/internet-finance/separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Meta-PoW channels all ORE payments through INGOT smelting making treasury inflow directly measurable via on-chain INGOT mints"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Futardio proposal G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol, 2025-11-07"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Separating ORE payment to smelting only creates single choke point for treasury inflow measurement and governance in multi-token game economies
+
+Meta-PoW's architecture makes ORE payment occur at exactly one point in the system: smelting INGOT. To smelt 1 INGOT, a player must burn 100 COAL and pay μ ORE (currently ~12.10 ORE) directly to the COAL treasury. No ORE is charged at pickaxe crafting, repair, or any other action.
+
+This design choice creates a single, auditable choke point for treasury inflow. Every INGOT minted on-chain represents a verifiable ORE payment. Since INGOT is required for both crafting and repairing tools, all economic activity that drives the game ultimately flows through this smelting bottleneck.
+
+The architectural benefit is measurement precision. In complex token economies with multiple burn mechanisms and fee structures, tracking actual value accrual to the treasury becomes difficult. By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, Meta-PoW makes treasury inflow directly observable: count INGOT mints, multiply by μ.
+
+This also creates a governance lever. The parameter μ (ORE per INGOT) can be adjusted to change the rate of treasury accumulation without touching the game's other mechanics. If the treasury needs more ORE inflow, increase μ. If ORE becomes too expensive and chokes off activity, decrease μ. The rest of the system (repair costs, crafting recipes, decay rates) remains unchanged.
+
+The proposal calibrates μ so that "a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow," creating a direct relationship between active player count (measured in maintained pickaxes) and treasury ORE accumulation.
+
+## Evidence
+- Smelting specification: "To smelt 1 INGOT: Burn 100 COAL, Pay μ ORE to the COAL treasury"
+- Exclusivity: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair"
+- Measurement property: "INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee"
+- Calibration target: "μ is chosen so a fully maintained pick maps to roughly 1 ORE/day of smelt-driven inflow. Current μ ≈ 12.10 ORE per INGOT"
+- Treasury flow: "All ORE paid at smelt goes to the COAL treasury"
+
+## Challenges
+Concentrating ORE payment at smelting creates a potential bottleneck. If INGOT demand collapses (due to player exodus or economic imbalance), treasury inflow stops entirely. The mechanism has no fallback revenue stream. Additionally, the 1 ORE/day per pickaxe calibration is theoretical—actual player behavior may not match the model's assumptions about repair frequency and tool maintenance. This is a proposed mechanism not yet deployed.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
----
-type: entity
-entity_type: decision_market
-name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
-domain: internet-finance
-status: passed
-parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
-platform: "futardio"
-proposer: "coal project team"
-proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
-proposal_date: 2025-11-07
-resolution_date: 2025-11-10
-category: "mechanism"
-summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model with evergreen tools, dynamic crafting costs, and ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
-tracked_by: rio
-created: 2026-03-11
----
-
-# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
-
-## Summary
-
-The Meta-PoW proposal establishes COAL's core economic model by introducing a multi-token system (COAL, ORE, INGOT, WOOD) where mining power resides in pickaxes rather than direct computation. The system creates a deterministic loop: players forge INGOT using COAL and ORE, craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD, then mine COAL with those pickaxes. All ORE payments flow exclusively through INGOT smelting into the COAL treasury at a rate of approximately 12.10 ORE per INGOT.
-
-The proposal implements "evergreen" tool mechanics where pickaxes decay by 4% per day if not repaired but can always be restored by paying accumulated repair costs. Repair is calibrated to be significantly cheaper than recrafting (0.082643 INGOT/day vs 1 INGOT upfront), incentivizing tool maintenance over churn.
-
-A dynamic license fee c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3 (clamped 1-300 COAL) scales pickaxe crafting costs with the ORE/COAL price ratio, creating a self-regulating throttle: when COAL strengthens, crafting becomes cheaper and more ORE flows into the treasury; when COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system.
-
-## Market Data
-
-- **Outcome:** Passed
-- **Proposer:** coal project team
-- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
-
-## Significance
-
-This proposal represents a novel approach to proof-of-work tokenomics where:
-
-1. **Treasury inflow is deterministic**: Each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE/day into the treasury through repair-driven INGOT demand
-
-2. **Price-responsive throttling**: The dynamic license fee creates negative feedback loops that stabilize activity across market cycles without requiring governance intervention
-
-3. **Single choke point accounting**: Concentrating all ORE payments at smelting enables transparent treasury tracking and simple governance parameter tuning
-
-4. **Evergreen tool economics**: Making repair cheaper than recrafting creates stable demand patterns and reduces system volatility
-
-The proposal explicitly allows "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," showing how futarchy governance extends into implementation details.
-
-## Relationship to KB
-
-- [[futardio]] - governance decision
-- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
-- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]

entities/internet-finance/coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: passed
+parent_entity: "[[futardio]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "coal project"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
+proposal_date: 2025-11-07
+resolution_date: 2025-11-10
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model for COAL with evergreen tools, dynamic license fees, and ORE treasury accumulation"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
+
+## Summary
+Meta-PoW establishes a multi-token game economy for COAL where mining power resides in pickaxes (not miners), crafting requires burning COAL and paying ORE to the treasury, and tools decay at 4% per day but are cheaper to repair than replace. The mechanism creates a loop: COAL emissions → pickaxe demand → INGOT smelting (burns COAL + pays ORE) → treasury accumulation. A dynamic license fee c(y) = c0 * (y/y_ref)^p automatically throttles pickaxe crafting based on COAL/ORE price ratio, with cubic sensitivity (p=3) creating strong economic pressure against crafting during COAL weakness.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Passed
+- **Proposer:** coal project
+- **Created:** 2025-11-07
+- **Resolved:** 2025-11-10
+- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
+
+## Significance
+This proposal demonstrates futarchy's ability to govern complex mechanism design, not just binary funding decisions. Meta-PoW introduces:
+1. **Evergreen tool economics** with 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement
+2. **Dynamic license fees** using price ratio exponents (cubic sensitivity) for automatic supply throttling
+3. **Single-point ORE payment** at INGOT smelting, creating auditable treasury inflow measurement
+4. **Calibrated treasury flow** targeting ~1 ORE/day per maintained pickaxe
+
+The mechanism is notable for embedding algorithmic monetary policy in token mechanics—the license fee adjusts automatically via on-chain price oracles without governance intervention. The proposal also specifies that "parameters can be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community," showing pragmatic flexibility within futarchy governance.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[futardio]] - governance decision on economic model
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - demonstrates platform scope expansion
+- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]] - hybrid emission model with performance-based access

entities/internet-finance/futardio.md

@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
-- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Meta-PoW economic model with evergreen tools and ORE treasury accumulation
-- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: COAL adopts Meta-PoW as core economic model
+- **2025-11-07** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] proposed: Multi-token game economy with evergreen tools, dynamic license fees, and ORE treasury accumulation
+- **2025-11-10** — [[coal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] passed: COAL adopts Meta-PoW economic model
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."

inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md

@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
 processed_by: rio
 processed_date: 2026-03-11
-claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-is-cheaper-than-recrafting-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "meta-pow-uses-dynamic-coal-license-fees-as-macro-throttle-where-crafting-cost-scales-with-ore-coal-price-ratio-creating-self-regulating-treasury-inflow.md", "meta-pow-separates-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creating-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance.md"]
+claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economics-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttling-in-token-economies-without-governance-intervention.md", "separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-inflow-measurement-and-governance-in-multi-token-game-economies.md"]
 enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
 extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
-extraction_notes: "Extracted 3 mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and single-choke-point treasury architecture. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched existing claims about MetaDAO's platform capabilities and dynamic emission models. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governance extending into complex economic protocol design, not just binary funding decisions."
+extraction_notes: "Meta-PoW is a sophisticated multi-token game economy proposal that passed futarchy governance. Extracted three mechanism design claims around evergreen tool economics, dynamic license fees, and single-point treasury inflow. Created decision_market entity for the proposal itself. Enriched two existing claims about MetaDAO's platform scope and dynamic token distribution. The proposal demonstrates futarchy governing complex economic architecture, not just binary funding decisions."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -274,16 +274,12 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
 
 
 ## Key Facts
-- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
-- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
-- Initial daily emissions: 11,250 COAL/day
-- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + 12.10 ORE
-- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
-- Daily pickaxe repair: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
+- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens with halving every 5% of supply (1.25M bands)
+- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
+- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL burned + ~12.10 ORE to treasury
+- Pickaxe crafting: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license fee
+- Daily repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD per tool
 - Tool decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
-- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped 1-300 COAL
-- Axe crafting: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
-- Daily axe repair: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
-- Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
-- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
-- Autocrat version: 0.3
+- License fee formula: c(y) = 200 * (y/50)^3, clamped between 1 and 300 COAL
+- Axe output: w0 WOOD per day (3-5, governance-set)
+- Proposal passed: 2025-11-10